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Abstract 
The aim of the following investigation is two-fold. Firstly, the project takes as its focus the 
growing corpus of secondary literature written on the work of the French philosophers and 
theorists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose work has generated a great deal of 
interest in recent years and a proportionate amount of controversy. Much of this 
controversy can be attributed to simplifications and misunderstandings on the part of 
commentators who have in some instances neglected to approach Deleuze and Guattari 
with sufficent rigour and care, resulting in the perpetuation of so many misunderstandings 
regarding their work. 
Secondly, the project will seek to redress some of these misunderstandings by recourse to a 
pragmatic embodiment of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts and ideas through a case-study 
based on the life and work of the African-American jazz musician Miles Davis. In 
attempting to provide a new and challenging case as the basis for this investigation, the 
overriding aim is to assess the pragmatic remit of Deleuze and Guattari's thought, in terms 
of aesthetics, ethics and politics, whilst remaining sensitive to the potential limitations and 
dangers of their project. 
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Introduction 
A Conspiracy of Imitators? Re-assessing Deleuze and Guattari's Reception. 
XXIII: Emulation is a desire for a thing which is generated in us because we imagine that 
others have the same desire. 
Exp.: If someone flees because he sees others flee, or is timid because he sees others timid, 
or because he sees that someone else has burned his hand, withdraws his own hand and 
moves his body as if his hand were burned, we shall say that he imitates the other's affect, 
but not that he emulates it - not because we know that emulation has one cause and 
imitation another, but because it had come about by usage that we call emulous only one 
who imitates what we judge to be honorable, useful or pleasant. 
Benedict de Spinoza' 
It is not by means of an exegetical exercise that one could hope to keep alive the thought of 
a great thinker who has passed away. Rather, such a thought can only be kept alive 
through its renewal, by putting it back into action [... J 
Felix Guattari2 
There is something quite telling about the fact that, after a belated and lengthy initial period 
of gradual filtration into the realm of Anglophone theory, the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
has over approximately the last ten years acquired and continues to acquire a growing 
following in contemporary philosophical and cultural theoretical circles, albeit one that is 
far from unequivocal in its response to the work. 3 What makes this telling is the way that 
the work of these authors has generated a 'burgeoning field'4 of secondary works that 
1 Benedict dc Spinoza, Ethics, III, 'Of the Affects' Def. XXXIII, cited in Edwin Curley [ed. ], A Spinoza 
Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 194. 
2 Cited in Charles J. Stivale, The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattarl: Intersections and Animations 
(New York: Guildford Press, 1998), p. 1. 
3 In an incisive and important essay on the translation and reception of Dclcuze in the English-speaking 
world, Barbara Godard demonstrates in some detail reasons why the establishment of the work of Dclcuze 
was such a long time in coming, when compared to that of some of his more recognized contemporaries: 
'Deleuze has made his way across the linguistic borders independently. Most obviously, the difference may 
be observed in the lack of personal involvement in the process. In contrast to Derrida and Foucault, translation 
of Deleuze's texts has not followed upon lectures or teaching in North America which contributed to the 
dissemination of their ideas and aroused a demand for translations. Nor has Dclcuzc involved himself as 
directly in the translation process as has Dcrrida, for instance, both in the selection of translators and the 
active intervention in relation to copyrights', cf., Barbara Godard, 'Dclcuzc and Translation', in Parallax 6: 1: 
2000, pp. 69-70. Other differences between Delcuze and Dcrrida will be drawn on briefly in chapter 1. 
The 'burgeoning field of Deleuze-Guattari studies' is an expression coined by Charles J. Stivale in his 
appraisal of a recent collection of essays on their work, cf., Brian Massumi [ed. ], A Shock to Thought: 
Expression after Deleuze and Guattari (London and New York: Routledgc, 2002). This book contains some 
continually grow in number, taking up ever more shelf-space in the philosophy and cultural 
studies sections of academic bookstores, and in recent times this has often taken place by 
the month. Given that Deleuze and Guattari were striving to promote a creative and critical 
approach to their work, one that challenges the hegemonic levelling of heterogeneity and 
diversity, the exponential growth in secondary texts is perhaps telling more for negative 
reasons than positive ones. Deleuze himself might have called it `the conspiracy of 
imitators'5, a phenomenon unfortunately liable to be accelerated by the audit culture of 
contemporary academic study in the arts and humanities, in Britain at least, and one which - 
in the language of Deleuze - serves to engender a repetition of the same rather than one of 
difference. 6 
Given the specific orientations of the single- and jointly-authored works of Deleuze and 
Guattari as attempts to survey? the `immanent' and `materialist' complexes they find in 
very interesting and important work by Massumi and other contributors, but will not be used to any extent 
here on account of having been published during the final stages of this project's completion. 
s This expression provides the subtitle to one of the sections from Deleuze's essay 'Mediators', in which he 
begins with the question '[H]ow can we define the crisis in contemporary literature? ', to which he provides 
the following response: '[M]any bookshops are already becoming like the record shops that only stock things 
that make it into the charts. Fast turnover necessarily means selling people what they expect: even what's 
"daring, "scandalous", strange, and so on falls into the market's predictable form', cf.,, Gilles Deleuze, 
Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 128. It 
would seem that one of the dangers effecting the intellectual, ethical and political value of Deleuze-Guattari 
scholarship, and more generally in this area of study, is that it follows the same predictable form. This trend 
points to one of a number of more ubiquitous dangers effecting contemporary culture and the theoretical 
diagnosis of its ills that Deleuze and Guattari themselves attempted to produce, a problem whose gravity will 
warrant it considerable attention here. 
6 Once again it is worth citing Barbara Godard to shed a little light on this matter, cf., Godard, 'Deleuze and 
Translation', pp. 74-5: '[I]n the absence of any systematic project of translating Deleuze along the lines of 
Strachey re-writing Freud where the translator-function consistently doubles the author-function, Deleuze's 
body of work has been subject to the volatile forces of the market place and of disciplinary norms [... ] 
[C]irculating widely in many different intellectual and social domains, their writing through translation now 
constitutes part of the 'cultural capital' of the academy'. 'The play of repetition and difference, crucial to 
Deleuze's philosophy and to Deleuze and Guattari's elaboration of the 'refrain', will be discussed in chapter 
I, whilst a detailing of the refrain will take place in chapter 2. 
7 The term survey is a very useful one for dealing with the complex task of thinking about the plane of 
immanence in relation to the act of its inscription, especially where it pertains to the question of desire, 
subjectivity and investment. For its use within their work, cf., Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is 
their own respective ways in their individual writings and also in the `pick-up'8 constitutive 
of their joint efforts, the very status of secondary attempts to explain their work is always 
already contentious. One might go so far as to ask the question: why write on Deleuze and 
Guattari at all? Suffice to say that this is not a question that exclusively applies to the works 
indexed to these particular proper names and rather perhaps points towards the need for 
vigilant reflexivity on the part of any philosopher or theorist's interlocutors capable of 
fulfilling one of philosophy's more fundamental aims, that is, an effective minimization of 
presuppositions, a task rendered all the more difficult by the more constraining aspects of 
the academic dispositif. 9 The question of how we should read their work, the one asked 
much less frequently of why we should, and the concept of the dispositif will constitute a 
key conjuncture in this project. 
Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London and New York: Verso Books, 1994), 
pp. 21-2. It is a term that they themselves derived from the work of Raymond Ruyer and has been perhaps best 
described by Massumi, cf., 'The Bleed: Where the Body Meets Image', in the revised version of this thesis 
recently published in Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 264n. 4: 'Raymond Ruyer calls [this] "survol asbolu". There is no 
adequate translation of the term [... ] Ruyer defines it as "existence-together as primary form" of 
consciousness, at a lived point of indistinction with sensation and perception'. The term captures something of 
the Bergsonian conception of consciousness and of Deleuze's deployment of Bergson's notion of difference, 
which shall be discussed briefly during the course of the project. Again, Massumi's book has been published 
too recently to have been afforded a proper investigation. 
8 Cf., Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: 
Athlone, 1987), p. 18, where Deleuze describes his approach to collaboration: 'This is a pick-up method. No, 
'method' is a bad word. But pick-up as procedure is Fanny's [Deleuze's wife's] word. Pick-up is a 
stammering. It is only valid in opposition to Burroughs's cut-up: there is no cutting, folding and turning 
down, but multiplications according to growing dimensions'. Comparisons to Burroughs' cut-up and the fold 
in music will be made later, and the idea of 'double-theft' that Deleuze here attributes to this approach will 
also be dealt with in chapter 2. In keeping with this description, the word method has here been avoided as 
much as possible and procedure used in its place. 
9 This term - notoriously difficult to translate into English though usually rendered as 'apparatus' - has been 
used variously by - amongst others - Althusser, Foucault, Lyotard and Deleuze. Foucault's work inspired 
Deleuze to write a short essay entitled 'What is a dispositif? '. A somewhat neglected piece of writing, this 
thesis provides a summary of some of the key themes of Deleuze's extended essay on Foucault, the ones he 
also explored in his work on 'micropolitics', alone and with Guattari. The essay and more generally the notion 
of dispositif is quite significant for the work undertaken here, in particular when Deleuze's work is read 
alongside that of Lyotard's 'libidnal' writings of the early-to-mid-1970s; cf., Gilles Deleuze, 'What is a 
dispostif? ', in Michel Foucault Philosopher, trans. Timothy Armstrong (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1992), Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. lain Hamilton Grant (London: Athlone Press, 1994), 
9 
Given this rather general observation regarding what are doubtless some of the pitfalls 
threatening any attempt to contribute anything pragmatic, transformative or new to 
knowledge production in philosophy or cultural studies, it is clear that the structures or 
processes of the `outside'10 symptomatizingll the `segmental' and 'linear' 12 relations 
constituting an interlocutor's `life' and `work' 13 are not things that can or should be taken 
p. x; Louis Althusser, 'The Only Materialist Tradition: Part 1, Spinoza' in The New Spinoza, Warren Montag 
and Ted Solze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 3-20. 
10 The notion of the 'outside' as it appears here and throughout the chapter is derived from Deleuze's reading 
of Foucault who in turn derives his conception of the outside from the work of Maurice Blanchot, in which he 
states that '[T]he outside is not a fixed limit but moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and 
foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the 
inside of the outside', cf., Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand (London: Athlone, 1986), pp. 96-7. The 
folding of 'inside' and 'outside' therefore does not make of an outside a transcendent, transcendental or 
absolute exteriority but rather in the very processes of its folding generates a virtual, crystalline relationship 
between 'inside' and 'outside', cf., Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988), p. 49, where they state that '[F]or 
example, on a crystalline stratum, the amorphous milieu, or medium, is exterior to the seed before the crystal 
has formed; the crystal forms by interiorizing and incorporating masses of amorphous material. Conversely, 
the interiority of the seed of the crystal must move out to the system's exterior, where the amorphous medium 
can crystallize [... ]'. For Foucault's own account of the 'outside' in his reading of Blanchot, cf., Foucault's 
essay 'The Thought from Outside' in Michel Foucault and Maurice Blanchot, FoucaultlBlanchot, trans. 
Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York Zone Books, 1990). 
11 The conception of symptomatology at work here is the one derived from Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche 
and developed in his 'critical and clinical' work, as described in Daniel Smith's outstanding introduction to 
this area and Deleuze's philosophy more generally, cf., Daniel W. Smith, "'A Life of Pure Immanence": 
Deleuze's "Critique et Clinique Project"', in Gilles Deleuze: Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. 
Smith and Michael A. Greco (London and New York: Verso, 1998), pp. xvi-xx. In his work on Nietzsche, 
Deleuze provides a crucial in-road into the materialist semiotics he would develop later, especially in the 
collaborations with Guattari, in that it is here that he describes the 'sign' as follows: '[A] phenomenon is not 
an appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force', cf.,, 
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1996), p. 3. For 
Deleuze, Nietzsche's 'diagnostic' method operates through this conception of the sign and this is why for him 
Nietzsche's philosophy is so eminently capable of connecting with the forces constituting a field of 
exteriority. 
12 The immanent rendering of social/subjective constitution in terms of the 'linear' and the 'segmental' is key 
to much of the work done in A Thousand Plateaus, in particular, cf., '1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity', 
pp. 208-31. This micropolitical dimension of their work will be used extensively in this project. 
What I have discerned to be the absolutely crucial Spinozist question of how many bodies - human, non- 
human, institutional, technological, musical - and by what means, are required to attain and maintain 
affirmative proximity in line with the conatus, or the affective 'striving' inherent in all relational interactions 
constituting the world, in order for sustainable ethical, ethico-aesthetic and (micro)political to take place, is 
one that will form something of a reprise as we proceed. It is also worth noting that the relationship between 
'life' and 'thought' was something of a pre-occupation, particularly in his later work. See for example his 
recorded conversation with Didier Eribon called 'Life as a Work of Art', in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, 
pp. 94-101, and his last translated essay, 'Immanence: A Life' in Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on 
10 
for granted. If one is to continue to work with such approaches as part of an academic 
intellectual project - there is an imperative, or `order-word' 14 that requires the author of 
such a project attain a degree of exegetical coherence and clarity, a good signal-to-noise 
ratio, a good part of which involves interpretation, the very approach that Deleuze and 
Guattari playfully posit as how not to read their work. 
However, if one is to take them at their word here it should be with a number of provisos. 
Firstly, their work can and should be read across multiple registers and - conceptually 
speaking - this is testified to by the interaction of the `molar' and `molecular' in their 
writing, as well as the play of `relative' and `absolute' deterritorialization. 15 This is 
particularly the case in A Thousand Plateaus. This amounts to a strategic approach that 
enables the reader and the work to maintain a relation to the dominant modes of language 
and thought whilst at the same time providing the potential for critique (Anti-Oedipus) and 
for pragmatic transformation (A Thousand Plateaus). This way of approaching their work 
A Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001), pp. 25-33. For an account of the affective 
striving of the conatus, cf., Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, IV, P38, in trans. Edwin Curley [ed. ], A Spinoza 
Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 221. For Deleuze's account of conatus, cf., Gilles 
Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (New York: City Lights, 1988), p. 99. 
14 The 'order-word' or - in French - mot d'ordre, is the fundamental function attributed to language at the 
level of the 'molar' in Deleuze and Guattari. This function is ultimately one of reduction, where a given 
problem incorporates a given solution or set of solutions which serve to make each articulation an ostensible 
repetition of sameness, masking a highly circumscribed and limited repetition of difference. As such, the 
order-word stands as a barrier or obstacle to the affirmation of an ontological difference and ethical activation. 
For the most thoroughly embodied articulation of the `order-word' assemblage, cf., Deleuze and Guattari, 
`November 20,1932: Postulates of Linguistics', in A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 75-6. 
's The 'molar' describes the statistical aggregation of processes and machinic interactions at the level of their 
capture, overcoding and redundancy, as in when the subject assumes the status of a 'person' or an 
; 'individual' as part of a liberal democratic society or socius (see chapter 1). The `molecular' describes these 
processes in terms of 'deterritorializations' or `becomings' between and across the 'molar' statistical 
aggregates, and in some cases sweep these aggregates along with them. However, what is important to 
remember is that 'molar' should not be equated with 'bad' whilst molecular is deemed 'good', as the two are 
always present in mixtures, including in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, hence why it is necessary to adopt 
a strategic relation to the molar. The same goes for 'relative' and absolute 'deterritorialization', which both 
have their dangers and limitations as well as their potential for productive transformation, cf., Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 227-231,174-175. 
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however has generated its fair share of disagreement and controversy in its reception, yet 
for all that it is not without its supporters. Despite the inevitably crucial problems that this 
disagreement has brought to light, the negotiation between molar and molecular, 
majoritarian and minor, relative and absolute deterritorialization, or any other strategic 
`dualism' 16 we might select, is not something that one can afford to neglect when it comes 
to writing an `academic' account of their work. Furthermore, if one is to approach this work 
in full recognition of the undeniable Spinozist inspiration that both explicitly and implicitly 
informs it by variation and degree in both the authors' individual and combined efforts, as 
is being done here, then the strategic'? importance of the molar is compounded. In 
unfolding the Spinozist dimension some of the reasons why this is the case should become 
all the more apparent. 
Let us attempt to clarify this multivalent approach to Deleuze and Guattari's work. One of 
the primary focuses of contention in the work's reception is the authors' seemingly arrogant 
and highly rash attempts to dispense with notions such as `ideology' or `interpretation', but 
whilst there is doubtless a reticence and even violent dismissiveness implied in such claims, 
again one has to be sensitive to their underlying strategic attenuation. '8 In the case of 
`ideology', what is at stake is a rather polemical claim whose force is capable of jolting the 
16 The use of the term `dualism' here is highly specific in that it does not describe what is conventionally 
understood by the term but rather 'a composite [ ... 
] divided according to its natural articulations, that is, into 
elements that differ in kind', cf., Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(New York: Zone, 1988), p. 22. This use of `dualisms' is directly taken from Bergson as is the idea of 
distinguishing in composites according to how they `differ in kind'. An example of this is the distinction 
Bergson makes between `perception' and 'memory' to which we will return. 
17 The term `strategic' should be taken in this instance and throughout the course of this project in the sense 
given to it by Deleuze in his book on Foucault, cf., Deleuze, Foucault, pp. 70-93, indexed very closely to the 
understanding of 'strata' in this work and in A Thousand Plateaus. 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 4. 
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reader into a state of perplexity, shorting the action-reaction circuits19 that can be found to 
condition the response of any person conversant with the place of `ideology' in 
contemporary theory, a strategy deployed in the hope of generating a 'counter- 
actualization t20 that - in considering why and how Deleuze and Guattari might be warranted 
in making such a claim - might lead to the realization that it is not a question of whether 
`ideology' exists as a `thing' so much as what a theory of ideology has to undergo to 
become immanent to material and semiotic processes. This reading of the strategy is re- 
inforced by the appearance of Althusser's theory of `interpellation' later in the work, 
rendered in terms of machinic assemblages of bodies and collective assemblages of 
enunciation. 21 In the case of interpretation, and the demand to `never interpret! ' once again 
one has to be aware that such a demand - perceived as an unconditional imperative - is 
19 This idea connects heavily with the work of Deleuze and Bergson on the sensory-motor-system or schema 
and shall be put to work in chapter 3. 
20 The important idea of 'counter-actualization' is developed in Deleuze's book The Logic of Sense. Whilst 
the virtual is most usually juxtaposed to the actual in their work and its reception, this term is useful for the 
purposes of demonstrating that actualization is a process that has to be suspended and challenged, cf., Gilles 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Constantin V. Boundas [ed. ] (London: 
Athlone Press, 1990), p. 178-9 and passim: 'Counter-actualizing each event, the actor-dancer extracts the pure 
event which communicates with all the others and returns to itself through all the others, and with all the 
others'. This concept of the event is important in Deleuze and will be discussed in its connection with 
'incorporeal transformation' at various junctures to follow. The actor-dancer example is also illustrative of the 
way this is to be investigated in the case-study of the project, in particular in chapter 3 when the problem of 
'attitude' will be examined along such lines. Furthermore, the event and its extraction through counter- 
actualization is bound up with the notion of passive synthesis, ubiquitous in Deleuze's work and therefore due 
some consideration of its own. 
2! This very point is made in a brilliant and sadly overlooked piece of writing by Meaghan Morris called 
'Crazy talk is not enough', Morris debunks some of the more 'hasty' readings of Deleuze and Guattari, in 
particular the 'hippy' and 'gothic' renderings which as we shall see further on have been in no small measure 
responsible for an overly dismissive rejection of the authors' work. This point is made very forcefully by 
Morris, and in drawing our attention to the need to read across the 'plateaus' of A Thousand Plateaus to get a 
sense of the rigour and value of the book, she shows how easy it is to gloss in a way that misses the point. Her 
chosen example of reading a deux '1227: Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine' and 'Of the Refrain' 
she shows that the former is as much if not more about 'home-making' as it is the nomadic voyage of the 
Steppe, before proceeding to show how this impacts on the potential value of Deleuze and Guattari's work for 
contemporary feminism, cf., Meaghan Morris, 'Crazy talk is not enough', Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 14: 1996, pp. 386-7: "`Of the refrain" does not have to be read before "Nomadology", 
although the connections between them in a book "composed ... of plateaus that communicate with one 
another across microfissures, as in a brain" [... ] are very clear: both are about "home-making", if we can 
allow variability, as well as an ambiguity for feminism, to this term's potentials of capture and escape, danger 
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potentially tantamount to the re-imposition of an order-word, the very reductive use of 
language that the work is supposed to be challenging. Deleuze and Guattari have to run the 
risk of laying down the law that they so despise to effect such jolts or affective ruptures 
between text and reader to ameliorate chances of a pragmatic connection to the 'outside'. 2 
The emphasis that has been placed on such claims as these by both `pro-` and `anti-` camps 
in the reception of Deleuze and Guattari has served to entrench them in their respective 
positions, with the `pro-` parties using these claims to justify an outright dismissiveness of 
any approach to theory that does immediately declare the primacy of immanence, 
processuality or materiality, whilst `anti-` parties are given to respond to such dismissals 
highly defensively and see them as evidence that the work of Deleuze and Guattari is 
nothing but hostile to any approach that isn't their own or one beholden to their repeatedly 
acknowledged precursors. What makes this stratification of the work problematic is that, 
firstly, once again the respective positions adopted reduce the potential for pragmatic 
deployment of the work by locking the participants into a closed system of entropic debate, 
and secondly, that it misses the extent to which the series of proper names which connect 
with those of `Deleuze' and `Guattari' proliferate far beyond the confines of their 
recognized precursors, or more accurately Deleuze's precursors (Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, 
Nietzsche and Bergson), to make connections with a great many other names including 
and security, subjection and empowerment, work and song [... ]'. This emphasis of the 'and' is not without its 
own significance, which will be made clear later. 
22 Michel Foucault characterizes this approach in terms of `humour', cf., Michel Foucault, `Preface', in Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem 
and Helen R. Lane (London: Athlone Press, 1984), p. xiv: `[T]he traps of Anti-Oedipus are those of humour: 
so many invitations to let oneself be put out, to take one's leave of the text and slam the door shut'. 
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those of Lacan, Levi-Strauss and Althusser. 23 This is important to the extent that - if one is 
to attempt to enter the machinic register and partake of any encounter with immanence - 
such an attempt should not proceed at all in terms of the work of an individual author qua 
closed system, but should instead read such work diagnostically in re-connecting it with the 
movements of immanence whereby the proper name becomes a -function or effect of 
the 
work rather than a proprium. 24 Whilst doubtless some proper names and the works to which 
they are indexed will lend themselves more readily to the task if for no other reason than it 
is one that Deleuze and Guattari set themselves, as would certainly be the case with 
philosophers such as Spinoza, Nietzsche or Bergson, this does not change the fact that any 
proper name can ultimately be mapped in accordance with the movements of immanence 
marking its passages: Spinoza clearly showed in the very first book of the Ethics, crudely 
23 It would seem that the separation of post-War French thought into `structuralist' and `post-structuralist' 
moments in the Anglophone world has itself contributed to the kind of hostile parochialism in question here. 
A distinction not recognized as such in France, it has certainly served to exaggerate the division between the 
work of different authors and has doubtless led to the unproductive gloss on Deleuze and Guattari that 
Meaghan Morris diagnosed. Again, another neglected text shows unequivocally that this is the case, this time 
Deleuze's own 'How Do We Recognize Structuralism', printed in Stivale, The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze 
and Guattari, p. 282.: `[B]ooks against structuralism (or those against the "New Novel" are strictly without 
importance; they cannot prevent structuralism from exerting a productivity that is of our era. No book against 
anything ever has any importance; all that counts are books that are for something, and that know how to 
produce it'. This dashes the idea that there is ever any absolute rejection of any given thinker or their work in 
Deleuze and Guattari and greatly supports the claim for a strategic rather than imperative demand aimed at 
the reader, and - following the work of Massumi in chapter 1 this will connect with the ethical question of 
'process lines', leading in chapter 2 to an endeavour to promote a more ethical form of `apprenticeship' in 
philosophy and non-philospphy (see next section). The term `strategic' also has a very specific use in the 
work of Deleuze which will become of great importance later in the current essay, primarily in its relation to 
the problem of strata, de-stratification and stratigraphic inscription, and which finds its most exemplary 
elaboration in the book on Foucault, cf., Deleuze, Foucault, p. 120-1. 
24 One of a number of terms that have been lifted from Spinoza's philosophy to provide us with our ethical 
trajectory, `propria' describe the way immanent expression is thwarted in the attribution of properties or 
characteristics to beings that cuts them off from their capacity to act and as such should be distinguished from 
`attributes' in the strictly Spinozist sense of the attributes of God-substance-nature, namely extension and 
thought, cf.,, Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone 
Books, 1990), p. 50: `[P]ropria are not properly speaking attributes, precisely because they are not expressive. 
Rather are they like "impressed notions", like characters imprinted, either in all attributes, or in some one or 
other of them. The opposition of attribute and proprium turns then on two points. Attributes are Words 
expressing substantial essences or qualities, while propria are only adjectives indicating a modality of those 
essences or qualities. 
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summarized here by reference to Axiom 2 to the Definitions of God: `What cannot be 
conceived through another, must be conceived through itself. 25 
Moreover, because immanence must also be responsible for producing transcendence, one 
must - in principle at least - be able to map the transcendences of the most immanence- 
ignorant of works to discern how they constitute inscriptions on a plane of immanence. 
Deleuze and Guattari often do this, using traits derived from the very works and authors 
that they elsewhere seem to unequivocally decry. The procedure by which this takes place 
is no more clearly or explicitly demonstrated than in their last collaborative work, What is 
Philosophy?, in particular with the innovation of the `machinic portrait'. 26 Whilst one might 
be forgiven for thinking that the likes of Hegel are `too despicable to merit even a mutant 
offspring'27, the project of `geo-philosophy' outlined in What is Philosophy? has recently 
been put to work in an attempt that in some ways approximates such an endeavour. 28 
To continue for just a little longer on this important point let us examine another of the hot- 
spots dividing the aformentioned camps: the claim for a literal `machinic' philosophy. The 
use of the word `machine' in Deleuze and Guattari's thought embodies one of the most 
25 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, I, `Of God', A2, p. 86. This conception of immanent causality is important in 
the same way that the `symptomatological' sign is, in that signs hereby become expressive of bodies, action, 
movement, sensation and thought, in a way that these signs are themselves effects inhering in their immanent 
causes. Cf., Gilles Deleuze, 'The Three Ethics', in Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, pp. 140-I : `[E]ffects 
or signs are shadows that play on the surface of bodies, always between two bodies [.... ] Signs are effects of 
light in a space filled with things colliding with each other at random'. 
26 Cf., Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, with a machinic portrait given for both Descartes' Cogito 
and Kant's Transcendental Subject, pp. 25,56. The idea for the machinic portrait is attrbuted to Tinguely, cf., 
55. ýý 
Brian Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. x. 
28 Cf., Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 82. 
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effective ways of articulating a bottom-up, non-hylomorphic, 29 pragmatic and rigorous 
philosophical account of the `unconscious', yet there is no absolute necessity attached to 
the use of the word `machine' in the elaboration of such a notion of distributed, positive 
desire. One only need read Spinoza's Ethics to witness this, and not a `machine', nor even 
`an' `unconscious' anywhere to be found! This can be viewed as a peculiar characteristic of 
immanent thinking and the intensive status that language may acquire when approached in 
terms of immanence. If one requires further evidence in support of this approach, one might 
do well to consult Althusser: 
"[T]he more power the body has, the more freedom the mind has" (Spinoza). It is 
here that one could bring together Spinoza with Freud: for this conatus, torn between 
sadness and joy, what is it therefore by anticipation if not the libido torn between the 
instincts of death and life, between the sadness of Thanatos and the joy of Eros?. 30 
Whilst Freud, for his part will articulate his concept of the unconscious in terms of the 
conflicting libidinal tendencies marking Eros and Thanotos31, Spinoza had already in some 
ways done in very different circumstances, using different methods towards different ends. 
Most importantly, the language he used was very different, yet in terms of the processes 
that Spinozist thought came to embody it undeniably produced a means to articulate a 
relation to what only much later with Freud would be termed the `unconscious'. 
29 On the critique of hylomorphism in Deleuze's philosophy, cf., John Protevi, Political Physics (London: 
Athlone, 2001), pp. 8: `Hylopmorphism is [... ] the doctrine that production is the result of an (architectural) 
imposition of a transcendent form on a chaotic and/or passive matter. ' Protevi - following Deleuze and 
Guattari - opposes to this an immanent, material `self-ordering', cf., pp. 9-11. 30 Louis Althusser, `The Only Materialist Tradition', pp. 18-19. 
31 With regard to immanent causality, both Deleuze and Guattari (but far more so the latter) take inspiration 
from Freud's materialist, immanent conception of the libido and the drives, but would both ultimately part 
company with his `triangulation' of desire on the grounds that the Oedipal `theatre' of the unconscious 
subordinates them to a structure that can be found to operate transitively rather than immanently. On 
Deleuze's reworking of Freud's notions of Eros and Thanatos, see chapter 1. 
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For Althusser, this outcome is a product of Spinoza's rediscovery of a `factual 
nominalism'. 32 This connects Althusser's and Deleuze's Spinozism in that they both take 
up the distinction between an `idea' and its corresponding `ideatum' in order to introduce 
difference into the concept and at the same to re-orient the concept towards ethics, both 
pursuing Spinoza's ethical trajectory between the first and third kinds of knowledge. In 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Deleuze posits this trajectory as one between a 
` 33 moral' and `ethical' `vision of the world'. In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, by way of A 
Thousand Plateaus, the indexing of ethics to ontology takes the more explicit form of an 
`ethology' 34, in which `ideality' becomes a dimension of matter'. 35 
Before we do this, it seems pertinent to re-iterate and in so doing summarize the foregoing 
regarding the task of `reading' Deleuze and Guattari. We have seen that proclamations to 
the effect of barring particular approaches to their philosophy are put to work to try and 
keep things in the strategic zone so as to ward off the restrictions of movement that can 
accompany structuralist-ideological or theological-interpretative strata. 36 What is emerging 
32 Louis Althusser, `The Only Materialist Tradition', p. 12. 
;; Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, pp. 255-272: `[O]ne recalls Plato saying that 
materialists, if at all intelligent, should speak of power rather than of bodies. But it is true conversely, that 
intelligent dynamists must first speak of bodies, in order to "think" power. The theory of power according to 
which actions and passions of the body accompany actions and passions of the soul amounts to an ethical 
vision of the world. The substitution of ethics for morality is a consequence of parallelism, and shows its true 
significance'. Immanent materialism as such, is what conjoins ontology to ethics in the work of Deleuze (and 
Guattari) and the Spinozist parallelism between extension and thought is very useful in thinking the relations 
between philosophy, language and action, and thereby points to the pragmatic dimension of these authors' 
works, the work of some secondary writers on Deleuze and Guattari, and also the thesis under way here. 
34 The more specific disciplinary and scientific concerns of ethology will warrant further brief mention, if 
only to signpost its potential and potential limitations in its deployment in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. 
;s Brian Massumi, `The Autonomy of Affect', in Paul Patton [ed. ], Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Cambridge 
MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 229: 'Deleuze dispenses with [Spinoza's conception of] God, but retains 
the notion that `ideality is a dimension of matter (also understood as encompassing the human, the artificial, 
and the invented)'. 
36 Rather than reject Althusser's thought, Deleuze and Guattari make extensive use of it in both volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. However, in doing so they attempt to restore movement and process into the 
proceedings, for example, by re-situating interpellation according to non-localizable assemblages instead of a 
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here is the sense in which it is insufficient to claim when engaging with philosophical 
writing that attempts to make `immanence immanent to itself that there are many or even 
infinite interpretations that we can put forward, and that it is necessary to go further and 
assert that we must claim a plurality of ways of reading which do not limit themselves 
exclusively to an interpretative register, but which at the same time recognize that any one 
given way of reading is not without its limitations, including the 'extra-textual 937 
procedures of Deleuze and Guattari. To try and conceive ways in which this might be 
achieved will be one of key tasks of this project, to explored at some length in chapter 1 
and which shall continue to inform the project throughout. 
Apprenticeship in (Non-)Philosophy: Making Do With Deleuze and Guattari 
A new Meno would say: it is knowledge that is nothing more than an empirical figure, a 
simple result which continually falls back into experience; whereas learning is the true 
transcendental structure which unites difference to difference, dissimilarity to dissimilarity, 
without mediating between them; and introduces time into thought - not in the form of a 
mythical past or former present, but in the pure form of an empty time in general. 
Gilles Deleuze38 
Here we knock, deeply moved, at the gates of present and future: will this "turning" lead to 
ever-new configurations of genius and especially of the Socrates who practices music? Will 
structured `subject'. The `theological-interpretative' strata might in one instance involve the capture of 
`faciality' epitomized by the image of Christ-on-the-Cross in the plateau `Year Zero: Faciality', cf Deleuze 
and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 167-91, or the interpretative tendencies in psychoanalysis, at least 
where they lead to the 'Holy Family' of the Oedipus Complex, cf., Deleuze and Guattari, 'Psychoanalysis and 
Familialism: The Holy Family', in Anti-Oedipus, pp. 51-138, and in particular p. 52: `[S]tructural interpretation 
makes Oedipus into a kind of universal Catholic symbol, beyond all the imaginary modalities. It makes 
Oedipus into a referential axis not only for the pre-oedipal phases, but also for the para-oedipal varieties, and 
the exo-oedipal phenomena'. Once again, this is not a wholesale rejection of psychoanalysis so much as a 
strategic attempt to diagnose its `illegitmate' usages. Whilst the problems of Oedipalization are crucial to the 
collaborative work of Deleuze and Guattari, and Guattari's own writing, it will not be explicitly discussed in 
detail in this project, but will appear in the guise of the Spinozist concept of `privation' and in the 
stratoanalytical critique of Deleuze and Guattari's thinking of the problem of becoming. The consequences of 
the `abstract machine' of faciality for a theory of constitutive subjectivity, especially as it pertains to the 
problems of race and racism, will warrant further discussion in chapters 2,3 and in the `Coda' preceding the 
Conclusion. 
37 See chapter 2. 
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994), pp. 166-7. 
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the net of art, even if it is called religion or science, that is spread over existence be woven 
more tightly and delicately, or is it destined to be torn to shreds in the restless, barbarous, 
chaotic whirl that now calls itself the present? 
Friedrich Nietzsche39 
In his dialogue entitled Meno, Plato famously expounds the pedagogical, epistemological 
and ethical principle of anamnesis, or innate knowledge borne of recollection. 0 Socrates's 
pupil and interlocutor is Meno, of the title to the dialogue, and by recourse to what might 
now be called a principle of deductive reasoning, Socrates claims to demonstrate that 
knowledge is something that anyone can come to possess by participating in the dialectic: 
[A]11 nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so that when a man has 
recalled a single piece of knowledge - learned it, in ordinary language - there is no 
reason why he should not find out all the rest, if he keeps a stout heart and does not 
grow weary of the search; for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but 
recollection. 41 
For Deleuze, this `image of thought' is fundamentally dogmatic. A major part of Deleuze's 
project across the course of his writings, both alone and with Guattari, is to expound a new 
`image of thought'. 42 As such, he imagines how a latter-day Meno would respond to 
Socrates's line of questioning, in a way that would not leave thought confined to the 
`arborescent' schema of an order-word assemblage, and would instead seek to promote an 
alternative conception of `apprenticeship' which foregrounds difference in itself. 
The alternative image of thought that corresponds to this epistemological procedure - as is 
well known, perhaps too well-known - is the `rhizome' or `vegetal' image of thought, and 
39 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Vintage, 1967), p. 98. 
40 It is arguably also a metaphysical principle, but - going along with the Aristotelian response to the `Socratic 
question' - it would seem that this aspect would emerge in later dialogues as an innovation regarded as 
Platonic rather than Socratic, cf., W. K. C Guthrie, `Introduction' in Plato, The Protagoras and Meno, trans. 
W. K. C. Guthrie (London and New York: Penguin Classics, 1956), p. 16. 
41 Plato, Meno, p. 130. 
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its inspiration stems from the `alternative' lineage of philosophers listed above. 43 This 
inspiration is fundamental both to Deleuze's writing as early as the 1950s and therefore 
shall be accorded a proportionate degree of consideration in this project. Perhaps the most 
important, challenging and outstandingly problematic fall-out from this approach to 
philosophy concerns, somewhat paradoxially, the problem of its relation to `non- 
philosophy', a term that functions as something of a penumbra under which one might on 
different occasions and sometimes in mixtures locate biology, physics, chemistry, film, 
painting, politics, quilt-making(! ) and - most importantly here - music. This is not to say 
that these terms are categorically contained under the heading of non-philosophy, but rather 
the capacities, functions and effects of each of these areas or `disciplines' are such that their 
creativity modulates their respective emphases according the different ways that they are 
perceived to relate to immanence, to materiality and to `ideality'. 
As such, philosophy can be said to have non-philosophical roles to play, that in its 
designated task of `creating concepts' it also creates `affects' and 'percepts'44, just as non- 
philosophy may possibly accede to conceptual creation. Where it pertains specifically to 
42 For the most extensive account of the dogmatic image of thought, cf., Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
pp.. 129-68, from which this account of Meno is taken. 
Perhaps the most oft-cited of Deleuze's neologisms is that of the 'rhizome' which - despite its endless 
invocation -- needs to be thought through more carefully as an image of thought. For an embodied account of 
this image, and that of `arborescence' cf., Deleuze and Guattari, 'Introduction: Rhizome', in A Thousand 
Plateaus, pp. 3-26; for its description as a `vegetal' image of thought, cf., Deleuze's preface to the English 
translation of Difference and Repetition, p. xvii. It is very important to bear in mind that the term image is 
definitively not that of a representation, which is one of the main targets of this book, but rather needs to be 
conceived along the same lines as Henri Bergson's 'image', for example his `perception-image'. For a 
description of this conception of images see chapters 2 and 3. From the outset, this thesis was conceived in a 
way that strategically held the concepts of concepts such as `rhizome' and 'becoming' in a degree of 
suspicion, on account of the amount of baggage they seem to have acquired through the course of their 
establishment at the core of the secondary literature. It will be interesting to note as the thesis proceeds what 
effect this strategy has on the status and value of these terms. 
44 Also largely adapted from Bergson's work on the `image' these terms and their relations to one another 
shall be explored in passing in chapter 3. 
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philosophy, this claim is exemplified by the 4Pop'45 ambitions that Deleuze and Guattari 
have for philosophy, that is a philosophy which is not precious in its (self-)exemplification, 
on account of the complexity of the world in its immanent processuality. For this reason, a 
case-study has been selected which has not been explored in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and in some ways goes against the grain of their own unacknowledged tendencies 
to molarize, as shall be shown in due course. 46 The case that has been chosen, as the title of 
the thesis no doubt indicates, is the `life' and `work' of the African-American jazz 
musician, Miles Davis. There are a number of reasons why Miles Davis was the final 
choice. Certainly, in some ways it represents a choice that is far from exemplary, in that 
musicology, jazz criticism and celebrity biography to some extent must be negotiated, and 
as such constitute an archive that constantly forces and reinforces the demands of 
interpretation, of judgements based on taste, and ultimately of `opinion', to which Deleuze 
and Guattari were so heavily opposed as a by-product of a dogmatic image of thought. In 
short, a case-study based on Miles Davis makes a number of demands which ally it 
potentially far more closely to such an image of thought rather than a more creative, 
rhizomatic one. However, in a way, this makes it even more appropriate to the project than 
one that would lend itself more readily to a Deleuze-Guattarian analysis/synthesis, because 
- given that one of the key aims of this thesis is to explore what I have chosen to call the 
pragmatic remit of their conceptual innovations and procedures - the decision to use Miles 
Davis poses a great challenge to this work, for the reasons given above, but also because it 
45 This is a description that Deleuze (and Guattari) give to their work on a couple of occasions, but the 
particular use of it that here springs to mind is the one given in a `Nietzschean' reading of Anti-Oedipus, cf., 
Mark Seem, `Introduction', in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. xxi.: `[S]toned thinking based on 
intensely lived experiences: Pop Philosophy'. This introduction symptomatizes the more `anarchic' end of 
Deleuze-Guattari reception, to which we shall return in the first chapter. 
46 See in particular chapter 2. 
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enables the project to bring together a significant number of `tools'47 from the inventory of 
Deleuze and Guattari and re-combine them in a way that hopefully extends their own 
philosophical `bricolage' 48at the same time as drawing attention not only its potential, but 
also its potential limitations. The question of `why' accompanying the `how' inflects the 
influence of cultural studies on the more `straight-ahead' philosophical renderings of their 
work that informed the writing of what follows. To the extent that this makes the project a 
pragmatic one, it is hoped that it will be on the order of a pragmatics capable of connecting 
with the 'outside' . 
49 It is along such lines that the case of Miles Davis will explored, by 
surveying out from the complexity, ambiguity and ambivalence of the many different 
aspects making up `his' life. 
47 Another oft-quoted example of Deleuze's procedure is that of the conceptual 'tool-box', for example, cf., 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, 'Intellectuals and Power' in Michel Foucault, Language, Counter- 
Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F. Bouchard [ed. ] and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 208: `[A] theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to 
do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function'. 
48 Deleuze and Guattari continue with the do-it-yourself theme by invoking the term `bricolage' from the 
work of Claude Levi-Strauss, the `making-do' of the title of this section of the introduction and to be found 
referenced first-hand in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 7: `[W]hen Claude Levi-Strauss defines 
bricolage, he does so in terms of a set of closely related characteristics: the possession of a stock of materials 
or of rules of thumb that are fairly extensive, though more or less a hodgepodge [... ]. A translator's footnote 
accompanies the definition, describing bricolage thus: `[T]he tinkering about of the bricoleur, or amateur 
handyman. The art of making to with what is at hand'. Whilst in many ways this approach is embodied in the 
thesis, it is with considerable reservation that this procedure is ultimately to be embraced. Thought of from the 
perspective of the 'amateur' apprentice, the risks are clearly indicated by the philosopher Michel Serres, when 
he states that 'art brut [... ] is confined to the psychopathology or to fashion: an ephemeral bubble worthy of 
the stage of buffoons', cf., Michel Serres, The Troubador of Knowledge, trans. Sheila Faria Glasier with 
William Paulson (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2000), pp. 90-1. 
49 Some of the best work done to date on philosophical pragmatism and the work of Deleuze can be found in 
Cary Wolfe's book Critical Environments, which takes up the relations between the more recognized 
protagonists of pragmatism, including William James, C. S. Peirce, Walter Benn Michaels and Richard Rorty, 
and compares the `pragmatics' of the `outside' of Foucault and Deleuze, cf., Cary Wolfe, Critical 
Environments: Postmodern Theory, and the Pragmatics of the "Outside" (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 87-128 and passim. To the extent that the current project is bound up with 
philosophical pragmatism it is through the connection between Deleuze, Guattari and C. S. Peirce. The 
`pragmatics' of the thesis title, however, refers more to the term as used by Deleuze and Guattari, including its 
seriations and proliferations. For a description of these see chapter 1. The issue of the `outside' as has already 
been indicated will itself be of marked importance at certain points in the project. 
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Other reasons for why the case goes against the grain of Deleuze and Guattari's work 
include the question of investment (cathexis in German, l'investissment in French, and in 
both languages connoting libidinal desire and economics), by which is meant the question 
of how a `subject' or an `individual' can get beyond their specific investment or perhaps 
even their fetish for a given `object', in this case constituted by the music of Miles Davis in 
order to simultaneously survey its social and/or institutional set-up or dispositif and effect 
an ethical and possibly even political dis-positioning of the said investment or fetish. This 
question is a vast and complex one, but one that is urgently in need of renewed address if 
any claim for the value and status of both popular cultural forms of production and more 
categorically `serious' or `artistic' forms is to be taken seriously and not just presupposed. 5° 
This question is also important because it impacts heavily upon the kinds of investment that 
constitutes the lines of force and subjectivity as part of a theoretical, critical, philosophical 
or academic dispositif, and again the potential for its ethical or political dis-positioning. 
This task is a vast and perhaps even ultimately thankless one, given that it runs the gauntlet 
of not only the order-words of academia, but also of the capture of investment and the 
systematic production of redundant subjectivities as part of an advanced capitalist mode of 
production that are expanding ever-faster on a planetary scale. Nevertheless, this is as much 
a threat to the tasks of other thinkers and writers in academia and ignoring it is not a realist 
option, postmodern platitudes to the contrary notwithstanding. On a brighter note, whilst 
the stakes remain high, if one is to write and think in accordance with the affirmative 
dimension of Deleuze and Guattari's work one might at least continue to strive for affective 
increase, even if this ultimately ends up being somewhat banal, and promote such increase 
So On the tenuousness of the distinction and the need to re-think it beyond the simplistic postmodernist 
attempts to level it, see chapter 2. 
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as widely as circumstances might permit. However, attention needs to be drawn to what 
potentially remains an abyssal gap between banal increase of a moderately ethical order to 
wide-scale ethical or political transformation, despite the ease with which Guattari declares 
the commencement of `molecular revolution'. Still, there remains perhaps, against the 51 
grain of the debilitating effects of capitalism and the `archaisms' that give the lie to their 
former power but increasingly enter into the service of capitalism, a transformative 
potential that that remains `all too tangible'. 52 
Furthermore, this problem is one that makes its own demands of the theory of Deleuze and 
Guattari, but more particularly the hitherto neglected contributions of Guattari in his own 
work as well as that of the collaborations with Deleuze, notably his project of 
transversality53 and his materialist semiotics, in addition to the fact that his own concept 
creation was mediated through his non-academic work in `anti-psychiatry' and radical 
politics. The question of the value of Guattari's work will be taken up towards the end of 
chapter 1 and carried over into the investigation of the case to follow in chapters 2 and 3, 
with an attempt made to transversalize theory between and across ostensibly very different 
SI This expression of Guattari's describes the non-localizable relation between desire and the social which is 
meant to render a macro/micro distinction in politics somewhat obsolete. Guattari's first full-length collection 
of essays to be published in English translation carries the expression as its title and the essays contained 
within deal with this issue in a lot of detail that makes this rather crude summary of the problem a bit 
oversimplistic. Guattari was a life-long political activist involves in a great many `grass-roots' struggles and it 
therefore hardly be said that he had no time for politics proper, cf., Felix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: 
Psychiatry and Politics, trans. Rosemary Sheed, with an Introduction by David Cooper (London and New 
York: Penguin, 1984). Published in English around the same time as Anti-Oedipus and prior to most of 
Deleuze and Guattari's other work, the translation misses the nuances of his machinic thought. Despite the 
schematic account of Guattari's politics given above, the problem of how ethics and politics connect as part of 
a `rhizomatic' non-localized field of distributed desire remains a major problem. 
52 Further evidence of a more nuanced relation between subjectivity and the social is put forward by Guattari 
at the end of his last book, cf., Felix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-A esthetic Paradigm, trans. Paul Bains 
and Julian Pefanis (Sydney: Power Press, 1995), p. 135, where he states that, despite the `subjective implosion 
and chaosmic spasms looming on the horizon' there remains the prospect of 'riches and unforeseen pleasures, 
the promises of which, despite everything, are all too tangible'. 
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thinkers, in a `pick-up' or 'double-theft' 54 of theirs and Deleuze and Guattari's ideas. This 
will primarily take Theodor W. Adorno and his work on popular music as its mainstay, 
with the work of other writers such as Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht providing the 
ss occasional `soundboard'. 
In setting up the case, extensive use will also be made of the procedures associated with 
`synthesis' in Deleuze and Guattari's work, and perhaps most aptly, the claim that they 
make for conceiving of philosophy as a 'thought-synthesizer' 56 which contributes 
fundamentally to their attempt to overturn the dogmatic image of thought, in addition to the 
deterritorialized re-working of Kant's a priori synthetic judgement that leads to this 
conception, but also a wider conception of philosophical synthesis that is very useful for 
exploring the extent to which philosophy can be said to have a pragmatic value that crosses 
over into non-philosophy. 57 These aspects will primarily be explored throughout the first 
two chapters. 
s; Guattari adapted transversality from the analytic transference and gradually adapted it into a full-blown 
ontology. For a more detailed description see chapter 1. 
S4 This second expression for describing the procedure of Deleuze's philosophy has considerable 
ramifications for his conception of the `war machine' and the problems of a philosophy of becoming. See 
chapter 3. 
ss I am indebted to Barbara Engh for introducing me to this highly useful device of (auditory and theoretical) 
amplification. 
56 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 343. 
57 Another book that has recently entered the burgeoning field of Deleuze-Guattari studies is Gregg Lambert's 
The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, which looks to be a very scholarly and detailed investigation of how 
non-philosophy, and in particualar literature, film, painting and sculpture, in some measure provide the 
conditions of existence of his philosophical work. Unfortunately, yet again, the book was published too 
recently to be granted a proper investigation, and though there are doubtless likely to be parallels, it 
furthermore seems that Lambert has not extended his investigation to look at music in any detail, cf., Gregg 
Lambert, The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2002). 
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This project, in all of its aims, will constitute an attempt to comprise analytic and synthetic 
procedures insofar as the remit of a PhD. thesis will permit such an enterprise to comprise 
its contribution to academic knowledge. Whilst there are doubtless more thoroughgoing 
examples of this approach to be found in the work of more established academics and 
writers (Deleuze and Guattari amongst them), it is hoped that this thesis can contribute 
something to the ongoing debates staged around their work in a way that seeks to emulate it 
in a way that goes beyond mere imitation. 
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Chapter 1: Making the Case for Deleuze and Guattari 
Before it is possible to proceed towards the case-study that will for the most part constitute 
chapters 2 and 3, it is first necessary to lay a theoretical or conceptual groundwork which 
attempts to navigate a path between the numerous possible approaches to Deleuze and 
Guattari's work as suggested in the introduction, in such a way as to try and avoid the 
pitfalls that emerge when attempting to make productive use of their work, pitfalls that are 
in some instances symptomatized by existing attempts to deal with their ideas. This task 
will initially lead the project to embark on an investigation of some of the roles played by 
synthesis in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, with a mind to emphasizing their pragmatic 
potential, and will then move on to consider how a `synthetic' procedure effects a shift in 
the philosophical conception of subjectivity that re-orients it along different ethical lines. 
An attempt to demonstrate how this shift develops through Deleuze's work shall be made 
by taking key aspects of some of his earlier projects to explore how they unfold through the 
collaborations with Guattari, with a somewhat cursory but hopefully illustrative and 
pragmatic demonstration of how the development of these aspects proceeds from Deleuze's 
earlier work towards the `machinic' embodiments to be found in Anti-Oedipus, to be taken 
up again in chapter 2 when exploring the `assemblage' of the `thought-synthesizer'. 
Following upon this first stage of the chapter, there will something of a detour taking place 
through the problem of investment, which will draw upon the notion of the dispositif and 
the prospect of its ethical dis-positioning. In doing so, this section will take up the problem 
of trying to produce an immanent, constitutive account of subjectivity qua process, drawing 
on Deleuze's essay `What is a dispositif? ', which provides something of an overview of his 
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work on Foucault, and lends an additional perspective on the problem of the `outside' 
which will be of considerable value as this project proceeds. The `libidinal' work of 
Lyotard will also be introduced as providing one of a number of theoretical and 
philosophical soundboards to be deployed at various stages during the course of the present 
undertaking. Overall, the material explored in this section will come into its own when 
attempting to discern the potential strengths and limitations of a Deleuze-Guattarian 
approach to ethical and political problems, and the risks involved in any undertaking that 
mobilizes their conceptual innovations. Additionally, it will provide a means by which to 
better assess the role that their work might play in cultural studies. 
Having made the initial case for synthesis in Deleuze and Guattari, the chapter will then go 
on to examine how other writers using their work have made the case, not just in the 
juridical sense of the word, but also in the sense of attempting to produce their own 
embodiments of the Deleuze-Guattarian procedure, a re-synthesis, if you will, of their 
philosophical constructions, with the focus on some of the `exemplary' instances of Brian 
Massumi. The issue of limitations in the corpus of Deleuze and Guattari will be signalled 
during this part of the chapter, through the fascinating and highly pertinent objections 
levelled at the `case' of the concept by the French philosopher Alain Badiou. 
Finally, the foregoing themes and problems will all undergo something of a reprise in the 
last section which will make the case for Guattari, whose thought in its own right has until 
recently largely been neglected, a case which will make the controversial claim for thinking 
his contributions to the collaborations as to some extent being separate from those of 
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Deleuze, but only with a mind to promoting a more rigorous and more productive approach 
to pragmatic embodiments of their work. 
Synthetic Trajectories of Thought 
Your synthesis of disparate elements will be all the stronger if you proceed with a sober 
gesture, and act of consistency, capture, or extraction [... ] 
Deleuze and Guattari' 
Difference and Repetition - published in French in 1968 - along with The Logic of Sense, 
which came out within a year of the former work, arguably contribute the most out of all of 
Deleuze's solo-signed works to the `schizoanalysis' that he would produce in conjunction 
with Guattari over the course of the subsequent decade. When considered from the 
perspective of its academic and intellectual context, as is well documented, these books 
embody one of the main pre-occupations of the period in their attempts to challenge the 
pre-eminence of identitarian thinking within the Western philosophical tradition by 
recourse to a complex notion of radical difference. Despite the similarities that Deleuze's 
take on this problem has to the work of others during this period, perhaps most 
recognizably that of Derrida, where Deleuze departs from Derrida and other protagonists of 
difference is in his emphasis on the `extra-textual'. 2 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 344-5. 
2 In explicitly distinguishing his own philosophical endeavour from that of Derrida, Deleuze apparently 
remarked that it was ultimately a question of the `extra-textual', cf., Daniel W. Smith, Gilles Deleuze: Essays 
Critical and Clinical, pp. xv-xvi: "`As for the method of deconstruction of texts", Deleuze once remarked, "I 
see clearly what it is, I admire it a lot, but it has nothing to do with my own method. I do not present myself as 
a commentator on texts. For me, a text is merely a small cog in an extra-textual practice. It is not a question of 
commentating on the text by a method of deconstruction, or by a method of textual practice, or by other 
methods; it is a question of seeing what use it has in the extra-textual practice that prolongs the text"'. It is 
worth pointing out however that in the corresponding footnote to this quote, Smith advises a degree of caution 
in making an absolute distinction, cf., p. 177 n. 24: `Deleuze nonetheless cites Derrida on numerous occasions, 
and the many lines of convergence between their respective works remain to be explored'. John Protevi 
attempts this exploration and takes the problem up in terms of Guattari's notion of 'transversality' between 
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In the chapter of Difference and Repetition entitled `Ideas and the Synthesis of Difference', 
Deleuze proceeds along the lines suggested in the introduction, here strategically 
deploying, and `synthesizing' a re-worked version of Kant's `Ideas' of the Understanding 
in a way that seeks to substitute for the residuum of identity that he locates in Kant's 
conception of the transcendental apperceiving subject a differential, relational conception 
of the Idea that rides the play of difference and repetition, through a philosophical 
rendering of difference and different/ciation3 borrowed from differential calculus. The 
modus operandum here is highly complex and a detailed analysis beyond the scope of the 
present project, but nevertheless it is worth granting it a cursory exploration as it provides 
some useful insights into the pragmatic `constructivism'4 of Deleuze and Guattari 's 
procedures. 
Derrida and Deleuze, cf., John Protevi, Political Physics (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2002), 
passim. 
Cf., Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 207: '[T]he negative appears neither in the process of 
differentiation nor in the process of differentiation [.... ] [T]he first process is identical with the description of 
a pure positivity, in the form of a problem and to which are assigned relations and points, places and 
functions, positions and differential thresholds which exclude all negative determination and find their source 
in the genetic or productive elements of affirmation. The other process is identical with the production of 
finite engendered affirmations which bear upon the actual terms which occupy these places and these 
functions'. The complementarity of differentiation and differentiation as such is one of the many instances in 
which Deleuze seeks to produce the One-multiple of production and affirmation, as when he says of Spinoza 
that his 'monism' becomes a monism of multiplicity in accordance with the relation between substance and 
the modes of being that embody its attributes, cf., Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 198-9: 
'[T]hese intrinsic modes, contained together as a whole in an attribute, are the intensive parts of God's power, 
within the attribute that contains them. It is in this sense [... J that modes of a divine attribute [extension or 
thought as those infinite attributes of God-substance expressed by finite beings] necessarily participate in 
God's power: their essence is itself part of God's power, is an intensive part, or a degree of that power'. The 
Spinozist rendering of the problem serves to highlight how it is one both of 'intensity' and capacity, that is the 
capacity to 'participate' in immanent substance, which lends difference-in-itself and its repetitions an ethical 
trajectory. The relation between intensity qua 'degree' and quality qua 'kind' in relation to difference as it is 
taken up in both of these works is in many ways the problem with which Deleuze begins in 1956 with his 
early reading of Bergson. 
4 Cf., Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 7: '[C]onstructivism requires every creation to be a 
construction on a plane that gives it an autonomous existence'. This conception of concept creation and its 
non-philosophical correlates will be explored in some detail in chapter 3, and it's invocation of 'making' 
returns us to the idea of bricolage as a procedure, at the same time resonating with the 'constructions' of the 
thesis's title. 
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So why synthesize a bastard 5 use of Kantian transcendental philosophy with the 
mathematics of differential calculus? This question can in part be answered by recognizing 
that differential calculus - whether one has a thoroughgoing understand of it or not - is 
bound up with a notion of difference and different/ciation, whereby what is at stake is its 
placement in the service of a thinking of affirmative and irreducible difference that 
sidesteps conceptual identity. It should be made clear here that whilst - as Deleuze shows - 
the calculus can be explored in terms of numerous different philosophers, what is at stake in 
using the calculus for philosophical ends is not the attempt to supply a scientific account of 
their work, but to use calculus to produce a processual logic of difference that sheds light 
on the workings of philosophy and provides a means for counteracting the tendency 
towards identitarian thinking. 
A Leibniz, a Kant and a Plato of the calculus: the many philosophical riches to be 
found here must not be sacrificed to modern scientific technique. The principle of a 
general differential philosophy must be the object of a rigorous exposition [... ]6 
The emphasis on rigour' is important and - for Deleuze - it isa factor that he was keen to re- 
emphasize at later stages in his career. It's importance for us will emerge shortly when we 
5 The term `bastard' is to be understood here in the sense given used by Brian Massumi when - in 
paraphrasing Deleuze's own account of his work as a form of encoulage, or buggery - he describes the work 
of Deleuze and his precursors as constituting philosophy `[o]f a bastard line', cf., Brian Massumi, 
`Translator's Foreword' to Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. ix. Another one of the much 
vaunted claims to be fetishized, this description of Deleuzian approach to philosophy is not without its 
problems, especially when read in the light of work being done in queer theory and in particular the work 
taking place around the question of to what extent theory impinges upon the act of 'having sex' and vice 
versa, all the more so when the trope of gay male sex is used to legitimate a philosophical approach 
expounded by a heterosexual male, in this case Deleuze. For a recent account of the relationship between gay 
male intercourse and its theorization in the work of male heterosexual writers, cf., Calvin Thomas, `Must 
Desire Be Taken Literally? ' in Parallax 8: 4 (forthcoming, 2002). In asking the question `must desire be taken 
literally? ' of Deleuze and Guattari's writing the answer has to be `yes', but again there are highly specific 
reasons for this that a `hasty' reading is destined to gloss. The question of the potential dangers and 
limitations of Deleuze and Guattari's thought in relation to problems of gender, sexuality and appropriation 
will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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consider further some problems of Deleuzian and Deleuze-Guattarian reception, in terms of 
the somewhat uncritical and occasionally non-rigorous endorsements by some of their 
works' advocates that have become the grist on the proverbial mill of some of their 
detractors. By looking at this passage in a little more detail we can see how it is that rigour 
is important for Deleuze. By deploying numerous functions from modem calculus he 
carefully unfolds the constitutive interactions between them that show how relationality can 
be articulated. Here, the differential operator d is considered according to the operations, 
dx, dy and dxldy. The aim is to free the differential operation of dx from any actual or 
principle determination for value x, such that the need for the Kantian Idea to proceed by 
qualitative or quantitative determination is side-stepped in order to re-direct the Idea of the 
`understanding' back upon itself so that the differential becomes its `object': 
[I]n this sense the Idea has the differential relation as its object: it then integrates 
variation, not as a variable determination of a supposedly constant relation 
('variability') but, on the contrary, as a degree of variation of the relation itself 
('variety') [... ] [I]f the idea eliminates variability, this is in favour of what must be 
called variety or multiplicity. The Idea as concrete universal stands opposed to 
concepts of the understanding, and possesses a comprehension all the more vast as its 
extension is great. This is what defines the universal synthesis of the Idea (Idea of the 
Idea, etc. ): the reciprocal dependence of the degrees of the relation, and ultimately the 
reciprocal dependence of the relations themselves. 8 
Moreover, differential calculus here involves the play of two orders of difference: 
differences of `degree' and differences in `kind' that - for Deleuze at least - are crucial to an 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 171-72. Emphasis added. 
7 One of the easiest things to overlook about Deleuze and Guattari's work is the extent to which it is rigorous. 
Their procedures of writing testify to a highly systematic philosophical approach, so long as one thinks of a 
system as being open rather than closed. Meaghan Morris has made this important point in 'Crazy talk is not 
enough': how we might think in more detail the paradoxical problem of being rigorous without being 
method(olog)ical is another problem to unfold as the thesis proceeds. 
8 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 173. 
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affirmative conception of difference .9 As such, then, differential calculus enables Deleuze 
to take the bits of Kant's philosophy that will fit his conception of philosophical difference 
by taking the Ideas of the Understanding and positing the `universal synthesis of the Idea 
(Idea of the Idea, etc. )' in terms of the `reciprocal dependence of the degrees of the relation, 
and ultimately the reciprocal dependence of the relations themselves', or else `differences 
of degree' and `differences in kind', or `of nature': 
[W]hat Bergson essentially reproaches in his predecessors is not having seen the true 
differences of nature. The constancy of such a critique signals to us at the same time 
the importance of the theme in Bergson. Where there were differences of nature, we 
have retained only differences of degree. 1° 
In his exploration of the philosophical uses of the calculus Deleuze is employing it as what 
he will later call the `deterritorialized term', in a way that is `inexact, yet completely 
rigorous'. 11 The term is deterritorialized because it has been placed at a partial remove from 
9 Cf., Deleuze, 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', trans. Melissa McMahon, in John Mullarkey [ed. ], The 
New Bergson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 42-65. Alain Badiou is not wrong in 
empasizing that the importance of Bergson for Deleuze cannot be underestimated, whilst his contention that 
Bergson is the ur-philosopher for Deleuze is arguable. In this essay Deleuze discerns in Bergson the ideas that 
he will develop in his subsequent work on the philosopher as well as most of his own work with Guattari and 
alone: intuition as method, the relational difference between differences of degree (intensity) and differences 
in kind, which leads to the distinction between `badly analyzed composites' based on a dualistic distinction 
between the possible and the real and the apprehension of the virtual through intuition, that is - what is real 
without being actual - the very immanent conditions of `real' experience and thought, cf., Gilles Deleuze, 
Bergsonism, p. 27 and passim. Here we find a very useful illustration of the task of this kind of philosophical 
enterprise, which is "`to seek experience at its source, or rather above that decisive turn, where taking a bias 
in the direction of our utility, it becomes properly human experience"'. This in another context might be 
thought of in terms of the immanent survey, and therefore bears no less on the ethical trajectory of Deleuze's 
thought than does the conception of difference outlined in Spinoza or in Difference and Repetition. 
10 Deleuze, 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', p. 42; cf., Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 21. It is actually 
`beneath' differences that we must find differences in kind and this it the purpose of the' dualism' in Bergson 
in general, to which the `dualism' difference of degree-difference in kind proves no exception. This strategic 
use of the dualism to 'go above that decisive turn' is one that will be adopted in much of what is to follow. 
11 Deleuze explains his use of deterritorialized terms in his conversation with Christian Deschamps, Didier 
Eribon and Robert Maggiori entitled `On A Thousand Plateaus', cf. Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, p. 29: 
'There are notions that are exact in nature, quantitative, defined by equations, and whose very meaning lies in 
their exactness: a philosopher or writer can use these only metaphorically, and that's quite wrong, because 
they belong to exact science. But there are also essentially inexact yet completely rigorous notions that 
scientists can't do without, which belong equally to scientists, philosopher and artists'. Rather than attempt to 
think the logic of immanence in terms of the dichotomy exactitude-inexactitude, one might deploy the notion 
of 'anexactitude' as a term potentially capable of expressing the logical operations informing immanent 
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the territory and milieus that - under certain circumstances - constitute the discipline 
`mathematics' as distinct from philosophy. In this case those circumstances might be 
termed as those of the Kantian `Copernican Revolution', when this relation changed 
considerably, and yet for Deleuze the task remains one of challenging the subjectivist and 
Idealist aspects of Kant by going beyond synthetic a priori judgement towards a different 
conception of the `passive' syntheses of the subject. 12 
In disarticulating difference of a necessary link to identity and its inventory of Manichean 
oppositions' 3, Deleuze has also made of the differential calculus an `abstract machine', 
which is another highly important reason why it should not be perceived as being limited to 
the disciplines of science and mathematics. 14 This concept of concepts can be found 
implicitly at work in the above example from Difference and Repetition, with the calculus 
as an operation of difference that is incarnated or embodied across a multiplicity of 
conceivable instances. Another example is its re-deployment in Anti-Oedipus to describe 
processes without thought becoming vicarous, random, or `esoteric', cf. Michel Serres, The Birth of Physics, 
trans. Jack Hawkes, David Webb [ed. ] (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2001), p. 19. Furthermore, rigorous 
anexactitude is the definition given by Deleuze and Guattari to non-metric mathematical multiplicities cf., 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 483. 
12 The `passive' syntheses will be discussed shortly and the `thought-synthesizer' will be examined in chapter 
2. 
13 An expression coined by Guattari to describe the more categorical dualistic distinctions which, from a 
Bergsonian perspective, we might say actually serve to disguise differences in kind, cf., Guattari, Chaosmosis, 
12. ý4 
A crucial innovation in the work of Deleuze and Guattari is the `abstract machine', or the 'diagram', 
exemplified by the panopticon of Bentham and Foucault, whereby surveillance comes to be embodied as part 
of so many difference assemblages on the order of a reciprocal relation between `visibility' and `statements', 
yet from which the abstract machine can be discerned independently as that which enables these to function 
across assemblages that include not just the prison, but the factory, the school, etc. The key significance of the 
abstract machine is to enable processual difference to be considered as it functions across an array of 
`assemblages' and as such has an ethical correspondence with Spinoza's 'common-notion' which seeks to 
extract from modes of substance their expressive heterogeneity as part of immanent God-substance-nature, 
cf., Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 150: ` [... ] [W]e will see that this "common notion" is 
itself necessarily adequate: it belongs to the idea of our body as to that of the external body; it is then in us as 
it is in God; it expressed God and is explained by our power of thinking'. The different `images of thought' 
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capitalist production a process of immanent capture that proceeds through an `axiomatic', 
which is then used to re-construct Marx's labour-commodity nexus in a way that restores it 
to the immanence of social and desiring production. 15 That different more or less concrete, 
articulated relational networks of composition and interaction whether social, political, 
artistic, economic, etc., and invariably a combination of some or all of these `assemblages', 
can be diagrammed to the point where one is able to posit their `abstract machine' is 
fundamental to the project of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and this is partly why the only 
rule regarding the order in which A Thousand Plateaus should be read is that `Concrete 
Rules and Abstract Machines' be read last. 
To provide an example of how differential calculus can made to function as a 
deterritorialized abstract machine whose assemblages are not simply those of mathematics 
or philosophy but are actually more diverse, it is worth considering that in Anti-Oedipus the 
conception of capitalism's `machinic' functioning distinguishes it from `earlier' modes of 
production because it operates along the lines of an `axiomatic', which is to say a 
differential relationality that converts a `surplus value of code' into a `surplus value of 
flux', the key operation of capitalism in its `decoding' and `deterritorialization' that makes 
it operate within limits in accordance with immanent processuality: 
This age of cynicism is that of the accumulation of capital - an age that implies a 
period of time, precisely for the conjunction of all the decoded and deterritorialized 
flows [... ] [W]e are no longer in the domain of the quantum or of the quantitas, but in 
that of the differential relation as a conjunction that defines the immanent social field 
particular to capitalism, and confers on the abstraction as such its effectively concrete 
value, its tendency towards concretization [... ] [T]he abstract itself posits the more 
complex relation within which it will develop "like" something concrete. This is the 
distinguished by Deleuze might also be considered as examples of abstract machines. We shall encounter 
further this complex yet highly useful innovation as we proceed. 
ýs On the `machinic' conception of desire and the 'socius', see below. 
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differential relation Dy/Dx, where Dy derives from labor power and constitutes the 
fluctuation of variable capital, and where Dx derives from capital itself [... ] [T]he 
differential relation expresses the fundamental capitalist phenomenon of the 
transformation of the surplus value of code into a surplus value of flux. 16 
There are a number of interesting things about the passage between the differential relation 
as it appears in Difference and Repetition and its abstract machinic use in Anti-Oedipus 17 
Firstly, in illustrating this passage, one witnesses how its thinking undergoes the very 
process of deterritorialization that it comes to embody in each given instance. This is a 
curious characteristic of immanent thinking, which is what makes the repetition of 
difference an active repetition and not just a speculative one, a repetition of difference that 
does not just state what something is but actually embodies it. This is perhaps what is most 
powerful and productive in Deleuze and Guattari's work taken collectively, and it again 
serves to emphasize the crucial role played by Spinoza as the precursor who in discerning 
the attributes of `extension' and `thought' to be expressions of substance and the expressed 
of modes did not just make a philosophical abstraction, but in the very act of its articulation 
increased an invested body's capacity to act. This also points to a key characteristic of the 
abstract machine, which is that philosophical abstraction is `not abstract enough', because it 
cannot go above the turn where difference is freed up from its concretizations, for example 
when in thought cannot get beyond an identititarian relation to the concept or the Idea. All 
this very interestingly also leads to an idea that Deleuze and Guattari will develop in their 
last co-authored book which will bring together the abstract machine of thought with the 
'6 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 227-9. 
17 The shift between Difference and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus is also marked by the further materialization 
of immanence where the differential function is performed by the `breaks-flows' of what now becomes 
termed the 'machine'. The 'break-flow' is the 'operator' here, termed 'machinic' in accordance with Franz 
Reuleaux's definition of a machine as `the combination of solid elements, each having its specialized function 
[... ] operating in order to transmit a movement and perform a task', cf., Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 
p. 141. 
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decoding tendencies of capital, as philosophy becomes `reterritorialized' on modem 
democracy: `[M]odern philosophy's link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as 
that of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane of immanence 
with a relative social milieu that also functions through immanence'. 18 As we shall come 
on to see much later, this is what connects philosophy to politics during the Modem period, 
just as it shall be made clear that non-philosophy will seek to do likewise in its immanent 
capture of matter-force, pitted against those instantiated via capitalism and its axiomatic. In 
summary then, philosophy according to Deleuze and Guattari does not just have an ethical 
dimension to it, but it also has a political one, and in its relation to non-philosophy it will be 
shown also to have an aesthetic aspect which contributes greatly to its constructivist 
description. 
The `three syntheses of the unconscious' in Anti-Oedipus both extend and develop the 
notion of synthesis as used in Difference and Repetition and the Logic of Sense. In all three 
of these works, the problem of the passive syntheses of subjectivity is explored with a mind 
to restoring them to immanence in a way that goes beyond the transcendental a priori 
conditions of possibility of experience towards what the immanent conditions of real 
experience. In each instance, the vocabulary used is somewhat different. For example, in 
Difference and Repetition, the three syntheses articulated by Kant as `apprehension', 
`reproduction' and `recognition' respectively undergo modification such that they are now 
described in terms of `habitus', the `Eros-Mnemosyne ' and the `Thanatos'. 19 The habitus 
18 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 98. 
19 Kant's original account of the three syntheses is to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason. The first 
synthesis of apprehension proceeds through intuition, such that a 'manifold' is synthesized into a 
representation that is given a priori through the pure forms of space and time; the second synthesis of 
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is a synthesis of `contemplation-contraction' or `binding' in the Freudian sense of the 
binding of investment. However, what Deleuze does that takes this first passive synthesis 
beyond Freud and Kant to extend it into non-human `contractions-contemplations', such as 
those of plants, of water, or of light: `[T]he eye binds light and is itself a bound light'. 20 
As was suggested previously, the unity of Kant's apperceiving subject is challenged by 
Deleuze, and here this takes place by removing the subject as a foundational unit by 
substituting distributed difference qua a biological principle of repetition, not repetition by 
a `subject' so much as repetition different/cially constituting subjectivity. As such, the 
binding that takes place is one that extends beyond the libidinal constitution of a temporal 
`living present' as lived by a human subject and `the Id'21, towards a more distributed, open 
conception of Freud's drives both of which will find their more powerful articulation in 
Anti-Oedipus, in the conception of the machinic unconscious. The emphasis on investment 
in the synthesis of habitus, and in particular the rescinding of a purely passive relation of 
the synthesis towards an `active' one will be of considerable importance for this project, 
though again more in the terms outlined in Anti-Oedipus, where `passive' synthesis 
becomes `legitimate synthesis' of (desiring-)production set against its 'active' 22 or 
reproduction takes place in the imagination and acts upon the appearances constituting experience a priori 
such that the modifications generated in the first synthesis are granted order; the third synthesis of 
`recognition' takes place to ally the ordered appearances produced in the first two syntheses to a (sel- 
identical) concept of Understanding, cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith 
(London: MacMillan, 1993), pp. 131-4. It is with this latter that Deleuze takes issue in the foregoing 
discussion of concept and Idea and is what leads to the strategic mobilization of the differential calculus. 
20 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 96. 
2! Cf., Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 1: `[I]t is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at 
other times in fits and starts. It breaths, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the 
id'. 
22 It is perhaps anomalous that the word `active' is used here to mark an illegitimate synthesis given how the 
term has been used hitherto here and how it is used affirmatively by Deleuze in his work on Nietzsche and 
Spinoza. It would seem that the use taking place in Difference and Repetition indicates the active 
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`illegitimate use' in the production of global objects or persons (the same will go for the 
other two syntheses respectively). The second synthesis, `Eros-Mnemosyne', `posits 
repetition as displacement and disguise'. 23 Again, both Kant's and Freud's conception of 
the subject/psyche are in play, and this time repetition is installed as primary in relation to 
difference, in that the repetition of displacement and disguise is what constitutes the 
`pleasure principle' of desire, a reproduction that indexes repetition to enjoyment in a way 
that founds a `past' and assigns it an Ego, with Mnemosyne thereby marking a mnemonic 
function of repetition, whilst Eros marks `erotic repetition'. 24 To the extent that this 
synthesis can become `active' it is in line with a `reality' principle of self-preservation as 
well as the sexualization of the drives. 25 Finally, there is the passive synthesis of Thanatos, 
which turns out to provide the 'groundlessness' underlying the 'ground' of the first two 
syntheses as that which repeats the difference ultimately constitutive of habitus, 
Mnemosyne, Id and Ego. Again, Freud is invoked but in a way that re-thinks the 'death 
instinct' as a the principle, par excellence of differenc/tiation, which - in its passive use - 
and again, invoking Kant, is capable of sweeping up past, present and future, 'played out as 
pure form'26, which will lead Deleuze hack to Bergson and also Proust. In as much as it is 
actively deployed this synthesis pertains to the 'future' whose topographical correlate is the 
`super-Ego' which 'announces the destruction of Id and Ego'"27 
manipulation of passive synthesis by a 'subject' that is 'apperceiving' to the extent that it perceives and 
imagines itself to be self-identical (see below). 
2 Ibid., p. 109. 
24 Ibid.. p. 109. 
1, Ibid. 
'`' Ibid., p. 115. 
27 Ibid. 
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This is, admittedly, something of an over-simplification of what remains perhaps Deleuze's 
most demanding work and the ultimate solo embodiment of his philosophical enterprise, 
but it is hoped that it illustrates, not just how Deleuze attempts to immanentize Kant but 
also Freud, in re-thinking his structural topography in a way that takes it `above that 
decisive turn' towards the intuition of differences in kind as distinct from differences of 
degree or intensity, a conception of Kantian intuition subject to revision by Bergson and 
then, using Bergson, by Deleuze, which moves everything away from the propria and 
propositions of a dogmatic image of thought in its transformation of its `problem' that takes 
it away from identity, generality, quality and quantity, the `x =x not y', its `more like... ' 
and its `less like... '. 28 It also demonstrates the role played by repetition. 29 
28 For Deleuze, the Bergsonian method of intuition is rigorous, in the way it attempts to distinguish 
differences in kind between different 'images', and thereby engenders an intensification , or difference in 
degree in the very act of intuition, an affective dimension of thought which leads Delcure to describe the 
method as one of jouissance', cf., Deleuie, 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', p. 43 'IIjntuition is the 
jornissanee of difference'. 
"' As was said before, the problem is addressed in the Logic of Sense. Here it is taken up in relation to 
language and the play of 'sense' and 'nonsense' where the latter is in many ways constitutive of the former. In 
both Difference and Repetition and the Logic of Sense, this is in part done through the 'esoteric wordisl', 
which are 'properly linguistic cases of the ohjcct=-r, while the ohjccl=. r structures psychic experience like it 
language on condition that the perpetual. invisible and silent displacement of linguistic sense is taken into 
account', cf., Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 123. This is where the relationship between language and 
the unconscious differs from that of Lacan, because the esoteric word rides the surfaces, depths and heights of 
an immanent. materialist psyche, topologically rather than topographically constituted in relation to an 
'outside'. For an account of the object=x in relation to structuralist psychoanalysis, cf., Delcuze's 1967 essay. 
'How Do We Recognize Structuralism? ', which not only contextualiies Dclcuie's work in its relation to 
structuralism, but also introduces some of the key ideas that would appear in next two years, including the 
role of differential calculus in a philosophy of difference, presented here in relation to the structuralist 
psychoanalytic 'symbolic'. This conception of language and the unconscious is taken up independently by 
Guattari (see below), and the two authors bring their respective approaches together in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. Interestingly, in outlining this idea, Delcuce describes it in as it 'refrain', cf., Dif%erence and 
Repetition., p. 123. The embodiment of the processual conception of subjectivity as outlined here will he 
developed extensively using this musical concept and will provide the groundwork for this project's case 
early in chapter 2. Unfortunately there is not sufficient scope here fier exploring the syntheses as developed in 
the Logic of'Sense, which provide something of it bridge between Di//ere, u e and Red etition and A111i- 
Oedipus. being somewhat closer to the latter than the former. Very interestingly, the syntheses are taken up 
again in The Fold, where the 'event', another of Dclcuze's most common 'refrains' is read through 
Whitehead and Leihnil in terms ol''extension'. 'intrinsic qualities' and the 'individual' conceived as 
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As we witnessed earlier with example of the differential calculus in Difference and 
Repetition, dx was ultimately divested of its necessary relation to a given value for x on the 
order of identity, quality and quantity, thus enabling the Idea to take itself as its own 
`object' in the survey of its immanence. Now, in Anti-Oedipus the same process is in play 
although - whilst the calculus is used in the immanent rendering of capitalism and its 
`axiomatics' - the synthetic operations are largely described through literature, and - in 
particular - the literary deployment of language to be found in the work of a number of 
different authors, with a particular emphasis on the work of Samuel Beckett. 30 The first 
synthesis is here one of `connection', that takes place on the order of an `and... ' and 
Beckett's literary characters and devices - in this case taken from his novel Molloy - are 
brought in to introduce the machinic interaction between flows and `partial objects'. 31 
[Beckett's characters] various gaits and methods of self-locomotion constitute, in and 
of themselves, a finely tuned machine. 32 
It is the connection of these partial-objects, derived and adapted to immanent ends from the 
work of Melanie Klein that constitute the concretized 'breaks-flows' that comprise the 
`difference in itself' of the machine. The connective synthesis as the first synthesis in the 
production of desire is bound up with the `production of production' qua process and only 
produces products as residual effects of the process. It is enters changes from a 'legitimate' 
'prehension', cf., Delcu, e, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press. 1993), pp. 77-80. 
i0 Beckett's prose, for Deleuie, comprised one of more outstanding examples of 'schizophrenic' use of 
language. cf., Gilles Deleuze, The Exhausted' in Es. sav. s Critical and Clinical, pp. l 52-175. 
" Deleuze made much of the Ktcinian theory of the 'partial-object' in the Logic of Sense and it assumes a 
more primary position in Anti-Oedipus in order to prevent the syntheses installing a global 'object', 
tantamount to an 'overcoding' of difference that would he 'illegitimate'. 
s' Deleure and Guattari,; lnti-Oedipus, p. 2. 
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to an `illegitmate'33 usage when the breaks-flows constituting the partial objects are 
rendered as `global' objects. 
The serial proliferation of connections between the partial-objects adjacently perform 
disjunctive syntheses of `recording', whereby part of their energy is transformed into a 
`recording surface' that presents itself to the partial-objects as a Body with Organs which 
`falls back on' (se rabat scar) the connective synthesis enabling intensification and de- 
intensification of their connections, old connections to be broken and new connections to be 
made. The recordings that take place are to be thought of as no less literal or material than 
the `break-flow' of the machine, and this is made clear by the fascinating use of the word 
enregistrement in the original French version, a word which has several meanings ranging 
from `the process of making a recording to be played back by a mechanical device (for 
example, a phonograph), the recording so made (a phonographic record or a magnetic tape, 
compact disc, etc. ), and the entering of births, deaths, deeds, marriages, and so on, in an 
official register. 34 This process of enregistrement, as well as being crucial to the three 
syntheses in Anti-Oedipus, will become highly important in A Thousand Plateaus, notably 
in the neglected notion of `stratoanalysis'. 
We can once again appeal to the writing style of Samuel Beckett in order to illustrate how 
the second synthesis is expressed in terms of an 'either ... or... or' operation, whereby an 
illegitimate synthesis of `exclusive disjunction' that returns everything to a fixed, 
categorical or transcendental distinction on the order of an either/or is replaced by a mobile, 
"Another distinction derived from Kant which is one hetwecn immanent (legitimate) and 'metaphyscial' 
(illegitimate) syntheses, cf., Delcuze and Guattari. , 4nti Oedipus. pp. 75-6. 
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immanent synthesis of `inclusive disjunction' that resists the lure of any set of fixed 
presuppositions: 
[T]his is the meaning of the disjunctions where Beckett records his characters and the 
events that befall them; everything divides, but into itself. Even the distances are 
positive, at same time as the included disjunctions. 35 
As such, inclusive disjunction should be distinguished from exclusive disjunction: 
[W]hereas the "either/or" claims to mark decisive choices between immutable terms 
(the alternative: either this or that), the schizophrenic "either ... or... or" refers to the 
system of possible permutations between differences that always amount to the same 
as they shift and slide about. 36 
Thirdly there is the synthesis of `consumption-consummation' whereby part-objects 
become indexed to the production of subjectivity. In the network of desirinb machines 
another conversion takes place adjacent to the other two syntheses whose operation in 
language now takes the form of `so that's what it was! '.. 37 Here the breaks-flows of 
connection, their disjunctive interactions as recorded on the Body without Organs; x and the 
accompanying intensifications and de-intensifications produce a residual subjectivity 
34 Ibid.. p. 4., Translator's note. 
's Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 76. 
'6 Ibid., p. 12. 
37 Ibid., p. 20. 
" The undifferentiated surface that presents itself to the synthesis of production as a surface of inscription is 
described as a Body without Organs, a material surface whose avatars in 'history' are: the Body of the Earth. s 
part of a 'primitive territorial machine' of `coding', or the marking of bodies that makes them so many milieu 
components that coalesce to produce terrestrial inscriptions, or territories; the Body of the Despot. which 
'overcodes' territorial inscriptions of the Earth that abrogates them according a rule of law or governance 
effected as part of a state apparatus which extracts from territories statistical equivalences which subject their 
codings to the transcendent redundancies of signijianee; finally, there is the Body of Capital which, as has 
already been shown, functions through a de-coding or detcrritorialiration on the order of an immanent 
relational capture. All of these Bodies provide undifferentiated surfaces that fall hack on (se- rab, t. sirr) 
production, and at their limit is the Body without Organs as immanent condition of' existence. Cf., ibid., pp. 9- 
16 and Chapter 3, passim. The regulation of coding and de-coding through inscription is in each instance 
effected by an organizing 'socius', a term used in place of 'society' in order to avoid the suggestion of 
transcendence or fixed transcendental structure of organization implicit in the latter, cf., ibid.. p. 139. 
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whereby the modulations taking place can be `felt' by a body, thereby producing an 
`orphan' subject. 
This subject itself is not at the centre, which is occupied by the machine, but on the 
periphery, with no fixed identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through 
which it passes. 39 
Staying with the literary example of Beckett, here `characters' and `authors' shed their 
status as individual subjects to become subject-states, their names becoming tensors 
marking or `describing' in that specifically Lyotardian sense of the word, the process of 
synthesis that produces their sense of being and the corresponding intensities that are 
recorded on the Body without Organs: 
[T]his subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the 
periphery, with no fixed identity, forever de-centred, defined by the states through 
which it passes. Thus the circles traced by Beckett's Un-nameable: "a succession of 
irregular loops, now sharp and short as in the waltz, now of a parabolic sweep", with 
Murphy, Watt, Mercier, etc., as states [... ]. 40 
However, the danger of this `subject' mistaking `itself for a self-identical being is where 
the shift from a legitimate to an illegitimate synthesis resides. The orphan subject of 
`enjoyment' produced in this third synthesis more than usually instantly betrays the 
movement of immanence in converting the `legitimate' third synthesis with an 
`illegitimate' synthesis that molarizes the relation between the partial-objects by allowing 
them to be overcoded in terms of statistical aggregates of global objects or, more accurately 




Eugene Holland succinctly describes this molarization as the `metaphysics of sovereign 
subjectivity'41, in which `so that's what it was', becomes `[I]t's me, and so it's mine', and it 
is here where the Oedipalizing tendency comes to the fore. 42The opening towards the 
`outside' of the residual `subject' to the processes that synthesize `it' in such instances 
begins to close off within the triangulation of Oedipal familialism. Breaks-flows have given 
way to propria in an `enclosure act' of subjective privation43, and the likelihood of an 
ethical relation to the world becomes severely reduced. Again, despite scant reference to 
his work in this text, Spinoza's influence is very much in evidence in the way in which the 
syntheses become performed in the very act of their articulation, substituting for his 
`parallelism' between `extension' and `thought' turning on the modifications of a single, 
univocal `substance', a `machinism' of relational interactions between breaks and flows, 
the partial-objects and connections, disjunctions and conjunctions, their intensifications and 
de-intensifications on the Body without Organs. The conatus plainly informs the notion of 
desire that is at work here as well in that the syntheses tend towards complexification and 
self-organization in their immanent relationality, an increase in the `capacity to affect' and 
`be affected' counteracted by the tendency towards aggregation and ossification which 
41 Cf., Eugene Holland, Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 34: [H]ere the subject in fact only arises in the consuming appropriation and 
consummating recognition of the results of desiring-production, yet it tends to construe itself as an 
autonomous entity capable of taking possession of the products of the processes that in fact constitute it'. 
42 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 16. 
43 Eugene Holland in his essay 'Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire: Some Illustrations of Decoding at Work' uses 
the example of the Enclosure Acts in 18th Century England to illustrate how 'territorialization' has been 
adapted in Deleuze and Guattari's work from that of Lacan to make psychic production immanent to social 
production by way of the processes of 'deterritorialization' and 'reterritorialization', cf., Paul Patton [ed. ], 
Deleuze: A Critical Reader (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), p. 242: '[1]n Deleuze's usage 
these originally psychological terms also operate in the social register, where they designate a crucial 
dynamic of the capitalist market: the disconnection and reconnection of working bodies and environments - 
for example, the disconnection of peasants from grazing land by the Enclosure Acts in England, and their 
reterritorialization onto textile looms as wage-labour in the nascent garment industry'. The example as used 
here takes what was originally the expression for a social-political-economic development as a tool for 
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result in a reduction in this two-fold capacity. It is here that the important question of 
investment re-emerges and the accompanying need to specify the conception of `desire' 
that is at stake. As has already been made clear, whatever this notion of `desire' it is not 
subjectivist, or else there would not have been a need to change the vocabulary to avoid 
`misunderstandings'. Where it concerns the work of Spinoza, the conception of desire is 
allied closely to the conatus and therefore is a non-anthropomorphic desire that is present in 
any composition of bodies to the extent that these bodies seek out potential connections that 
increase their capacity to act. 
Dispostions of Investment 1: Dis positif 
We must first grasp this: signs are not only terms, stages, set in relation and made explicit 
in a trail of conquest; the can also be, indissociably, singular and vain intensities in exodus 
Jean-Francois Lyotard44 
The concept of investment is not a new one in either philosophy or cultural studies, the 
latter of which seems particularly keen to recognize its ongoing relevance to 
inderdisciplinary studies, to political theory, aesthetic theory, and so on, no doubt largely a 
result of the pre-eminence that psychoanalysis has within the field. The Freudian concept of 
cathexis obviously has something of a history and a pedigree that makes it invaluable for 
asking questions regarding the constitution of investment. Another reason why investment 
is important to consider is that it not only provides the means for thinking about the 
constitution of subjectivity at the level of the psyche but also at the level of political- 
economy. Indeed, it is in the theories of Lyotard and the Deleuze and Guattari of Anti- 
diagramming the passage towards subjective rather than social privation, although the two are never really 
distinct and the former is invariably in the service of the latter. 
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Oedipus that we find the immanent critique of psychic interiority that absolutely insists on 
recognizing that a political-economy and a psychic or nervous economy, before they can 
actually be separated out from one another, are reciprocally constituted as a libidinal- 
economy. Needless to say that it is this latter approach that we must pursue here. However, 
in doing so, it seems pertinent to attempt a pragmatic synthesis or construction that brings 
together some key concepts from Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Spinoza, Lyotard and 
others in order to re-assess the status and value of such an approach at the same time as 
extending its scope and being mindful of its potential limitations. Furthermore, it allows us 
to consider how the reflexivity of cultural studies can be put to work productively in 
dealing with these problems and in so doing expose further some of the existing 
fundamental limitations in the investments constituted around the names of `Deleuze' and 
`Guattari'. 
So how do we effectively combine these various conceptual `tools' in constructing a 
pragmatic relation to the academic dispositif and its relation to the `outside'? Firstly, using 
the Foucauldian conception of the term as developed by Deleuze in `What is a dispositif? ', 
we notice that in attempting to answer the question of his title, Deleuze begins by dividing 
the dispositif into four dimensions: making up the first two dimension is the classic 
Foucauldian coupling of `curves of visibility' and `curves of enunciation'. The immanent 
materialist relationality that Foucault founds between these two dimensions in much of his 
work provides the means for examining quite concretely (a strength of Foucault's 
`historical' works that it must be said is slightly lacking in the more `incorporeal' efforts of 
Deleuze and Guattari, a problem pertaining to the Deleuze-Guattarian `case' to which we 
44 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. 50. 
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shall return in due course) the material and spatial constitution of a given apparatus, its 
emergence or transformation over time, and the accompanying enunciations that are 
directly indexed to such emergence and transformation, with such that `what is seen' and 
`what is said' constitute an `evaporative surface effect'45 of the play of visibility and 
invisibility and enunciation curving through the development and transformation of 
institutional apparatuses in relation to one another. These `regimes of light' and `regimes of 
enunciation' determine the `enonces' which - according to Deleuze - are `affirmations' that 
`in turn can be traced back to lines of enunciation over which the differential positions of 
their elements are distributed'. If enonces are affirmations it is because we can actually 
perform this `tracing back' which takes us beyond any asserted primacy of the relationship 
between `subject' and `object' towards a recognition of their actual secondarity and in 
going `above that decisive turn' it becomes possible to survey the interrelating curves of 
light, enunciation and the enonces in terms of their `drifting, transformations and 
mutations'. In thinking of Foucault's work as philosophy, we can see this as another 
example of a `survey' of the pre-philosophical plane of immanence, one which in Spinozist 
terms challenges the propria of privation and provides an instance of a `common notion' 
that increases the relational capacity of composite bodies in the very act of tracing back. 
What we have here is a way of thinking about investment in terms of discerning the 
immanent constitution of subjectivity by means of the process of survey or cycling 
outwards to connect with the `outside'. The conception of enunciation and `enonces' as 
developed here and elsewhere in the work of Foucault and Deleuze is taken up along 
43 Cf., Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari 
(New York: Zone Books, 1992), p. 21. See also the remarks concerning the `event' below. 
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slightly modified lines by Guattari, whose own rendering of these linguistic operators will 
be put to work in chapter 2. 
The other two dimensions of the dispositif for Deleuze are made up by `lines of force' and 
`lines of subjectification'. The strange, unorthodox `linearity' of that Deleuze and Guattari 
use in so much of their work is invoked here. Another example of a common notion, 
`everything is made up of lines' this `linearity' provides further evidence that one need not 
necessarily get hung up on the `machine' every time, even if it is a question of desire that is 
at stake, which is the case here as we shall soon see. Lines of force as the third dimension 
inevitably takes up the Nietzschean problem of force when considered from the perspective 
of a play of forces (puissance) which become aggregated into relations of power (pouvoir). 
This is what leads Deleuze to call it the `dimension of power'. The final dimension, `lines 
of subjectification', implicitly dealing with the later of work of Foucault on sexuality, finds 
the primacy of a `self being challenged to the extent that it is always secondarily 
constituted out of processes of subjectification, and - as such - `it is a process of 
individuation which bears on groups and on people, and is subtracted from the power 
relations which are established as constituting forms of knowledge'. The significance of the 
group is most extensively dealt with in the solo writings of Guattari, the idea of 
`individuation' is one that Deleuze developed in Difference and Repetition, borrowing the 
term from the biological philosophy or Gilbert Simondon. 46 This is only mentioned to once 
again show what Deleuze and Guattari are describing when they state `each of us was 
already several', further indication of the bricolage, or synthetic construction that is 
46 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 246: '[I]ndividuation is what responds to the question 'Who? ', just as 
the Idea responds to the question 'How much? ' and 'How? '. 'Who? ' is always an intensity'. 
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operating here as elsewhere. It is in taking our impetus from this approach that we take 
leave of Deleuze's essay in order to bring in some `machine parts' of our own, in bring this 
conception of the dispositif into a connection with that of Lyotard. In Lyotard's Libidinal 
Economy, the dispositif becomes the dis positif, which - as Iain Hamilton Grant explains in 
his glossary to the work - is simultaneously - the dispositif of the social or institutional 
apparatus as we have seen from Deleuze's account of Foucault, with the hyphen serving to 
describe the two-fold tendential capacity of the apparatus both towards stabilization, 
regulation and order, but also towards dissimulation, or the proliferation of tensor-signs. 47 
Deleuze's description of the `drifting character' of the dipositif approximates this 
dissimulation if one considers it from the perspective of Lyotard's, or even that of the 
Situationist `derive '48 from which the former arguably takes its main inspiration. Whilst it 
is much more difficult to argue an `ethics' on the part of Libidinal Economy, given the 
extremes to which it resists critique as a method all together in its wanton proliferation of 
tensor-signs, than it is for Anti-Oedipus, the most `Nietzschean' of the Deleuze and Guattari 
books yet one that still plays host to critique, there is no reason to necessarily accord with 
such wantonness in invoking the dissimulating tendencies of the dis-positif or the `drift' of 
47 For a general definition of `tensor' cf. lain Hamilton Grant's `Glossary' in Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
Libidinal Economy, trans. lain Hamilton Grant (London: Athlone Press, 1993), pp. xiii-xiv, in which - directly 
linked to the dispositif as `the organization of the possibility of signs' - the tensor-sign both marks an attempt 
to `remain faithful to the incompossible intensities informing and exceeding the sign' and to provide a 
`description of this attempt'. Cf., the section of the book dedicated to fleshing out the tensor, pp. 43-94; For 
Deleuze and Guattari's account of the tensor cf. `November 20,1923: Postulates of Linguistics', from 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 97,99: 'All languages [... ] are in immanent continuous 
variation: neither synchrony nor diachrony, but asynchrony, chromaticism as a variable and continuous state 
of language'. The notion of chromaticisim resonates widely with music and will therefore, along with the 
descriptive tensor-sign figure extensively in what in the next two chapters. 
48 Cf., Sadie Plant, The Most Radical Gesture: The Situationist International in a Postmodern Age (London 
and New York, Routledge, 1992), p. 58: `[O]ne of psychogeography's principle means was the derive. Long a 
favourite practice of the dadaists, who organised a variety of expeditions, and the surrealists, for whom the 
geographical form of automatism was an instructive pleasure, the derive, or drift, was defined by the 
situationists as the "technique of locomotion without a goal"'; Also, cf., Felix Guattari, The Three Ecologies, 
trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London: Athlone Press, 2000), pp. 90-1 n. 5 1: `Guattari and Deleuze's idea 
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Lyotard, despite the contempt with which the libidinal Lyotard would greet such a 
suggestion. However, once again, we will save further consideration of this idea for the 
case-study, although once again it suffices to say for now that it is the ubiquitous presence 
of Spinoza in this project that will provide the means by which to bring this suggestion to 
the table. It is by emphasizing the Spinozan aspects of libidinal philosophy over the 
Nietzschean ones that usually take primacy whilst at the same time not neglecting the 
pivotal place of Nietzsche's work, that enables such an attempt. 
The conatus of Spinoza is what marks this striving in both human and non-human bodies 
and as such it is the name this project gives to `desire' if it has to give it a name. By survey, 
by constructing common-notions, by relating to the dispositif in this way, we begin to 
produce pragmatic constructions that enable us better to sound out the remit of immanent 
thinking and its ethical trajectory within the confines of a given institutional framework and 
thereby how effectively it might be possible to connect with the `outside'. The invocation 
of Spinoza here serves to challenge the view that libidinal philosophy necessarily does 
away with all criteria by which it would be possible to judge anything in the name of an 
unequivocal Nietzschean affirmation, as it is plain to see that for all the lofty declarations 
`to have done with judgement' and just say `Yes! ' that we read in Anti-Oedipus and the 
libidinal writings of Lyotard during the same period, we can say - at least when it comes to 
Anti-Oedipus if not Libidinal Economy - that it is possible to read this book ethically 
without falling into a postmodern 'impasse'49, and that Foucault's observation to this effect 
of the `schizo stroll' [... ] is a variation of the derive, and the introduced it into the domain of theory with their 
concept of nomadic thought'. 
49 The tragedy of the 'hasty' readings of Deleuze and Guattari is that their work - in particular -A Thousand 
Plateaus has been equated with the postmodernism of its time, which entirely misses both the rigour and 
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in the preface becomes all the more persuasive when one considers the implication of 
Spinoza in this work. That said, the problem of going `a synthesis too far' is one that is 
very much liable to persist. 50 Whilst this claim is problematic in the light of certain readings 
of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, as we have seen, it is not without sympathetic voices. 
Indeed, in many ways it is such a Spinozist approach to their work more generally that will 
inform what is to follow, in briefly examining an exemplary `case' of investment: the work 
of Brian Massumi. 
Making the Case: The Exemplary Embodiments of Brian Massumi 
I asked the question - the words that had been haunting me for so many weeks - 
'Where's the rest of me? "'. 
Ronald Reagan51 
From his translation of and foreword to A Thousand Plateaus, through his 1992 book A 
User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari, 
through numerous short yet highly dense articles to the introduction to his most recent 
edited collection Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Brian Massumi has 
produced some of the most fascinating and pragmatic responses to Deleuze and Guattari's 
work. He has gone as far as to cultivate a very particular style which - whilst undoubtedly 
inspired by the work he translated - remains somewhat different and quite singular. What 
makes his work for the most part exemplary is how he proceeds by way of synthesis, 
ethics informing this work. Furthermore, Guattari went out of his way both in his writing and in public to 
distance himself and his work from postmodernism on account of its 'ethical abdication', cf., Felix Guattari, 
`The Postmodern Impasse', in Gary Genosko [ed. ), The Guattari Reader (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell, 1996), pp. 109-114. 
50 This describes the perennial problem of where `one' is when one 'affirms' and that so long as `one' remains 
outside of the critique being performed or the residua of transcendence, or 'Reason' persist in playing a part, 
one forfeits the very claim to having embodied immanent processualiry, cf., lain Hamilton Grant, 'Book 
Review: Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History', in Parallax 5: 1: 1999, p. 127. 
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immanently engendering the processual logic he finds in the concepts and ideas providing 
the basis for his `deviations' in the moment of its articulation, not positing this as 
transcendental a priori given once and for all, nor as a structure that has any independence 
from its working illustrations or descriptions. Rather, he mobilizes carefully and rigorously 
a variety of concepts from Deleuze and Guattari by way of his chosen cases which - 
arguably even more than those of Deleuze and Guattari themselves - attain a degree of 
concreteness and corporeality that goes some way to addressing the criticism of their work 
expounded by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri that their work remains somewhat too 
`angelic'. 52 These cases are sometimes rather strange and seemingly irreverent, as in the 
two instances where he makes playful use of the `crumblings' of former actor and US 
President Ronald Reagan, but which usually serve as highly pertinent soundboards for his 
`deviations'. 
In addition to the synthetic `deviations', the relatively concrete `case', and the rigorous and 
careful unpacking of the `stories' using Deleuze-Guattarian innovations towards a survey of 
the wider philosophical and political concerns, we might add a considerable number of 
reasons as to why Massumi's work - for the most part - is exemplary. The `stories' that go 
to make up the cases in much of his work, and the ways in which he uses these as points of 
departure in terms of both analysis and conceptual synthesis provide us with a means of 
exploring any number of other cases where ambiguity and ambivalence are in play, which 
is something we will notice in abundance in the case of Miles Davis. In `The Bleed: Where 
Body Meets Image', the Reagan example is derived from his own auto-biographical 
s' Brian Massumi, `The Bleed: Where Body Meets Image', in John C. Welchman [ed. ], Re-Thinking Borders 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 24-5. 
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account of his dramatic ineptitude coupled with an abject experience he had during the 
filming of a scene from King's Row, in which he is once again `rigged', but this time in 
order to make him both look and seem to be an amputee. 
`Wan and worn' from a sleepless night, a despairing Reagan stumbled into the studio 
for the shoot. 
"I found the prop men had arranged a neat deception. Under the gay patchwork quilt, 
they had cut a hole in the mattress and put a supporting box beneath. I stared at it for 
a minute. Then, obeying an overpowering impulse, I climbed into the rig. I spend 
almost that whole hour in stiff confinement, contemplating my torso and the smooth 
undisturbed flat of the covers where my legs should have been. Gradually, the affair 
began to terrify me. In some weird way, I felt something horrible had happened to my 
body [... ] I heard [the director's] low voice call `Action! ' [... ] I opened my eyes 
dazedly, looked around, slowly let my gaze travel downward. I can't describe even 
now my feeling as I tried to reach for where my legs should be [... ] I asked the 
question - the words that had been haunting me for so many weeks - `Where's the rest 
of me? "'. 53 
Taking this account as a point of departure, Massumi brings together a revised Bergsonian 
conception of the image, with developments in the science of human physiology and 
Deleuze's own work using Bergson in the Cinema books, he shows how it becomes 
possible to make effective use of (auto-)biographical data in a way that not only does not 
revert to a personological or subjectivist rendering of this date, but actually moves away 
from such a rendering towards recognizing - following Deleuze's last published work, the 
`immanence' that makes up `a life'. To illustrate this point it seems pertinent once again to 
quote somewhat at length from the essay, at the point at which Massumi begins to unfold 
the significance of Reagan's attempt to account for his experience: 
Reagan must embody the scene of a man recognizing himself as irretrievably 
changed, as having been transported in total darkness and unbeknown to himself from 
one perspective on life to another that is irreconcilably different from it. The actor's 
labor is not one of the intellect: the act of recognition is the end result, not the means 
by which the scene's reality is produced. Acting is a labor of feeling, but not only 
52 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 28. 
5.3 Brian Massumi, `The Bleed: Where Body Meets Image', pp. 24-5. 
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that: the feeling is inseparable from motility. Reagan becomes a travelling rehearsal. 
He moves from one place to another, repeating the culminating phrase, `Where's the 
rest of me? ' He starts from a difference between two unbridgeable perspectives which 
in their disjunction encompass an entire life, as telescoped into the absolute distance 
between being able to walk and being a cripple. 4 
In unpacking this further, Massumi divides the story into three phases in order to develop 
his analysis/synthesis. There is not scope here to explore his use of all three phases, but 
observations made regarding the third phase alone should suffice to demonstrate what is at 
stake here: 
[P]hase three. The suspension of the suspense by the director's signal transports him 
across a blackout of vision into the space of transformation. The feeling that was 
welling inside his body bursts forth in a gesture and a phrase. He bolts up, crying his 
line [... ] An actual event really did occur [... ] The event he recreated has bled into 
his everyday life, colouring it for ever. Reagan laments that he has become a `semi- 
automaton' and will remain one as long as he is just an actor. The autonomic 
repetition into which he collapses during the preparatory phase leading up to the even 
has carried over into his everyday life. He can't go on that way. He resolves to find 
the rest of him. He will look for it in conservative politics. 55 
Okay, so here we have a deployment of the Deleuzian concept of the `event', elaborated 
most extensively in the Logic of Sense, to account for the way in which Reagan's rigging 
precipitates a real event that makes of `his' life, `a' life, whereby the horror of his 
`experience' is something that he feels he must in some way account for and overcome. He 
comes to mis-recognize himself as being a `semi-automaton' whereby he is overwhelmed 
by a sense of not being able to control his actions and reactions. The trajectory that Reagan 
ultimately pursues in order to achieve some kind of overcoming is - for Massumi - one of 
becoming a complete automaton: 
sa Ibid., p. 25. 
ss Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
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[I]f the event was in a sense real, and if it made him a semi-automaton, does that 
mean that finding the rest of him entails becoming a complete automaton? The 
answer is obvious to anyone familiar with his subsequent career. 56 
So here we have something of a refrain indexed to the proper names `Reagan' and 
`Massumi', explored in terms of the Deleuzian `event'57 with a mind to demonstrating once 
again that the `rigging' of the body is bound up with the autonomy of affect, with the 
ambivalence and uncertainty that this brings with it, and for all of the strangeness and 
horror that such an `experience' might entail, it does at least mean - for both Reagan and 
Massumi - that a problem has presented itself and that by attempting to produce a 
'diagram 58 of the problem we can move towards a constitutive conception of subjectivity 
that pursues a path of `identity-undifferentiation' that at once activates the potential for 
ethical transformation at the same time as a `participatory critique of capital'. Surveying 59 
56 Ibid., p. 27. 
57 The 'event' as already suggested is of major importance for Deleuze, figuring not only in The Fold, but also 
in The Logic of Sense where it undergoes its most rigorous elaboration. Pitting it against a Platonic conception 
of the 'simulacra', Deleuze here draws on the work of the Stoics to show how language plays at the surface of 
bodies - not coming from them - but nevertheless giving them their 'sense' and opening them up to the 
possibility of an 'incorporeal transformation', cf., Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 4-I 1 and passim. This idea 
connects with the attempt to draw a diagram of immanent processuality, or to survey towards an abstract 
machine, and it is the incorporeal transformation that transforms a body's relation(ality) with other bodies. 
58 The diagram as a tool for surveying immanence occurs frequently in the collaborative works and is 
deterritorialized from its use in the pragmatics and semiotics of C. S. Peirce. The term will be explored through 
Guattari's 'mixed semiotics' in chapter 2. 
59 The procedure of diagramming outlined here is taken up by Massumi in his book A User's Guide, using 
what once again seems like a silly story but one which serves clearly to show the Spinozist ethical dimension 
of this approach. It is the 'case' of the man that tries and fails to diagram his relational proximity to a 'dog' in 
his attempt to overcome hunger by going on all fours. The example further illustrates the danger inherent in 
overly-localized attempts at 'becoming' which result in the worst kinds of re-territorialization and re- 
Oedipalization, a danger that confronts not only the man's failed becoming in the story, but any attempt to 
work ethically with such concepts and approaches as we are here within the confines of the academic 
dispositif; Like Guattari, Massumi recognizes also that such diagrammatic procedures as those to which he 
draws our attention must also ultimately be considered - not only in relation to the ethical task of becoming - 
but also the ways in which such a task has to run the gauntlet of the dominant mode of social production, ie. 
Capitalism. For Massumian attempts at this, cf., 'Requiem for Our Prospective Dead: Towards a Participatory 
Critique of Capitalist Power', in Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin Jon Heller, New Mappings in Politics, 
Philosophy and Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 40-64, and also the final 
chapter of the User's Guide. The immanent critique of Capitalism developed in the last chapter of Anti- 
Oedipus remains one of the most controversial aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's work and not without 
justification, given that it makes the claim that Capitalism in its absolute decoding and deterritorialization - 
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outwards from a point of investment and attempting to pursue it `above that decisive turn' 
in experience in such ways as this demonstrates a fidelity - not so much to the names 
`Deleuze' and `Guattari' - but rather to the project of an ongoing and forever self-renewing 
transcendental empiricism that does not content itself with the well-trodden path of the 
cases explored by Deleuze and Guattari in their own works. 
Massumi therefore brings together all of the most pragmatic and workable aspects of 
Deleuze-Guattarian philosophy that we have encountered in this chapter, negotiating a 
complex of levels from the ostensibly-if-not-ultimately trite to the deadly serious. 
Diagramming Reagan diagramming his loss of self, Massumi brings a great many resources 
to the task of producing a detailed and rigorous analysis of `a' life, a close reading that does 
not necessarily entail what we would be given to understand a `hermeneutic' or even a 
`textual' reading, because it accedes to the extra-textual in the very process of 
simultaneously embodying and tracing back the diagram of affective constitutivity. 
Dispositions of Investment 2, Or Whatever Floats Your (Processual) Boat: Massumi 
and Cultural Studies 
There is only one general principle in ethics: no process line has the God-given "right" to 
tell another to "wink out" 
Brian Massumi60 
In an essay called `Too-Blue: Color-Patch for an Expanded Empiricism', published in the 
journal Cultural Studies, Brian Massumi has brought together all of the elements of his 
like the unconscious - 'knows no negativity'. However, it should be made clear that to understand this as a 
form of postmodern resignation is to miss the point, given that Capitalism remains ultimately bad to the extent 
that it always re-territorializes on 'archaic' territories: Oedipus, the nuclear family, the school, etc. The 
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exemplary approach to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari as outlined in the previous 
section to further explore the uses of philosophy for connecting with the `outside', this time 
put forward according to the idea of an `expanded empiricism' of the title of the piece. 
However, what singles out this thesis from the others is that it adopts a reflexivity with 
regard to the attempt to embody processuality from the perspective of what - for want of a 
better term - we might call `inter-disciplinarity', or perhaps even `infra-disciplinarity'. 61 
Using the case of the `color-patch' and the `missing shade of blue' derived from an 
empirical study by David Katz and the `radical empiricism' of the pragmatist philosopher 
William James as his point of departure, Massumi cycles outwards towards a diagramming 
of tendencies within different disciplines including those we might describe as the `hard' 
sciences as well as the arts and humanities in terms of their different modus operandi and 
the tendencies of their respective `process lines' towards convergence, in particular in the 
work of cultural studies. There is not sufficient space here to explore the given `case', but 
as we have already examined two examples of this aspect of Massumi's procedure, we shall 
this time instead focus on the place of cultural studies in relation to the processuality of an 
`expanded empiricism', which ultimately is a development and extension of Deleuze's 
62 notion of a `transcendental empiricism'. In building his argument towards the 
uncertainty at work in this conception of Capitalism needs to be explored in more detail, as does the 
fundamental question to which it is allied: 'is it possible to make the selection? ', cf., chapter 3. 
60 Brian Massumi, 'Too-Blue: Color-Patch for an Expanded Empiricism', Cultural Studies 14: 2: 2000, p. 216. 
61 See section on Guattari below. 
62 The paradoxical description of Deleuze's philosophical enterprise as a 'transcendental empiricism' goes 
back to his early book on the philosopher Hume and it should be emphasized that the 'transcendental' aspects 
of this philosophy are those that were shown to have derived from Kant's Critical project, but only to the 
extent that they are rendered immanent. Deleuze rejects the traditional definition of 'empiricism' and suggests 
that it be replaced by a relational one in which knowledge is not derived from experience so much as 
relationally embodied in or enacted through it, cf. Constantin V. Boundas, 'Translator's Introduction' in 
Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin 
V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 6: '[A] more helpful definition of empiricism, 
59 
consideration of cultural studies relation to processuality, Massumi discusses how science, 
art and philosophy - following the distinction made by Deleuze and Guattari in What is 
Philosophy? - come to embody process lines according to their respective embodiments of 
disciplinarity within the institutional dispositif. When it comes to cultural studies, however, 
Massumi makes a case for the claim that cultural studies might have taken a specific 
process line itself as its raison d'etre. 
A process line of this kind [... ] might [... ] be in a position to draw political 
effectivness from its movements, perhaps serving in some way as an arbiter in the 
mutual interferences, battles and negotiations between philosophy, science and art. It 
would distinguish itself from both art and philosophy by taking their political middle 
as its eventual terminus [... ] What would distinguish it from other political 
movements would be its base in cultural institutions such as the university, 
museum/gallery, think tank, and research centre. 63 
Whilst the argument that Massumi puts forward in this essay is about as complex and 
synthetically wrought as any that he has produced, the gist of his observations regarding 
cultural studies are not too difficult to summarize, given what we have laid out so far in 
terms of the uses of Deleuze and Guattari in this chapter. Effectively, Massumi is stating 
that cultural studies, rather than take anything as its `object', might rather object to such an 
approach by instead pursuing a project of diagramming in which those Manichean 
dichotomies or oppositions that we encountered earlier would be challenged in terms of 
their hegemonic status and immanently re-connected to the process-lines that expose their 
status as primary as a fallacious one and - in so doing - re-connect an `expanded- 
empiricism' of cultural studies to an ethical trajectory, which substitutes the need for any 
in Deleuze's estimate, must respect the irreducible dualism that exists between things and relations, atoms and 
structure, perceptions and their causes, and also relations and their causes'. Deleuze sees this definition 
operating in the 'associationism' of Hume's philosophy. 
6 Massumi, 'Too-Blue', p. 214. 
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object as such. However, Massumi claims that cultural studies may have had and lost its 
chance to do this, 
[T]his process line could well be cultural studies. But it isn't. Cultural studies has 
missed its processual boat [... ] As it is widely practised, cultural studies falls short of 
singularity at both limits because it clings to the notion that expression is of a 
particularity. It realizes that expression is always collective. But it takes the 
collectivity as already-constituted: as a determinate set of actually existing persons (in 
common parlance, a constituency). TM 
Massumi's argument here is that cultural studies has missed the opportunity to short-circuit 
its categorical relation to the particularity of (liberal democratic) constituency in the 
promotion of a more immanent constitutivity. Whilst Massumi might appear to many 
working in the field of cultural studies as somewhat jaded in his pretensions and even 
blatantly wrong - given that many people working in cultural studies are working to 
develop conceptions of the political that are far removed from a liberal democratic one - the 
pertinence of his point actually resides in the way in which he conceives of an alternative 
approach, which we can summarize by saying that in all of the examples that we have 
encountered so far from his work, what is most fundamentally at stake is a fidelity to 
process-in-itself, and the claim he makes for cultural studies is that - in attempting to re- 
conceptualize its relation(ity) in terms of `inter-disciplinarity' - it can come to embody the 
very procedure of an ethical diagrammaticism, an ethics along Spinozist lines which is 
constituted anew in each instance of its articulation whilst mapping immanence according 
to traits that cross each such instance (abstract machine). 
Now, what we encounter here is a claim for cultural studies that is not likely to be shared 
by all or even most of its practitioners. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, for many 
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this piece might represent what Meaghan Morris describes as a `hippy' approach to cultural 
studies, and certainly, at the points in the essay when Massumi appeals to notions of 
`belonging' and `togetherness', points at which he probably does himself few favours by 
selecting a vocabulary that is more readily associated with tree-huggers than rhizome- 
makers. 65 However, one more familiar with his work will more likely note that the rigour 
with which he deploys his Deleuze-Guattari-inspired approach merits a reading that goes 
against the grain of such esoteric baggage. 
The question of how to read such work as this returns us to the problem of investment, to 
the extent that it is a question of the orientation of a given investment and whether - in the 
case of Deleuze and Guattari's work - such an investment be oriented towards the 
promotion of their status or their names, in terms of what Rosi Braidotti calls a hysterical 
attachment to dead masters, 66 or whether - to follow both Braidotti and Morris - the 
investment should be oriented towards the survey of its own immanent constitutivity, a 
`nomadism' which does not place its faith in a `romanticized' conception of dispossession, 
migration or diaspora, but rather the promotion of irreducible, complex distribution of 
bodies and thought in a more empowering relation to the dispositif that more usually serves 
to confine. It is only by remaining sensitive to the problem of investment and its orientation 
that one can begin to avoid a dilettantish or vicarous relation to the kind of philosophy 
produced by Deleuze and Guattari in which the danger is always that one lumps things 
together in a way that permits a non-rigorous approach whereby anything goes and all that 
64 Ibid. 
65 Thanks to Kurt Hirtler for inspiring this particular rendering of Morris's observation. 
66 Cf., Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), p. 92. 
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is needed by way of legitimation is the idea that bricolage is about just going with the flow 
and following `whatever floats your (processual) boat'. As we have been attempting to 
show, however, throughout this chapter, is that such an approach does a tremendous 
disservice to a body of work that has so much more to offer than this. One final observation 
from Massumi's essay however, might serve to illustrate a means by which cultural studies 
might proceed against the grain of a parochial attachment to names and methods, in 
accordance with a highly useful notion developed in the work of Guattari, both alone and 
with Deleuze, the notion of transversality. 
There is only one general principle in ethics: no process line has the God-given 
"right" to tell another to "wink out". 67 
Here is an example of an ostensibly rather `hippy' proclamation which should be read 
against the esoteric grain to the extent that it embodies a Spinozist appeal to the conatus. 
More importantly, it promotes a relation(ality) between different approaches to cultural 
studies such that - whatever approach constitutes a given investment and in spite of any 
antagonisms - there might be a mutual recognition that between these approaches is likely 
to be a shared `knowledge-practice' whereby such traits can be explored across these 
different approaches: can rather than must, given the imperative not to `wink out' different 
process lines. As we mentioned earlier, work is being done in this area by John Protevi in 
his exploration of the transversal connections between Deleuze and Derrida. We shall 
attempt to produce a similar transversal cross-cutting of approaches, between Deleuze, 
Guattari and Adorno, in the next chapter. Firstly, it remains for us to consider one more 
approach to the work of Deleuze (though not Guattari) that we cannot afford to overlook 
67 Massumi, 'Too-Blue', p. 216. 
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and whose implications for the `case' are potentially far-reaching, the work of Alain 
Badiou. 
Taking Exception to the Case: Alain Badiou 
[A]ll those who have taken Deleuze to be the apostle of desire, flux, and animal anarchy 
will have apoplexy reading this book. 
Wad Godzich, on Alain Badiou's Deleuze: The Clamor of Being68 
Alain Badiou's book Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, published in English translation in 
2000 definitely deserves to be numbered amongst the more outstanding encounters with the 
work of Deleuze to have so far appeared in the language. A profoundly challenging and 
philosophical engagement, Deleuze really does cut to the chase in attempting to assess the 
value and status of its namesake's work by pursuing its claims right back to its overriding 
desire to `overturn Platonism', a desire not entirely shared by Badiou himself. In doing so it 
makes a number of equally fascinating and far-reaching statements to the effect that 
Deleuze - for all he professed to the contrary - was not ever a thinker of multiplicity, but 
rather one of Univocal Being, of the One, that he was never an `apostle of desire' but rather 
an ascetic aristocrat and that his Bergsonian leanings towards a `vitalist' philosophy of the 
`virtual' is fundamentally flawed due to an impossibility of accessing this latter by recourse 
to his, Deleuze's, purportedly ill-founded appeal to multiplicity. 
These remarkable objections - for all of their value in forcing a far more rigorous 
engagement with Deleuze's work - remain in some instances highly problematic and belie a 
form of tactical manoeuvring on the part of Badiou that challenges the extent to which his 
68 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchell (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000). Back cover. 
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arguments apply. One only need consult the list of texts he uses - none of which are any of 
the texts co-authored with Guattari -a somewhat mysterious omission given that 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia is his main target of criticism. This is not to say that the 
claims are wrong. Certainly, the image of `animal anarchy' dear to some readers is 
problematic, as are the ways in which postmodern `proliferating rhizomes' are often 
misguided. 69 Certainly, the idea that Deleuze was something of an ascetic aristocrat also 
has some mileage. This is an area that certainly needs to be investigated further, as - in 
terms of the kind of ethics proposed here - the perpetually renewed appeal to affirmation, 
openness and the `outside' might actually disguise an underlying asceticism that - when one 
takes up the gauntlet of Deleuze's `experiments' in `life' - might ultimately doom any such 
endeavour to fulfilling its opposite and coming to embody all that this entails, whether 
figured in terms of Oedipus, neurosis, subjectivation, or even fascistic, `cancerous' Bodies 
without Organs. 70 In short, it is a problem that cuts to the core of Deleuze's philosophy and 
may show that its commitment to a false conception of the `multiple' might leave it prey to 
the very fears and dangers that Deleuze and Guattari warn us about throughout all of their 
work together. 
For all of the gravity of these objections, it is the connected problem of the `case' that is 
perhaps most fascinating and, in terms of this thesis, the most pressing. We have already 
witnessed the value of the case in Massumi's work, a fact not without direct Deleuze- 
Guattarian inspiration. Largely through a reading of the Cinema books, Badiou brings 
together his armoury of highly explosive philosophical charges in attempting to show that 
69 Cf., Peter Dews, `Uncategorical Imperatives: Adorno, Badiou and the Ethical Turn', in Radical Philosophy 
111: 2001, p. 33. 
65 
this perennial appeal to the case is flawed and that it ultimately serves to make of the 
repetition of difference only the repetition of Deleuze's difference, one that hands the 
concept back over to identity, the very place from which it was supposed at all costs to 
avoid. The claims do not only have potentially severe import for Cinema 1 and 2 but for the 
whole enterprise undertaken in A Thousand Plateaus, a profoundly case-based book, and 
therefore highly notable by its absence from Deleuze. As the next two chapters will attempt 
to produce a kind of `diagram' of the pragmatic efficacy of Deleuze and Guattari's work as 
it pertains to the `non-philosophy' of music and will take the form of a `case', that of Miles 
Davis, it only seems pertinent to dwell a little longer on what Badiou might possibly mean 
by the case, why it might or may not be problematic, and how it actually figures within 
these works. 
Towards the beginning of his essay, and with the quite remarkable lucidity and erudition 
characteristic of this work generally gets right to the philosophical heart of the matter in 
singling out the `case' as the prerequisite locus of mediation between a concept and the 
world and therefore, a priori, a condition of possibility of Deleuze's philosophy of 
difference. 
It is always a question of indicating particular cases of a concept. If you do not first 
start with a particular case, you are claiming to go from the concept to the variety that 
it subsumes. In this way, you reestablish the Platonic transcendence of the Idea, and 
you show yourself to be unfaithful the Nietzschean program that, constantly evoked 
by Deleuze, designates the "overturning of Platonism" as the contemporary 
philosophical task. Immanence requires that you place yourself where thought has 
already started, as close as possible to singular case and the movement of thought. 7' 
70 On the `empty' Body without Organs, cf., Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 163. 
71 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, trans. Louise Burchell (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 14. Emphasis added. 
66 
Here again, Badiou parts company with Deleuze, this time on his formulation of the 
`contemporary philosophical task', which Badiou holds to be flawed in that in trying too 
hard to get away from Plato Deleuze ends up doing the opposite. Also, that Badiou's net of 
philosophical entrapment is indeed intricately woven is something in evidence here, with 
the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy, the question of ethics and 
affirmation, the efficacy of the `image of thought' and the appeal to a notion of the virtual, 
all up for grabs. 
What we saw in Difference and Repetition (incidentally, but certainly not co-incidentally 
the main target of Badiou's own `overturning' endeavour), is that Deleuze attempted to 
counteract the tendency in much philosophy to maintain that there is a fundamental relation 
between the concept and identity. In sidestepping the general-particular dyad by way of the 
`concrete universal', one can avoid positing transcendence or `illegitimate' transcendental 
conditions by enabling an encounter with irreducible, complex, constitutive difference in a 
rigorous, immanent, `synthetic' fleshing out of its dynamism. What Badiou claims here is 
that in order to have any plausibility such a move must always proceed by way of the case 
and that a failure to do so would engender the re-instatement of the relation between 
concept and `variety' and all that goes with it (quality-quantity, generality-particularity, 
etc. ) on the rocky road back to identity. In claiming this role for the case, Badiou is saying 
that an omission of this essential mediating move will lead back to a `Platonic 
transcendence of the Idea' and away from the Nietzschean project of activation and 
affirmation. 
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So what might be an example of the case? Well, for Badiou a number of Deleuze's own 
books constitute cases. 
Certainly, the starting point required by Deleuze's method is always a concrete case. 
This is what explains that there is no significative difference for him, between what 
is, in appearance, a "dogmatic" treatise (Difference and Repetition, for example), a 
text falling within the domain of the history of classical philosophy (Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza), the dialogue with a great contemporary (Foucault), a general 
survey of a particular art (Cinema 1 and Cinema 2), or a meditation on a writer 
(Proust and Signs). 72 
I believe that in a good deal of the foregoing we have accounted quite extensively for the 
elliptical openness and interaction between the `dogmatic' and `historical' texts of Deleuze. 
What now remains to be done is to introduce a more expressly `non-philosophical' 
instance. Badiou points us in the direction of perhaps the most obvious and exemplary 
instance of such works: the two books on Cinema. To focus on this example and the 
accompanying observations of Badiou, one can begin to witness the import of his globally 
applied argument unfold. 
In effect, Deleuze in no way considers his exposure to cases-of-thought related to the 
cinema (however thorough this exposure may be) as being equivalent to producing a 
theory of cinema. The end of Cinema 2 makes it absolutely clear that his entire 
enterprise is proposing a creative repetition of concepts and not an apprehension of 
the cinematic art as such: "The theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema, but on 
the concepts of the cinema" (Cinema 2, p. 280). 73 
Reading Deleuze to the letter here, Badiou shows that the aim of Deleuze's writings on 
cinema, as an instance of his entire oeuvre, are bound up with conceptual creation, 
transcendental empiricism and immanence. Film is a material apparatus, it is - if you will - 
72 Ibid. Badiou is not strictly correct when he describes the case as `concrete', given that the concrete is 
always parallel to the incorporeal or 'ideal' dimension of immanent processuality, which is why the 
expression 'more-or-less' has been used in this thesis. Brian Massumi characteristically appeals to paradox to 
express this in the title of the introduction to his most recent book, cf., 'Introduction: Concrete is as Concrete 
Doesn't', in Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, pp. 1-22. This resonates with Badiou's attempt to disavow 
Deleuze's philosophy of its claim to virtuality, a claim challenged in the current project through the 
systematic attempts to survey the abstract machines of the chosen case in chapters 2 and 3. 
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a dispositif, with its curvatures of visibility and enunciation, its lines of force and 
subjectivation, just as philosophy within its respective milieu of institutional academia. 
This begs the question, if philosophy has its concepts, and yet forms no more or less of an 
`assemblage' than does cinema, sharing material, ideal, semiotic traits all interacting in 
their occupation of a mutually shared pre-philosophical plane of immanence, then surely 
cinema must be capable of producing its own concepts? 
Deleuze's answer to this question is quite obviously, yes, cinema does have its own 
concepts. And yet there is a question that follows off from the previous one which still 
needs to be answered. If cinema's concepts are `its' own, autonomous from those of 
philosophy, then why don't philosophers stick to their own and leave cinema to carry on its 
inventions independently of the intervention or mediation of philosophy? This question is 
profoundly more difficult to answer, and, according to Badiou, Deleuze's answer gives the 
lie to his shortcomings. 
[B]ecause "cinema's concepts are not given in cinema", "philosophy must produce 
the theory [of cinema] as conceptual practice" [... ]74 
So philosophy must intervene by producing a theory to show that cinema has concepts that 
are its own. This problem - for the work on cinema, and for the whole of Deleuze's own 
pragmatics of non-philosophy - remains fundamental, and needs to considered far more 
extensively than it has been so far. According to Badiou, the case ultimately fails, because 
of the intervening gesture of philosophy and the fact that this gesture belies an inability to 
demonstrate cinema's immanent embodiment of material, ideal and semiotic difference 
73 Badiou, Deleuze, p. 16. 
74 Ibid. 
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without always already making it the subject of philosophy. Had Badiou sought to make 
use of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, he might have heightened the apoplexy of 
affirmation-happy Deleuzians by calling this `capture'. 
Everything that is wrong with this case is also what Badiou finds wrong with all of 
Deleuze's work where it cannot be extricated from his conception of the multiple: virtuality 
can never be surveyed because it is always-already actual; the simulacrum does not bring is 
closer to the One-all but leaves us perpetually tied to its arbitrariness; the image of thought 
as a virtual image can never be intuited. The last of these objections is most resonant here, 
as the pre- or non-philosophical `image of thought' is what might enable a workable 
pragmatic connection between cinema, or music, or painting, or literature, and conceptual 
innovation and thought, but how can we even begin to do this when the philosophy that 
claims to be able to is built around such a pre- or non- philosophical `image of thought' that 
it is supposedly incapable of intuiting? 
Let us understand that, under the constraint of the case of cinema, it is once again, 
and always (Deleuze's) philosophy that begins anew and that accuses cinema to be 
there where it cannot, of itself, be. 75 
As always, Badiou is more than happy to give credit where he considers it due, portraying 
Deleuze in a way that reminds one of Deleuze's own portrait of Kant, an `affectionate' one 
of an 'enemy'. 76 In making a positive claim regarding Deleuze's concept creation as 
follows: 
[W]hat counts is the impersonal power of the concepts themselves that, in their 
content, never deal with a "given" concrete instance, but with other concepts: "A 
theory of cinema is not `about' cinema, but about the concepts that it generates" [... ] 
7s Ibid. 
76 Massumi, `Translator's Foreword', in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. x. 
70 
The entire interest of these cases lies in this generation, but what is generated bears 
no resemblance to the generating power. 77 
Badiou does not therefore deem the enterprise of the cinema studies to be without merit, in 
that he concedes that cinema has the power to generate concepts but that these concepts 
remain wholly in the province of philosophy, or the movement of the concepts pertaining to 
philosophical thought and it is the interrelation between the concepts themselves that 
Badiou views positively. So one can embark from cinematic concepts to produce 
connections with other concepts, and this would be the limit of the case's function. 
Ultimately, concepts, which are never "concepts-of', are only attached to the initial 
concrete case in their movement and not in what they give to be thought. This is why, 
in the volumes about the cinema, what one learns concerns the Deleuzian theory of 
movement and time, and the cinema gradually becomes neutralized and forgotten. 78 
In summary, Badiou's argument here is that the `repetition of difference' of Deleuze is not 
a ubiquitous, immanent, multiplicitious repetition of difference independent of being 
indexed to a proper name, but - on the contrary - that in the case of cinema it is simply the 
repetition of Deleuze's difference, his concepts and their perpetually re-worked, re- 
constructed interactions in the course of his work. The case is never concrete, but rather 
serves as a much more limited motor for proliferating abstractions, from which the case is 
not independent or autonomous. Furthermore, this philosophy is - according to Badiou - not 
schizophrenic, but systematic. This abstraction and systematization must be distinguished 
from the generality of subsumed variation in the concept, but nevertheless this does not 
prevent the concept - via the case - from returning to itself. 
Care must be taken not to forget that what is submitted to this trial by the adventitious 
multiple of cases never stops experiencing itself as self-identical. For it is the fact that 
a concept, traversing the illimited determination of cases, reunites with itself and that 
77 Badiou, Deleuze, p. 16. 
78 Ibid. 
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it supplely resists the variation of that which calls upon it to return, that constituted 
the only possible protocol of validation for this concept. 79 
So, it would seem, the concept does not escape identity, but nevertheless retains a 
thoroughly philosophical value and status in terms of the inter-relation between different 
concepts. It is this alternative path towards a Deleuzian philosophy of univocity that Badiou 
follows, and it is his view that in doing so, unlike Deleuze's more acephalic disciples, is 
remaining faithful to the true philosophical value of Deleuze's work. We have covered the 
basic ground which constitutes the fabric of Badiou's arguments to come, and he himself 
summarizes according to three principles. 
1. This philosophy is organized around a metaphysics of the One. 
2. It proposes an ethics of thought that requires dispossession and asceticism. 
3. It is systematic and abstract. "O 
It is clear that Deleuze: The Clamor of Being is a highly valuable and enormously important 
work, a work that forces many presumptions to be carefully reconsidered, that throws the 
gauntlet down to the `animal anarchists'. Badiou views Deleuze's enterprise as generating a 
supreme philosophy of univocity rather than multiplicity, which doubtless opens up some 
very exciting possibilities for future uses of his thought. However, as we suggested at the 
beginning of this engagement, Badiou does play a little freely in what he accepts and what 
he rejects, certainly if one reads his work in the wider context of the collaborations with 
Guattari, which, not only not necessarily an appeal to animal anarchy, provide the means by 
which Badiou's objections force a re-consideration of the multiple in Deleuze and 
Guattari's works, collectively and individually, whereby their philosophy of One-all is not 
79 Ibid. 
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simply `adventitious', but workable, philosophically amenable, pragmatic and affirmative 
in a way that is perhaps more sober yet more nuanced than an impatient declaration of `yes' 
is likely to bring to anyone's attention. 
The partial fulfilment of this task will form the primary objective of the remaining two 
chapters. Furthermore, taking something of an impetus from Badiou in actually taking the 
trouble to problematize rather than presuppose the self-evident validity of a case, we will 
attempt to address his objections and at the same time engender something of an analytic- 
synthetic re-rendering of some key innovations of Deleuze and Guattari that will aim to put 
them to work in useful ways and simultaneously shed some light on the extent of their 
pragmatic remit. 
None, One or Several Guattaris?: The Pragmatic Constructions of 'the Other Guy'81 
What was realityfor Felix? [... J [B]etween production of subjectivity and machinic 
heterogeneity, in his chaosmosis universe ... I've never experienced such a full immersion in the real as when I gave myself over to Felix's neologismatic madness. 
Antonio Negri82 
80 Ibid., p. 17. The issue of the One-multiple is a very complex one that runs to the very core of the debate 
between Badiou and Deleuze, and though it will figure to some extent in the elaboration of the case of Miles 
Davis, what will ultimately transpire to be of more import here will be the other two points. 
8' Gregg Lambert's recent book makes a reference to Guattari as the 'other guy' which the author qualifies by 
saying that 'there has been a tendency in the French reception of Deleuze's work, to present a clean and 
shaven portrait of the philosopher [Deleuze] which has amounted to extracting a purely philosophical Deleuze 
from its admixture with the presence of Guattari', cf., Gregg Lambert, The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, 
p. x. and p. 159n1. This argument is not however restricted to the French reception of Guattari, as more often 
than not his own contributions to the collaborations are not distinguished from those of Deleuze whose solo 
imprint almost always finds its way into the proceedings. Having made this observation he goes on to criticize 
Badiou for his neglect of the collaborative works in his dismissal of Deleuze's animal anarchy, but it seems 
that Lambert is himself perpetuating the clean-shaven image of Deleuze on occasions by not given Guattari 
due consideration, even when discussing the collaborative works. For example, cf., ibid., p. 140-1, when - in 
discussing their work on Kafka - Lambert refers to Deleuze alone. The only writers who seems to have taken 
the cause of Guattari up to any extent so far are Charles Stivale and Gary Gensoko. Incidentally, Stivale's 
work in The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari seems to most closely resemble that undertaken in 
this project, although Stivale seems a little reluctant to explore the limitations of Deleuze and Guattari's own, 
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In describing the key innovations of `Deleuze' and `Guattari', it has becoming increasingly 
pressing to place a renewed emphasis on the contributions of allied to the name of the 
latter. As we saw earlier, in the `humour' of the Deleuze and Guattari of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia it became necessary to run the gauntlet of the dangers and limitations that 
the project was in many ways designed to expose and overcome to strategically open the 
reader to an alternative register in which approaches based on more established regimes 
could simultaneously be challenged and subject to critical and pragmatic investigation. 
Now, we ourselves are forced to do like by running the gauntlet of everything that has so 
far been said regarding the problem of putting too much faith in the proper name, by 
attempting to redress a profound imbalance in the reception of Guattari's solo writing as 
compared to that of Deleuze. Furthermore, it is necessary to raise the stakes even further by 
challenging the claim that - in dealing with the collaborative works it is both futile and 
entirely unfaithful to the project to attempt a separation between the bits attributable to 
Deleuze and those of Guattari. Such a precarious task must necessarily be undertaken and 
with great precaution, because it is not so much an attempt to discern who did which bits 
and thereby perform a personological enclosure that falls foul of the propria of `sovereign 
subjectivity' so much as to further index investment to process by shedding more light on 
the `pick-up' of ideas and concepts that constitute the collaborative works. 
The overriding problem with the existing secondary work on Deleuze and Guattari is that - 
whether discussing the individual or collective efforts - it is nearly always the name of 
Deleuze that takes primacy, not just in order of appearance, but, much more importantly, in 
not pushing the question of 'why use their work' to a sufficient remove. Gensosko's work shall be discussed 
briefly below. 
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that far more energy and thought has been devoted to the innovations that we know to be 
those of Deleuze and - in the worst instances - the name of Guattari is completely absented 
and - at best - the bits one is not sure were actually done by Deleuze are described as being 
done by `Deleuze and Guattari'. There are a good many reasons why this is highly 
unfortunate and actually unfaithful to the primacy of processuality in their work, some of 
which we have already encountered and others that need to be elucidated. Firstly, we know 
that a proper name, along the lines of the philosophy that is at work here, can either 
function as a tensor-sign or mark a global person with fixed, discernible attributes and 
characteristics. One must also remember that this disjunction can be both exclusive 
(either/or) and inclusive (either ... or... or) and - given that the dual perspectives of the molar 
and molecular are constantly in play in relation to one another - inclusion and exclusion can 
simultaneously both be in play. For all that has been said and said again regarding the 
ethical or etho(nto)logical orientation of this philosophy and what it makes of the 
`individual', the `subject', the `author', the `proper name', etc., it is remarkable how in 
repeatedly advocating this line the name of Deleuze is perennially invoked. It must be 
admitted, certainly when the aim is a re-assessment along the lines of the one being 
attempted here - that this is something of an occupational hazard. However, what seems 
harder to accept is the extent to which this capture has been effected specifically with 
regard to `Deleuze' and - until very recently - has almost always subordinated the name 
`Guattari'. The suggestion being made here is that the name of Deleuze has been lauded to 
a far greater extent that that of Guattari, and that this symptomatizes the capture that has 
taken place, making of Deleuze a statistical aggregate and at the same time an `object' of 
82 Cited in Stivale, The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, p. 289. 
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fetishistic investment. This is the first reason why the overemphasis on `Deleuze' is 
problematic. 
The second reason why this is so is that the cult of Deleuze has intensely overshadowed the 
tremendously complex and prolific work that Guattari did which - despite the fact that he 
was never an `academic' intellectual as such - was ultimately no less philosophical or 
pragmatic than the work that Deleuze produced on his own. In glossing between the names 
when discussing the joint works it is this complexity and density that largely gets lost or 
overlooked. Amongst the many innovations that are to be found when Guattari is writing 
alone are the following: the re-orientation of the psychoanalytic `transference' along the 
`transversal' lines of the group-subject, the ethico-aesthetic paradigm, the re-articulation of 
subjectivity and subjectification along processual lines by creating a new conception of the 
`machine', the concept of `faciality', the immanent critique of the place of the signifier in 
the psychoanalytic institution and more generally a longstanding commitment to the 
overturning of the `despotic sign' by adapting Hjelmslevian glossematics.. There are many 
more that could be added to the list, however to do so would entail the risk of a 
`redemptive' assessment of Guattari's work that would leave us firmly in the register of an 
exclusive disjunction and the `metaphysics of sovereign subjectivity'. If it is necessary to 
list these developments it is only to demonstrate that so many of the pragmatic possibilities 
that are in place for the extension and development of this kind of philosophy come from 
somewhere other than the work of Deleuze, and in addition to the value of the `machine' 
which we have already encountered, we should consider what the other Guattarian 
innovations might contribute to addressing the problems and objections that have been 
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raised here as well as those of Badiou, to the turns that this thought has hitherto taken, in 
particular Guattari's emphasis on immanent linguistics and the highly valuable concepts of 
`transversality' and of `faciality'. It is worthwhile to examine some of these aspects in more 
detail, in part by recourse to the work of Gary Genosko. 
In an excellent section from his recently published and timely book, Felix Guattari: An 
Aberrant Introduction, entitled `Deleterious Deleuziana' Genosko makes the point very 
pronouncedly that Guattari has almost always been confined to the margins of Deleuze- 
Guattari reception, despite so many `synthetic' contrivances that profess to redress the 
imbalance: 
Deleuze and Guattari. D+G. D/G. D-G. D&G. DaG. Deleuzo-Guattarian. Philosopher 
and psychoanalyst/activist. No matter how creative the combination, no matter how 
wily or woolly the disjunction, conjunction or connection, none adequately evoke the 
remarkable accomplishments of Deleuze and Guattari's collective projects and all beg 
the question of how they worked together, apart [... ] [T]he very proliferation of these 
shorthand designations across the secondary and tertiary literatures suggests the 
search for a means to express a creative collaboration, what Deleuze referred to as an 
"assembling [a work] between us, neither union nor juxtaposition", whose present 
fate has been in too many instances to render the `co-` of co-authorship inoperative. 83 
Genosko views this marginalization as an instantiation of the order-word assemblage at the 
heart of Deleuze and Guattari reception and is perhaps the first commentator to go so far as 
declaring that their collaborative efforts should indeed be considered in terms of individual 
contributions to the pick-up of ideas, a view shared here. 
83 Gary Genosko, Felix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction (London and New York: Continuum Press, 2002), 
p. 41. Yet another in one of the many recent contributions to the burgeoning field of Deleuze-Guattari studies, 
this book also came out during the writing of this project and therefore has not received the attention it 
undoubtedly warrants as what seems to be one of the most pertinent commentaries to have come out in quite 
some time. 
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Perhaps the first thing to point out is that, alongside the synthetic procedures that doubtless 
derived from Deleuze's earlier monographs, the most ubiquitous procedural aspect of A 
Thousand Plateaus alongside the attempt at an embodiment of the syntheses of connection, 
disjunction and conjunction, is the use of a revised Hjelmslevian glossematics, developed 
primarily in the solo work of Guattari as part of his materialist semiotics, and whose 
ubiquity will make its mark on the forthcoming case-study at numerous critical junctures. 
Genosko, along with one other commentator, Bruno Bosteels, has provided the most 
incisive and succinct account of how this adapted glossematics works. 
What is most important about the choice of Hjelmslev, as opposed say to that of Saussure, 
is that it provides the scope for re-integrating the operations of language back into a 
materialist framework, which serves to limit signification to a relatively narrow field of 
operation as part of a wider network of systemic interactions. To quote Genosko, 
For Hjelmslev, there is an unformed "thought-mass" common to all languages called 
purport (matter) [... ] [P]urport is like sand, Hjelmslev suggests [... ], formed in 
different ways in different moulds [... ] [P]urport is formed into substance. 84 
Language is therefore bound up with the formation of material substance, and in fact, it is 
only in the process of ordering matter that matter can be called substance. 
Hjelmslev remarks in one of his most famous examples - which Guattari also quotes 
[... ] - [that] form is "projected on to the purport, just as an open net casts its shadow 
down on an undivided surface" [... ] [F]orm is not concrete - the net - but abstract - its 
shadow. 85 
This non-hylomorphic formation of matter into meta-stable substance is crucial to 
' 10,000B. C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is? )', the plateau ofA 
84 Gary Genosko, Undisciplined Theory (London: Sage, 1998), p. 122. 
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Thousand Plateaus that makes most explicit and extensive use of the Hjelmslevian schema 
in the elaboration of their stratoanalysis, and the process of `double-articulation'. 86 
As Genosko makes clear, the notion of double-articulation draws directly upon Hjelmslev's 
`net', and in so doing, brings into play the other aspects of his glossematics: 
Deleuze and Guattari [... ] play on the `net' motif in suggesting that Hjelmslev wove 
one out of the strata of expression, content, matter, substance and form. 87 
The formation of purport or matter into substance is not abstract in the sense in which 
Badiou speaks of the term (an example of Guattari's contribution to the collaborations 
serving to contest Badiou's criticism of Deleuze), in that the word `abstract' does not here 
describe a stable system of categorical determinations but rather a logic of immanent 
processuality in which a complex of heterogeneous aspects function in reciprocal 
presupposition (as with the three syntheses) which will manifest at the level of language or 
enunciation with the latter operating once again as an effect at the surface of processual 
interactions. The aspects described here are the ones to which Genosko refers in addition to 
the ones already discussed: expression, and content. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 40: '[A]rticulate twice, B-A, BA. This is not at all to say that 
the strata speak or are language based. Double articulation is so extremely variable that we cannot begin with 
a general model, only a relatively simple case. The first articulation chooses or deducts, form unstable 
particles-flows, metastable molecular or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a statistical 
order of connections and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes functional, compact, stable 
structures (forms), and constructs the molar compounds in which these structures are simultaneously 
actualized (substances) [... ] [S]ubstances are nothing other than formed matters'. This shows a number of 
things in addition to illustrating the stratoanalytic rendering of the form-substance relation. Firstly, it shows 
how the molar/molecular relation is articulated, where the term 'articulated' becomes both linguistic and 
processual, therefore it becomes 'strategic' in the sense of the term deployed in this project, that is - 
pertaining to the strata and the processes of (de-)stratification. Secondly, it shows that the language of 
geology has a high co-efficient of deterritorialization that makes it amenable to a theory of 'morals' as well as 
a materialist semiotics, via geology's own vocabulary for analyzing process and immanent materialist 
inscription on the order of strata (extension) and de-stratification (in-tension or thought). 
87 Genosko, Undisciplined Theory, p. 122. 
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The schema is greatly nuanced by the incorporation of expression and content, because the 
formation of matter into substance proceeds tendentially or dynamically between two 
abstract planes, a plane of content and a plane of expression, where the forms coalesce and 
coagulate in their double-pincer movement of stratification. This complex two-fold 
formation of substance is once again most incisively captured by Genosko, in his 
invocation of Jürgen Trabant's representation of the schema [see fig. I]: 
[T]he unilateral arrows on both the expression and content sides represent the 
formation of purport into substance. The bi-directional arrows in the centre between 
expression form and content form show that the sign-function is de-materialized into 
pure form. 88 
This description of the sign-function doubtless recalls that of Saussure's signifier-signified 
dyad, a connection that not lost on Hjelmslev. As such, whilst it introduces matter into the 
sign it does so in a way that effectively enforces the two abstract planes of expression and 
content of being separable from one another, and therefore, again recalling Spinoza's own 
definition of substance, betraying the movement of immanence because a univocal 
substance cannot be limited by something outside of itself, otherwise it is not univocal. 89 
88 Ibid. 
89 Cf., Spinoza, Ethics, I, `Of God', D3: '[B]y substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived 
through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be 
formed'. 
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This is where Guattari's innovation comes in: he realizes the potential in Hjelmslev's 
schema that makes the relation between the planes reversible so that the matter that is 
articulated in the formation of content in a given more-or-less concrete instance is from 
another perspective constitutive of a formation of expression and vice versa: 
I believe I've found a valid alternative to the structuralism inspired by Saussure, one 
that relies on the Expression/Content distinction formulated by Hjelmslev, that is to 
say, based precisely on the potential reversibility of Expression and Content. Going 
beyond Hjelmslev, I intend to consider a multiplicity of expressive instances, whether 
they be of the order of Expression and Content. Rather than playing on the 
Expression/Content opposition which, with Hjelmslev, still repeats Saussure's 
signifier/signified couplet, this would involve putting a multiplicity of components of 
Expression, or substances of Expression in parallel, in polyphony. 90 
Having made this innovation, Guattari - as with so many of his ideas - will subject it to 
continual complexification and refinement, and the sheer extent of this complexity is 
immediately apparent from even a cursory examination of Genosko's recent book, in 
particular, when examining the myriad diagrams of the `four functorial domains'. 91 
Cutting through this complexity, two diagrams have been incorporated into the illustrations 
of this project just to give an idea of how all of this is perceived to work. Firstly, in the 
90 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 23. The conception of polyphony at work here derives from Bakhtin and is one of a 
number of music-derived terms that Guattari, alone and with Deleuze will mobilize for their high co-efficients 
of deterritorialization or transversality, which can now be more concretely specified as describing the 
potential for cutting across the planes of content and expression as so many ordinates of deterritorialization. 
There will plenty of occasions to witness this in the next two chapters, and in chapter 3a considerably more 
detailed embodiment of Guattari's adapted glossematics will be put forward. 
91 Genosko, Felix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction, pp. 194-227. Deleuze and Guattari have variously 
deployed rectilinear schemata for the operations of language, space-time, memory, and also music. This 
represents a strategic attempt to open the triangle of bi-univocal relations, the arborescent schema or dogmatic 
image of thought, to the outside (thought), via the subtractive operation of n-I dimensions, whereby the fourth 
'corner' of the rectangle is a point that extends into a line that deterritorializes the rectangle, a line that plots 
an abstract, intensive diagonal that de-stratifies whatever has been doubly-articulated in any given more-or- 
less concrete instance. This is the pragmatic value of the diagram, that it enables an initial schematization of 
relational interaction (of language, thought, matter, etc. ) to be refined, an operation that proceeds along 
similar lines to the 'dualism' of Bergson, in order to 'go above that decisive turn'. 
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diagram accompanying the essay entitled `The Place of the Signifier in the Institution'92 it 
becomes immediately clear how the adapted glossematics relativizies the role played by 
signification and how its remit does not extend into the domains of material processuality, 
rendered in this instance according to Guattari's distinction between `signifying 
semiologies', `a-semiotic encodings' and `asignifying semiotics' [see fig. 2]93 What is of 
primary interest here is that, by marginalizing the role played by signifying semiologies, 
Guattari has provided a way of diagramming the way materialist semiotics actually function 
as part of the (psychiatric) institution. Research needs to be done to see how this plays out 
at a more deterritorialized level in relation to non-psychiatric institutions, such as academia, 
a far cry from the aristocratic asceticism that Badiou ascribes to Deleuze. Such a project 
might take as its point of departure Guattari's idea of `intra-disciplinarity'. 
I am interested in an "intradisciplinarity" that is capable of traversing heterogeneous 
fields and carrying the strongest charges of "transversality" 94 
A third diagram illustrates how the relations between formed content and expression relate 
to the functions of denotation and referentiality relative to the diagram, abstract machine, 
affect and of particular importance, the function of enunciation and - to invoke another 
deterritorialized musical term the `ritornello' [see fig. 3], this latter significant not only for 
92 F61ix Guattari, The Place of the Signifier in the Institution', in Genosko [ed. ], The Guattari Reader, 
pp. 148-57. 
Bruno Bosteels has summarized this complex distinction quite beautifully in his excellent essay 'From Text 
to Territory: Felix Guattari's Cartographies of the Unconscious', in Kaufman and Heller [eds. ], New 
Mappings, pp. 145-74, cf., p. 162: '1. A-semiotic encoding functions without constituting an autonomous and 
translatable, semiotically formed substance, and thus operates outside of the strata of glossematics [... ] 2. 
Semiologies of signification operate with systems of signs ordered into semiotically formed substances along 
the two planes of content and expression. 3. A-signifying, diagrammatic semiotics exceed the double- 
articulation of already semiotically formed substances into content and expression: they work flush with the 
real, beneath the representational functions of signification and designation, and they have direct purchase on 
the continuum of material flows in the purport (for example, musical transcriptions, technological planes, 
scientific descriptions, to which Guattari in his last book adds the example of hypertexts)'. Emphasis added. 
94 Cited in Stivale, The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, p. 289. This idea will be put to the test 
when Deleuze and Guattari are brought into conjunction with Adorno in the next chapter. 
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this reason but also because the way it nuances the conception of affect in a way that will 
be crucial to the case of Miles Davis (see chapter 2). 95 
Bruno Bosteels points us in the direction of a no less crucial aspect of the rectilinear 
diagramming of semantic, signifying, semiological, a-semiotic and asignifying operations, 
and it is what legitimates the description of deterritorialization or transversality as the 
plotting of a `diagonal': the vertical and horizontal axes of a punctual system: 
[S]ignifying semiologies primarily concatenate a chain of actually formed substances, 
of either content or expression, along the horizontal syntagmatic axis, to which only 
secondarily corresponds a virtual set of formed substances along the vertical 
paradigmatic axis. Signification and interpretation along these two axes, moreover, go 
hand in hand with an individuation of subjectivity, divided into the subject of 
enunciation (je) and the subject of the enunciated (moi), both of which are subjugated 
to the signifying chain 96 
This `regime' of signification effects its redundant levelling of subjective individuation by 
excluding affect from its remit, arguably the very thing which enables a singularization, or 
immanent individuation to take place. The other functions of Guattari's schizoanalytic 
pragmatics, namely diagram, abstract machine, affect, refrain and also enunciation as shall 
eventually be shown, are the ones that have the greatest potential for deterritorializing a set 
of formed content/expression relations, and in doing so they plot a diagonal or transversal 
line across the vertical and horizontal axes. In many ways, this is the `meaning' or sense of 
the term transversality, the process that this descriptive tensor-sign marks, and it is this that 
must be briefly outlined further. 
95 Bosteels, From Text to Territory, pp. 162-3. 
96 Ibid. 
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The notion of transversality has a complex and rather vague history that goes back to the 
work of Jean-Paul Sartre, credited with having explored this notion prior to Guattari 97 This 
concept of Guattarian concepts begins as a slow and careful re-figuring of psychoanalytic 
transference which both re-orients it along group lines, where the bi-univocity of analyst- 
analysand is gradually substituted by a collective group subject and incorporates non- 
human `machines' into the process as sites of transference-transversality. For example, to 
take another of Guattari's key conceptual innovations, that of the abstract machine of 
`faciality', he posits the potential for art-works to deterritorialize the features of the face, 
such that a `transference of enunciation' takes place, so the signifying redundancies 
outlined above and the subjectivating resonances (see chapter 3) both of which cut 
subjectivity off from material process, can be transversalized in a way that makes 
enunciation the engine for an ethical activation of subjectivity. 98 
97 Ibid., p. 156: '[F]irst imported into the philosophical domain by Jean-Paul Sartre in a critique of Husserlian 
phenomenology, the idea of transversality is the mainspring of Guattari's prolific conceptual machine, and it 
offers a tool to understand his whole thinking, including the theory of cartographic practice, in answer to the 
98 
uestion of articulation. 
It is with particular reference to the work of the Japanese celebrity portrait artist, Keiichi Tahara, that 
Guattari posits this idea, cf. Genosko, Felix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction, p. 150: '[F]or Guattari, the 
"unleashing of this existential transference of enunciation, this capture of the look of the portrait" emanates 
from the core of the image, the Barthesian punctum, and pierces the onlooker. But Guattari rejected both the 
backward-looking orientation of Barthes towards what has been and his perpetuation of a memory of his 
mother for the sake of a new orientation presented by Tahara's photographs away from the identities of his 
subjects and allusions to them [... ] Barthes's choice of a private photograph of his mother contained what 
Guattari elsewhere called a syntax of faciality (in this case familial) and severely circumscribed its sense 
(loss, death, memory). Despite the public character of the faces of Tahara's portraits which slide perilously 
toward a homogenous identification that wraps itself around a "supreme iconic marker'- these are portraits of 
great celebrity artists after all - Guattari argued that "here, the manifest faciality no longer totalizes the 
faciality traits which, on the contrary, begin to interfere with the contextual traits. It brings into play 
deterritorialized Universes of existential reference [... ]: The proper names that Keiichi Tahara leads us to 
apprehend under a new angle, become the notes of a musicality that exceeds them in every way"'. The 
abstract machine of the face as conceived by Guattari is described by Deleuze in terms of the pick-up 
procedure as follows: 'Felix was working on black-holes; this astronomical idea fascinated him. The black 
hole is what captures you and does not let you out. I was working, rather, on a white wall: what is a white 
wall, a screen, how do you plane down the wall and make a line of flight pass? We had not brought the two 
ideas together, but we noticed that each was tending of its own accord towards the other, to produce 
something which, indeed, was neither in the one nor the other. For black holes on a white wall are in fact a 
face [... ] [S]uddenly the problem bounces back and it is political: what are the societies, the civilizations 
which need to make this machine work, that is, to produce, to 'overcode' the whole body and head with a 
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Starting out as an institutional concern, transversality operates as follows: 
mhe official hierarchy and structural distribution of roles among doctors, nurses, 
administrative staff, and patients define the institution's manifest coefficient of 
transversality [... ] [T]he analytic practice then tires to change the various coefficients 
of transversality at the different levels of an institution. 99 
According to Genosko, in the later Guattari transversality accedes to a full-blown ontology 
in which 
[T]ransdisciplinarity must explore its transversality, initiating new connections 
between science-society-ethics-aesthetics-politics, while struggling against reductive 
academic versions of this process that have become increasingly pegged on profit 
(corporate campuses) or accepting of multidiscplinary fuzziness without real 
institutional commitments [... ]10° 
Rather than embark on a more detailed account of transversality, it seems ultimately more 
pragmatic to try and embody the process such that - at the risk of banality - the process can 
be ethically set in motion in an academic project such as this. Doubtless, this will be 
extremely limited, but nevertheless it seems as though it might ultimately be a step in the 
right direction to try and overcome parochial theoretical affiliations in the promotion of 
transversal alliances that don't `wink out' anyone's process lines. We shall return to this in 
chapter 2 
face, and to what end? ', cf., Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, pp. 17-8. The abstract machine will indeed 
`bounce back' politically in chapter 3 and in the Coda preceeding the conclusion with an all-too-brief 
embodiment of faciality in Abdul Mati Klarwein's sleeve images for Miles Davis. The 'Universe of 
existential reference will also be musically embodied in chapter 3. 
99 Bosteels, From Text to Territory, p. 157. 
100 Genosko, Felix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction., p. 200 
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Chapter 2- The Refrains of Deleuze, Guattari and Miles Davis 
In opening this chapter, it is necessary to lay some more general ground regarding the 
relationship between the numerous characteristics of an immanent, ethical project of the 
kind outlined in the first chapter and to develop the specific contributions that music- 
and sound-based ideas, concepts and figures might make to such a project, whereupon it 
can proceed to relate the outcome of this initial investigation to the question of why and 
how one might make a case of the life and work of Miles Davis. 
`Deterritorializing the Refrain': Words and Music by Deleuze and Guattari 
Like Bakhtin, I would say that the refrain is not based on elements of form, material or 
ordinary signification, but on the detachment of an existential "motif' (or leitmotiv) 
which installs itself like an "attractor" within a sensible and significational chaos. 
Felix Guattari' 
Tra la la. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari2 
Straight away we can field a number of observations established in the previous chapter 
that will be of fundamental importance in establishing the potential role of music and 
sound in thinking and activating immanence. Firstly, it should be pointed out that music 
figures in the work of Deleuze and Guattari in ways that strongly accord with their 
philosophical approach of taking terms from different disciplines and applying them 
philosophically in a way that is not random but selective, that is to say, that only terms 
with a `high co-efficient of deterritorialization' will be used and that such a use should 
be deployed in a way that is `anexact yet rigorous'. As a result, despite an inevitable 
Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, p. 17. 
2 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 299. 
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degree of hat-tipping towards the work of musicologists and classically-oriented 
composers and performers, this approach is one that we shall come on to see is not 
without its limitations with regard to the potential contributions of music and sound to a 
philosophy of immanence and that furthermore reverts to an `archaic' conception of the 
division between `serious' and `classical' music. Before dealing with these limitations, 
however, we should elaborate in some detail how it is that music and sound are put to 
work in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari in ways that contribute positively to 
their enterprise and it is primarily in A Thousand Plateaus where will find the main 
examples. 
To provide an exhaustive account of the appearances of the manifold figures of music 
and sound in this book would require a much greater word-count than can be granted 
here. As in the instances where such a difficulty presented itself in chapter 1, we shall 
attempt to draw out some of the more fundamental traits, orientations and features of 
these aspects. The most obvious place to commence is with the plateau entitled `1837: 
Of the Refrain', which of all the plateaus constituting the work is most specifically 
oriented towards a sustained and rigorous yet highly deterritorialized deployment of 
musical and sonorous examples, and as the title of this section indicates, it is the 
musically-derived notion of the refrain that provides the point of departure. That is not 
however to say that the section solely makes use of the refrain, but that it weaves a great 
number of music- and sound-based illustrations into its conceptual and pragmatic fabric. 
What needs to be pointed out, following the observations made with regard to the 
contributions of Guattari disclosed at the end of the previous chapter, is that music and 
88 
sound - as with most of the concepts in the book - function according to the adapted 
Hjelmslevian glossematic schema of `planes of content' and `planes of expression'. As 
a result of this attempt to instigate a thoroughgoing materialist semiotics, the terms that 
are lifted out of the disciplinary confines of institutional milieus and territories 
constituting the academic production of music- and sound-based knowledge, are those 
which more readily lend themselves to this approach in that they respect the 
reversibility of content and expression. From the perspective of materialist semiotics, 
this would amount to selecting those with the highest co-efficient of deterritorialization. 
The refrain is the literal point of departure in the plateau to which it lends its name, in 
that the relational embodiment of the production of subjectivity that opens the plateau is 
diagrammed using this notion. However - at this early stage in the plateau - it is barely 
recognizable as an analysis of the refrain as it would ever be found to function in music, 
because the example that has been chosen only to a very limited extent fixes the refrain 
as a form of Content: the song. 
I. A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his 
breath. He walks and halts to his song. Lost, he takes shelter, or orients himself 
within his song as best as he can. The song it like a rough sketch of a calming and 
stabilizing [... ] centre at the heart of chaos [... ] 
II. Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a 
circle around that uncertain and fragile center, to organize a limited space [.... ] 
Sonorous or vocal components are very important: a wall of sound, or at least a 
wall with some sonic bricks in it. A child hums to summon the strength for the 
schoolwork she has to hand in [.... ] One draws a circle, or better yet walks in a 
circle as in a children's dance, combining rhythmic vowels and consonants that 
correspond to the interior forces of creation as to the differentiated parts of an 
organism. 
III. Finally, one opens a circle in the crack, opens it all the way, lets someone in, 
calls someone in, or else goes out oneself, launches forth. This time, it is norder to 
join with the forces of the future, cosmic forces. One launches forth, hazards an 
improvisation. But to improvise it to join with the World [.... ] One ventures from 
home on the thread of a tune. 3 
3 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 231-2. 
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The example, that of the child singing to itself in the dark, the making of a home and the 
opening of this domiciliary `circle' to the forces of the `Cosmos' and the future, at the 
level of content is one in a number of instances in which Deleuze and Guattari elaborate 
the idea of the `chaos-cosmos' or what is elsewhere described in terms of `chaoids', or 
the `chaosmos'. 4 To the extent that it involves singing, dancing and a tune, the refrain 
has a musical form of content, but as we shall see this is only part of the story. 5 
If the attempt to provide different examples of the production of a chaos-cosmos are 
deployed on the plane of content, in order to respect the immanence and processuality 
informing these respective examples it is necessary to deploy the appropriate concepts 
on the plane of expression, which - as we have said - are those with a suitably wide co- 
efficient of deterritorialization. This is where the refrain in this instance becomes of 
importance. Whilst it will characteristically tip over onto the plane of content at various 
moments in the section, most notably in the instances where the work of a number of 
composers is being discussed, whatever the given concrete examples dealt with, which 
are many, what underpins their relationality and their interactions is the concept of the 
refrain as it functions at the level of Expression, but not simply at the level of 
4 For the most detailed account of these terms and their inter-relation, see Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, 'Conclusion: From Chaos to the Brain', pp. 204,208, where they explore the chaos-cosmos 
dyad along similar lines to 'Of the Refrain', but in a more explanatory way. 'Chaoids' are the names given to 
the three intersecting planes of Art, Science and Philosophy, and 'Chaosmos' describes their composition, 
illustrated in the case of the plane of Art by the way in which a novel such as James Joyce's Ulysses is 
constructed, 'neither foreseen nor preconceived'. On the relation between these various planes, see Chapter 
3. 
s Other non-musical forms of Content explored in the elaboration of this idea include painting, and more 
specifically the work of Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee, cf., What is Philosophy?, p. 180-3. These artists 
are briefly discussed in relation to the refrain, cf. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 347. Whilst 
the relation between music and painting is one that is actually addressed in this plateau, it remains more 
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expression. What makes the concept particularly useful for the purposes of this plateau 
and the book more generally is that it marks and is marked by movement, by variation, 
but also by the repetition of difference. According to Deleuze and Guattari's 
understanding of the term then, the refrain functions by fixing a point in chaos, a point 
fixed in relation to movement proximal to the point and that both point and movement 
become capable of opening up to the forces of an `outside'. The child's song that quells 
the abyssal terror of the darkness is the fixing of such a point but is also itself a 'skip'6, 
that is -a movement out of chaos into a primitively ordered relational interaction, the 
simultaneous fixing of a point in chaos and move towards order out of chaos in the 
establishment of a territorial space encircling the point that is capable of opening up to 
the wider set of forces that constitutes this interaction. 
Now perhaps there are any number of terms to be lifted from no less a number of 
disciplines that could do the job of describing, marking or diagramming such a process, 
some perhaps even better suited to the task than the `refrain'. Doubtless this is not the 
only term that is actually used when dealing with the task of surveying processuality in 
the work of these authors. However, its usefulness is indicated by the fact that its 
definition involves the interaction of lines and their recurrence. As we discovered in 
Chapter 1 when looking at Deleuze's work on Foucault and the dispositif, linearity is of 
crucial importance in Deleuze's own work understood not in terms of a horizontal, 
punctual conception of linearity, but rather a `super-linear', diagonal one where the task 
is to find ways of surveying the interactions of multiple lines and their aggregation into 
important for our present purposes to continue drawing on the complex interplay informing the planar 
interactions between expression and content. 
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segments in a way that affirms their constitutive difference rather than reducing it. As 
we also learned, it is the ideas of linearity and segmentarity that make up the primary 
focus of `1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity', to which we shall have further 
recourse in chapter 3. In the plateau that we are currently dealing with, it is the refrain 
that facilitates the survey of such linear interactions that not only functions at both on 
the planes of content and expression, but that provides the `diagram' for these 
interactions. It is a result of its high co-efficient of deterritorialization that it is capable 
of straddling both planes, respecting their reversibility and thereby having a sufficiently 
high level of abstraction to function diagramatically. As with the examples of 
differential calculus in Difference and Repetition, and the machine in Anti-Oedipus, the 
refrain simultaneously provides the means for taking a suitable case, exploring its 
relation to immanence relatively concretely, and the surveying of its relationality at the 
level of constitutive difference. This is at one and the same time why the use of terms 
like `machine' or the `refrain' is as viable as it is inessential. So, to summarize this 
rather complex use of the term, we should just re-emphasize that we can take it at the 
level of content, whether this be the refrain as it is put to work in specific musical 
examples, for instance in the work of Schumann, Debussy or Ravel, or whether the 
example be that of the immanent constitution of subjectivity as in the example of the 
child in the dark, or whether one examines the appearance of a refrain in a poem or - to 
take an instance used on a number of occasions by Deleuze and Guattari both together 
and individually - in the prose work of Proust. However, the refrain also enables us to 
examine how the repetition of a given `phrase', for example, whether this be in a poem, 
a song, or `Venteuil's little phrase', provides a means for diagramming the expressive 
6 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 311. 
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aspects of constitutive difference, in the fixing of a point in and out of chaos, in setting 
a `pace' of movement and in connecting to the forces of the outside. 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari see the phrase as being one amongst 
numerous refrains in Proust's work. 7 The fact that the content can be so variable, 
combining and crossing any number assemblages, testifies to the Deleuzian 
`transcendental empiricist' inspiration of the work to the extent that - in principle - any 
number of examples derived from literature, art, music, philosophy and everyday life 
could be explored at the level of their expressive traits, the constitutive difference 
underlying these traits, and also - very importantly - the repetition of this difference. 
Where it concerns art, the traits that cut across the different planes but which remain 
singular to aesthetic production are `sonorous and visual', and it is in describing them as 
such that Deleuze and Guattari seek to ward off any generic hierarchization. 
There is surely no question here of declaring a given art supreme on the basis of a 
formal hierarchy of absolute criteria. Our problem is more modest: comparing the 
powers or co-efficients of deterritorialization of sonorous and visual components. 8 
So why is the refrain a repetition of difference? The refrain always involves a return, or 
a movement tending towards or away from a `point' whereby the processes at work are 
at once embodied through a given example in terms of their content and activated at the 
level of expression. If chaos can give way to immanent ordering such that it is either 
conceivable or worthwhile to diagram this immanent ordering, it has to be because there 
are traits that cut across each and every instance, and when they come to attain a given 
7 Ibid., p. 347: 'Taking Proust's examples [of the refrain]: Does Vermeer's little span of yellow wall, or a 
painter's flowers, Elstir's roses, constitute less of a refrain than Venteuil's little phrase? '. The question - as 
all too often in their work - is rhetorical. 
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level of consistency in the survey of constitutive difference, it is because these traits can 
enter into relations that are repeated. However, what is at stake in this claim is the idea 
that the repetition of a musical phrase, or poetic or painterly lines, always has 
underlying it a constitutive repetition of difference and not the repetition of the same. 
This is why - in the example at the beginning of `1833: Of the Refrain' - Deleuze and 
Guattari state that the emergence of a fixed point out of chaos, or the tendential `skip', 
along with the encircling of space in the creation of a domicile or territory and the 
opening of this space or territory in its movement towards the outside, its 
deterritorialization, `are not three successive moments in an evolution', but rather `three 
aspects of a single thing, the Refrain (ritournelle)'. The word `refrain' can therefore be 
seen to function on the order of a descriptive tensor-sign whereby it marks the 
emergence of and piecemeal consolidation of order in the production of a territory and 
its capacity for deterritorialization. The fact that this proceeds by way of three `aspects' 
of the refrain in a non-linear way is the main indication as to why the word is used in 
this particular example, that is to say, to demonstrate that the ordering of chaos is not 
subordinated to a telos, but rather proceeds as a bottom-up, non-hylomorphic ordering, 
positing the `subjectivity' of the child as the aggregation of these processes in the 
production of a meta-stable territory, secondary rather than primary, nothing but the 
residuum of the processes themselves. In the movement towards the outside, the 
capacity for deterritorialization is another way of positing what - in chapter 1- we 
described in terms of the `ethical' trajectory of immanence, and this particular 
configuration viewed in terms of the refrain will provide us with a means to explore key 
aspects of the pending case. 
8 Ibid., p. 347. 
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It is perhaps worth noting in passing as well that the capital `R' as used in the above 
quote, is not to suggest a transcendent `Refrain' that provides the essence of each 
individual `refrain', but rather - as with the relation between the Body without Organs 
and `bodies without organs' - when considered on the level of expression suggests that 
there are relatively localized instances of counter-actualization which can be 
diagrammed in terms of the refrain, but that there is an abstract machine that provides 
the immobile motor of any such instance and this is the `Refrain'. Hence, in the refrains 
of art, literature, philosophy and so on, there is an embodiment of the Refrain, which in 
their appeals to the work of the Danish biologist Jakob von Uexsküll Deleuze and 
Guattari call `[N]ature as music'9. Again, taking the risk of further reinforcing their 
`hippy' image, the authors leave their work readily open to an overly-simplistic reading 
which should be avoided. In their writing, `nature' upholds the materialism 
underscoring the philosophy and - along with `culture' - forms another heuristic 
`dualism', `nature-culture', which should again be used to push `beyond that decisive 
turn' from differences of degree to differences in kind. Massumi has clarified this 
neglected point in `The Autonomy of Affect'. 
Theoretical moves aimed at ending Man end up making human culture the 
measure and meaning of all things, in a kind of unfettered anthropomorphism 
precluding - to take on example - articulations of cultural theory and ecology. It is 
meaningless to interrogate the relations of the human to the nonhuman if the 
nonhuman is only a construct of human culture, or inertness. 10 
9 Ibid., p. 314. Jakob von Uexsküll is used here largely on the basis of his research as documented in 'A Stroll 
Through the Worlds of Animals and Men: A Picture Book of Invisible Worlds', published in the journal 
Semiotica 89: 4, pp. 319-391. What seems most interesting about this work is that it is based on musical 
counterpoint, as a means to producing a non-hylomorphic conception of evolutionary biology and - in the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari - an ethology. However, ethology does number amongst the approaches to 
'becoming' that need considerably more investigation, for which there will only be the most limited scope 
here. 
10 Brian Massumi, `The Autonomy of Affect', in Paul Patton [ed. ], Deleuze: A Critical Reader, p. 233. 
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One of the important ramifications of this approach is - returning to the previous issue 
of reifying art-forms - is that for Deleuze and Guattari it provides a way of avoiding the 
reification of Art as a general category of human creativity and achievement by 
attempting to show how the milieus, territories, deterritorializations, expression-content 
relations, refrains and so, can be found to function entirely independently of human 
intervention: bird-song. ' 'This is also an outstanding example of Spinoza's influence on 
this work, in his conception of Deus sive natura, God, that is Nature, and life's 
partaking of Nature as monist substance under the parallel attributes of extension and 
thought constituting `modes' of this single substance, a conception which provides a 
sophisticated and highly effective way of by-passing the Manichean dichotomy or 
opposition of nature and culture. 
In addition to the refrain's `artistic' constructions on the order of the visible and the 
audible or sonorous one must consider its important connection to affect. This requires a 
thinking of sonority in a way that foregrounds the refrain's ethical character at the same 
time as enabling a clearer sense of its contribution to auditory participation and its 
relationship to language. This leads us to posit a few more characteristics of the refrain 
or `ritournelle', though this time as expounded by Guattari. In an essay entitled 
`Ritornellos and Existential Affects' 12 Guattari clarifies the role of diagram and abstract 
machine in the constitution of a `ritornello', giving its English formulation as it appears 
in this piece. In addition, he brings his own theoretical concerns to bear in his 
" Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 316-7. 
12 Felix Guattari, `Ritornellos and Existential Affects', in Genosko [ed. ], The Guattari Reader, pp. 158-172. 
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formulation of the ritornello in terms of the discursive, enunciative and affective 
characteristics that he considers fundamental to an understanding of the term, not to 
mention the adapted Hjelmslevian glossematics. 
To some extent, Guattari does provide an account of how the ritornello comes to 
embody a variety of `formed substance', effectuated reciprocally between the plane 
constituting the `forms of Content' and the plane of `forms of Expression'. Examples 
again include a number derived from the work of Proust - doubtless inspired by the 
work done on Proust by Deleuze in the early 1970s and that produced for the 
collaborations prior to the composition of this particular essay - including the recurring 
example of the `bit of phrase' of Venteuil, but also of the relationship between the 
constantly returning phrase and the image of Odette's face. Furthermore, as we have 
seen with the work done in A Thousand Plateaus, there are many conceivable examples 
of what can constitute the refrain's form of content. 
Under the generic term ritornello, I would place re-iterative discursive sequences 
that are closed in upon themselves and whose function is an extrinsic catalysing of 
existential affects. [R]itornellos can find substance in rhythmic and plastic forms, 
in prosodic segments, in facial traits, in the emblems of recognition, in leitmotifs, 
signatures, proper names or their invocational equivalents [... ]. 13 
What Guattari brings to his solo rendering of the ritornello, in addition to a complex, 
materialist semiotic elaboration of the term's potential use, is a no less complex 
qualification of affect, which he divides into `sensory affect' and `problematic affect'. If 
the `bit of phrase' of Venteuil is an example of sensory affect then Odette's face is one 
of problematic affect, and the face is tremendously important in the work of Guattari in 
13 Ibid., p. 162. 
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this instance as in others because, marking all formed substances that we can call 
`faces' there is an abstract machine of `faciality'. 
In `Ritornellos and Existential Affects' Guattari elucidates four semiotic functions 
which attempt to "`frame" [... ] significational relation' in terms of the `reciprocal 
presupposition, or of solidarity, according to Hjelmslev's terminology, between the 
form of an Expression and the form of its Content' [see fig. 3]. These are as follows: 
1. a denotative function: f (den), corresponding to the relations between the form 
of Content and the Referent; 
2. a diagrammatic function: f (diag), corresponding to the relations between the 
matter of the Expression and the Referent; 
3. a function of sensory affect (ritornello), corresponding to the relations 
between Enunciation and the forms of the Expression; 
4. a function of problematic affect (abstract machine), corresponding to the 
relations between Enunciation and the form of the Content. 14 
It is possible to see from these four functions something of the character of Guattari's 
mixed semiotics, in that he is combining the approach derived from Hjelmslev with 
ideas developed in other areas of linguistic and semiotic theory, taking up the notion of 
Enunciation and providing a place for denotative and referential functions. Despite the 
difficulty, a degree of sustained investigation should reveal something of the four 
functions' applicability, with particular emphasis on the last two: of the 
refrain/ritornello and of affect. 
For Guattari, the four functions - like the formed matters (substance) of content and 
expression - should be understood as sharing a high degree of reciprocity. The first 
function, the `denotative function', shows how denotation is framed within the adapted 
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glossematics in terms of the relation between the form of content and the `Referent', 
Content embodied at the molecular level and the referent fulfilling the task of 
representation at the molar level. The second function returns us to the procedure of 
diagramming, however here it proceeds from fixed forms of Content (molecular) and a 
rigidly-designating Referent (molar) towards the `matter of Expression', taking the 
unformed matter (purport) of processuality as being autonomous from any given 
concrete formation. It is the third and fourth functions that introduce affect into the 
frame, with the third one bringing us back to the ritornello as marking a `function of 
sensory affect', which becomes characterized herein terms of the relationship between 
`Enunciation' and the formed matters of Expression, whereby the former term is to be 
understood along the lines of Bakhtin's work on the theory of the novel, a pervasive 
influence on Guattari if not on Deleuze, along the following lines: 
[I]n [... ] drawing affect towards the aesthetic object (which is what I wish to 
underscore), Bakhtin in no way turns affect into the passive correlative of 
Enunciation, but into its engine, a bit paradoxically it is true, since affect is non- 
discursive and entails no expense of energy - which is what has led us elsewhere 
to characterize it as a deterritorialized machine. 15 
The paradox that is in play here results from the complex relation between the 
incorporeality and `non-discursivity' of affect, that is its pre-personal, pre-individual 
status as heterogeneous processes out of which the subject-object binary can make its 
cut but only at the cost of compromising their heterogeneous quality, and the discursive 
domains in which the enunciation ostensibly comes to be formed. As a result, affect 
relates to enunciation on the order of a Spinozist parallelism, similar to the one we 
encountered between `extension' and `thought', whereby the two domains interact in 
14 Felix Guattari, 'Ritornellos and Existential Affects', in Genosko [ed. ], A Guattari Reader, pp. 162-3. 
99 
such a way that they do not cause one another but actually result as immanent effects of 
other causes, in this instance the processes of subjectification themselves. This is 
because affect is a mark of so many relational interactions constituting subjectivity in 
any instance, for Guattari it is the intensive dimension of the production of `existential 
territories', an example of which we encountered above from `1833: Of the Refrain'. 
Parallel to the production of these territories and the affective dimension of their 
production is enunciation, which becomes - on the one hand - an evaporative surface 
effect of existential territorializations and deterritorializations, but - on the other hand - 
can also serve to effect such territorializations and deterritorializations themselves. This 
is at least one way of formulating the paradox, and as such the `passive' and `active' 
aspects of enunciation that are simultaneously in play mark its relation to affect: in the 
case of the first aspect, enunciation is a procedure resulting from an affective 
intensification or de-instensification, as with the third synthesis of the machinic 
unconscious, `so that's what it was! ', and also therefore engenders subjectification, 
whereby affective intensity is given a proper-name which tends either towards the 
establishment and proliferation of transformative effects or reproduces a sovereign 
subject (subjection). I have chosen to call this aspect `passive' in that the affective 
modulations are marked or indicated by the enunciation, whereas under the second 
aspect the enunciation actively partakes of the affective modulation and may even 
engender it. Usefully, Guattari chooses to use a music-based example to illustrate this 
nuanced conception of enunciation and it is an example that has had much made of it in 
different ways by a number of writers, as we shall come on to see in Chapter 3: it is that 
of the conductor and `his' orchestra: 
13 Ibid. 
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[E]nunciation is like an orchestra conductor who on occasion accepts a loss of 
control over the musicians: at certain moments, it is articulatory pleasure or 
rhythm, or it is an inflated style that begins to play a solo and to impose it upon 
the others. Let us underscore that if an enunciative lay-out can entail multiple 
social voices, it also engages pre-personal voices susceptible of inducing an 
aesthetic ecstacy, a mystical effusion, or an ethological panic [... ] as well as an 
ethical imperative. A good conductor does not strive despotically to overcode the 
ensemble of these components but attends to the collective crossing of the 
aesthetic object's completion threshold as designated by the proper name. 16 
So Guattari paints quite an endearing portrait of the orchestra conductor (later we will 
encounter some slightly less positive examples) in which - if he is doing his job 
properly will allow his beating out of measures, tempi, dynamics and mood to subside 
as the motoricity of his body, his gesticulations and his relation to the orchestra to enter 
a different register in which the affective character of Enunciation will sweep the 
assemblage up and take it across an `unforseen and unforseeable' threshold: 
chaosmosis, or - to use another word - improvisation. When this term is called upon to 
capture something of Guattari's conception of affect and enunciation, we can see why it 
is that his chosen example might be problematic: for most of the history of orchestral 
composition and performance in the occidental tradition, there has been little latitude 
for improvisation, and - even where the music permits this - one must still ask the 
question of whether there is a residuum of (social, cultural and political) hierarchization 
that is embodied in the figure of the conductor. This - as with the examples making up 
the content-forms of `1833: Of the Refrain' - testifies to the limitation of Deleuze and 
Guattari's investments in music to largely canonical Classical examples. This is where 
they subject their own thinking to the molarizing, binarizing limitations that they spend 
16 Guattari, 'Ritornellos and Existential Affects', p. 165. 
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most of their work attempting to stake out. Again, as something of a refrain in the 
current project, this problem is yet another to be encountered further on. 
So - to re-iterate - the enunciation marks and is marked by (passive, active) affective 
modulations, and this is one way in which the paradox that Guattari discerns when he 
derives his conception of enunciation from Bakhtin can be made productive: affect does 
not cause enunciation so much as it is, on the one hand, dissipated through affective 
modification and, on the other hand, itself sinks back into affective modifications to 
partake of a positive feed-back loop. In accordance with Guattari's Bakhtinian 
inspiration, affective transformations of the kind outlined must be re-connected with a 
conception of ethics: 
[A]n affect is therefore not, as the `shrinks' commonly wish to represent it, a 
passively endured state. It is a complex, subjective territoriality of proto- 
Enunciation, the site of a work, of a potential praxis [... ]17 
It now remains for us to consider affect under its own two aspects: refrain and abstract 
machine. 
The ritornello of the third function marks the relation between the formed matters of 
expression and enunciation pertaining to any given `existential territory'. It is also the 
instance of sensory affect, which means that the intensive dimension of such a territory 
in terms of the relation between forms of expression and enunciation register at the level 
of the corporeal, by way of sensation. In the case of the last function, the relationship to 
be accounted for is that between forms of content and enunciation, and - at the level of 
"Ibid., p. 167. 
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intensity - it is an instance of problematic affect. What becomes very important here is 
the role played by the `abstract machine', which becomes the correlate of problematic 
affect. 
If we look back to the account of enunciation that Guattari has derived from Bakhtin, 
we can see that - if enunciation is capable of providing a means of access to the 
processes of expressive material formations and deformations, it also must be accounted 
for in its relation to forms of content, and it is here that its ethical efficacy comes to be 
re-inforced, because in the instance of an assemblage intensively engendering a 
problematic affect, this is where an enunciation `externally encompasses the content' of 
its `value bearing'. I want to argue here that - if the forms of content marking a given 
assemblage carry a value, it is initially as quasi-objects catalysing an affective 
fluctuation on the part of the bodies composing the territory which - in principle - 
enable a surveying outwards from any investment mistakenly perceived as being the 
property of a subject towards an encounter with the pre-individual singularities that can 
be found to constitute `it'. The `abstract machine' as the `engine' or `immobile motor' 
of a given array of assemblages then, pushes furthest in the direction of a pure 
virtuality, as that which can be extracted from the most diverse array of assemblages, or 
- in the language of Guattari's materialist semiotics - from the interactions between 
planes of content and expression. 
Given their mutual sharing of affect, functions 3 and 4 encompass what Guattari calls a 
`ritornello-abstract machine' dyad. It is in describing this that the practical orientation 
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of Guattari's thought and its indebtedness towards the work of Bakhtin find perhaps 
their clearest expression in this essay. 
What can one expect from our ritornello-abstract machine dyad? Essentially a 
pinpointing and a deciphering of the practical existential operators installed at the 
intersection of Expression and Content. An intersection where, I insist, nothing is 
ever played out within a perfect structuralist synchrony, where everything is 
always an affair of contingent lay-outs, of heterogenesis, of irreversibility, of 
singularization. With Hjelmslev, we learned that the fundamental reversibility 
between the form of the Expression and the form of the Content arches over the 
heterogeneity of the substances and matters which are its support. But, with 
Bakhtin, we learned to read the foliatedness of Enunciation, its polyphony and its 
multi-centredness. 18 
It is worth noting here that we find in the work of Bakhtin the term `polyphony' which 
has what Deleuze and Guattari would call a high co-efficient of deterritorialization, to 
the extent that it can be used to develop a nuanced theory of enunciation which, as with 
the refrain, provides a means for avoiding a punctual, linear-teleological, horizontal- 
vertical approach and enables a complex, heterogeneous, diagonal approach. It is for 
this reason that it takes on importance for Guattari, and it is once again why those who 
fetishize or over-invest the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari by ascribing a 
necessary, a priori, pre-ordained role to any given term and using it as a form of 
nomenclature have added to the criticisms of this kind of work at the same time as 
adding to the shop-worn productions of trendy or post-modem cultural theory more 
generally. 
So, to summarize our digression through Guattari, the cycling outwards from the 
`intersection of Expression and Content' towards the apprehension of their underlying 
complexity, their reversibility and their transversality across a diverse range of 
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assemblages is the ethical trajectory pursued in the attempt to counter-actualize the 
`abstract machine'. One can proceed by means of the ritornello of a given intersection 
of content/expression relations, the production of a refrain constituting in part sensory 
affect and the accompanying array of potential enunciations. Problematic affect as an 
instantiation of an abstract machine is problematic because it seeks in Enunciation the 
possibility of generating new enunciations to accompany the affective intensifications, 
what Guattari calls in Chaosmosis, the production of new `incorporeal universes of 
reference'. This - in terms of the refrain - is its relative deterritorialization and its 
absolute deterritorialization (Refrain), the move away from the well-worn phrases of a 
circumscribed and largely territorialized use of the refrain, towards the recognition in 
such phrases (musical, poetic, prosodic, etc. ) that they bear affective and enunciative 
possibilities that enable not only an ethical or ethico-aesthetic transformation, but also a 
political one. This is why the Refrain of the plateau we have been considering finds its 
absolute limit in a `Cosmic' deterritorialization, for which `the people are missing' or 
`yet to come'. In the collaborative works, this aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's writing 
remains possibly their profoundest and yet most problematic statement with regard to 
the political. The question of absolute deterritorialization, strategically and 
micropolitically figured in terms of the `line of flight' or `line of abolition' and the 
Cosmic Refrain and its relation to the political problematic of the `people yet to come' 
shall be returned to in the final chapter. 
There are at least a couple of other fundamental observations to be made regarding the 
place of music and sound in the work undertaken in A Thousand Plateaus before 
'8Ibid., p. 164. 
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moving on, but before we deal with these a few more things need to be clarified with 
specific reference to the refrain. Firstly, and of considerable importance for thinking 
about jazz and the figure of Miles Davis, we must return to the question of 
improvisation. Concerning the third aspect of the composition of an elementary chaos- 
cosmos in the `becoming-music' of the child that we previously encountered, it is said 
by Deleuze and Guattari that `[O]ne launches forth, hazards an improvisation'. In 
opening a fissure or crack in the domiciliary circle onto the outside, one enters into an 
unpredictable relation to this outside. The bodies, enunciations, particles-signs to which 
the circle and the bodies oriented within the circle open up unforeseen interactions that 
place all the components in a relation of variation. Again, a musically-derived notion, 
this time improvisation, is introduced to announce the meta-stablility of the refrain and 
the production of subjectivity taking place in the example of the `becoming-music of 
the child'. A non-hylomorphic elementary organization out-of-chaos is well served by 
this notion, given that within the more ostensibly concrete musical assemblages where 
improvisation is a feature one finds that the key themes, motifs, refrains, melodic and 
chordal passages (all here to be considered as forms of content) provide a more-or-less 
flexible platform from which to `launch forth' on an improvisation. We will come on to 
see this far more clearly when we look at some of the innovations introduced into jazz 
by Miles Davis and some of his contemporaries. In the section of `Of the Refrain' that 
we have returned to, improvisation has again been selected at least in part on account of 
its high co-efficient of deterritorialization, and its capacity to mark the intersection 
between forms of content and forms of expression. This is indicated by its use in the 
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present example where even the most simple everyday (non-musical) activities can be 
explored in terms of musically-derived concepts. 
So what does one open oneself up to when one `hazards an improvisation'? 
[O]ne opens the circle a crack, opens i19 all the way, lets someone in, calls 
someone, or else goes out oneself [... ] 
All of this talk of letting someone in, calling someone, is suggestive of a notion of 
`hospitality' in which one opens up unconditionally to an Other. However, it really 
needs to be specified that the `one' that does all this, does so by counter-actualizing its 
'self', by opening up simultaneously to the outside and the inside of its own 
intangibility. A statement made in Deleuze's Foucault suggests something of this 
intangibility and its connection to improvisation. 
[T]he place of the fissure [... ] is like a pineal gland, constantly reconstituting 
itself by changing direction, tracing an inside space but coextensive with the 
whole line of the outside. The most distant point becomes interior, by being 
converted into the nearest: life within the folds. 20 
The domiciliary space, the circle, the act of letting someone in or calling someone do 
not establish a relationship between an apperceiving Self and another person, or even 
between a Self and an unknown, unknowable Other of radical alterity. Rather it these 
19 Ibid., p. 31 1. 
20 Deleuze, Foucault, p. 123. The constitution of selfhood and otherness as secondary is elaborated in a 
different yet complementary way by recourse to Leibniz's notion of the 'possible world', cf., Deleuze and 
Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 17: 
Let us proceed in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of experience taken as a real world no 
longer in relation to a self by to a simple 'there is'. There is, at some moment, a calm and restful 
world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field. The other person 
appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the 
possibility of a frightening world. The possible world is not real, or not yet, but is exists nonetheless: 
it is an expressed that exists only in its expression - the face, or an equivalent of the face [... ] [W]hen 
the expressing speaks and says, "I am frightened", even if its words are not truthful, this is enough for 
reality to be given to the possible as such. This is the only meaning of 'I' as a linguistic index. 
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are acts that open the elementary organized territory towards potential passages of 
deterritorialization which are `hazardous' because they are unpredictable and because 
what is beyond prediction are the molecular fluctuations of subjectification that result 
from such an improvisation. Given that the inside and the outside are constituted as 
`folds' of one another, in opening up (the circle) to the World, the `one' that launches 
forth is constituted in the very act of its launching as a folding of the outside. The 
improvisation is not performed by a pre-determined person or Self, but rather by a 
composition of bodies constituted as capacities and relations which are forced to change 
and fluctuate by constantly de- and re-composing anew. When `one' opens the front 
door to an `other' `it' runs the gauntlet of different regimes of signs, of processes of 
subjectivation-subjection, of lines of flight and passage, through which - even if it is 
only at the most molecular, imperceptible level, lost in the redundancies of the molar - 
is still constitutive of this `one'. Diagrammed philosophically in terms of the refrain and 
improvisation, such launching forth can perhaps be best described as a 'becoming- 
music'. 21 
On the plane of content, the launching forth can also be musical, as when `One' 
ventures from `home on the thread of a tune'. However, in singing as one leaves home 
and moves out onto the street, the tune becomes a component of passage that 
contributes to the fending off of the chaos from which the first `aspect' of the refrain set 
out, the consolidation of a territorial relation constituted through the second `aspect' and 
21 This expression provides the title of the last section of '1730: Becoming Intense, Becoming Animal, 
Becoming Imperceptible', Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp 299-309. The themes in play here 
pre-empt much of what follows in '1833: Of the Refrain', but provides some additional material that will 
become of use later. 
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the opening up of this relation to the outside. The fabric then, of which the tune is a 
`thread' is itself the refrain on the plane of expression, maintaining the components of 
expression in a mutually reciprocal relation of determination and the Refrain, 
understood as marking the intersection of the planes of expression and content, as the 
abstract machine of the production of subjectivity. 
Shifting register slightly and returning to the linear/segmental take on immanence, 
Deleuze and Guattari say in a little more detail on what one is venturing forth. One does 
so `[A]long sonorous, gestural, motor lines that mark the customary path of a child and 
graft themselves onto or begin to bud "lines of drift" with different loops, knots, speeds, 
movements, gestures, and sonorities'. 22 
Loops, knots, speeds, movements, gestures and sonorities are not here simply 
referenced in order to mask the vagueness of such a theory or to deliberately obfuscate 
the reader with ill-conceived rhetorical sleights-of-hand. What they all have in common 
that is of positive philosophical value is that they are relational, terms chosen to mark 
the between-ness through which the various lines interact without transcendence or 
reduction, in a way that attempts to ward off the illegitimate fixed Self or Subject 
challenged by this rendering of processual subjectivity. The role of motor-function, 
sonority and gesture, or more accurately a conception of the `gestus'23, and their 
contribution to a slightly less straightforwardly 'incorporeal' conception of relationality 
22 Ibid., p. 312. Emphasis added. 
23 See chapter 3. 
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and its ethico-aesthetic and political ramifications will be crucial to the consideration of 
Miles Davis's `life' and `work', to which we shall shortly turn. 
Before we do, as we said a little earlier, there are a couple of other music- and sound- 
based contributions to A Thousand Plateaus that should not be overlooked. Firstly, 
Brian Massumi in his `Translator's Foreword' makes a very interesting and crucial 
claim for the relationship between philosophy and music which sheds some light on the 
relationship between philosophy and `non-philosophy'. Firstly, he sets apart music - 
along with mathematics - from other `media' as `on a strictly formal level' being the 
ones that `create the smoothest of smooth spaces'. 24 The claim is highly resonant with a 
number of aspects of the way music functions in the book, including the ways we have 
already encountered. The word `formal' first of all should be `strictly' understood in 
terms of the glossematic approach that has been discussed above, which means it is not 
to be thought in terms of a Manichean dichotomy or opposition between `form' and 
`content' as more conventionally understood, but rather in the sense that music and 
mathematics are constituted out of formations of the matters of expression and content 
specific to their own concerns and as such are capable of producing the `smoothest of 
smooth spaces', that is to say their processual element is usually more foregrounded 
than that of film or painting. 
24 Brian Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. xiii. That 
mathematics is placed alongside music is testimony to the intrinsic connections between music, mathematics 
and philosophy outlined in the Introduction and mentioned briefly in chapter 1 and the idea of mathematics 
as a formal 'smooth space' is drawn from Deleuze's Riemannian inspiration - key to his conception of 
multiplicity - and Deleuze and Guattari's interest in fractal geometry. 
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The second important observation to make is with regard to the smooth spaces 
themselves. What are they? Well, the dyad smooth-striated is explicitly derived from 
the work of the composer/conductor Pierre Boulez who developed these terms to 
facilitate a more feasible and accurate way of conceptualizing musical space in 
accordance with the distinction between pulsed and non-pulsed time. To quote Deleuze 
and Guattari on Boulez: 
Boulez says that in a smooth space-time one occupies without counting, whereas in a 
striated space-time one counts in order to occupy. He makes palpable or perceptible 
the difference between nonmetric and metric multiplicities, directional and 
dimensional spaces. He renders them sonorous or musical. 25 
The terms `smooth' and `striated' function in a number of ways across a number of the 
plateaus in A Thousand Plateaus, their function in this instance to illustrate the way that 
music produces smooth and striated spaces, specifically within its own area of activity, 
in that music is supposedly capable of `rendering sonorous' multiplicities. 
In using them as deterritorialized terms that enable a move from the specifically musical 
examples towards other purported inscriptions of the multiple, Deleuze and Guattari 
make of the `smooth-space' a tensor-sign for the nomadic distributions constitutive of 
the relational interactions between extension and thought in the instances of passage or 
`drift', and of `striated space' they make a tensor-sign for the tendency towards 
`overcoding' whereby a more conventional, horizontal linearity is introduced, 
metricized, reduced to fix measure or discrete intervals. Where the nomad-nomos tips 
25 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 477. 
ill 
over into an act of enclosure is, for example, where one might expect to find a shift 
away from a smooth space towards a striated space. 26 
This borrowing of terms and lifting them from their specific `disciplinary' territories 
and milieus, is - as we have seen -a common feature of Deleuze and Guattari's work. 
The smooth/striated dyad is not the only music example of this, either. In further 
describing the character of the Refrain, for instance, they bring together the ideas of 
`melodic landscapes' and `rhythmic personnages' from the work of Olivier Messiaen. 
The latter of these will become of crucial importance in What is Philosophy? when its 
philosophical potential is most fully explored in its re-incarnation as `conceptual 
personae'. All of this in some measure doubtless leads Massumi to follow up his claim 
for music and mathematics with the following related one: 
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari would probably be more inclined to call philosophy 
music with content than music a rarefied form of philosophy. 27 
If the smooth/striated dyad gives an indication of the `formal' character of music it is 
not simply in the instance of Boulez's innovations, but more generally according to 
features that underpin musical and sonorous production and reception in any instance. 
26 The 'nomad-nomos' is given what is perhaps its most extensive description in Difference and Repetition, 
one which at once demonstrates the philosophical rigour that has often been neglected in dealing with the 
`nomad' question at the same time as indicating how such hasty readings might emerge, cf., Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition, p. 36: '[T]here is a [... ] distribution [... ]must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, 
without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but 
rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space -a space which is unlimited, or at 
least without precise limits. Nothing pertains or belongs to any person, but all persons are arrayed here and 
there in such a manner as to cover the largest possible space'. This individuated distribution makes of the 
nomad nomos a 'smooth space'. It is my contention that this conception of the 'nomad' should be conceived 
along the lines of a conceptual persona and that the specific case of nomadology should be approached with 
caution, a contention which ostensibly bears out Badiou's claim that the concept only relates to other 
concepts, although the conceptual persona should be held in distinction from concepts as such. On 
nomadology and conceptual personae, see chapter 3. 
27 Brian Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', p. xiii. 
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Independently of genre, style, subject-matter, time and place of production and 
reception, historical, cultural or social context, there remains some key facets of music 
that we can posit as underpinning any given instance. Firstly, sounds are made and 
sounds are heard, or received by a listening body or bodies. Secondly, at the level of 
production, material implements are used to generate the sounds to be heard, whether 
by beating, blowing, scraping, rubbing, or another means of converting kinetic energy 
into sound. Thirdly, at the level of reception, the body responds to vibrations that are 
processed by the brain and recognized as music, sound or noise, which are all to be 
cognized as physiological phenomena (though it needs to be pointed out that the 
vibrations received and cognized are ascribed these names differently according to the 
location of production and reception as part of different cultural-historical formations, at 
least where it pertains to music made by humans). Fourthly, the auditory field is always 
characterized by immersion, in that sound is never actually here or there, nor is it 
everywhere, but it is all around us in that sound-producing and receiving bodies are 
immersed in this field. In short, to provide a locus or frame for the production and 
reception of sound at the level of its experience prior to any attempt to translate or 
analyze its characteristics is tremendously difficult if not impossible. Perhaps more than 
other media, music draw our attention to the empirical observation of the philosopher 
Hume, which doubtless influenced Deleuze if not Guattari when - in the opening 
passage of `Introduction: Rhizome', from A Thousand Plateaus, they say that `it's nice 
to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it's only a 
matter of speaking'. 28 We know that when we say that a film is on the screen or the 
painting is on the wall, we are being somewhat reductive, paying insufficient attention 
28 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 1. 
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to the inadequacy of our language to capture the complexities of the medium, but when 
somebody says the sound or the music is `on' the radio, the stereo, the Walkman, etc., 
this is not simply reductive but - beyond the mere communicational value of such a 
proposition, ie. I listened to x on ... - they are entering into the realm of nonsense. 
29 
Music thereby lends itself quite readily to the label `rhizome' at least in terms of 
fulfilling the principles connection and heterogeneity, in that it is composed of 
heterogeneous parts: body+instrument/implement+air+ear+brain, in which it is 
impossible to localize the sound or the music, yet there is doubtless an ordered process 
occurring in any instance of production and audition. However, simply tagging music 
with `rhizome' is - as we have pointed out - insufficient. As a result of all this it is not 
necessarily just the highly sophisticated and often technologically enhanced sonic 
productions of a musician like Boulez that is capable of producing the two space-times 
that he discerns, because the fabric of any sonorous or auditory space-time is 
necessarily woven from a complex of qualities that make the measures of striation 
insufficient to the task of qualifying a deterritorialized refrain or smooth space-time. For 
example, how far can we go in delineating the space of listening before we find that it is 
more than just a question of physical space? Likewise, how much can we say about 
musical temporality before we realize that its invocation of perception, memory, 
recollection or affection forces us to ask questions of the relation between past, present 
and future? These all remain problems to be addressed in more detail. 
29 This takes us back to the 'esoteric word' of seriation and synthesis from chapter 1, nonsense as constitutive 
of sense, cf., Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, passim. 
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Returning to Massumi's claim, music proves an exemplary formal instance of aesthetic 
production when it comes to smooth space, but music on this definition has only 
components of its own production and reception for content, that is to say that it is 
primarily sound and music that convey affect, sensation and Enunciation between and 
across the planes of Expression and Content when music is being made. To claim that 
philosophy can be called `music with content' is what we have already witnessed with 
the examples of `Of the Refrain' and the ritornello of Guattari, because as we have seen 
the actual content in any particular Expression-Content relation is not really of 
importance, but rather how we can proceed towards a counter-actualization of its quasi- 
objectivity and a survey of the processes engendering heterogeneous expression-content 
interactions: refrain, diagram, affect, enunciation, abstract machine, etc. 
This finally leads us on to the last highly pertinent claim made for the place of sound in 
philosophy. We say `sound' in this instance without its accompanying term `music' not 
in order to suggest that we can ever readily distinguish one from the other but because 
the contribution in question specifically concerns the idea that philosophy can be 
conceptualized as a `thought-synthesizer'. Again, Deleuze and Guattari are not making 
life easier for themselves by introducing another machine into the fundaments of their 
thinking, not where their detractors are concerned anyway. Furthermore, for techno- 
fetishists the synthesizer likely proves a frequent quasi-object of investment. So once 
again it is our task to remain sober in ascertaining more carefully the role of the 
synthesizer in Deleuze and Guattari's work and attempting to avoid glossy 
superficialities. 
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If we return to the idea of `chaos-cosmos' underpinning `1833: Of the Refrain', we can 
see that as Deleuze and Guattari proceed from the tentative beginnings of the 
`becoming-music' of child, the production of territory/domicile and its opening onto the 
forces of the outside, they develop the idea according to a `historico-materialist' 
conception, whereby the three `aspects' - whilst respecting the inevitable reciprocity 
and admixture that prevents them from being `moments' - each become foregrounded or 
take the lead within the process of constructing and deterritorializing the refrain at 
different stages in the development of aesthetic modernity: Classical, Romantic and 
Modem. The complexity of this admixture has been helpfully schematized by Gary 
Genosko in his book Undiscplined Theory [see fig. 4). 30 
30 Cf., Genosko, Undisciplined Theory, p. 89. The idea that Guattari and Deleuze's materialist semiotics are 
actually historico-materialist is expressed by Eugene Holland, cf., Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, 
p. 39: 'schizoanalysis is not just a materialist semiotics: it is an historical-materialist semiotics'. In the case of 
Anti-Oedipus this is exemplified by the three different 'historical' inscriptions of the socius, as were briefly 
considered in chapter 1. In A Thousand Plateaus, this carries over into the 'regimes of signs', but also the 
three 'aspects' of the refrain. In all of these instances one aspect is always on the virtual horizon of the 
others, for example, capitalist decoding on the horizon of the primitive and despotic machines, or Modernism 
on the horizon of Romanticism, deterritorialization on the horizon of milieus and territories, etc. If this is a 
conception of history, it is there for a non-linear, virtual one. 
116 
Proliferation, Openness, - and the Between 89 
Ages: cs. ukal Romantic Modern 
Figure of. 















Gather forces (form); 











Refrain: Milieu Natal (territorial) Cosmic 
Population: Universal One-alone to one-crowd Depopulation 
Fig 4. 
117 
Again, whilst exploring these developments across different media, they take music as 
the primary example, with the refrain tendentially oscillating between planes of 
expression and content, diagram and abstract machine, but with most of the illustrations 
provided focusing on music as it is more conventionally understood. Hence, with the 
examination of Classical aesthetics there is an emphasis on the music of Mozart, and 
`his' refrains; with Romanticism, Schumann becomes the mainstay as an exemplar of 
more extreme sonorous and musical deterritorializations; perhaps somewhat 
contentiously, at least concerning the canon of Western music and its categories, the 
transition between the stage of Romanticism and Modernism is marked by the names of 
Wagner and Berg, with Modernism being exemplified by Debussy, Varese and Berio, 
amongst others. 
What Deleuze and Guattari use these names to mark in terms of the passages between 
chaos-cosmos, are the three aspects as they come to the fore. Classicism, then, marks 
the moment of initial organization, or the `point' of initial ordering of the refrain; 
Romanticism, the territorialization of the refrain; and - most interesting for our purposes 
- Modernism embodies the deterritorialization of the refrain towards the Cosmos. There 
are crossovers, as the categories - for Deleuze and Guattari - are not ground in stone but 
function like the `dualisms' of Bergson, as heuristic devices for discovering the more 
nuanced processual interactions underlying the movements of (aesthetic) history. 
Hence, Schumann - despite predating the Modernist moment - marks profound 
deterritorializations. In qualifying the distinction more rigorously, Deleuze and Guattari 
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find in each of the aspects a relation to mileu, territory-Earth and Cosmos, respectively. 
In terms of the glossematic schema, Classical music is primarily bound up with the 
forming of matter into relations of expression and content and proceeds by means of an 
`overcoding' that seeks to subjugate and regulate sonorous production and reception, at 
the same time universalizing production and reception in a system of redundancies; 
Romanticism places the expression/content relations into continuous variation and in 
doing so, opens them out into a territorial complex that seeks to inscribe the Body of the 
Earth; finally, Modernism, is bound up with the `capture' of material force 
independently of the formations of expression/content and their placing in variation, 
hence the opening out of the territories of music to the `rendering sonorous' of the 
forces of the Cosmos, whereby the territorialization of the Earth and the natal gives way 
to the deterritorialization of the Earth and its `de-population'. The transitions between 
these various aspects of the Refrain in their foregrounding and their relations to the 
micropolitical and `minor' aspects of Deleuze and Guattari's work will be considered in 
chapter 3. The relevance of this elaboration of the refrain here, however, is that it has 
led us to the point where the refrain attains the maximal positive redundancy of the 
abstract machine, where - under its third aspect - it attains the capacity to `render 
sonorous' matter and place it in continuous variation independently of 
expression/content formations. It is this that leads Deleuze and Guattari to describe the 
synthesizer as the best way of conceiving of philosophy as an assemblage, because it is 
the synthesizer qua assemblage that best places material elements and forces in 
continuous variation, the most nuanced assemblage that perpetually patches and re- 
patches its connection to produce an infinite variety of effects and an irreducible 
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modulation of auditory materiality. It is this connection between the synthesizer and 
philosophy that perhaps provides the most striking instance of the relation between non- 
philosophy and philosophy, but also facilitates the crucial connections drawn between 
philosophy and politics in What is Philosophy?, with the Cosmic Refrain being the aim 
of philosophy, the positive potential of (audio) technology, and the political potential 
for the counter-actualization of the present and `the people yet to come'31. Whether we 
consider its political import (which we shall) or whether we take things at the level of 
`pure philosophy', the synthesizer contributes greatly to a new image of thought in 
which the Kantian project predicated upon `synthetic judgement' is replaced by 
[A] thought synthesizer functioning to make thought travel, make it mobile, make 
it a force of the Cosmos (in the same way as one makes sound travel). 32 
Kant's identarian concept and Idea of the understanding are hereby once again subject 
to different/ciation, however this time, difference is machined as part of an assemblage 
of material components and lines of modulation, variation and drift, as one finds 
performed by a (modular) sound synthesizer. As such, the assemblage of the synthesizer 
exemplifies for philosophy a way of conceiving of its future in terms of a constructivist 
`knowledge-practice', as distinct from what Kant calls the `theoretical sciences of 
reason'33, its ethical orientation in the replacement of judgements `as to the legitimacy 
of the claims of knowledge' with judgements `as to the desirability of social formations 
and representations'. 34 Some very interesting observations have been made with regard 
to this conception of the thought-synthesizer from a number of quarters which are worth 
" See Coda 
32 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 343. 
. 33 Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1984), p. 5. 
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mentioning in brief as they all ultimately inform the underlying trajectory of this 
project. 
Firstly, in the important contribution made to a study of the relationship between 
Deleuze, Guattari and music, Christine Bezat has gone into some detail in describing 
the assemblage of the thought-synthesizer. 
Deleuze and Guattari place different elements in continuous variation on a 
synthesizer as an active, creative process of thinking a multiplicity. The 
polyphonic interaction of synthesizing makes it possible to forge connections, 
articulate relations, and determine uses and functions between the differing lines 
and registers of thought, without reducing the many to the one or subsuming one 
in another. 35 
Furthermore, in a highly useful footnote she draws our attention to the Bakhtin 
connection she states that 
[T]his process of synthesizing intersects with Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of 
dialogical polyphony, which allows for an interaction of several "consciousness- 
centers" that are not reduced to "a single ideological common demoninator". 36 
The significance of this is that it makes of Bakhtin a precursor to Deleuze and Guattari 
in their re-assemblage of Althusserian interpellation that does not locate a structured 
Subject, or at least not so long as the idea of `structure' is understood as 
transcendentally fixed or static. In addition, the connection shows Guattari's debt to 
Bakhtin in his conception of the assemblage and his 'mixed semiotics' which, as we 
have seen, endeavour to create a complex, multivalent conception of subjectification 
34 The idea of a knowledge-practice that is oriented along these ethical lines is developed by Eugene Holland 
in Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, cf., p. 127n35. 
35 Christine Bezat, Music Affect at Work: The Bodymind, Subjectivity, and Thought, Unpublished Thesis, 
University of Minnesota, 1999, p. 41. 
36 Ibid., p. 4l. n. 
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partially constituted from refrains or ritornellos which, as we also saw, Bakhtin pre- 
empts in his use of `dialogical' polyphony. As Bezat goes on to explain, citing Bakhtin, 
dialogism qualifies the relation between the different `consciousness-centers' in terms 
as a "`whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which 
entirely becomes an object for the other" and "which meet on a plane of the present 
where past, present, and future are quarreled together"' 37 
The second writer to look at when exploring the reception of the `thought-synthesizer' 
is Gary Genosko who, whilst characteristically underplaying the complexity of these 
ideas does demonstrate an ability to make insightful and - it has to be said - amusing 
connections between popular culture and Deleuze and Guattari's `Pop' philosophy by 
way of the synthesizer. In comparing the technique of post-performance editing or 
`splicing' to the advent of more advanced music technology in the shape of the Moog 
synthesizer, Genosko states: 
[T]he Moog synthesizer, even more than post-performance editing, it needs to be 
added, enables one to destratify and assert the multiple by assembling tones. 
Deleuze and Guattari seem to have a similar thing in mind, while at once urging 
sobriety in the proliferation of lines and cautioning against a cult of the machine 
[... ] 
Avoid noodling [... ] -a pastime perfected by the `keyboard wizards' of 
progressive rock in the early 1970s, when the synthesizer invaded rock with a 
vengeance, just as today old analog models like the Moog are being dragged from 
the scrapheap to fuel the ambient music scene - and the agglomeration of 
reproduced, synthesized sounds. 38 
What is both amusing but also highly pertinent about Genosko's observation is that in 
recognizing the problem of `noodling' as effected in the works indexed to band names 
37 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Problem of Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984), pp. 18,90, cited in ibid., p. 4 In. 
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including Yes and Genesis, he highlights the danger of the Body of Capital falling back 
on (se rabat sur) a deterritorializing potential marked by the entry of new `technical 
machines' into machinic assemblages of music. This is important because, firstly it is a 
problem that does not just pertain to the synthesizer as a technical machine, but also as 
the assemblage proper to philosophy. Genosko is aware that the danger of such ideas is 
that they amount to nothing more than `theoretical noodling', in which any pragmatic, 
ethical, ethico-aesthetic or political potential opened up by such philosophical 
constructions is forfeited in the name of a techno-fetishism and - to put it crudely - 
showing off. It should be very clear by this stage that - should this scenario transpire - 
the efforts to challenge the `hasty' dismissals of chapter 1 not only collapses but falls 
fully into the hands of advocates of such a view: the relation between differences of 
degree and those of kind might become blurred, distorted and ultimately forsaken, 
allowing the binary determinations of generality, particularity, equivalence and analogy, 
forfeiting difference, and thus allowing the refrain to collapse back into chaos. 
Genosko's observation is also very important for this project because - in singling out 
1970s `Prog-Rock' as an example of how not too proceed, it is necessary to recognize 
that the period of jazz fusion that immediately precedes and initially overlaps these 
developments provides these rock bands with so much of their raw musical material and 
their mythico-poietic incorporeal universe of reference. 39 
38 Gary Genosko, Undisciplined Theory, p. 80. 
39 The work of Miles Davis and his numerous bands during this period can be seen to have had a formidable 
influence on these developments and even some of his own bandmembers at this time would go on to 
arguably do their own extensive 'noodling', most notably the work done by the guitarist John McLaughlin 
with his Mahavishu Orchestra. More stern critics might also look at former 'Miles Davis 2nd Great Quintet' 
band-member Herbie Hancock's work of this period (albums like Sextant and Crossings) as an example of 
such noodling, but it might also be distinguished from the work of McLauglin's band as having worked with 
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Lastly, it is worth bringing Bezat's and Genosko's respective accounts into relief by 
briefly highlighting the one given by Douglas Kahn. As a historian of sound, noise and 
music in `the Arts', Kahn has taken Deleuze and Guattari to task for using the work of 
Edgar Varese as their exemplary illustration within the field of music and using some of 
the work of John Cage to warn of the dangers. 
[A] demarcative use of Cage's own music comes from an unlikely source, that of 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. One would suspect they might share Cage's 
musical radicalism, yet they thought Cage went too far, and, more surprisingly, 
the offending works were not among his most raucous but were instead the fairly 
benign piano pieces 40 
So how do Deleuze and Guattari distinguish Cage from Varese? 
Varese's procedure, at the dawn of this age, is exemplary: a musical machine of 
consistency, a sound machine (not a machine for reproducing sounds), which 
molecularizes and atomizes, ionizes sound matter, and harnesses a cosmic 
energy. 1 
Unlike the prepared piano pieces of Cage, apparently: 
[S]ometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and 
sounds; then instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of "rendering 
sonorous", one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up reproducing 
nothing but a scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds. ° 
Kahn is not satisfied with the distinction that Deleuze and Guattari make between 
Varese and Cage, and both his reasons and his conclusion are telling. 
problematic affects and the production of new incorporeal universes of reference, although the extent to 
which such a distinction can be made between the two group should be subject to more rigorous 
investigation. 
40 Douglas Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat: A History of Sound in the Arts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 
114. 
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 343. 
42 Ibid., pp. 343-4. 
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What terrestrial and territorial hazards drove Deleuze and Guattari away from 
Cage's music? Their portrayal of Varese's music as a synthesizer would be 
appropriate to his percussion-laded music, but not, say, Poeme Electronique 
(1958), which used new technologies to both produce and reproduce sound. The 
prepared piano was an act of melding a percussion ensemble and with the piano 
(itself an instrument already equipped with percussive functions) following 
Varese's own formidable forays into percussion. The specific occasion for its 
development was a dance by Syvilla Fort at the Cornish Institute in Seattle. Fort, 
an African-American choreographer and dancer, wanted music with an African 
feel to it, but the stage was too small for a percussion ensemble, thus its 
miniaturization under the lid of a piano 43 
Kahn shows that Deleuze and Guattari, in their choice of examples, have once again 
potentially fallen foul of dangers they themselves perceive and articulate. This may be 
an example of where the approach based on `rigorous yet anexact' use of 
deterritorialized vocabulary runs up against a limit, the `angelic' or `too incorporeal' 
attempt to produce a more or less concrete case exposes its weaknesses and - at the very 
worst - the philosophical (and non-philosophical) apprenticeship begins to break down 
to be replaced by `theoretical noodling'. Firstly, this would be because they have not 
made a sufficiently detailed foray into the history of modern Classical music, and - even 
worse than that - in failing to sufficiently follow the rule of proceeding with `utmost 
sobriety', they have missed a crucial connection that situates Cage's experiment in 
relation to African-American music. Secondly, this oversight symptomatizes both 
Deleuze and Guattari's propensity - despite their best efforts - to reify Classical music 
as a category that retains something of a perceived evaluative superiority, allowing the 
binarism Classical (white, Western)-African-American, to re-territorialize their refrain. 
As Kahn rhetorically asks, 
43 D. Kahn, Noise, Water, Meat, p. 115. 
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[W]hy was it, then, that their interpretation of musical events so easily sailed 
skyward to the unpopulated vacuum of the cosmos and not south? 44 
His answer is as follows, 
[M]any of these problems could be credited to a general lack of understanding 
about sound; there is, after all, little discourse on sound 45 
So perhaps these problems are not so much attributable to Deleuze and Guattari's lack 
of sufficient investigation after all, and perhaps it is a case of transversalizing the 
relation between the kind of philosophical work that they specialize in and the work of 
music historians, `new' musicologists and ethnomusicologists, to `render sonorous' 
forms of content that are musical. However, the fragility of such a project as Deleuze 
and Guattari attempt in A Thousand Plateaus, and this more modest attempt under way 
here, is surely at lot clearer now, and, unfortunately, Deleuze and Guattari's oversights 
do not restrict themselves to an ignorance of Non-Western musical forms, but to a 
contentious take on popular music which - despite their calls for a `Pop' philosophy - is 
decidedly stuffy, given their use of mostly-Classical examples and their belief that - 




46 The exceptions are being referred to can be found at various points in the individual and collective work of 
Deleuze and Guattari. For example, cf. Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, where Deleuze likens his ideal 
pedagogical approach to the song-writing style of Bob Dylan, where on pages. 7-8 he says that '[A]s a teacher 
I should like to be able to give a course as Dylan organizes a song, as astonishing producing rather than 
author'; in 'Introduction: Rhizome', Deleuze and Guattari use the song Old Man River to illustrate the image 
of the rhizome, cf. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 25; the work produced by Richard Pinhas 
has not gone unnoticed by Deleuze and Guattari who cite him twice in footnotes in A Thousand Plateaus, cf., 
pp. 551n. 53,562n. 94; Deleuze actually corresponded with some of the people working for the Mille Plateaux 
and Sub Rosa labels; Deleuze also professed a liking for the singing of Edith Piaf, cf., Charles Stivale, 'The 
ABC of Gilles Deleuze' at www. lan lag b. wayne. edu/Romance; finally, in a quite humorous and telling 
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The reason given for why the refrains of popular music are inadequate to the task of a 
positive deterritorialization is given in a crucial footnote to `1833: Of the Refrain', 
taken from an essay by Gisele Brelet, 
[P]opular music is melody, in its fullest sense, melody persuading us that it is self- 
sufficient and is in fact synonymous with music itself. How could it not refuse to 
bend to the learned development of a musical work pursuing its own ends [... ] 
The popular melody could never constitute a true theme, and that is why, in 
popular music, the melody is the entire work, and why once it is over it has no 
other recourse than to repeat itself. 47 
In other words, popular songs are reducible to melody qua a repetition of the same. 
However, given that any rigid segmental division between Classical and popular musics 
obstructs access to the refrain, one has to question the extent to which this is 
unequivocally the case. In looking at Miles Davis, and the use of popular songs in jazz, 
we can begin to address this problem. 
In a Silent Way: Words and Music by Miles Davis 
Good music speaks for itself. No sleevenotes required. 
Kodwo Eshun48 
I've been trying to get Irving [Irving Townsend, the Columbia A&R man] for years to 
put these albums out with no notes [... J [T]here's nothing to say about the music. Don't 
write about the music. 
section of the discussion conducted with Charles Stivale, Guattari professes an interest in jazz music before 
betraying his ignorance of non-Classical musics, cf., Stivale and Guattari, 'Pragmatic/Machinic', in The Two- 
Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, p. 207. 
FG: Jazz has a great impact on the level of world culture. Line up cinema, jazz, the mystery novel [... ] 
CS: I think the problem for me is that I'm too close to daily life in the States, and I see so much 
stupidity in all these areas[... ] 
FG: That's true: when one hears the classical music that people listen to in the United States, it's 
overwhelming. Won't you ever get fed up with Rachmaninoff, Tchaikovsky, and all that...? 
CS: I was really thinking about popular music [... ]. 
47 Gisr le Brelet, cited in Delcuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 551-2, n. 59. 
48 Kodwo Eshun, More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction (London: Quartet, 1998), p. vii. 
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Miles Davis49 
The selection of Miles Davis as providing the main case for this project returns us to 
one of the more pressing questions asked in chapter 1, the question of investment. It has 
to be said that Miles Davis is not as obvious a choice for a case exploring the pragmatic 
potential for transversalizing the work of Deleuze and Guattari and music, as one would 
doubtless locate more points of interface and more potential resonances by taking the 
work produced on the record labels Mille Plateaux, Sub Rosa, Force Inc., and 
Cuneiform, whose signed artists and - in the case of Mille Plateaux and Force Inc. - 
their founder, Achim Szepanski, have all actively embraced Deleuze and Guattari's 
work extensively. In a number of instances, the records produced on these labels have 
ventured a sustained effort to embody the concepts developed in this work - in 
particular in A Thousand Plateaus and The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque - in such a 
way as to activate the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy that takes 
Deleuze and Guattari at their word: key concepts have all been taken up on two albums 
produced on Sub Rosa records, respectively entitled Folds and Rhizomes and Double 
Articulation; text from Anti-Oedipus has been performed using customized 
technological prosthetic enhancements in the work produced by Richard Pinhas and 
Maurice Dantec, in particular on their album Schizotrope and the work Deleuze has 
done on the event, molecularity and the `abstract machine' forms the basis of the work 
produced for the In Memoriam: Gilles Deleuze album released on Mille Plateaux 
Records. 
49 Cited in Ralph J. Gleason, `At the Blackhawk', in Gary Carner, A Miles Davis Companion: Four Decades 
of Commentary (London: Schirmer Books, 1996), p. 85. 
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Whilst doubtless these are important and highly interesting developments that resonate 
widely with the work of their primary inspiration, and therefore should be subject to 
more detailed consideration, the choice of the life and work of Miles Davis as a case 
embodies a slightly different set of concerns. Firstly, where it concerns the question of 
investment, the proper name `Marcel Swiboda' assembling and assembled in this 
project, to the extent that it involves propria, privation and affective capacities is 
inextricably bound up with an investment in those indexed to the name of Miles Davis. 
As should by now be quite clear, a project that accedes to the name of a transcendental 
or `superior' empiricism should be able to lodge itself in any given assemblage in order 
to partake of an immanent self-survey, and should not be forced to select the ones that 
seem to connect most explicitly with the work of Deleuze and Guattari or their 
concepts. It has been said already that the treatment of their work as an 
unacknowledged instance of nomenclature is both a fact of some of the secondary work 
done in the field and remains a danger for the present and any future endeavours. In 
order to try and avoid this danger, ultimately at worst one that leads to an exercise akin 
to painting-by-numbers, a strategic decision has been made to choose a case that in 
some ways goes against the grain of Deleuze and Guattari's work: a representative of 
popular culture that they would perhaps prefer not to find used to blow the proverbial 
trumpet of their oddly elitist `Pop' philosophy, one who arguably sacrificed his musical 
and cultural credentials to one of the predominantly white, majoritarian, male, middle- 
class developments, neutralized within the axiomatic of capitalism and its 
reterritorializing archaisms of heterosexual, woman-objectifying conjugality, liberal 
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democratic consensus politics and pseudo-individuality and its machinic 
so enslavements 
The motor-force of these claims lies in the career trajectory of Miles Davis's music, 
which can be summarily described by recourse to a brief resumd of the developments 
with which he credited and paths that his music took over the five decades that he was 
working. Born into an African-American middle class family in Alton, Illinois in 1926 
and brought up in East St. Louis, Miles Dewey Davis III, a dentist's son, grew up in a 
provincial part of the United States, influenced from around the age of six by the radio 
show 'Harlem Rhythms', playing the music of Louis Armstrong, Count Basie, Bessie 
Smith and Duke Ellington, before receiving his first trumpet as a present when he was 
`nine or ten' 5.1 The lure of the metropolitan world of jazz would gradually become more 
concrete than ethereal and imaginary and by 1944, Davis won a scholarship to the 
Juillard School of Music in New York, where he moved and lived a `Jeckyll and Hyde 
existence 'S2, dividing his time between the austere, academic world of the Juilliard 
School of Music and the jazz clubs of 52"d Street (with the latter largely winning out in 
its claim on his libidinal investments), where the pioneers of the Bebop style of jazz 
were resident, in particular both in the canon of jazz history and in the affections of 
Davis, Charlie `Bird' Parker and Dizzie Gillespie, who would give Davis something of 
an apprenticeship in the music, culture and lifestyle of the New York jazz scene. 
50 Cf., Deleuze and Guattari,, '7000 B. C.: Apparatus of Capture', in A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 458. 
51 Ian Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography (London: Harper Collins, 1998), p. 4. 
52 Ibid., p. 18. 
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Using these initial outings as his career springboard, Miles Davis would proceed from 
his tentative, youthful beginnings as a professional musician to become one of the main 
innovators of the `Cool' style of jazz in the late 1940s and early 1950s, along with his 
long-time collaborator, the arranger Gil Evans, proceeding to contribute to the 
development of the Hardbop style of jazz in the late 1950s, at roughly the same time as 
his groundbreaking contribution to the establishment of `modal' jazz to be examined in 
Chapter 3. This would pave the way for the transformations of the 1960s, to be taken up 
and developed to the highest level of sophistication and skill by John Coltrane, a band- 
member of Davis's `First Great Quintet' between 1955 and 1961. 
By 1967 Davis would be venturing towards another highly controversial development - 
the incorporation of electronic instruments, electric guitars and effects, rock-style 
rhythms and the endorsement of extensive post-production modification - in what 
would come to be called the period of `jazz-rock' or `fusion'. Prompting accusations of 
`sell-out'53, this is the moment when Davis would provide his initial grist for the critical 
mill which, for his fans, would find a constant source of renewal in his `Cellar Door' 
experiments in the early 1970s and ultimately in his covers of songs like the Cindy 
Lauper hit `Time after Time' in his `systems funk' bands of the 1980s. As we shall 
come on to see, the extent to which these late developments in Davis's career mark a 
significant departure from what went before in terms of the orientation and self- 
consistency of the music produced earlier on is a highly complex question, and the issue 
53 Cf. in particular Stanley Crouch's scathing attack on Miles Davis's fusion period, entitled 'On the Corner: 
The Sell-Out of Miles Davis', in Robert Gottlieb, Reading Jazz, pp. 898-914. On page 898, Crouch claims 
that - during the period of this music - 'when one hears his music or watches him perform, deserves the 
description that Nietzsche gave of Wagner, "the greatest example of self-violation in the history of art"'. 
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of whether he actually `sold out' is important. It matters not so much in terms of the 
entropic `squabble assemblage'54 of the musicological and critical dispositifs, but rather 
in terms of the ways in which the developments and their reception symptomatize more 
nuanced and more pressing problems, at least where this project is concerned, by 
pointing up so many difficulties regarding the problem of the music's relation to the 
political, and to capitalism. 
With regard to the other claims made earlier of the dangers and limitations that threaten 
both the self-consistency of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy and the transcendental 
empirical world that provides it with sources of inscription, in terms of Miles Davis's 
life, one might point to his intermittent addictions to drugs, most notably heroin and 
cocaine, at various stages in his career, the oft-cited question of whether or not he had 
homosexual affairs and - most troubling of all - his proclivities for brutal physical 
violence against his female partners. Of course, in such an eventful and protracted, 
high-profile career as Miles Davis had, there are many other perhaps less obvious but 
no less symptomatic aspects to which one might point, as we will doubtless do as we 
proceed, but - despite running the gauntlet of a molarizing tendency in giving a 
biographical account of Miles Davis's life and work as is the case here - there is a 
degree of necessity attached to providing this information in order to provide a 
schematic frame for the remainder of this project. 
54 The idea of the 'squabble assemblage' I have taken from the section of A Thousand Plateaus entitled '587 
B. C. - A. D. 70: On Several Regimes of Signs', in which Deleuze and Guattari develop their work on the 
problem of the relations between thought, language and 'conjugality', the squabble being largely 'domestic' 
and therefore territorial. I have taken the liberty of applying the idea beyond the confines of the domicile and 
conjugality to locate it in the order-word assemblage as it passes into critical and musicological debates 
which - in short - are bound up with the vain effort to objectify judgements based on taste, cf. Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 132. 
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For more positive reasons, Miles Davis does turn out to be an appropriate choice for a 
case: the complexity and ambivalence of his life both `within' an `outside' of music- 
making; the milieus, territories and assemblages weaving the fabric of his 
subjectification-subjection, his refrains and becomings. Miles Davis embodies 
something of that constitutive indiscernibility that Massumi finds in Ronald Reagan in 
the sense that one can look at the archive of inscriptions (the recordings of music, 
biographical data, sleevenotes, artwork, speech) and be confronted at every turn with an 
extremely overdetermined array of symptoms, motivations or traits which - as 
constitutive - may be read, viewed or heard as mutually inclusive enunciative and 
affective possibilities that can open towards an outside in a way that promotes 
transversality. In the remainder of this chapter and the one to follow will be an attempt 
to explore in some detail this claim by surveying taking some key formative moments in 
the music of Davis to produce a modest yet illustrative case. 
An ostensibly undermining qualification of music in general and one that was 
vehemently propounded by Miles Davis is the idea that `music speaks for itself' and 
therefore has no need of explanation, description or analysis. As a statement that Davis 
went on the record to make on a number of occasions it is characterized by his reticence 
regarding the provision of extensive sleevenotes to his recordings, and - most 
interestingly and infamously - is captured in his live performances (at least until the 
1970s) in which he acquired a reputation for arrogance and disrespect in his attitude 
towards his audience by his refusal to announce songs, introduce band-members and by 
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his tendency to walk off-stage mid-performance and turn his back on the audience (see 
chapter 3). His strongly-held belief that music should not be belaboured by critics or 
commentators is documented - perhaps somewhat ironically - in the sleeve-note for a 
concert recording released as Saturday Night Live at the Blackhawk, quoted in the 
epigraph above. 
The writer Kodwo Eshun begins his book More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in 
Sonic Fiction by arguing that such a view typifies what he reads as example of 
`cretinism': 
[R]espect due. Good music speaks for itself. No sleevenotes required. Just enjoy 
it. What else is there to add? 
All these troglodytic homilies are [Great British] cretinism masquerading as 
vectors into the Trad Sublime [... ] The fuel this inertia engine runs on is fossil 
fuel: the live show, the proper album, the Real Song, the Real Voice, the mature, 
the musical, the pure, the true, the proper, the intelligent, breaking America: all 
notions that stink of the past, that maintain a hierarchy of the senses, that petrify 
music into a solid state in which everyone knows where they stand, and what real 
music really is [... ] this insistence that Great Music speaks for itself. ss 
Eshun's neologistic flourishes aside (an issue to be returned to later), what makes his 
claim particularly interesting and pertinent in terms of Miles Davis's observations and 
gestures that seemingly support such a view as the one Eshun decries, is that Davis 
represents for him an exemplary instance of everything that stands against this view. 
Eshun sees Davis as an exponent of the science-fictional critique of White, occidental 
hegemony and an attempt at a radical cultural politics that challenges its dominance - 
retrospectively cast according to the description `Afrofuturism'56, most notably in the 
ss Kodwo Eshun, More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction, p. vii. 
56 Afrofuturism covers a highly disparate body of work across different media. As Mark Dcry explains, in his 
editor's introduction to a series of interviews conducted with the Black writers Samuel Delany, Greg Tate 
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recordings between 1968 and 1975 which for Eshun uniquivocally do not mark the 
demise of Davis's career but, on the contrary, his most inventive and enduring 
challenge to established narratives of music history, including those of jazz music. 
The reasons for this will be explored in some detail in the final chapter. Still, as should 
be instantly discernible from this paradox is that the case of Miles Davis, where it 
concerns the relationship between music and written documentary accounts of its worth, 
is somewhat paradoxical. It is one of the many instances in which the name `Miles 
Davis' lends itself to the reciprocal suspension of different possible worlds. 
Kodwo Eshun's approach to music writing is to make writing musical, hence his 
coining the term `sonic-fiction' to describe his book. Whatever the successes and 
failures of this book (see chapter 3), Eshun does provide a means for thinking and 
writing a way out of the impasse between music and its documentation, and more 
specifically the place of philosophical concepts as part of such an endeavour. The way 
in which this should be done, according to Eshun, is to avoid as much as possible 
writing `on' music so as to generate a series of mediators and relays between sonorous 
and Tricia Rose, `[I]f there is an Afrofuturism, it must be sought in unlikely places, constellated from far- 
flung points. Glimpses of it can be caught in Jean-Michel Basquiat's Molasses [... ]; John Sayles's The 
Brother from Another Planet [... ]; Jimi Hendrix's Electric Ladyland, George Clinton's Computer Games, 
Herbie Hancock's Future Shock [... ]; and in the intergalactic big-band jazz churned out by Sun Ra's 
Ominverse Arkestra, Parliament-Funkadelic's Dr. Seussian astrofunk, and Lee 'Scratch' Perry's dub reggae', 
cf., 'Black to the Future: Interviews with Samuel R. Delany, Greg Tate and Tricia Rose', in Mark Dery [ed. ]. 
Flame Wars: The Discourse of Cyberspace (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p 182. The 
term itself largely describes the endeavours of Black science-fiction writers and artists to re-appropriate the 
genre and explore its extrapolative qualities to examine the relation between Black culture and technology 
and how in doing so Black culture and its subjectivities might be inflected or altered. For his part, Kodwo 
Eshun uses the terms `Afrodiasporic Futurism', 'Black Atlantic Futurism' and 'Sonic Futurism' and, where it 
concerns Miles Davis, the term 'Afrodelia' is deployed to specifically signal the developments of electric 
jazz and what he calls the 'fission' music of the late 1960s and 1970s. His own writing style reflects the 
science-fiction orientation that Mark Dery locates in Afrofuturism. 
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production and reception, the material body and the affective, perceptive and conceptual 
aspects of literary and philosophical writing combined. We might go so far as to say 
that Eshun is attempting to map the transversal relations that immanently conjoin these 
various, artificially closed systems in such a way as their complexity and relation to the 
outside can be discerned. To this extent, the approach to Miles Davis in Eshun's book 
and in this thesis are oriented along the same lines. It is important to bear in mind that 
what Miles Davis objects to in attempts to capture his recordings and performances in a 
written form is the desire for explanation, reduction, resolution, or categorical 
evaluation. This desire is objectionable to Davis not least of all because it 
symptomatizes the fact that what is usually written and published on jazz in the mass- 
media is written by white people and that the modes of dissemination of these media 
were and still largely are geared towards the reinforcement of exclusion and 
appropriation. In the language of this thesis, we might say that the investments of 
prepersonal desire constitutive of these subjectivities are fabricated as part the 
institutional dispositifs making up - at least in part - the media establishment, libidinally 
constituted as part of a restricted economy that seeks to regulate or manage dis- 
positional intensifications, or `the dissimulation of tensors', consolidating its internal 
limit by the constantly falling back on archaic determinations of race, cultural 
superiority, and so on. It is a problem strongly implied by Miles Davis on several 
occasions in his `autobiography': 
[A] lot of white critics kept talking about all these white jazz musicians, imitators of 
us, like they was some great motherfuckers and everything [... ] but wasn't nobody 
writing about them like they was writing about us. They didn't start paying attention 
to white guys being junkies until Stan Getz got busted trying to break into a 
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drugstore to cop some drugs. That shit made the headlines until people forgot and 
went back to just talking about black musicians being junkies. 7 
We shall encounter this problem in more detail in the examination of `My Funny 
Valentine', which is to follow in the next two sections. 
1956-1964: A Sonorous Trajectory: `My Funny Valentine' 
Is your mouth a little weak? This is your song.. 
Richard Rogers and Lorenz Hart58 
There are no wrong notes in jazz. 
Miles Davis 59 
`My Funny Valentine', written by Richard Rogers and Lorenz Hart in 1937, was 
originally composed as a Tin Pan Alley tune, and if anything singles it out at all from 
the vast output of other Tin Pan Alley recordings of the time it is the lyrics which, going 
against the grain of some of the conventions of the love-song idiom, disparagingly 
profess love for a person who is - to put it crudely, yet aptly - ugly: `My Funny 
Valentine/Sweet Comic Valentine/Your looks are laughable/Unphotographable/Yet 
you're my fav'rite work of art'. 60Despite its Tin Pan Alley credentials and its trite, 
melodramatic lyrics, the song has acquired an ambiguous history in its recording by 
different artists, turning on the song being performed as a `cutesy ditty' at one moment 
and as a `rueful lament' the next. 61 Structurally, the song frames the ambiguity in terms 
57 Miles Davis and Quincy Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 146. 
58 Richard Rogers and Lorenz Hart, 'My Funny Valentine', cited in Tim DeLisle [ed. ], Lives of the Great 
Songs (London: Pavilion, 1994), p. 27. 
59 Cited in Ashley Kahn, Kind of Blue: The Making of a Miles Davis Masterpiece (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 2001), p. 28. 
60 Lorenz and Hart, 'My Funny Valentine', cited in DeLisle [ed. ], Lives of the Great Songs, p. 27. De Lisle 
himself reminds us that the song was actually written for a Broadway music called Babes in Arms 'in which 
Betty, smart and self-possessed, sings it to a character actually called Valentine, a dope who has failed to 
notice her affection for him'. 
61 Ibid. 
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of its key and mode, which `while it is predominantly C minor, the bridge is in the 
relative major, E-flat and the tag brings the song to a conclusion in E-flat major' 62 
Numbered amongst the many popular and jazz musicians who have re-worked the 
standard, including Tony Bennett, Chet Baker and Ella Fitzgerald is Miles Davis, who 
is famous for having performed and recorded three versions of the song, the first in 
1956 as the opener on the Prestige album Cookin' With the Miles Davis Quintet, then in 
1958 he did a version which can be heard on the Columbia release Stella by Starlight, 
and in 1964 he performed his most in/famous rendering of the song in a performance 
given at the Lincoln Center's Philharmonic Hall which again, barring the MC Mort 
Fega's vocal introduction to band, is the opening Miles Davis tune on the CD - released 
on Columbia Records as Miles Davis: The Complete Concert 1964: My Funny 
Valentine + Four and More, the performance stretching the 36 bar (32 bars plus a4 bar 
tag) number to last for 14 minutes and 54 seconds. 
Giles Smith provides a short musicological account for the ambiguity of the song: 
[... ] "My Funny Valentine" shares a crucial compositional device with "Three 
Blind Mice". And yet the song is built around an evenly descending bass-line, and 
the slight rise of the melody against the slow fall of the bass can come over you 
like melancholy. 63 
In the 1956 version of the song recorded by the Miles Davis Quintet, the structure is 
AABA and the tempo is downbeat (64bpm), played in straight 4/4 time. The 
performance of the melody by Davis is controlled, restrained and - often coming in 
62 Howard Brofsky, `Miles Davis and "My Funny Valentine: The Evolution of a Solo"', in Bill Kirchner 
[ed. ], A Miles Davis Reader (Washington and London: The Smithsonian Institution, 1997), p. 142. 
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quite far into the bar - generates a good deal of musical space. The swinging quality of 
the bridge section is largely a characteristic of Red Garland's piano playing style, 
heavily off the beat. Garland is actually the only bandmember to solo during the bridge, 
before the song returns for a final half-chorus and re-states the opening melody, ending 
with the four bar tag. 
Structurally, the ambiguity is marked by a transition between what we might label a 
blues-tinged `rueful lament' and a period of sustained levity from 2 minutes and 18 
seconds, a transition prior to which the song - and in particular the trumpet lead - have a 
dynamically subdued, tempered and lyrical quality. At the bridge, where the transition 
takes place, the song adopts a much lighter, more upbeat character, with the rhythm 
section providing the ground for a piano improvisation by Garland, whose lightness of 
touch complements the delicacy of Davis's trumpet-playing but adds to this a lilting, 
swinging playfulness, until at 4 minutes and 29 seconds it returns to the opening theme 
and the dropping of the double-time, restoring to the re-statement the minimalist 
sparseness of the opening one. In addition, the descending bass-line of the original song 
that, for Smith, makes it `like melancholy' has actually been modified, with Davis 
substituting an A-flat 7`h (augmented 11`h) for the original, which gives the opening 
four bars a strange harmonic quality that greatly alters the mood of the originals song 
thus compounding its structural ambiguity. 64 
63 Giles Smith, 'My Funny Valentine' in DeLisle [ed. ], Lives of the Great Songs, pp. 26-7. 
64 Brofsky, 'Miles Davis and "My Funny Valentine"', p. 144, where the description of the modification is 
given and a comparison made with Chet Baker's 1952 recording of the song which maintained the original 
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Furthermore, the recording is notable for the precision and clarity of Davis's playing, 
which - with his trademark amplified use of the Harmon mute generates a delicate, 
gentle yet piercing sound -a sound practically indissociable in jazz from his style. The 
combination of the mute, microphone and amplification is an innovation that Davis 
incorporated into his recordings starting with `Oleo' in 1954, just two years before the 
first version of `My Funny Valentine'. As Davis's biographer Ian Carr notes, 
[I]t was with this recording that Miles Davis introduced a totally new sound to 
jazz: the amplified sound of the Harmon mute with its stem removed. The mute 
has to be placed very close to the microphone, and the resulting sound is full and 
breathy in the lower register and thin and piercing in the upper. 65 
The ambivalence of the soft, subdued and `intimate' character of the sound and its 
piercing, driving and visceral quality when played loud in the upper register maps onto 
the ambiguity of the song itself, with both aspects in evidence, impossible ultimately to 
separate. 
So, the recording has something of the `rueful lament' about it and despite being too 
complex be described as a `cutesy ditty' - plays with the ambiguity of the song by 
conjoining a profoundly sombre rendering of the trumpet theme in C minor with the 
vivacious piano chops of Garland during the bridge in the relative major of E-flat. In 
addition, the use of the amplified Harmon mute introduces something of a more staged 
descending chromatic bass-line. A comparison of the openings of Baker's and Davis's early recording brings 
the marked difference into relief. 
65 Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 81. 
140 
quality into the performance and its recording which parallels the style and technique of 
Frank Sinatra's singing, a major influence on Miles Davis. 66 
When we move on to consider the 1964 recording we find aspects of the original's 
melodic exposition retained, albeit in a more fragmental form, and the `intimacy' is still 
much in evidence, with Davis once again playing with the amplified Harmon mute, but 
the song becomes drastically different in almost every other way. It is in considering 
this version where the attempt to categorize the emotive aspects of the piece - obviously 
a problematic endeavour when the aim is to get at the `extra-textual' dimension 
informing the music and its reception - comes up against its own limits. Returning to the 
third of Guattari's four functions, this earlier version of the song introduces a degree of 
deterritorialization of the `refrain', but retains a low co-efficient because the form of its 
content retains a good deal of proximity to the original standard. Nevertheless, 
embodied within this version is the potential for going further, expressed in the 
manipulation of song's conventional harmonic ` like melancholy' structure to produce 
an affect that cannot even inadequately be described as using this term, or any other 
66 Giles Smith, 'My Funny Valentine', p. 27. Smith claims that the song was transformed by Frank Sinatra in 
1953 when he recorded for the album Songs for Young Lovers, whereby it became 'intimate' and 'informal'. 
Sinatra is recognized as a pioneer of amplified vocal technique which he manipulated to generate the effect 
of intimacy with his audience. Smith describes the transformation of the song as one between 'theatre' and 
'nightclub'. His characterizing of the transformation applies in some measure to Davis's early recording, at 
least where the intimacy effect is concerned, to some extent attributable to the new methods of 'rigging' 
enabled by technological developments that allowed for sotto-voce phrasing that could be heard clearly by 
sizable audiences. In the shift from the theatre to the nightclub, the theatrical quality is not therefore 
abandoned, but is itself transformed, in the shift from one assemblage to the other. It is not quite so easy 
however to qualify Davis's version as 'informal', especialy when one is aware of the extent to which he 
detested the pandering of some performers to their audience and that he adopted strategies for challenging 
such informality which would confound many critics and even some of his audiences. The difficult question 
of Davis's relation to performativity and theatricality will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
For Miles Davis on Frank Sinatra, Cf,. Davis, Miles : The Autobiography, p. 60: 'I learned a lot about 
phrasing [... j listening to the way Frank, Nat 'King' Cole and even Orson Welles phrased. I mean all those 
people are motherfuckers the way they shape a musical line or sentence or phrase with their voice'. 
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nomenclature of emotion (as some music critics are wont to use a term like 
`melancholy'), yet one that - indexed to the limited refrain of the version - generates an 
affect of sensation for that moment. In the `launching forth' of the 1964 version, this 
problem will be brought out much more pronouncedly. 
Working with an entirely different group of musicians, three of which would - along 
with Davis - provide four of the five of his `Second Great Quintet' that extended the 
vocabulary of the modal conception developed in the late 1950s between 1965 and 
1967: Herbie Hancock on piano, playing in a more impressionistic style than Red 
Garland, in the wake of Bill Evans's work with Davis (incidentally, the pianist on the 
1958 version of `My Funny Valentine' for which there is insufficient space to describe 
here, but whose contributions to Kind of Blue will be explored in chapter 3), Ron Carter 
on bass and the teenage virtuoso Tony Williams on drums. The only musician who did 
not make it into the second quintet is George Coleman on tenor saxophone. Collectively 
this quintet works very loosely around the original melody, rhythmic and harmonic 
characteristics of `My Funny Valentine' which crosses into numerous different time- 
signatures, makes use of Latin rhythms at key points. The performance is extended and 
`everyone "stretches out more' so that the song has six complete choruses, two played 
by Davis, two by Coleman, one-and-a-half by Hancock and the last half-chorus played 
by Davis again. 67The extension of the song to such a protracted length enables a much 
more profound experimentation in which many of the possibilities of melodic, 
harmonic, rhythmic and textural qualities are explored - not just those of the song - but 
those available more generally during the time as part of the jazz vocabulary. 
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However, these more conventional musicological aspects of the performance are not - 
in the instance of the 1964 version of the song - the features that shall be drawn out 
here, but rather Davis's solo in the opening theme and more specifically its `problems' 
At the opening of his essay `Out of Notes: Signification, Interpretation and the Problem 
of Miles Davis', the musicologist Robert Walser introduces the reader to a rather telling 
problematic at the heart of the music of Miles Davis. 
A flurry of posthumous tributes to Miles Davis almost managed to conceal the 
fact that jazz critics and historians have never known how to explain the power 
and appeal of his playing. Miles Davis has always been difficult to deal with 
critically: along with his controversial personal life. `The problem of Miles Davis' 
is the problem Davis presents to critics and historians. How are we to account for 
such glaring defects in the performance of someone who is indisputably one of the 
most important musicians in the history of jazz? 68 
In order not to presuppose any level of familiarity with the very long, varied and 
complex musical career of Davis, but without going into too much biographical detail at 
this stage, it should be made clear that - despite his generally recognized contributions 
to conception, composition, and band-leadership, at least to the point of his turn towards 
rock-influences and jazz-fusion -a point of contention amongst critical and followers of 
his music is what we might spuriously yet tellingly call the command of his instrument, 
namely the trumpet (and occasionally flugelhorn). Again, to quote Walser: 
[W]hile nearly everyone acknowledges his historical importance as a band leader 
and a musical innovator, and while for decades large audiences flocked to his 
67 Brofsky, 'Miles Davis and "My Funny Valentine", p. 150. 
68 Robert Walser, 'Out of Notes: Signification, Interpretation and the Problem of Miles Davis', in David 
Schwarz, Anahid Kassabian, and Lawrence Siegel, [eds. ], Keeping Score: Music, Disciplinarity, Culture 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997), p. 147. 
143 
concerts, critics have always been made uncomfortable by his "mistakes", the 
cracked and missed notes common to his performances. 6 
Before going any further, it is necessary to take care and avoid proceeding along a 
potentially wayward path into the well-trodden and somewhat murky terrain of critical 
and musicological narratives regarding the persona of the artist, his or her worth in 
terms of individual contributions or - to point up the problem - the contribution of 
individual, most tellingly evinced by the expression `artist-hero' 70, with all of the 
Manichean `bipolar valorizations' 71 thereby suggested (individual-collective, hero- 
villain, man-woman) and their resulting exclusions. In venturing to challenge the 
primacy of subject and object, self-identity and personological categories, it would be 
somewhat self-defeating to fall back on such an archaic conception of the musician, 
however it is strategically necessary to proceed by way of such molarities before trying 
to `tip the assemblage towards the Body without Organs'. 
The first point that we can uncontentiously assert regarding the issue of Miles Davis's 
technical accomplishment is that in a great many of his recordings, whether done in the 
studio or performed live, the music produced includes a good many instances of 
unpredictable notes and sounds. In the parlance of the instrumentalist-technician, he 
often `half-valves', depressing the valves of his trumpet such that the sound produced 
69 Ibid. 
70 The figure of the artist as 'hero' is - according to the three stages of the refrain conceived as Classical, 
Romantic and Modem pertains to the Romantic stage. Christopher Small has explicitly mentioned the 
problem of Miles Davis in relation to the trope of artist-hero in jazz discourse, cf. Christopher Small, Music 
of the Common Tongue (London: John Calder, 1987), p. 315: '[T]he notion found in many histories and other 
studies of jazz, of the great individual artist-hero - Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, Miles Davis for instance - 
creating out of his own nature and genius, has to be treated with great caution'. To bring Deleuze, Guattari 
and Small together, one can conclude that - in terms of the refrain - the figure of the artist-hero in jazz an 
example of an archaic reterritorialization of a more 'Modern' moment. 
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lacks precision and clarity in its failure to accurately hit on a given note. Slightly less 
technically, he has also been known to burble notes and swallow notes. If one listens to 
Miles Davis's recordings starting with the early sessions that he recorded with Dizzy 
Gillespie and Charlie Parker in the 1940s, when his playing had undeniably yet to 
mature, right through his `cool', `hard-bop' and `modal' accomplishments in the 1950s 
and 60s, to the `electric' phase of his career that predominantly characterized his work 
from the late 1960s until his death in 1991, one can find any number of instances in 
which the sounds produced sound at best unusual and at worst just sound plain wrong. 
Rather than get embroiled in the ongoing debate around the questions of Davis's 
playing ability or lack thereof, there seems to be another way in which this investigation 
might proceed that avoids the intractability of what amounts to yet another example of 
the order-word assemblage, in that asking what is a right note and what is a mistake 
leaves the partaking subjectivities with a highly limited and largely already determined 
set of possible responses from which answers to such questions might be produced, 
thereby contributing to the tendency of an institutional dispositif towards stratification, 
ossification and aggregation, as well as a refusal to locate the terms of the debate in 
relation to investment. 
Hence - rather than remain limited to analysing the playing of the person named 
`Miles 
Davis' as `good' or `bad', judgements made that lead such analysis to restrict itself to a 
framework built out of a musical (quasi-)object and a de-sexualized, de-corporealized 
supposedly self-same subject(ivity) - the questions that might be asked here might make 
71 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 29. 
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use of the groundwork laid down in chapter 1. The problem of what constitutes the 
`correct' note or sound is in actual fact bound up with the relationship between sound 
and noise, and the political and libidinal-economic task of Western music has 
throughout its history and to some extent still very much in the present attempted to 
fend off any extraneous notes, sounds or harmonic intervals that we might - in the 
language of information theory - call `noise'. As was claimed earlier, the category of 
noise needs to be wrested from its own scientific objectifying tendencies in order to be 
put to work as part of a deterritorialized vocabulary which respects not just the 
informational character of noise, but the ways in which what qualifies as noise has itself 
become modulated and transformed over the course of the historico-materialist 
developments of Western culture. As such, it is necessary to locate the perception of 
noise and its affective constitution in connection with the aggregated investments of the 
institutional dispostif of music in order to proceed towards their dis-positioning. 
In the case of Miles Davis, what characterizes the relationship between sound and noise, 
or signal-to-noise ratio is as much about the lines along which the investments of critics 
and musicologists are constituted. Within the context of the narration of jazz music 
history, words initially used by musicians in relation to their own practice have found 
their way into the critical vocabulary. As Walser states, where this concerns the 
performance of incorrect or inaccurate notes, including in the work of Miles Davis, the 
term `clams' might readily be invoked, not just to give a name to musical mistakes, but 
to label the discrepancies as things to be ignored or dismissed as unfortunate by- 
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products of extenuating circumstances, which - for Walser - has hitherto largely been 
the case. 
Often critics simply ignore the mistakes. In his history of jazz, Frank Tirro 
delicately avoided any mention of the controversies surrounding Davis, whether 
missed notes, drug use, or electric instruments. Joachim Berendt, in The Jazz 
Book, regretfully mentions Davis's "clams" but quickly passes on, and the widely 
used jazz appreciation text by Mark Gridley, like that of Donald D. Megill and 
Richard S. Demory, similarly whitewashes Davis's career. 72 
`Clams' as a term not only signifies mistakes, but also symptomatizes the status of 
music criticism as a masculinist discourse (see chapter 3). 
Given that this project aspires to a workable ethics of increased capacity another avenue 
that must be avoided is the one that leads us towards moralizing dogma, hence to decry 
Miles Davis's critics for labouring and belabouring the issue of unwanted detritus 
marring his music and the question of the majority of these critics' failure to recognize 
their own profoundly problematic relation to the Manichean couplings informing their 
own discourses. The way in which this is to be done is to bring together the inventory of 
conceptual and semiotic devices that have provided the mainstay of this thesis so far in 
an attempt to re-synthesize these in the exploration of the milieus, territories and 
deterritorializations marked by the name `Miles Davis' and at least suggested in the 
work of more theory-mindful writers such as Robert Walser, Joachim Berendt and Gary 
Tomlinson. 73 In addition, the new areas of concern that the investigation will open out 
72 Robert Walser, `Out of Notes', pp. 147-8. 
73 As indicated by the title of his essay, Walser attempts do deal with the problem of Davis's music and its 
reception in terms of Henry Louis Gates Jr. development of the African and African-American function of 
'Signifyin(g)', cf., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African American Literary Criticism (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Gates's work will be discussed in a slightly modified context in 
chapter 3. Interestingly, Gary Tomlinson has explored the `electric period' using both Gates's research and 
Bakhtin's dialogical approach to language, cf., Gary Tomlinson, `Cultural Dialogics and Jazz: A White 
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onto to some extent by necessity, but also inevitability, will be the relation of music 
production and reception to the problem of investment as it is indexed to the issues of 
race, gender and to the wider circuits of late Capitalism, or Empire. As an in-road into 
this, and as was mentioned in the first chapter, one of the tests of the pragmatic efficacy 
of Deleuze and Guattari's work would proceed by attempting to map the transversal 
relations between and across the overcodings of theory and philosophy across the 
network of lines, forces and subjectifications of the academic institutional dispositif. By 
returning to the elaboration of the three syntheses of the machinic unconscious, as well 
as stratoanalysis and the refrain, I shall shortly attempt to patch these into a key essay 
by Adorno, putting the claims of transcendental empiricism to the test by attempt not 
just to map transversal connections between Deleuze, Guattari and Adorno, but to also 
to produce an immanent, corporeal and ultimately libidinal theory of auditory reception 
which we can then use to examine the problem of thinking the music of Miles Davis as 
a potential example of non-philosophy capable of providing at least a degree of redress 
to the hasty criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari and the more considered ones that we 
found to be epitomized by the work of Alain Badiou. This endeavour will take the 1964 
recording of `My Funny Valentine' as the starting point, as it is this recording more than 
most that has become the (quasi-)object of a fair share of libidinal discharge. 
When Howard Brofsky and Bill Cole independently transcribed and published the 
trumpet solo of Davis's 1964 recording of "My Funny Valentine", both chose to 
leave out the cracks, slips, and spleeahs, enabling them to produce nice, clean 
texts and to avoid many problematic aspects of the performance. 74 
Historian Signifies' in Katherine Bergeron and Philip V. Bohlman [eds. ], Disciplining Music (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 64-94. 
74 Ibid., p. 148. 
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Brofsky, who in his analysis produces a musicological comparison between the 1956 
and 1964 versions has recourse to extensive use of transcription, in particular of the 
later, more complicated version and as Walser rightly points out, nowhere in his essay 
or his transcriptions does he given an account of the more problematic elements [see 
fig. 5]. 
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Walser's attempt to re-assess the role of the musical `accident' in terms of the `problem' 
of Miles Davis leads him to single out this later recording of `My Funny Valentine' 
because it contains `one of the most notorious fluffs ever released' 75 The errors are 
numerous and frequent, yet despite this, the piece was the opener for what was regarded 
at the time by participants and is still regarded now by some critics as one of the 
outstanding performances of Davis' career. According to Chip Deffaa's sleeve-note for 
the album, Mort Fega - the MC at the opening of the recording - witnessed Miles' 
producer Teo Macero with an `almost euphoric expression' on his face. 6 Miles Davis 
himself famously observed: 
We just blew the top off that place that night. It was a motherfucker the way 
everybody played - and I mean everybody. 
77 
Walser is amongst the critics prepared to defend the performance - warts and all - as an 
exemplary instance of Davis's experimentation with his instrument. Following the 
example of Howard Brofsky, Walser's proceeds by way of a musicological analysis of 
the piece, relying on a transcription that he himself produced [see fig. 6]. 
By looking at the end of the score, one can see that Walser has provided two new 
symbols to accompany the more established tools of musical annotation. The cross 
denotes what he calls a `half-valved note' whilst the wavy dash denotes a `swallowed, 
burbled, or ornamental note'. One may further note that Walser has added individual 
remarks at certain key points in the performance which can be found written under the 
75 Ibid. 
76 Chip Deffaa, Sleeve-note to Miles Davis, The Complete Concert 1964: My Funny Valentine + Four & 
More, Columbia, 1964, p. 4. 
77 Ibid. 
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stave at the points in question. It should therefore be sufficient to remark Walser's 
explanation for the numerous additions. For the most part, rather than point to a 
technical ineptitude on the part of Davis, these details actually mark an attempt to 
explore the potential of the trumpet beyond its more regular confines of usage. This is 
not to say that Miles Davis is technically infallible or that he did not make mistakes, but 
rather to call into question the idea that any wrong note, extraneous noise or 
interference is to be considered negatively at all. The fact that Macero rated the 
performance so highly with his ear so attuned to the very materiality of sound and Davis 
- self-critical in the extreme - would call it a `motherfucker', suggests quite clearly that 
for both of them such `accidents' are not what they seem. 
Miles was quoted as saying, "[T]here are no wrong notes in jazz". What he 
obviously meant was that you could take one particular thing that might sound 
incorrect or jarring, and build something beautiful. He felt that that was a way of 
improvising, to get out of what seems to be a terrible situation was a challenge. 
"To me, it's all like a high-wire act", he said and moved his arms like a bird, just 
for a minute. 78 
The way in which Miles worked as a `composer' is documented as being something he 
did on the fly, an experimental, improvisatory conception of writing. To quote Wilfred 
Mellers on the solo in the first fully `modal' composition called `Milestones' from 
1958, `Bird [Charlie Parker] was a composing improviser, and Miles is an improvising 
composer'. 79 
The `clams', `fluffs', `burbled notes', `swallowed notes' and `half-valved notes' that 
occur in the first few minutes of the 1964 recording of `My Funny Valentine' are 
78 David Amram, Vibrations: The Adventures and Musical Times of David Amram (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1968), cited in A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, p. 28. 
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doubtless jarring, and if one's musical habitus, born of particular listening experiences 
and affective and motor action-reaction circuits have become conditioned according to a 
tonal, diatonic auditory dipositif, as have those bodies subject to the vast majority of 
music produced in the Western tradition including both `Classical' and `Popular' 
denominations, then such aberrances will strike the listening body/ear as detritus to be 
removed, that should be dismissed as extraneous to auditory participation. However, if 
one ventures a counter-actualization of this habitual type of reaction and attempts to 
survey the immanent constitution of such a visceral convulsion as results then it 
becomes possible to `render sonorous' the potential for such detritus to become a 
`leitmotiv' for the deterritorialization of the refrain and the opening out onto an outside, 
and into new `incorporeal universes of reference'. That does not mean to say that every 
such instance will lend itself to this possibility, as in some what might result is `a 
scribble effacing all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds'. However, as we saw in this 
instance, to dismiss without sufficiently exploring and elaborating the case in question 
runs the risk of reducing the theoretical exercise to one of `noodling', so the task with 
the 1964 recording of `My Funny Valentine' would be to try and better discern what 
really constitutes such an effacement and what accedes to the capacity of becoming a 
deterritorializing motif. 
Walser's analysis leads us to recognize that the additional customized annotations that 
he incorporates into his transcription are perhaps in one register signifiers but in another 
they are tensor-signs, marking `zones of indiscernibility' in which a dis-positing of 
investment can take place, onto `lines of drift', a musical derive which in de- 
79 Cited in Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 130, 
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institutionalizing music may facilitate the production of new universes of reference. 
This is an auditory or sonorous rendering of the example of the face and the `possible 
world' that we encountered earlier, in which multiple possible worlds are suspended 
without resolution, in excess of emotion and therefore problematizing the enunciations 
attributable to the `I' as linguistic index: a complex of sounds emerging from the 
auditory field which may plunge the milieus of the first aspect of the refrain of 
subjectification into chaos or may open the territories binding them in the second aspect 
up to the forces of the outside. This returns us to Guattari's division of affect as part of 
both sensory and problematic functions. The shift between the sensory function and its 
refrains/ritornellos and the problematic affect is what constitutes the affective difference 
between the two versions of `My Funny Valentine', with the first limited to the 
relatively low co-efficient of deterritorialization when compared with the second, 
effected by the relatively more territorialized refrain/ritornello of the former on the 
order of a low-intensity sensory affect, which in the latter is accompanied by a 
problematic affect that deterritorializes the musicality traits further through Davis's 
`mistakes'. In more simple, more music-based terms, it can be said that the in jazz from 
the 1940s onwards, if not before, the very task is to take the standard as a `melody' and 
deterritorialize its refrain, to make invent ways of transforming a repetition of the same 
into a repetition of difference. If we return to Deleuze and Guattari's dismissal of 
popular music on the grounds of its supposedly being reducible to melody, the quote 
they use to make the point from Gisele Brelet singles out Bela Bartok as an exception. 
Let us just remind ourselves of the quote. 
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The popular melody could never constitute a true theme; and, that is why, in 
popular music the melody is the entire work, and why once it is over it has no 
other recourse but to repeat itself. 8° 
But then the question is asked, 
But can't the melody transform itself into a theme? Bartök solves this problem, 
81 which was thought insoluble. 
We are not told here how Bartok actually achieves this but this is not our major 
concern. What is being suggested in this thesis is that jazz music is capable of doing the 
same, and that the example of the 1964 recording of `My Funny Valentine' supports 
this suggestion. 
Tranversalizing Adorno, Deleuze and Guattari: The Signal: Noise Ratio of 'My 
Funny Valentine' 
In Beethoven, position is important only in a living relation between a concrete totality 
and its concrete parts. In popular music, position is absolute. Every detail is 
substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in the machine. 
Theodor W. Adorno82 
Lapses, parapraxes, symptoms are like birds knocking on the window with their beak. 
The point is not to interpret them. It is rather a question of mapping their trajectory to 
see whether they can serve as indicators of new universes of reference capable of 
acquiring enough consistency to turn around the situation. 
Felix Guattari83 
In his essay entitled `On Popular Music', Adorno philosophically explores the 
conditions of popular music reception within the Culture Industry and its instrumental 
80 Gis8le Brelet, cited in Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 551-2, n. 59. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Theodor W. Adorno, 'On Popular Music', in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9: 1941, p. 19. 
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modus operandum in a way that is strikingly akin to the means by which redundancy is 
used to describe the production of subjectification-subjection by Deleuze and Guattari. 
His is a definitive retort to the purists who believe that music can be independent of 
social, economic and cultural factors. By the same token he succeeds in bringing things 
back to the actual music itself, its formal, material and sensory characteristics whereas 
many critics are inclined to take these details out of the loop. Taking jazz as his primary 
case, as on numerous occasions he was wont to do, Adorno examines the 
`standardization' of the popular song, the mechanisms of the production process, both 
cultural and economic, including the music recording and publishing industry, notably 
the output of Tin Pan Alley, as well as radio broadcasting and film, and the roles played 
by recognition, appropriation and repetition in the production of what shall continue to 
be described as redundancies. 
This is framed in terms a formal analysis of the ways in which popular music functions 
and how this differs from the more exemplary instances to be found in the classical 
canon, examined in relation to the conditioning factors of the culture industry. 84 In this 
piece, the differences pertain to differing relationships between whole and part, with the 
better instances of classical music engendering a complex interaction between whole 
and part whereas popular and jazz forms short-circuit the relation between whole and 
83 Felix Guattari, Les annEes d'hiver, cited in Eleanor Kaufman and Kevin John Heller, [eds. ], New 
Mappings, p. 158. 
84 As with Deleuze and Guattari, despite the ostensible rejection of popular and jazz forms - inevitably born 
of an insufficient investment - Adorno, though renowned for his scathing attacks on jazz and popular music's 
development is not unequivocal in his rejection of these forms any more than he is that classical music is one 
hundred-percent good, and in reading they and he against the grain of their investments, it is most certainly 
possible to put their respective conceptions to work in attenuating this inadequate, categorical distinction. I 
am indebted to Barbara Engh for drawing my attention to the largely unexplored yet crucial intersections 
between Deleuze, Guattari and the Frankfurt School work of Adorno and Walter Benjamin. 
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part by making the whole equivalent to the entire framework of popular music 
production. This is what is meant by standardization. To relate the detail to the rest of 
the composition in popular and jazz forms is to relate it to every other composition that 
conforms to the process of standardization: this is the first redundancy of the popular 
listening experience. To quote Adorno: 
[T]he primary effect of this relation between framework and the detail is that the 
listener becomes prone to evince stronger re-actions to the part than to the whole. 
His grasp of the whole does not lie in the living experience of this one concrete 
piece of music he has followed. The whole is pre-given and pre-accepted, even 
before the actual experience of the music starts [... ]8S 
For Adorno, the detail no less than the whole is deprived of singular or qualitative 
value. In other words, it too is redundant: 
[I]n popular music, position is absolute. Every detail is substitutable; it serves its 
function only as a cog in a machine. 86 
This is not the same as saying that popular music is simplistic, either: 
[H]armonically, the supply of chords of the so-called classics is invariably more 
limited than that of any current Tin Pan Alley composer who draws from 
Debussy, Ravel and even later sources [... ] Listening to popular music is 
manipulated not only by its promoters, but as it were, by the inherent nature of 
this music itself, into a system of response-mechanisms wholly antagonistic to the 
ideal of individuality in a free liberal society. 87 
So what happens to this `ideal of individuality' where popular music is concerned? 
According to Adorno it becomes `pseudo-individualization' as `the necessary correlate 
of musical standardization': 
[B]y pseudo-individualization we mean endowing cultural mass production with 
the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself [... ] 
85 Theodor W. Adorno, `On Popular Music', p. 18. 
86 Ibid., p. 19. 
87 Ibid., p. 21-2. 
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Pseudo-individualization, for its part, keeps them in line by making them forget 
that what they listen to is already listened to for them, or `pre-digested'. 88 
This is the third redundancy: that of subjectivity. 
An effect of these complementary redundancies that specifically relates to jazz music 
concerns the status of improvisation, which - as a result of standardization - finds its 
freedom `severely delimited', and as thereby found its possibilities `quickly exhausted', 
relegating the apperception of musical freedom to one of pseudo-freedom. 
The standardization of the norm enhances in a purely technical way 
standardization of its own deviation - pseudo-individualization. 89 
The improvised flourish does not therefore escape the redundancy of the detail. 
It is well-known fact that in daring jazz arrangements worried notes, dirty tones, 
in other words, false notes, play a conspicuous role. They are apperceived as 
exciting stimuli only because they are corrected by the ear to the right tone 90 
Adorno seems to be making some very worthwhile observations here with regard to the 
listening experience, and his analysis goes quite some way to providing a groundwork 
for a constitutive account of investment in material, perceptual and semiotic terms. 
However, there are three significant limitations to Adorno's critique. Firstly, like 
Deleuze and Guattari, he adopts a position here towards non-Classical musical forms of 
production in a way that goes against the grain of the need for a more thoroughgoing 
exploration of the complex relation such music has with the production of subjectivity, 
even in its most superficial manifestations. Adorno's position, adopting a schemata for 
88 Ibid., p. 25. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., p. 26. 
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relating particular detail to a whole piece calls upon an organismic conception of the 
work which seems far more amenable to the formal strictures of Classical composition 
and performance that it does to more popular forms which - as shall be shown - do not 
necessarily lend themselves to such a conception. This leads to the second limitation 
which is that, in describing popular forms according to a logic of whole-part reverts to a 
mechanistic picture of this relation, the substitutable detail as a `cog in the machine', a 
workable metaphor for how superfluous details of production/consumption within the 
culture industry mirror the substitutions of labour and commodities as part of a 
capitalist mode of production, but unfortunately restricting a consideration of 
production/consumption in capitalism to a formalist, static representation of the 
structure of a song that permits very little latitude for the consideration of process, a 
description whose limitations are perhaps evident when compared to the refrain of 
Deleuze and Guattari which lends itself more readily to dealing with the processual 
dimension of sonority. Finally, his account of improvisation does not go far enough in 
its exploration of the relation between the `worried notes' and `dirty tones', how the 
relationship between signal and noise plays out in a way whereby process is emphasized 
according to its tendential character, towards and/or away from the redundancies of 
standardization, pseudo-individualization and auditory subjectivity, and towards and 
away from de-standardization. However, for all of these shortcomings, as was made 
clear earlier, the aim here is not to criticize or deride the work of Adorno contra 
Deleuze and Guattari as part of a `squabble assemblage' but rather to tentatively open 
up a transversal or diagonal line across and between Deleuze, Guattari and Adorno, and 
there are numerous important and original observations that Adorno makes in `On 
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Popular Music' that may facilitate a more nuanced account of popular and jazz music 
production and reception and the affirmative potential virtually crystallized in the 
seemingly-extraneous elements of music and sound. 
Returning to the task of situating the body or corporeality within an assemblage - here 
an auditory or sonorous assemblage - and exploring how one might dis-position the 
investments thereby constituting subjectification and subjectification-subjection within 
a musical, sonorous and social dispositif, now is the time to bring Adorno, Deleuze and 
Guattari together from the perspective of the latters' conception of the `three syntheses 
of the machinic unconscious' from chapter 1, by linking it to an exemplary account of 
listening and its enunciative effects that Adorno describes in his essay. 
According to Adorno, the listener who encounters a particular version of a standard for 
the first time will undergo two stages of recognition on the order of a `that's it', the 
utterance which implicitly or explicitly is elicited from said listener. 
[T]he moment of actual identification - the actual "that's it" experience. This is 
attained when vague remembrance is searchlighted by sudden awareness. It is 
comparable to the experience one has sitting in a room that has been darkened 
when suddenly the electric light flares up again. By the suddenness of its being lit, 
the familiar furniture obtains, for a split second, the appearance of being novel. 91 
Adorno's visual metaphor for standardization, the improvised detail and pseudo- 
individuality pertains to a conception of the consuming subject as empty, not in the 
same sense as Deleuze says in his Foucault book, because it is disconnected from a line 
of the outside, and this subjects consumption of music is reduced to a `regressive' or 
91 Ibid., p. 34. 
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childish, fetishistic activity that results in extreme privation. One conceivable yet 
possibly tenuous way that a transversal line might be plotted between Deleuze, Guattari 
and Adorno is to take the visual metaphor of Adorno and to `literalize' it, which is to 
say, treat the illustration as an actual embodiment of a `possible world', and at the same 
time of a dispositif. 
As already made clear, the refrain consists of three aspects: milieus, territory, 
deterritorialization. The darkness that threatens the fabric of milieus and territory that 
make the home or the domicile is that of chaos, the collapse of the order that emerged 
from this chaos. We might follow Deleuze and Guattari's thesis in `1833: Of the 
Refrain' that in a certain sense - the sense of a human and non-human capacity for the 
selection of milieu components into a territorialized combination and terrestrial 
inscription - that `all history is the history of perception'. Here perception is conceived 
along Bergsonian lines as a `perception-image' which is relational and completely non- 
localized `in principle' yet from which the body is formed and from which it extracts or 
selects `its' perceptions in practice. 92 Using this thesis to read Adorno's example, the 
92 For Bergson's description of how perception in practice, as distinct from pure perception, is bound up with 
the passage between 'virtual action' to a selection or actualization in 'real action' which registers at the level 
of sensation in terms of 'affection, cf., Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and 
W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 44: 'That matter should be perceived without the help of 
a nervous system and without organs of sense, is not theoretically inconceivable; but it is practically 
impossible because such perception would be of no use [... ]; p. 57: '[O]ur perception of an object distinct 
from our body by an interval, never expresses anything but a virtual action. But the more distance decreases 
between this object and our body (the more, in other words, the danger becomes urgent or the promise 
immediate), the more does virtual action tend to pass into real action. Suppose the distance reduced to zero, 
that is to say that the object to be perceived coincides with our body; that is to say again, that our body is the 
object to be perceived. Then it is no longer virtual action, but real action, that this specialized perception will 
express, and this is exactly what affection is'. Extending the selection process of perception out onto non- 
human processes has been attempted by Manuel DeLanda where he describes geologists' attempts to show 
how geological processes form a 'sorting computer', cf., DeLanda, A Thousand Years of 
Non-Linear History, 
p. 66, taking Deleuze and Guattari's notion of double-articulation from 'I O, 
000B. C.: The Geology of Morals, 
or Who Does the Earth Think it is' in A Thousand Plateaus. Likewise, 
Massumi actually uses this plateau 
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metaphoric use of a `rendering visible' to illustrate a `rendering sonorous' is 
complemented in an alternative register by a processual rendering based around the 
selection of perceptions from a perception-image, or percepts, and their accompanying 
affection-images, or affects. 
The gradual emergence of familiarity from undifferentiated darkness also marks a 
territorialization, the gradual return to visiblity of definition in light and shade, or the 
defining contours, shapes and characteristics that make it a room, and in the passage 
between indiscernibility and discernibility there is - for Adorno -a semblance of 
novelty, but it is ultimately an optical illusion. In this passage, the re-establishment of 
contours of visibility and invisibility that mark out the space as discernible is 
accompanied by an enunciative possibility, `that's it'. This returns us to Deleuze's 
account of Foucault in `What is a Dispositif, the seeable and the sayable forming a 
Spinozist parallelism, with curvatures of light, lines of force and lines of subjectivation 
forming a complex of interactions. In terms of the three syntheses, the indiscernibility 
and its passage toward discernibility is on the order of a `contour and shape and 
reflection and light and face' in a `zone of indiscernibility... '. 
This reading of Adorno and `1833: Of the Refrain' highlights the pragmatic orientation 
of A Thousand Plateaus and the importance of the case in that particular work: 
embodiments of the syntheses of the machinic unconscious. From milieus to territory: 
partial objects are the milieus components that enter into a connective synthesis with 
and the idea of geological selection to illustrate a different embodiment of the 'three syntheses of the 
machinic unconscious', cf., Massumi, The User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, pp. 56-57. 
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one another and the territory is composed of an inscription (enregistrement) of the Body 
of the Earth that inclusively disjoins the interconnected milieu components; 
accompanying all this, is the production of residual subjectivity indexed to enunciation: 
"that's it": synthesis of conjunction-consummation. 
One might attempt to use the diagram of the searchlighted room to venture a `rendering 
sonorous' rather than `rendering visible' with regard to the popular music standard, 
whereby the first moment `of actual identification' is attained when the first few bars 
are heard and are `searchlighted' by sudden awareness. An initial impression of novelty 
subsides to be replaced by one of familiarity. In inscribing the Body of the Earth as a 
recording surface produced in the process of synthesis (between connection and 
disjunction) that falls back (se rabat sur) on the syntheses and enables them to function, 
the syntheses are constituted from an assemblage that is more or less restricted by 
milieus that it brings together and the degree to which they are aggregated or `stratified' 
and the extent to which their combination is territorialized. This is what enables the 
unfamiliarity to subside and be replaced by recognition of something that one has heard 
before, such that the ambient fluctuations of sound, the background noise, hiss or 
interference, all co-mingle in the beginning seconds of listening to a piece of music with 
which one is unfamiliar. 
Where it concerns standardization in music, the recognition that a tune is famous, that is 
it is or was a hit: `that's the hit `Night and Day', 
93Adorno calls the `element of 
subsumption' which binds recognition to the social, a `connecting reaction' that brings 
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the listener to perceive `his apparently isolated, individual experience of a particular 
song as a collective experience'. The relation between individual and collective 
understood as such is a Manichean opposition and therefore another example of 
illegitimate connecting, disjoining and conjoining between the social and the psychic, or 
between social machines, desiring-machines and technical machines in a way that 
makes the individual a local unit of a global society who apperceives a self connected to 
others in a way that has a semblance of increased capacity but is actually entirely bound 
up with propria and privation, reflected in the `element of self-reflection on the act of 
identification: "oh, I know it; this belongs to me"': a moment of consummation- 
consumption of desire, marking a momentary intensification perhaps, but one that is 
ultimately narcissistic and redundant and one that leads the listener to perform an 
illegitimate use of the third synthesis, whereby they hear the song as something that 
belongs to themselves, thereby positing a self to which the song belongs. 4 From the 
perspective of the refrain, such a move amounts to a reteritorialization of the auditory or 
sonorous assemblage on the refrain of the natal and a population of a `one-alone' 
relating to a `one-crowd' that Deleuze and Guattari associate with Romantic music 
which - from the perspective of the Body of Capital is an archaism which the latter 
relies on to consolidate its own internal limit. 
In brief, the notion of break-flow has seemed to us to define both capitalism and 
schizophrenia. But not in the same way; they are not at all the same thing, 
depending one whether the decodings are caught up in an axiomatic or not; on 
whether one remains at the level of the large aggregates functioning statistically, 
or crosses the barrier that separates them from the unbound molecular positions; 
93 Ibid., p. 34. 
94 Ibid., p. 35. 
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on whether the flows of desire reach this absolute limit or are content to displace a 
relative immanent limit that will reconstitute itself further along [... ]95 
For Adorno, the process of making pseudo-individuals is a function of the culture 
industry and as such is one based on propria. 
By the identification and subsumption of the present listening experience under 
the category "this is the hit so and so", this hit becomes an object to the listener, 
something fixed and permanent. This transformation of experience into object - 
the fact that by recognizing a piece of music one has command over it and can 
reproduce it from one's own memory - makes it more proprietable than ever. 96 
However, Adorno does acknowledge that energy is expended in no small measure in by 
pseudo-individuals in their adherence to a culture that is increasingly cynical about its 
capacity to channel this energy towards the accumulation of surplus value, doubtless in 
no small measure fear of the loss of their pseudo-individuality. Again, in Deleuze and 
Guattari's libidinal philosophy every synthetic interaction involves the conversion and 
expenditure of energy whether legitimate or illegitimate, and both theirs' and Adorno's 
thinking here owes a debt to Nietzsche's conception of `ressentiment': `More taxes, less 
bread! ' 97 Adorno imagines the possibility of such energy having some kind of potential 
for challenging, resisting or overturning the machinations of instrumental reason. 
In order to become a jitterbug or simply to "like" popular music, it does not by 
any means suffice to give oneself up and to fall in line passively. To become 
95 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 247-8. From another perspective, the process could be described as 
being one of 'interpellation', in which it is a 'subject' which is being 'hailed' by the refrain, whereby the 
searchlight becomes a light of interrogation, and the assemblage is transformed into an 'order-word 
assemblage'. However, as subject of statement and subject of enunciation are themselves assembled 
processualy, it is here where Deleuze and Guattari depart from a more rigidly structuralist use of the theory 
of interpellation towards one that endeavours to foreground process and survey movement, and we can say 
that what is altered in the act of self-survey are pre-individual and pre-subjective percepts and affects. This is 
something that shall be returned to in Chapter 3. 
96 Adorno, `On Popular Music', p. 35. 
97 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 29. 
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transformed into an insect, man needs that energy which might possibly transform 
'98 him into a man. 
For Adorno, the possibility of transformation of popular culture and the `jitterbug' is 
most definitely not a transformation through them, which is to say that whilst energy is 
expended in no small measure in the frenetic activity of a dancehall full of pseudo- 
individuals doing the jitterbug - the latter removed from the subsumption of the culture 
industry - might be able to become individuals. For Deleuze and Guattari, `real 
subsumption' or machinic enslavement are massive dangers, but they represent one 
amongst a number of tendencies for `capture', another of which is a tendency towards 
productive capture made possible by legitmate uses of the three syntheses such that the 
surface of inscription of the second synthesis captures the connective syntheses of 
production and produces a `surplus value of code' which is not predestined towards the 
consumption-with-minimal-consummation of wholly privated subjectivities (Adorno), 
but which itself might be put to the task of `trans-coding' across different assemblages 
that enables a connection to the outside, whereby the consumption-consummation of the 
third synthesis becomes nomadic. Again, one might take the metaphoric use of the 
`jitterbug' and approach it from the register of `becoming-animal' in order to show how 
popular music is capable of transversalizing itself and its listening subjects, as for 
example through the ethology of bird-song, a return to a Spinozist ethical physics of 
bodies, desire and thought, although such a theory of becoming-animal, not unlike that 
of the other becomings, is problematic. 
98 Adorno, 'On Popular Music', p. 48. 
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What Adorno's own use of his examples brings to the theoretical transversalization 
attempted here is a renewed sense of the danger in partaking of such exercises. If the 
machine of Deleuze and Guattari has been the object of hypercathexis or 
overinvestment, then perhaps so has the notion of becoming which - in its invocation on 
the order of nomenclature, whereby becoming becomes sufficient to itself without the 
need for a rigorous theoretical or analytical account of its attainability, dangers and 
limitations may well just serve to reinforce the standardizing tendencies of a culture 
industry. Whatever the case, Adorno's account of popular music, its instrumental 
serviceability and its `fetish' character provides a cautionary warning against too-easily 
affirming its consumption as a consummation of desire at the same time as it implicitly 
warns against theoretical noodling. By bringing Deleuze and Guattari together with 
Adorno there is a danger that such noodling is all that will have resulted, but at least its 
dangers will have been further emphasized and made more theorizable in themselves. 
At best, a transversalizing connection will have been drawn that raises the power of the 
effects associated with each and all of the proper names Deleuze, Guattari and Adorno. 
Let us try to summarize how this might be conceived. 
Despite a shared degree of ignorance and reticence regarding popular musical forms all 
three thinkers contribute a way of articulating the embodiment of auditory subjectivity 
in a way that connects it to the social and to capitalism and ventures an exposition of its 
logic and the processes underlying subjectification-subjection or `pseudo-individuality' 
and its unethical privations. However, whilst Adorno's searchlight can bring familiarity 
and recognition out of indiscernibility, as we have seen Deleuze and Guattari's 
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conception of the refrain keeps open the potential for its deterritorialization, whereby 
the domicile opens up to the outside and `one launches forth' or `hazards an 
improvisation'. For Adorno the standard and improvisatory detail are bound up with 
redundant repetitions of the same, and in this he does not depart greatly from Deleuze 
and Guattari. Nevertheless, an important proviso needs to be made. What Deleuze's 
conception of difference and Deleuze and Guattari's development of this into the refrain 
bring to the task of corporealizing and analyzing auditory and sonorous subjectivity is 
the thinking that a repetition of the same is always already a repetition of difference, 
and to ask by what means the repetition of difference permits an immanent survey of its 
constitutive irreducibility. The standard is most usually a repetition of difference that 
amounts practically to a repetition of the same, in other words, redundancy, and one at 
the level of the culture industry (Adorno) or the socius (Deleuze and Guattari) is in both 
instances bound up with what I have been calling a dispositif. The difference is that - in 
the case of Adorno - to conceive the culture industry as such would be to posit the 
dispositif as rigidly structured in a way that disavows the potential for ethical or 
affirmative dis-positioning, but - in the case of Deleuze and Guattari as has been shown 
- is upheld. To quote Guattari, 
[O]ne has here to contrast the abstract machines of music (perhaps the most non- 
signifying and de-territorializing of all! ) with the whole musical caste system - its 
conservatories, its educational traditions, its rules for correct composition, its 
stress on the impresario and so on. It becomes clear that the collectivity of musical 
production is so organized as to hamper and delay the force of deterritorialization 
in music as such. 
With the 1956 recording of `My Funny Valentine' one to some extent is constituted in 
terms of auditory subjectivity following the path towards benign familiarity, but 
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crystallized within this version is the potential for converting its formal ambiguity into 
something different, something that goes beyond musicological designations and the 
vocabulary of privated emotion: the molecularization of sound qua force-matter 
whereby the perspective of standardized investment that corrects `mistakes' to the right 
note has the potential for a counter-actualization. The decodings of the `mistakes' in the 
1964 recording of `My Funny Valentine' potentially achieves the conversion by 
challenging the molarizing, standardizing aspects of song-structure, performance 
protocol and `interpretation' and exposing the auditory field to the rasch10° that always 
threatens to tear a rent into its fabric and irreversibly change things, and that in 
gathering together the field's component activities into what Christopher Small calls 
musicking101 one may turn the order-word of standardization into a genuinely novel 
`problem', into a `pass-word' that facilitates incorporeal transformation and promotes 
passage away from the organizing tendencies of the order-word assemblage straddling 
the dispositif. 
There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are 
components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organized, 
stratified compositions. A Single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold 
nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other - to transform the 
compositions of order into components of passage. 102 
Reprising the quote from Guattari that provided an epigraph for this section, this 
Chapter will be brought to a close with a succinct re-iteration of the role that the 
99 Felix Guattari, Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics (London: Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 106-7. 
100 Deleuze and Guattari invoke Roland Barthes' work on Schumann regarding the 'rasch' of corporeality his 
music, cf., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 297. 
101 Christopher Small, Musicking: The Meanings of Performance and Listening (Hanover and London: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1998), p. 9: 'To musick is to take part, in any capacity in a musical performance, 
whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or praciticing, by providing material for the performance, 
whether by performing (what is called composing), or by dancing'. See chapter 3. 
102 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 110. 
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`accident' plays as the catalyst for potential transformation, a shift marked at an 
affective level by the gap between sensory and problematic affect: 
Lapses, parapraxes, symptoms are like birds knocking on the window with their 
beak. The point is not to interpret them. It is rather a question of mapping their 
trajectory to see whether they can serve as indicators of new universes of 
o3 reference capable of acquiring enough consistency to turn around the situation. ' 
The question of how far resistances and potential transformations by and of musicking 
bodies are real, attainable, ethico-aesthetic and political is the topic of the final chapter. 
We will look at some of the social machines, technical machines and desiring-machines 
from which listening and performing bodies are assembled, and how Miles Davis and 
his `problem' turns on the complex issues of resistance, transformation, but also 
violence. Deleuze's claim for a transcendental empiricism and his and Guattari's 
pragmatics/schizoanalysis/stratoanalysis will be put to the test again, with the question 
of the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy to the fore. 
103 Guattari, Les annees d'hiver, cited in Kaufman and Heller, [eds. ], Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings, 
p. 158. 
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Chapter 3- Strategies of Non-Philosophy: Lines of Flight, Segments of Power 
In this final chapter, the various lines, trajectories and orientations that have been followed 
up to the present point in this thesis will be brought together in an attempt to produce some 
more refrains and partial syntheses whilst pursuing more extensively the question of their 
remit. This chapter will also bring the question of the case into relief in a renewed 
consideration of the relationality that Deleuze and Guattari find between philosophy and 
non-philosophy. Music, and once again the jazz innovations associated with Miles Davis 
will provide the mainstay of the case, but in considering this case the chapter will open out 
onto a wide array of material which Deleuze and Guattari would place under the aegis of 
non-philosophy: film, theatre, visual art, and politics. These areas will be explored picking 
up the threads of the various preceding lines of argument and taking them further with the 
investigation unfolding from a more detailed examination of the `life' and `work' of Miles 
Davis and returning at various junctures to the problem of investment, considered from the 
perspectives of gender and race issues and the problematic status of becoming. 
Dispositions of Investment 3: The Libidinal Economy of Modal Miles and Monteverdi 
Coltrane said the reason he played so long on [modal tunes like 'So What'] was that 
he couldn't find nothing good to stop on. 
Jimmy Heath' 
Call it the Modal Manifesto. Subtitle: You Can Feel the Changes. 
Ashley Kahn2 
In 1957, Miles Davis visited Paris and - via his one-time lover, the actress-singer Juliette 
Greco - met the film-maker Louis Malle. Malle was working on his debut feature to be 
1 Quoted in A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, p. 70. 
2 Ibid., p. 68. 
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called Ascenseur pour L'echaffaud, translated into English as Lift to the Scaffold in the UK 
and Elevator to the Gallows in the US, and asked Miles Davis to compose a `score' for the 
film, a request which Davis accepted and produced a series of improvisation-based 
compositions comprised mostly of `straight ahead blues themes and simple riffs'3 in the 
space of one evening whilst watching the rushes of Malle's film. The word `mostly' is 
used here because on one of the tracks produced around the stock of themes that would 
eventually provide the musical dimension of the film, Davis jettisoned a vertical chordal 
progression and replaced it with a scale and implied melody. This move arguably marks 
the initial shift towards the use of modes instead of blocks of chords as the basis for 
harmony, a scalar or modal conception of musical composition and improvisation that 
would explicitly inform Davis's work into the mid-to-late sixties, most notably on the 
land-mark recordings Milestones in 1958 and Kind of Blue the following year. 
In a manner that anticipates the suspended effect of a composition like Kind of Blue's 
"Flamenco Sketches", "Le Petit Bal" on the Ascenseur soundtrack eschewed any 
chordal movement at all, allowing Miles to project a mood by simply playing off one 
scale, subtly implying a lyrical line. 
The themes making up the slower cuts on the soundtrack album are in a minor key and 
involve a mixture of muted and unmuted melodies and improvisations, again using the 
Harmon mute, and sometimes mixing muted and unmuted trumpet on the same track. The 
effect is variable, but usually very blues-oriented and often `like melancholy', as on `My 
Funny Valentine' once again partially a product of the economic use of space and 
occasionally due to the addition of studio processing using a reverb system that cycles 
through a virtual-actual circuit to enhance this sense of space. Not so pronounced is the 
3 Ibid., p. 64. 
4 Ibid., p. 65. 
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role played by the Harmon mute. The overall mood of the slower tracks is described by 
Eric Nisenson as 'indigo' .5 In `Le Petit Bal' the effect of the music is very much in 
keeping with the rest of the soundtrack but for the use of two chords composed of the same 
intervals played a tone apart repeatedly in a sequence continued almost throughout without 
any development. 6 The result is that the scale pushes through the chords and thereby 
becomes emphasized as the key harmonic component. As such, it therefore anticipates the 
more fully-developed modal composition from the following year, 1958's `Milestones', 
recorded for the album of the same name. 
The piece which most obviously opens up new territory, and points to the future 
developments, is the title track, `Milestones'. Once more, this explores areas touched 
on in the Scaffold film music (... ] The whole piece is thus built on only two separate 
scales, with harmony becoming decorative rather than functional. In other words, 
when each scale is used, different chords can be picked out from the notes of that 
scale; the chords may thus change while the scale (and key) remains constant .7 
In addressing the issue of modality's introduction into jazz during this period one can use it 
to sound-out at least two very important connected concerns. Firstly, from the perspective 
of performance, production and reception, modality leads to a reorientation of investment 
in the habitus of tonal music based on chords, along with its tendency towards locking 
tensor-signs into the restrictive action-reaction circuits confined by the redundancies and 
order-words of a musical and auditory or sonorous dispositif. Aggregated molarities such 
as the indexing of major and minor keys to different `moods' as we have seen 
(major=playful, lively, joyous, etc.; minor=sombre, intimate, indigo, etc. ) form elementary 
s Eric Nisenson, The Making of Kind of Blue: Miles Davis and His Masterpiece (New York: St. Martin's 
Griffin, 2001), p. 46. 
6 The use of chords is not entirely abandoned in modal jazz. There are reasons for this as Ashley Kahn has 
documented, cf., Kind of Blue, p. 69, when he invokes the music scholar Barry Kernfeld in saying that 'many 
jazz soloists would play off a prescribed scale - hitting the same bluely notes that were an inherent part of 
chordal jazz. Even musicians like Miles and Coltrane, who adhered more closely to the modal path, 
suggested chordal patterns in their solos'. 
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schema that are highly restrictive of the potential to survey the complexity of the 
investments but also the rigid segmentarity of molarized investment. Perhaps the best 
indicator of the functioning of auditory or sonorous investment along such lines would be 
cadential resolution, which itself regulates libidinal discharge according to an exclusive 
disjunction of successful resolution (pleasure), or unsuccessful, unresolved cadences 
(pain), thus constraining affective capacity to the narrow latitude afforded it by such an 
illegitimate either/or. 
The second important result of the introduction of modality into jazz affects the 
relationality between philosophy and non-philosophy qua music. Modality was actually 
introduced into jazz a as a theoretical development by the composer-theorist George 
Russell, whose book Towards a Lydian Chromatic Concept for Tonal Organization 
explores in immense detail the nuanced complexity of modality in its relation to the very 
rudiments of occidental harmonic and melodic conceptions of music. To what extent 
Russell's `Concept' fits the status accorded to it by Deleuze and Guattari is a task that - 
were it to be done in sufficient detail - would be another project in itself, but its importance 
to the case and to the question of non-philosophy means that it must be considered, if only 
on the basis of the limited amount of extant writing presently available on Russell's work. 
By providing a more in-depth analysis of these two issues of `modality' in jazz there opens 
up the potential for relating the question of investment back to the `creation of concepts' 
and also to percepts and affects, as well as for further exploration of the connections 
between libidinal-economics and the rigid segmentarities of social apparatuses or 
7 Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 129 
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dispositifs. However, these ideas will need to be brought into conjunction with some of the 
critical musicological work done by Susan McClary on the topic of modality to situate its 
relation to music more historically and, in particular, the rigid segment of gender. It is with 
a quote from McClary that we shall now proceed, showing as she does the Manichean 
opposition between masculine and feminine in terms of cadential resolution: 
The 1970 edition of the Harvard Dictionary of Music [... ] includes the following 
entry: 
Masculine, feminine cadence. A cadence or ending is called "masculine" if 
the final chord of a phrase or section occurs on a strong beat and "feminine" if 
it is postponed to fall on a weak beat. The masculine ending must be 
considered the normal one, while the feminine is preferred in more romantic 
styles. 
This standard definition makes it clear that the designations "masculine" and 
"feminine" are far from arbitrary. The two are differentiated on the basis of relative 
strength, with the binary opposition masculine/feminine mapped onto strong/weak. 8 
With the development of modal jazz and in particular `Milestones', Miles Davis, his band 
of the time and George Russell innovated the new non-chordal harmonic system of 
organization and with this brought a challenge to the convention of using cadences to end 
passages or whole compositions. By working with the diagonal relation between melody 
and harmony against the use of more standard chordal progressions, the modal or scalar 
approach would - as with the example of `Le Petit Bal' - work with very limited harmonic 
repetitions that would usually involve only the smallest variations or deviations of a tone 
or even a semitone with the same intervals regulating the few chords that would be used to 
foreground their modal underside. As a result, a piece like `Milestones' moves between 
these limited variations from start to end with modulations going into and coming out of 
the bridge, but retaining the same harmonic approach throughout, and this proceeds to the 
8 Susan McClary, Feminine Endings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 11. 
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`end', the quotes indicating the fact that there is no cadential resolution of any kind in 
either of the takes of the track available on the re-issued CD, both finishing as they do with 
a fade-out and therefore no definitive closure .9 The suspensions - musical and libidinal - 
that result from the move from the suspension-resolution of a cadential sequence of chords 
are by proxy no longer in evidence, any more than the piece carries a sense of `mood' 
according to key, whether major or minor, which is also challenged by the composition's 
modality, so affectively it is also much harder to characterize. There are a number of other 
crucially important offshoots of this development for this project to which I shall come 
shortly. 
However, to deal with the matters in hand it is necessary to situate these developments 
more firmly in relation to the cultural history of musical investment. With regard to this, 
Susan McClary makes the following point: 
The codes marking gender difference in music are informed by the prevalent 
attitudes of their time. But they also themselves participate in social formation, 
inasmuch as individuals learn how to be gendered beings through their interactions 
with cultural discourses such as music. 1° 
These codes - `overcodings' - in Deleuze and Guattari's terms reside at the level of musical 
signification in which gender is ascribed a given value according to the formal and stylistic 
traits of a certain musical approach. These significations are structured according to the 
9A more detailed description of this approach can be found in the appendix of Nisenson's book The Making 
of Kind of Blue, described by Russell himself which he first began to develop whilst recovering from 
tuberculosis in a solarium during the 1940s, cf., p. 219: "`It was there in the solarium that I began to play the 
Lydian scale. I took the second tetrachord at the G-major scale: G-A-B-C, in a C-major scale. I said to 
myself, 'That sounds the unity'. Then, logically, I just ran the second tetrachord at the G-major scale: D-E-F- 
G [... ]"'. Russell has continued to develop his theory since the 1940s and recently published in his own 
imprint a final version of the work, whose complexity is beyond the scope of this project. The quote from 
Russell should suffice to indicate in a more musically erudite way the basic details of modal organization. 
10 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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binary determination of masculine-feminine in which the second term is evaluatively 
differentiated from the first in a way that makes the problem of a positively constituted 
musical `femininity' problematic, and from certain perspectives arguably impossible. 
McClary's work sets out to challenge the evaluative biases and exclusions that favour 
masculinity over femininity in music by analysing and debunking a number of 
musicological myths and by exposing the political and libidinal economics that underscore 
the problem of affirming feminine difference and the violence that is done to any 
unconscious threat posed by the possibility of its emergence. For McClary, as has already 
been hinted, the ways in which these codings are structured changes according to cultural, 
political, economic and social shifts. 
These codings change over time - the "meaning" of femininity was not the same in 
the eighteenth century as in the late nineteenth, and musical characterizations differ 
accordingly. 11 
Taking modality into account, she explores in some musicological detail the libidinal 
economics of Claudio Monteverdi's opera L'Orfeo. In comparing this example to 
`Milestones' there are some interesting parallels. 
Underlying Orfeo's opening strain is one of the most predictable progressions for 
that time: the generating modal line initiates a descent through the G-dorian [... ] 
[Y]et instead of simply singing the modal line as his melody [... ], Orfeo embellishes 
its first element to an extreme that is almost unbelievable, given the expectations of 
the day [... ] We are instilled with a longing to hear motion, yet dazzled by the 
audacity and control with which he stretches out... and out... his initial appeal. 12 
In providing further detail of Orfeo's postponement of libidinal discharge she explains 
how, during the second section, 
1 Ibid., p. 8. 
12 Ibid., pp-40-1. 
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[T]wice the listener is encouraged to expect the promised resolution - and twice - 
after tricking us into investing libidinally in hearing that final - [... ] [W]hat occurs in 
the rarified, suspended animation that follows the ruptures is extremely significant 
[... ] [W]hen he approaches the source of his happiness - Euridice and her responses 
to his sighs - his forthrightness is sidetracked by eros. Gradually that moment of 
rupture on [section]a becomes the pivot to another pitch centre that lies deep within 
his modal ambitus [... ]13 
What both of these passages clearly show is that the use of modes in Monteverdi's opera 
brings with it a libidinal economy that lends itself readily to irresolution or postponed 
resolution. The ruptures, suspension, pitch-changes and modal transformation all 
contribute to the musical `character' of Orfeo and `his desire-laden frisson' which - even 
when a cadence occurs (under the burden of the musical habitus, including audience 
expectation) it is not the one expected. 14 This constant bucking of expectation reflects the 
postponements of Orfeo's fulfilment at the same time as the consummation of desire that 
the audience anticipates as a necessary correlate of its investment. 15 The overall effect is 
designed here to be dramatic: to postpone heightens intensity and prolongs it. This might 
even be a description of a `plateau' as used by Deleuze and Guattari and, is they argue, 
effectively paralleled by the `non-Western' libidinal economy of Taoist sexual practices, 16 
away from the `orgasmic orientation'" of the West. 
13 Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
14 Ibid., p. 43. 
's Ibid. 
16 The expressions 'non-Western libidinal economy' is the description that Massumi to the observations 
made by Gregory Bateson with regard to Balinese sexual practices, whose term 'plateau' was explicitly taken 
up by Deleuze and Guattari for their work, cf., Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', p. 24. and Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 21-22; for a description of Taoist sexual practices, cf., p. 157: 'A great 
Japanese compilation of Chinese Taoist treatises was made in A. D. 982-984. We see in it the formation of a 
circuit of intensities between [... ] [T]he condition for this circulation and multiplication is that the man not 
ejaculate'. 
Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', p. 24. 
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McClary argues that the libidinal economy of the seventeenth century as captured in the 
work of Monteverdi marks a shift in Western history: 
From this moment on in Western history, men are encouraged to stifle their feelings, 
while women are expected to indulge in emotional expression. 18 
So, the division of masculine-feminine along the lines of stifling and emotional indulgence 
is a division that, according to McClary, establishes itself as the dominant mode of 
libidinal-economic production. However, the shift that takes place is marked by a period of 
ambiguity that she locates between L'Orfeo , and Domenico Scarlatti's La Griselda, in 
which 
[O]peratic spectacles [... ] may not actually have served their masters in as 
monolithic a way as we might expect. Indeed, in Venice, where a degree of free 
enterprise tempered the administered culture of the courts, it seems actually to have 
been in the interest of some of the elite to underwrite spectacles that displayed a 
more varied, more liberal social network. 19 
This moment - illustrated by Monteverdi's L'incoronazione di Poppea - provides an 
example of not only how music is indexed to social, cultural, and political-economic 
molarities but how its libidinal orientations can be made to disrupt their statistical 
aggregation. The period marks an alteration in the libidinal trajectory of official music in 
which deceiving the audience as to their investments and expectations mirrors the 
contemporary crisis in most forms of patriarchal authority, and the mask of deceit worn by 
the `intellectual libertines' who sought to challenge such authority. 20Hence, the rigid 
segment of masculine-feminine bissecting the lines of audition, force and subjection that 
make up this dispositif are also challenged such that, in the case of L'Orfeo `the 
18 McClary, Feminine Endings, p. 50. 
19 Ibid., p. 5 I. 
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extravagant sensuality and the extravagant anguish exhibited by Orfeo come to be regarded 
as "effeminate"'. 21 
This challenge posed to the binary determination of masculine-feminine and the relations 
of force (puissance), power (pouvoir) and subjectivity in some ways returns us to the 
ambiguity of the song `My Funny Valentine' and the 1956 recording by Miles Davis 
which, in its combination of `rueful lament' and nightclub `intimacy' combines elements 
that - at the time of Monteverdi - were considered profoundly emasculating and therefore 
to be avoided. Interestingly, lament and seduction were two key rhetorical forms at the 
time of Monteverdi's music, but - when displayed in the intense, protracted postponements 
of Orfeo - masculine (rhetorical) authority subsides and gives way to a more delirious 
relation between sexualilty and `madness'. 
While sexuality and madness remain favorite themes of music drama, they prove to 
be extremely problematic when enacted by male characters. The "mistake" was 
rarely repeated, for in operas by Monteverdi and others after L'Orfeo [... ], both 
forms of rhetoric - seduction and lament - come to be practiced almost exclusively by 
female characters. 22 
In bringing this deviation back to the issue of modality, and more specifically the modality 
of Miles Davis's music, we can use some of the foregoing insights of McClary to further 
explore the key outstanding `problem' from the previous chapter by considering it in terms 
of the work of Davis and its documentation, in which one repeatedly finds descriptions of 
his playing that refer to its tenderness, fragility and vulnerability which - when considered 
alongside the aggressive aspects of his sound - generates a central paradox informing the 
20 An observation made by the music historian Lorenzo Bianconi regarding the Accademia degli Incogniti of 
which the librettist for L'incoronzione di Poppea was a member, cf., Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 50. 
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`problem' of Miles Davis which is ultimately a problem of violence, and whether 
affirmative violence to the confinements of a social dispositif inevitably entails violence to 
the superlinear fabric from which it is weaved, is a question which shall be considered 
towards the end of the chapter and in the conclusion. Before doing this, the focus will 
remain on Davis's and Russell's conception of jazz modality, to be explored in the next 
two sections through its embodiment of a Guattarian historico-materialist semiotics of 
music, the Deleuze-Guattarian conception of the war machine, and their collective work on 
percepts, affects and concepts. 
The Machinic Heterogenesis of Modality 
What we are aiming at with this concept of the refrain aren't just massive affects, but 
hyper-complex refrains, catalysing the emergence of incorporeal Universes such as 
those of music or mathematics, and crystallizing the most deterritorialized existential 
Territories. 
Felix Guattari23 
[MJusic inevitably refers to other music. 
Kofi Agawu24 
George Russell's `Lydian Chromatic Concept of Tonal Organization' has a number of 
features that characterize it as a `concept' of modal theory, but - as with McClary's 
analysis of Monteverdi - these developments need to be explored in relation to those other 
`factors' of a social dispositif. According to Joachim Berendt, Russell's project constituted 
`the first work deriving a theory of jazz harmony from the immanent laws of jazz, not from 
22 Ibid., p. 48. 
23 Guattari, Chaosmosis, p. 5. 
24 Kofi Agawu, African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 7. 
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the laws of European music'. 25 Christine Bezat's observations on the matter of `structural 
immanence' in music should be borne in mind here in order to distinguish the idea of 
music embodying its own formal laws independently of social, cultural, political and 
economic factors, as - to return to Eshun's description of the `troglodytic homilies' from 
the previous chapter - are used to try to make music entirely autonomous from the outside 
of what is, in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's conception of immanence, its own 
constitutive relationality. Obviously, the idea of immanence as structurally autonomous 
from social and political co-ordinates invites a necessary degree of suspicion. However, as 
becomes clear when the idea of the `immanent laws of jazz' is subject to such scrutiny the 
likelihood of their being autonomous from the non-structural26 constitutivity of the socius 
can be dismissed, in a way that re-opens up the question of Deleuze and Guattari's uses of 
music in relation to those of African and African-American cultures. 
Miles Davis's connection with Russell begins during the mid-1940s when - experimenting 
with modal possibilities - Davis obliquely suggested that the conventions might be opened 
up to experiment, and it was Russell that he turned to. Whilst he never worked on any 
compositions as such with Miles Davis he is credited - by Eric Nisenson at least - as being 
as important as Davis's bands in the late 1950s in helping to shape the modal sound. 27To 
quote Russell about his involvement with Davis as early as 1945, 
25 Joachim E. Berendt, The Jazz Book: From Ragtime to Fusion and Beyond (New York: Lawrence Hill 
Books, 1992), p. 412. 
26 It should be noted that the use of the term `structural' is not to be read in terms of 'structuralism' which - 
as was suggested in Chapter 1 and has been hinted throughout - is not as antagonistic to the processual 
thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. 
27 Nisenson dedicates an entire chapter to his 'Rashomon'-inspired approach to the making of Kind of Blue, a 
story told from the perspective of each of the musicians who played on the album (though ominous by their 
omission are half of the rhythm section: Paul Chambers, the bass player and Jimmy Cobb on drums) and 
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We used to have sessions together. He was interested in chords, and I was interested 
in chords. We would sit at the piano and clay chords for each other. He'd play a 
chord and I'd say, "Ooh, that's a killer". 2 
To quote Ashley Kahn, quoting Russell, 
"When I asked him in the forties what music he was playing", recollected Russell, 
"he said he wanted to learn all the changes. That sounded ridiculous to me. Miles 
knew how to play all the changes". Russell recognized in that comment the essence 
of the search that eventually led Davis to modes and modality. 29 
The first thing to say in bringing all this back to Deleuze and Guattari is that Russell's 
claim for the `non-European' status of modal harmony has two sides to it. Firstly, in 
distinguishing between European and non-European music it should be borne in mind that 
the traditions described by Russell as `European' refer predominantly to the tonal tradition 
of Classical music. Given that this tradition itself was being pushed to its limits and 
beyond during the twentieth century by Classical composers, this opens up something of a 
more productive connection between the work of some `European' composers and the 
aims of modal jazz. As a result of this, in finding resources for establishing this new 
conception the music of Classical composers was analysed and used. Ravel, Debussy, 
Bartok, Katchaturian and Stravinsky to name just a few. Added to the work of some 
Classical composers are European folk-traditions, such as the Armenian tradition that 
influenced Katchaturian, which - in actual fact - is `basically modal'. 
30 
Miles Davis himself listened intensely to the music of Bartok, Ravel, Katchaturian and 
later in his career Stockhausen and Messiaen. In addition, the crucial role played on the 
George Russell who gets his own chapter and the only appendix in the book, cf., Nisenson's Kind of Blue, 
Ch. 3, 'The Lydian Odyssey of George Russell' and 'Appendix'. 
28 Ibid., p. 60. 
29 A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, p. 69. 
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1959 landmark modal recording of the Miles Davis Sextet Kind of Blue by the classically- 
trained pianist Bill Evans is marked by a very impressionistic quality that was to some 
extent a product of Debussy's influence. This first aspect of modal jazz - in Deleuze- 
Guattarian terms - is one that should be thought of as the embodying a `war machine', in 
their specific sense of the expression, in that the machinic `phylum' that crosses these 
different musical assemblages was strategically tapped in its development whereby the 
strata composing the more established, more dominant auditory and sonorous habitus of 
Modern European Classical music were swept along a line of flight, upon which the `war 
machine' is constructed. This involved a massive appropriation of the institutionalized 
European musical innovations and their passage across different assemblages in the 
tapping of the machinic phylum, which is the movement of deterritorialization itself 
engendered at the level of matter-force, independently of its double-articulation as forms of 
ontent/expression. Bringing it back to the refrain in order to think sound in terms of matter, 
one must remember that the molecularization of sound produced in its Modem moment is 
geared towards the freeing of sound from the content/expression nexus, a task massively 
aided as has been seen by the advent of new technologies. 31 The machinic phylum that is 
being tapped in the present case could itself be described as the phylum of musical 
modality. Guattari describes the `French musical phylum' as catalysed in the `pentatonic' 
refrain, and a perhaps by now quite obvious point should be made regarding Kofi Agawu's 
statement used at the opening of this section, in that whilst `music inevitably refers to other 
30 Ibid., p. 48. 
31 The idea of war machines constructed through the assemblages of 'jazz' and the intensive transformations 
allied to the tensor-sign 'Miles Davis' perhaps find their most convincing case in the electric period and the 
role played by technological development in this construction is something to which we shall all-too-briefly 
return in the Coda. 
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music', when it comes to Guattari's conception of music - apropos his materialist, mixed 
semiotics - referentiality is only a relatively small part of the story: 
Consider for a moment the example of the pentatonic musical refrain which, with 
only a few notes, catalyses the Debussyist constellation of multiple Universes: 
- the Wagnerian Universe surrounding Parsifal, which attaches itself to the 
existential Territory constituted by Bayreuth: 
- The Universe of Gregorian chant: 
- that of French music, with the return to favour of Rameau and Couperin 
- that of Chopin, due to a nationalist transposition (Ravel, for his part appropriating 
Liszt): 
- the Javanese music Debussy discovered at the Universal Exposition of 1889: 
- the world of Manet and Maliarme, which is associated with Debussy's stay at the 
Villa Medicis. 
It would be appropriate to add to these past and present influences the prospective 
resonances which constituted the reinvention of polyphony from the time of the Ars 
Nova, its repercussions on the French musical phylum of Ravel, Duparc, Messiaen, 
etc., [... ]32 
This characteristically jargon-ridden passage from Chaosmosis takes the phylum, which - 
as the abstract machine of matter - is bound up with its flow and distribution. Okay, so now 
the appeal to flux has emerged despite the warnings early on against its hasty affirmation 
but invoking this term now is not tantamount to joining the ranks of the `apostles of desire 
and flux' that Badiou supposedly left feeling `apoplexy', the task here is to make 
something more rigorous of Guattari's reconstruction of the machinic phylum of music so 
that we can use it to produce a diagram of the modal phylum and attempt work towards the 
inevitable follow-on question: can modal jazz be conceived along the lines (of flight) of a 
`war machine'. 33 
32 Guattari, Chaosmosis, pp. 49-50. 
33 Meaghan Morris was quoted as saying earlier that '1227: Treatise on Nomadology - The War Machine' 
had been hastily appropriated by some of its readers. One of the most notorious sections of the book in its 
reception and - along with 'l O, OOOB. C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is? )'- is the 
most far-out of all the plateaus composing the book. As such it invites somewhat readily the 'hippy' and 
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In `1227: Treatise on Nomadology - The War Machine', the machinic phylum is described 
as a matter-flow to be followed. Given that the case in question in this section is that of 
`nomad-thought' it has been `populated' by the nomads of the Asian Steppe, their creation 
of new weapons and tools, their development of new techniques of movement, mobility 
and projectility. Central to this `smooth space' is the tapping into of a metallurgical matter- 
flow that provides the immanent, material conditions of existence for the nomads, who are 
described as `itinerant', `ambulant' and `anisanal'. It should be pointed out here that the 
nomads of the Steppe are not of primary interest here and that the fetishistic nomeclature 
that has followed them has largely missed this point of the war-machine idea. What matter 
in this instance are the abstract machinic connections that the plateau has to modal jazz, 
and the key to these connections is in the description of the relation between metallurgy 
and music: 
If metallurgy has an essential relation with music, it is by virtue not only of the 
sounds of the forge but also of the tendency within both arts to bring to its own, 
beyond separate forms, a continuous development of form, and beyond variable 
matters, a continuous variation of matter: a widened chromaticism sustains both 
music and metallurgy [. ,, 134 
So the machinic phylum of music, like all machinic phyla constitutes the matter-flow 
which has to be considered as having a non-organic life, independently of its double- 
articulations as part of the expression/content captures. This is what makes the machinic 
phylum the material correlate of the abstract machine because as with the abstract machine 
it only deals with form as on the order of `diagrams' or `diagramming' procedures, the 
form of a `map' that is `immanent to the territory'. A metallurgical `flow' is indivisible and 
'gothic' readings that it has received and makes the task of using the section to say anything that is not 
tantamount to some form of theoretical noodling or fetishism, yet that is the task here. 
34 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 4l 1. 
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irreducible at the level of matter-force, at least from the perspective of its `molecularity' in 
Deleuze-Guattarian terms irrespective of the statistical aggregates that a more scientific- 
physical conception of atoms and molecules might make of it, however, for all of its 
fluidity it serves multiple functions and in terms of the `tools' and `weapons' of the 
nomads of the case provides the conditions of existence for their war machine, with the 
invention of the stirrup changing the relationality between human and non-human (horses, 
weapons, tools, but also the Body of the Earth) compositions and thereby introducing new 
mobility, or new relations of speeds and slownesses into their relationality. In short, from 
this Spinozist perspective, the nomads' capacity to act and to be affected has been 
massively increased. 
But what of the sonorous machinic phylum? How does that perform a like task in the `war 
machine' of modal jazz? Well, returning to Guattari's description of the French music 
phylum, we can begin by outlining some of the characteristics of its `machinic 
heterogenesis'. 35 We have a head-start in doing this with the list of `incorporeal Universes 
of reference' that connect both the French and the modal machinic phylum, the Debussyist 
Universe, signalled primarily by the pentatonic elements in the piano style of Bill Evans on 
Kind of Blue; but also of Ravel, the folk idioms of Katchaturian, Stravinsky, whose work 
was used extensively in the compositions of George Russell, and a number of other 
`Universes'. Following Guattari the Universes that compose the `musical refrain' of 
modality might be listed as follows: 
35 Guattari, Chaosmosis, pp. 32-57. 
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- The Universe of Katchaturian36, with the modal aspects of Armenian folksong; 
additional Eastern European folksong elements tapped into included Slavic music, 
Turkish, Romanian and Hungarian music37: 
- the Javenese Debussy `discovered', with his visit to the Universal Exposition of 1889 
and the introduction of more pentatonic elements into European music38: 
- that of Chopin39, and Ravel, `for his part, appropriating Liszti40 as well as 
Rachmaninoff, captured in the sonority of the Dorian modea1: 
- the Universe of blues captured in the sonority of the Dorian mode42: 
- that of Spanish folk music, captured in the sonority of the Phrygian mode43: 
- that of North African and Middle Eastern scales44: 
36 Cf., A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, p. 70, where Davis is quoted as saying to jazz writer Nat Hentoff: "'I think a 
movement in jazz is beginning away from the conventional string of chords, and a return to an emphasis on 
melodic rather than harmonic variations. There will be fewer chords but infinite possibilities as to what to do 
with them. Classical composers - some of them - have been writing this way for years, but jazz musicians 
seldom have"'. Kahn points out that '[O]ne of the classical composers Miles was referring to was the 
Armenian Katchaturian, who uses scales that, as Miles said, "were different from the usual Western scales"'. 
37 Ibid.: 'The Austrian-born [composer and keyboardist] Zawinul, who would join forces with Miles in the 
late sixties, brought a native familiarity with ethnic modalities of eastern Europe when he arrived in New 
York in 1958. 
In the early fifties, we were doing modal stuff in Vienna, you know? We were getting into all these 
different scales from folk music. Where I come from there were all these different influences from 
Slavic music, Turkish, Rumania and Hungarian'. 
38 Ibid., p. 74: '[... ] Davis and Evans proved to be two musical explorers bound by kindred passions and 
visions. Both were ardent fans of modem classical composers such as Rachmaninoff and the French 
impressionists'. 
39 Cf., Berendt, The Jazz Book, pp. 282-3: '[Bill] Evans [... ], in today's terms [... ] was the first "modal" 
pianist. He might be designated a "Chopin of the modern jazz piano", with the eminent skill - without 
comparison in jazz - to make the piano sound in a way that places him (in terms of sound) in the vicinity of a 
pianist like Rubinstein [... ]'. 
° Cf., A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, where Davis is quoted as saying of the modal approach in the late 1950s. To 
cite Kahn quoting Davis, "'[W]e were just leaning toward - like Ravel, playing a sound with only the white 
[piano] keys [a common way of defining a model .... 
It was the thing to do.... Like all of a sudden all the 
architects of the world started making circles, you know, like Frank Lloyd Wright"'. 
41 Ibid., p. 71: 'The Dorian mode - favored by classical composers like Ravel and Rachmaninoff - works well 
as a blues scale and was employed by Miles on "Milestones" off the album of the same name. 
'Z Cf., Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 8, where he quotes Davis as having said that '[W]e 
always played the blues in St. Louis. Bands came up on the boats from New Orleans, guys came down from 
Kansas City and Oklahoma City, all playing the blues... When I was a kid I was fascinated by the musicians, 
particularly guys who used to come up from New Orleans and jam all night... you listened to everybody and 
took the parts you liked. You watched how they hold the horn, how they walk ... 
I mean, if you're fifteen! '. 
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- that of Gospel music and slavery songs45: 
- that of the post-tonal experiments of Schoenberg and the Viennese School46 
And, again following Guattari `[I]t would be appropriate to add to these past and present 
influences [... ] prospective resonances', including Gregorian chant with its working 
through of `all the permutations of the major scale'47, the construction of harmony in 
European Classical music prior to Rameau48 and the dominance of the triad, including the 
use of modes in the music of Monteverdi49 and the influence that these would have on the 
modal phylum as followed in jazz and beyond, as part of the modal experiments of John 
Coltrane in the 1960s, the work of the Second Miles Davis Quintet and the move in the 
direction of electric jazz and fusion and the new Universes of reference marking the `deep 
African thing' that came to be produced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to which I shall 
return later in the chapter. 
43 Ibid., pp. 70-1: `[T]he Phrygian can be exploited to exude a Spanish sonority, as on [the Davis album] 
Sketches of Spain'. 
as Cf., Ibid, p. 71, where David Amram is quoted as saying that jazz musicians at this time would listen to 
'Egyptian, Lebanese and sometimes music from Morocco, all of which had in common a certain rhythmic 
pattern and a certain mode'. 
S Cf., Small, Music of the Common Tongue, p. 104: `[N]o matter what the provenance of the songs, they are 
seldom if ever sung `as written', either words or music, even when printed texts are used. Those [... ] 
practices noted by the editor of Slave Songs of the United States are still in evidence today: rhythmic 
elaboration, pitch bending, hand clapping on the off beats, stamping and swaying, call and response and 
dense improvised harmonic and heterophonic textures [emphasis added], and above all an emotional 
intensity without parallel in European or Euro-American musicking [... ]'. 
46 Cf, n. 50 below. 
49 Ibid., p. 70. 
48 Susan McClary, `Afterword', in Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, Jacques Attali, 
trans. Brian Massumi, 'Foreword' by Fredric Jameson, 'Afterword' by Susan McClary (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 151: 'Before Rameau' Traite de l'harmonie [Treatise on Harmony) 
(1722), theories and pedagogical methods dealt principally with two aspects of music: coherence over time 
(mode) and the channeling of noise in the co-ordination of polyphonic voices (counterpoint) [... ] Rameau, in 
a striking re-working of Descrates' Cogito manifesto, 
declared this earlier tradition moribund and, in seeking 
to build a musical system from reason and science, hailed the triad as the basis of music'. 
49 See the above account of modality in Monteverdi. 
189 
Guattari's machinic heterogenesis is not just about the production of universes of reference 
and the tapping of their phylic connections. In order for this to make more sense and to 
stop the whole conception of `Universe' sounding the return of transcendence or naive 
idealism, or even worse, mysticism, it is necessary to respect its parallelism with the 
`existential territories' formed of machinic links which bring together `technical machines, 
social machines and desiring machines' at the level of their concrete materiality, to some 
extent bringing in the conception of milieus, territories and deterritorialization from `1833: 
Of the Refrain'. So, what would be some of the milieus components and territories that 
would be carried along the `line of flight' of modal jazz? 
These milieus and territories are largely to be found in the largely Black-populated districts 
of New York during the 1950s and would be comprised of a number of diverse spaces 
including the library, local restaurants and `belly-dancing clubs' S0 In addition to these one 
should add the 30th Street Studio on New York's East-Side where the album Kind of Blue 
was recorded, one of the most sustained, definitive experiments in modal jazz of the time 
and certainly in the career of Miles Davis. Radios, gramophones, engineering equipment 
and magnetic recording tape would number amongst the technological machines making 
up the milieu components that constituted these territories51, along with human body-parts 
50 A. Kahn, Kind of Blue, p. 70: '[J]azzmen of the fifties- in the spirit typified by Miles's music library visits - 
sought out new and unusual modal patterns beyond the usual major and minor scales [... ] New scales would 
also be found in musical exercise books. "A lot of the scalar material Coltrane was playing was Nicola 
Slonimsky's Thesaurus of Scales and Melodic Patters", keyboardists Joe Zawinul remembers, and he adds: 
"Most of the reed and trumpet players played out of different violin books, and also scale books like [Carl] 
Czerny' [... ] David Amram recalls 
I knew about some of those primary modes, because living in New York you could go to these belly- 
dancing restaurant-bars like the Egyptian Gardens [... ] Some of the jazz players were really into that. 
They'd say, "The baddest cats are Bela Bartok [sic. ], Arnold Schoenberg, and the guys playing in 
those belly-dancing clubs"'. 
S1 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 311: 'Radios and television sets are like sound walls around 
every household and mark territories (the neighbours complain when it gets to loud)'. 
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in machinic connection with non-human body-parts: lips/tongues-mouthpieces, fingers- 
valves, eyes-scores, lips-cigarettes [see fig. 7]. The 30`h Street studio, an abandoned Greek 
orthodox church, is also notable for a number of its own milieu components: the `sound 
wall' generated by its reverberant room and its wooden (rather than metal) surfaces. 
Additionally one might add that the sessions he recorded at the studio introduced Davis to 
his future producer Teo Macero and - of particular importance - the studio itself was run 
under the auspices of Columbia Records, pioneers of mass distributed music and who 
patented the invention of the 33 1/3 RPM `long-playing' record: `the apparatus of capture' 
and - as such -a marker for another crucial ambiguity that is allied to the name `Miles 
Davis', in his later `electric' work, which is one of his relationship to Capitalism and 
power. This shall be returned to later in the thesis. However, it is necessary to return to the 
question of modal jazz's relation to its African-American connections and - at the same 
time - to ascertain more clearly what the modal sonorous phylum means to the idea that it 
comes to embody a war-machine, a question that in some ways sets the terrain for dealing 
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Writing and music can be war machines. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari53 
It has been said a great many times that music is an essential aspect of culture, and 
documents claiming this with regard to African and African-American cultures are not 
hard to come by. In some ways, the task of this project is to assess such a claim and ask 
what can be said of music's functions within contemporary western Capitalist society that 
does not simply fall into pessimism or nihilism. In the case of Christopher Small and John 
Miller Chernoff, the particularly fundamental role played by music in African and African- 
American cultures has itself been allied to an ethics of a similar order than the one that 
underpins the concerns regarding music here. For some examples of parallels that might be 
drawn it is worth dwelling momentarily on a few of their observations. To quote Chernoff, 
The fact that most people in Africa do not conceive of music apart from its 
community setting and cultural context means that the aesthetics of the music, the 
way it works to establish a framework for communal integrity, offers a superb 
approach to understanding Africans' attitudes about what their relationship to each 
other is and should be. 4 
Christopher Small quotes Chernoff as saying that 
[J]ust as a participant in an African musical event is unlikely to stay within one 
rhythmic perspective, so do Africans maintain a flexible and complicated orientation 
towards themselves and their lives [... ] The sensibility we have found in musical 
expression more accurately appears to represent a method of actively tolerating, 
interpreting and even using the multiple and fragmented aspects of everyday events 
to build a rich and more diversified personal experience ["""]55 
52 I am indebted to Professor John Mowitt for drawing my attention to this connection. 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 513. 
54 Cited in Nisenson, The Making of Kind of Blue, pp. 2-3. 
55 Cited in Small, Music of the Common Tongue, pp. 23-4. 
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Personological and interpretative orientations notwithstanding, these accounts of African 
music in its relation to culture can be transposed into a Deleuze-Guattarian register which - 
far from being a redundant exercise - will provide a means for grasping what it is that 
modal jazz has done in `following' the sonorous phylum and its machinic heterogenesis as 
described above in a way that gives a much clearer understanding of how far it has gone in 
taking a line of flight and in assembling its tools-weapons along the lines of a war 
machine. One must be wary nevertheless of doing with the concept of the war machine the 
very thing that should be avoided, that is -a hasty affirmation of dispossession and 
diasporic nomadism that would romanticize slavery and racist exclusion. 
The first observation of Chernoff s makes clear that music is important in terms of the 
potential for moving towards a common notions of the relationality between bodies 
composing a set of milieus and territories making up a given `community'. The second 
observation points to the heterogeneity of the relations composing these milieus and 
territories and the idea that music contributes to the production of a `flexible and 
complicated orientation' towards life and one that is `rich and diverse', which recalls the 
description of the `hyper-complex' refrain of Guattari, the production of which is the task 
of ethico-aesthetics and a transversal enhancement of subjectivity through its more creative 
capacities. By way of another quote from Chernoff, we can see that the description given is 
not simply one pertaining to `culture', but in actual fact to `nature-culture'. To quote Small 
once again, 
[... ] Chernoff, who himself trained for some years as a drummer in the Ewe tradition 
of Ghana, makes a strong case for a parallel "between the aesthetic conception of 
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multiple rhythms in music and the religious conception of multiple forces in the 
world". 56 
Kofi Agawu's work on the Ewe tradition of complex rhythm reaffirms a conception of its 
relation to the socius as being akin to a hypercomplex refrain: 
The absence of a single word for "rhythm" in Ewe suggests that rhythm refers to a 
binding together of different dimensional processes, a joining rather than a 
separating, an across-the-dimensions instead of a within-the-dimension phenonemon. 
I have taken a cue from this interpretation to begin the present study of Northern 
Ewe rhythm on the broadest possible level, the level of the rhythms of society. 57 
Whilst rhythm and religion - obviously immensely important aspects of African and 
African-American musics and cultures - is the main concern of Chernoff, and is not simply 
a product of overinvestment on his part, there will not be sufficient space available to 
explore either of these areas in the remainder of this project. That said, his observations 
regarding the parallelism between `multiple rhythms' and a `religious conception of 
multiple forces in the world' can be found to map in terms of the parallelism between the 
conception of modality and its relations to `force', or more specifically `matter-force', 
which - it should also be pointed out - can be deterritorialized in such a way as to be 
capable of producing religious and mystical universes of reference. 
For all that African and African-American musics might share in the Spinozism 
constituting perhaps the main refrain of this project, their participation in such an ethics 
does not preclude its role in a politics, which is a politics of a war-machine against a state 
apparatus. From the perspective of music, this is an apparatus of tonality, as coded in 
music, but also as it overcodes music in its relation to the socius, and desiring-production. 
56 Ibid., p. 23. 
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As Deleuze and Guattari say, the state apparatus has its own science, which here is a 
science of tonality, resonating with mathematics dating back to Pythagoras, horizontal 
harmonic development and diatonic capture of musical possibility in ways that permit its 
overcoding to be successful in generating redundance and resonance at the level of 
signifiance and subjectification and thereby is an arbiter of interpellation, or the 
aggregation of subjectivity in accordance with desiring-repression of state-forms. 
Not ones to be entirely negative, Deleuze and Guattari also posit an `itinerant' or 
`ambulant' science of nomadism and the war machine, which bring us back to the smooth 
space-time of the previous chapter, and its complement: sedentary space. The state 
apparatus effects its captures in order to regulate space and the behaviours, passages and 
movements that take place as part of this space. To invoke Deleuze and Guattari's overly- 
laboured but endlessly useful illustrations, the game of Chess is an embodiment of this 
type of regulatory space-time because all of the possible permutations are overcoded to the 
extent that pieces are hierarchized in the designation of specific functions according to top- 
down rules of organization. To the extent that the organization of state-space involves a 
`science', it is a science that promotes this regulative, regulated sedentarity. This point 
perhaps does not need much by way of its own illustration, given that there are endless 
daily examples of how science engenders this capture, but to provide just one example 
from Deleuze, we might refer to the use of Muzak in the regulation of suburban mall 
spaces, or the enslaved, sedentary televisual subjectivities that make ever greater demands 
57 Agawu, African Rhythm: A Northern Ewe Perspective, p. 7 
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on the assemblage of each (human) body and its affective correlate: Countdown. 58 But 
what of itinerant science capable of creating and distributing its productions in a smooth 
space, and moreover a science that is musical? A quote from Jacques Attali (and lannis 
Xenakis) should help us here: 
[S]cientism. Western music theory is expressed essentially in the context of its 
relation to science and its crisis [... ]: "Music is unified with the sciences in thought. 
Thus, there is no break between the sciences and the arts ... Henceforth, a musician 
should be a manufacturer of philosophical theses and global systems of architecture, 
of combinations of structures (forms) and different kinds of sound matter" 
(Xenakis)[... ] Like science, music has broken out of its codes. 59 
Music can be coded, overcoded, but also decoded, and thereby decoding. The quote 
attributed to the composer Xenakis is telling for a number of reasons: firstly, he equates 
music, science, philosophy and architecture as being reciprocally bound up with one 
another in the task of manipulating sonorous matter. This returns us to the problem of non- 
philosophy and in particular, music, in its relation to philosophy and the status of the 
concept in relation to non-philosophy. It also suggests that music - with what has been 
found here to be a supposedly high co-efficient of deterritorialization - is capable under the 
appropriate circumstances to sweep all these assemblages along a line of flight. So, to 
bring it back to the sonorous phylum, the war machine and - where we started out in this 
section - modality in jazz, and in the music of Miles Davis. Returning to the much- 
laboured board-game example, if Chess is an embodiment of the overcoding procedures of 
a state-based apparatus or a sedentary science, then the Japanese board-game Go is an 
embodiment of the smooth space of the war machine, or nomad-nomos. The distribution of 
58 I am indeed referring to the daytime television gameshow here, and Deleuze refers to the French 
equivalent when he says that '[I]t's rather worrying that there's an enthusiastic audience that thinks it's 
watching some cultural activity when it sees two men competing to make a word with nine letters'! Cf., 
Deleuze, 'Mediators' in Negotiations: 1972-1990, pp. 128-9. 
59 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, p. 113. 
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counters in this game are arrayed in relation to one another as part of an open system of 
infinite permutations that are not random but ordered, yet ordered in a way that is non- 
hylomorphic. 
If modal jazz in any way can be considered an example of a war machine that successfully 
follows the sonorous phylum by assembling its inventory of tools-weapons on a line of 
flight, it has to be to the extent that in tapping the sonorous phylum that passes across the 
multiple, machinic and heterogeneous universes of reference and by using its tools- 
weapons as part of a set of given existential territories to engender passage, or incorporeal 
transformation, extracting from these relations a diagonal that sweeps them along a line of 
flight: `[T]he immanent power of corporeality in all matter, and [... ] the esprit de corps 
accompanying it'. And this bring us back to where we began, with George Russell and his 
Lydian Chromatic `Concept'. Firstly, let us situate this `Concept' in relation to the State 
apparatus of musical overcoding, with a quote from Russell himself: 
Traditional European harmony overlooked a lot. Harmony was viewed in a 
progressional manner, going from one chord to the five-chord and back to the one. 
That was considered "harmony". But the dictionary says that "harmony is unity". 
People completely overlooked the individual chord as a viable and individual entity 
that has unity and could evolve into a Lydian chromatic scale, with is all of equal 
temperaments [... ] Stravinsky's Rite of Spring was recently analysed in some 
bullshit way, like "Oh, this is the first theme, and then he repeats the second in bars 
three and four" and so on. But what is really going on in the music? Analysis like 
this has no name for it. 60 
This points to an approach constituting the primary investment of the academic 
musicologist as part of an institutionally aggregated dispositif, and at the same time implies 
the overcodings of such analysis as part of a European system of tonality which captures 
and bisects the lines of the dispositif and the lines that patch it into wider socius according 
198 
to rigid segmentarities (gender, race, and arguably class). So what does the modal Concept 
do that challenges this in the radical way that is being suggested: 
The Concept defined the meaning of `horizontal' and `vertical' playing. These terms 
depend on how the musician relates to the chord of the moment. The vertical player 
depends on the chord of the moment to access a scale that will enable him to sound 
the genre of the chord in an artful way. The horizontal player depends not on the 
chord of the moment, but rather, the chord to which chords are resolving. The non- 
final chords resolve to a final, and the horizontal player depends on that final, of 
which he picks the scale to either vertical or horizontal. Horizontal playing had to do 
with the cotton fields, and the black interpretation of English ballads. That is where 
the blues come from. Lester Young was the grandfather of the horizontal, and he also 
played vertically in a beautiful way. Bird personified the melding of horizontal and 
vertical. 61 
The Concept is therefore designed to explain how it is possible to move away from what 
Guattari might call a `despotism' of the `horizontal' through a reassertion of the `vertical' 
and their relative diagonalization. The horizontal, as it is now possible to see quite clearly, 
is bound up with resolution and all that this brings, including the libidinal economics of an 
`orgasmic orientation' that plug directly into the state-apparatus and in this instance, post- 
World War Two capitalism. In following the machinic phylum that cuts across the 
universes of reference that were listed earlier, modal jazz has constructed an alternative 
conception of musical harmony that deterritorializes and decodes the universes crossed by 
the phylum and takes them on a creative line of flight: a diagonal or zig-zag line that acts 
as a crack, or intensive fault-line between the milieus, territories, assemblages and strata 
and moreover, a diagonal that has potential to cut a transversal line between the horizontal 
and the vertical. The horizontal line patches into the phylum as it crosses the Blues 
universe of reference, a flow of sound-matter that passes through heavily-striated space of 
slavery to be double-articulated through expression/content of blues music, and a vertical 
60 Cited in Nisenson, The Making of Kind of Blue, pp. 220-1. 
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line rediscovered by Lester Young and Charlie Parker, the latter of whom contributed most 
to the seismic transformations in the sound of jazz with his Bebop innovations: `Bird 
personified the melding of vertical and horizontal' Tapping this lines, Russell, and his 
Concept, have succeeded in articulating the ways in which the new modality rediscovers 
the vertical and opens up the possibility of shifting vertical and horizontal along a 
diagonal, to get back to the `immanent laws of jazz' (immanent in the broader 
philosophical sense) and away from the `laws of European music': 
Western traditional music theory overlooked the vertical aspect of music, which 
means it left out one-third of music. The Concept is the first theory to address that 
missing third. 62 
For all this, there is a problem. The line of flight is - by definition -a line of absolute 
deterritorialization, and it is not clear at all to what extent the development of modality is 
located on a line that only reterritorializes on its deterritorializations. This is for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, whilst it is the case that a war machine is always produced in a relation 
of reciprocal presupposition with a state apparatus and the question of its success of failure 
in engendering a creative line of flight away from the overcodings and captures of this 
state apparatus concerns whether it uses its weapons-tools in such a way as to take the line 
itself as the end, rather than war as such, and only pursues the latter trajectory to the extent 
that it attempts to fend of the overcodings and captures of the state. It certainly seems that 
the assemblages constituting the development construct themselves on a line of flight that 
taps directly into the machinic phylum passing through all the universes of reference and 
more that were listed earlier, to the extent that the assemblage is defined in its relation to 
the war machine as `every constellation of singularities and traits deduced from the flow - 
61 Ibid., p. 221. 
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selected, organized, stratified - in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and 
naturally; an assemblage in this sense, is a veritable invention'. 63 Modality, at least from 
this perspective, would seem to fit the bill. Furthermore, the `assemblages cut the phylum 
up into distinct, differential lineages, at the same time as the machinic phylum cuts across 
them all, taking leave of one to pick up again in another, or making them co-exist'. 64 This 
would also seem to be the case, as the lineages that are brought together in modality are 
arrayed such that they transform and are transformed in jazz and the incorporeal universes 
that are the `esprit de corps' of these lineages qua the sonorous phylum. Where things 
become less clear is when one has to `take into account the selective action of the 
assemblages upon the phylum, and the evolutionary reaction of the phylum as the 
subterranean thread that passes from one assemblage to another, or quits an assemblage, 
draws it forward and opens it up'. 65 
The assemblages definitely do make a `selective action' of the phylum, and it is arguably 
the case that the phylum reacts within and across the assemblages and `opens it up'. 
However - whilst the order-word of European music and culture has been challenged by 
the pass-word of modal jazz, has doubtless in doing so counter-actualized many of the 
actions-reactions of bodies and tools making up its assemblage and extracted from the 
other assemblages and universes a certain `incorporeal' power (puissance), but it would 
seem that it remains somewhat limited, localized and circumscribed, in that its existential 
Territories remain to some extent at the behest of consumer culture. Jazz changed, and 
62 Ibid. 
63 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 406. 
6" Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p. 407. Emphasis added. 
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American culture changed in no small measure during this period. This much is beyond 
question, yet - as Deleuze and Guattari say of Kerouac - in crossing the frontier there is 
always the risk of reterritorializations that cause the Body of the Earth, the Body of the 
Despot or the Body of the Capital to fall back on (se rabat sur) the assemblage and its 
deterritorializations thus introducing new segments into the line, stratifying it and 
prohibiting its movement, or else combining rigid and supple (more deterritorialized) 
segments thus turning potential (puissance) into power (pouvoir). Finally, any failure to 
maintain a line of flight by the war machine might ultimately be due to an in-built 
tendency that prevents such a maintenance: 
[I]s the war machine already overtaken, condemned, appropriated as part of the same 
process whereby it takes on new forms, undergoes a metamorphosis, affirms its 
irreducibility and exteriority, and deploys that milieu of pure exteriority that the 
occidental man of the State, or the occidental thinker, continually reduces to 
something other than itself? 66 
This danger concerning the line of flight returns the problem to one that has been spoken 
of selection, and whether it is ultimately something that can be made, or else whether 
complexity is hypercontingent such that a strategy such as that which is being developed in 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari and also in this thesis, is ultimately non-negotiable.. 
One thing that is beyond doubt is that the nomad of the steppe did not have to contend with 
the full force of the capitalist axiomatic which would have been beyond its horizon, 
whereas modal jazz, and jazz and more `popular' forms of culture in the 20th Century have 
had to. This is the capture of the capitalist axiomatic, and it greatly complicates things, 
including the assertions that can be made regarding the creative or revolutionary role of 
66 Ibid., p. 356. 
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music and culture both in the past and in the future. Remember, Columbia Records owned 
the 30th Street Studio, invented the long-player and produced, promoted and distributed 
Miles Davis's output for most of his career, including Kind of Blue - one of the most 
widely owned jazz records to this day - and Bitches Brew, the best selling `jazz' record of 
all time. 
Returning to Russell's Lydian chromatic Concept, we can also see that - as a monadic 
embodiment of the wider movements and transformations perceived to be taking place and 
their limitations - at once gestures towards the potential for a diagonal or zig-zag line and 
for a reassertion of verticality which results in a reterritorialization. It is a question of 
whether Russell's `missing third' of harmony pits itself against the other two thirds in a 
way that sweeps them along a line of flight or whether the `gravitas'67 of the vertical 
reasserts itself in such a way as to merely substitute for the resolution of the horizontal 
other reterritorializations which index modal jazz no less thoroughly to the libidinal 
economy of the dominant culture of capitalism and its reliance on the segmentarity of the 
white, male adult: '[Als long as there is form, there is still reterritorialization in music'. 68 
These problems are complex and are destined to remain ongoing. Modal jazz provides a 
solution to a problem, a very musical problem: how to do all the changes and free up the 
potential for more extensive improvisation. It is embedded in the production of new 
universes of reference whose cultural impact is undeniable: Bebop, Cool, Modal, Free, 
etc., yet it would be naive in the extreme to imagine that these developments have 
67 Cf., Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 371. 
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engendered a revolution at the molar level: all of the pre-existing problems with their 
ready-made solutions are still much in evidence in the order-words of the state, of racism, 
sexism, violence and wide-scale material and cultural exploitation. Perhaps they have done 
so at the `molecular' level, which is something that I shall come onto quite shortly, but for 
now it should be flagged as a problem in itself: the problem of understanding exactly how 
a conception of molar, political transformation can emerge in relation to a molecular one, 
where every gesture is supposedly political, yet up against the most cynical, insidious and 
enslaving efforts of capitalism and the apparatuses of capture it uses and exploits to 
consolidate its internal limit. 
Another undeniable feature of George Russell's theory is that - whether or not it succeeds 
absolutely in deterritorializing the assemblages through which the sonorous phylum passes 
- it does succeed in producing a diagram that at least suggests the possibility of liberating 
the phylum of sonorous-matter from its aggregation as part of stratified, doubly-articulated 
expression/content relations in order to produce new universes of reference that might have 
a more obvious effect on the apparatus of capture and the political. 
Writing and music can be war machines. The more an assemblage opens and 
multiplies its quantifiers of intensities and of consolidation, the closer it is to the 
living abstract machine. 69 
More research should be done into the details of Russell's conception of modality and its 
relation to verticality, horizontality and transversality, in order to determine more 
accurately what the Russell `effect' might have been, and how - in a certain register - this 
68 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 6. A more detailed consideration of music and sound as they are used in 
this work will follow. 
69 Ibid., p. 513. 
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name is a tensor-sign for diagramming nature-culture in and its potential for 
transformation. Doubtless a contribution has been made towards the production of new 
affective potential and thereby arguably ethical potential, an aim of certain African and 
African-American uses of music and culture, if only due to the challenge to the hegemonic 
libidinal investment in tonality and resolution; in doing this, modality has arguably 
succeeded in constructing a plateau of intensity. Doubtless also, modality has succeeded in 
creating something of a smooth space - at least as part of its own assemblages - in that the 
reassertion of the vertical does at least mean that the metric, linear temporality of the 
cadence has been replaced by the fade-out of modal harmony, thereby arguably bringing to 
a juncture the metric and nonmetric multiplicities that permit those musicking to `occupy 
without counting' (nomos) rather than `count in order to occupy' (polls). 
Finally, whatever else it is the Concept is geared towards a chromaticism which, as has 
already been claimed in this thesis, is - in language and in music - characteristically 
tensorial. For all this, however, one must still ask how far this innovation goes to 
smoothing the striations of the state and coping with the speedier smoothings used by 
capitalism. It is a question not just about Russell, about Miles Davis or about jazz, but 
about the value of the war machine concept itself: does it have the power (puissance) to 
generate widescale ethical and political transformation? Or is it the product of theoretical 
noodling or - to return to Adorno - the fetish character of theory and the privations of 
contemporary infantilism? A `parable' told by Charlie Parker's biographer and relayed by 
the music writer and composer David Toop embodies the nuanced complexity of all these 
questions and the stakes that are involved following the sound-matter phylum: 
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There are stories, perhaps apocryphal, of Charlie Parker following Varese through 
the streets of New York, plucking up the courage to ask for private tuition. Varese 
played down this not entirely innocent image of the jazzman curled up at the feet of 
the European master [... ] Parker wanted to learn structure, wanted to be taught how 
to write for an orchestra and was even prepared to cook for Varese in repayment. 
"He spoke of being tired of the environment his work relegated him to [... ]". 
[P]arker struggled for escape, not only from the harmonic limitations of the blues or 
the conservatism of jazz, but from the expectations of promotors [sic. ], record 
companies and the suffocating embrace of fans. 0 
Parker, pioneer of Bebop and cutting across the `vertical' and the `diagonal, pursues 
Varese, the ioniser of sound-matter through the streets of New York seeking to move away 
from the horizontality of the blues and the stratifications of jazz `conservatism' that the 
music pioneered in his name had already done so much to transform, at the same time as 
running the gauntlet of poverty, exploitation and `stardom' (capture). `Parker' is a tensor- 
sign for the diagonal line diagrammed by Bebop whilst `Varese' is a tensor-sign marking 
the abstract machine of sonorous matter-force: assemblage and phylum. This is a 
cautionary tale, especially when it is recalled that Parker died at the age of 34 from the 
abuse of alcohol and drugs: line of flight/line of abolition? 
Whatever the answer to the above questions, one could do worse than quote Robin Mackay 
on the uses of Deleuze-Guattari at the same time as introducing one of the key terms to be 
explored in the final section of this chapter: 
It remains for us to see how, effectively, simultaneously, these various tasks of 
stratoanalysis proceed. 7' 
70 David Toop, Ocean of Sound: Aether-Talk, Ambient Sound and Imaginary Worlds (London: Serpents Tail, 
1995), p. 85. 
71 Robin Mackay, 'Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Wildstyle in Full Effect', in Keith Ansell Pearson, Deleuze 
and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 267. This is actually 
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Before we get to this, there still remains the outstanding question of to what extent George 
Russell's Concept is a concept in the specific sense attributed to the term by Deleuze and 
Guattari. 
Percept, Affect and (the) Concept: The Russell Effect 
Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that comprehends it; it needs a philosophical 
comprehension just as art needs nonart and science needs nonscience. 
Deleuze and Guattari72 
What I see is thinking; what I hear is thinking too. 
Atom Heart73 
The most clear elaboration of the status of the concept in (Deleuze and Guattari's) 
philosophy is to be found throughout their last collaborative work, What is Philosophy?. 
Each chapter of this work involves a re-thinking of the role of the concept both in terms of 
its `properly' philosophical uses, how concepts inscribe a pre-philosophical plane of 
immanence which in its very inscription comes into being and how concepts and their 
`zones of indiscernibility' or `neighbourhoods' are `peopled' by `conceptual personae' that 
enable concepts to attain consistency and have a history. 
In addition to the philosophical constructions on a pre-philosophical plane of immanence, 
there are the non philosophical compositions of art, music and literature that come to 
occupy a plane relative to the pre-philosophical one, but one that is primarily composed of 
`percepts' and `affects'. There are also other planar constructions to be found which a 
a quote `sampled' from the last page of Anti-Oedipus, in which the word 'schizoanalysis' is used instead of 
71 'stratoanalysis', cf. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 382. 
72 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 218. 
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relative to the philosophical and aesthetic ones in science and logic, the former produced in 
terms of functions or `functives' whilst the latter is made up primarily of `prospects'. As is 
perhaps already clear from this brief outline, it is the first two planes that are of particular 
interest in this study: the plane of immanence of (pre-) philosophy and its concepts, and the 
`plane of composition' of art, and more specifically, music. However, as science seems to 
occupy a key place in the description of the war machine, it also seems pertinent to dwell 
briefly on the role played by functives. 
The notion of the conceptual persona is yet another one deterritorialized from the musical 
writings of the French composer Olivier Messiaen, and his `rhythmic personnages' or 
`characters'. By returning to `1833: Of the Refrain' it is possible to track how the passage 
between the rhythmic characters or personnages and conceptual personae proceeds. In this 
earlier work, Messiaen is invoked to provide the connection between music qua formations 
of content/expression in the work of the composer but also in terms of its co-efficient of 
deterritorialization that enables a survey of other content/expression relations on the 
nature-culture continuum, in particular the contrapuntal conception of nature inspired by 
the work of Jakob von Uexsküll that was briefly mentioned in the previous Chapter, as 
well as the work of Konrad Lorenz, Irenäus Eibl-Eibelsfeldt and Nikolaas Tinbergen. 74 
73 Atom Heart, 'Abstract Miniatures In Memoriam Gilles Deleuze', from Various Artists, In Memoriam: 
Gilles Deleuze, Mille Plateaux, Sub Rosa, 1996. 
74 As was stated earlier in the project, these are important precursors in the elaboration of a thoroughgoing 
ethology both because of the contributions their ideas make to articulating a more rigorous conception of 
becoming-animal and because of their dubious connection to fascism and racism, but unfortunately - despite 
their relevance -I have had to gloss in order to allow sufficient space for a discussion of the other 
problematic becomings of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy: becoming-child, becoming-woman, becoming- 
black, becoming-minor. 
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The rhythmic personnage is characterized in terms of the territorial (leit)motifs that were 
found to operate in the refrain, and is described as follows: 
[W]e should say, rather, that territorial motifs form rhythmic faces or characters, and 
that territorial counterpoints form melodic landscapes. There is a rhythmic character 
when we find that we no longer have the simple situation of a rhythm associated with 
a character, subject, or impulse. The rhythm itself is now the character in its entirety 
(... )75 
The rhythmic personnage undergoes something of a further deterritorialization in its 
transformation to conceptual persona, whereby it moves from a non-philosophical plane of 
composition to a pre-philosophical plane of immanence, and is characterized no longer 
explicitly as a motif of a musical refrain as before, even if this is one of `bird-song', but 
instead becomes a key component of the deterritorialized refrain of thought on the plane of 
immanence. 
The role of conceptual personae is to show thought' territories, its absolute 
deterritorializations and reterritorializations. Conceptual personae are thinkers, solely 
thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic 
features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual 
persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us. 76 
This shift goes some way to showing the relation between the non-philosophical plane and 
the pre-philosophical one. No longer able to invoke a notion of the apperceiving subject or 
even a structured subject residing solely in language or in ideology, in order to attain a 
sufficient level of consistency philosophy has to call upon its inventive capacities to 
elaborate and sustain a relational conception of philosophy and non-philosophy that finds a 
place for the residuum of subjectivity which remains when apperception is removed from 
the equation, which has been perhaps the key task of Deleuze and Guattari's work one way 
73 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 318. 
76 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 69. 
209 
or another throughout 77 In What is Philosophy?, this relationality is elaborated and 
sustained using the conceptual persona as the means for exploring the residuum of thinking 
subjectivity. The persona populating the plane of immanence a numerous and - by 
implication - What is Philosophy? 's `manifesto' for philosophy invites the `reader' who is 
inclined towards philosophy to go away and create their own. In providing a head-start, 
Deleuze and Guattari enumerate the following personae: friend, claimant, rival and idiot, 
all of which mark positions that thinking subjectivities might adopt in their inscription 
of/on the plane of immanence, and all of which can be found to have functioned in various 
mixtures throughout the course of `geophilosophy'. 78 
When it comes to outlining the role played by affect and percept, and their relation to the 
concept, it is necessary to shift registers onto a plane of composition. In this work, 
following on from the highly detailed and as yet underexplored elaboration of perception- 
images and affection-images derived from Bergson by Deleuze and put extensively to 
77 In this last work that the two authors produced together, the question not just 'what' is asked, but also 
'why', in that it attempts to address the declaration of the 'death of philosophy' that predated it in the 
postmodern 'impasse' of the 1980s and its relation to capitalism. It is no longer presupposed that philosophy 
is a question of how one makes it work, but why it might still be important to do so in an age 'when 
computer science, marketing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication, seized hold of the 
word concept and said: "This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! We are the 
friends of the concept, we put it in our computers". This enormously important issue will be tackled in some 
measure towards the end of this essay. 
78 For example, the friend of the concept is a persona that they find operating in the original Greek 
conception of 'philo-sophy', and one that continues to function across the history of philosophy up to the 
present. Along with the claimant, lover and rival the friend composes 'transcendental determinations that do 
not for that reason lose their intense and animated existence, in one persona or in several': determination- 
indeterminacy; the idiot as conceptual persona is - for Deleuze and Guattari - to be found in Descartes' 
method of doubt and in Dostoyevsky's 'idiot', inscribing the plane according to the 'image of thought' that it 
simultaneously constructs: '[I]t is the Idiot who says "I" and sets up the cogito, but who also has the 
subjective presuppositions or lays out the plane. The idiot is the private thinker, in contrast to the public 
teacher (the schoolman): the teacher refers constantly to taught concepts (man-rational animal), whereas the 
private thinker forms a concept with innate forces that everyone possesses on their own account by right ("I 
think"). The idiot is a conceptual persona'; in Dostoyevsky the idiot is modified to become a persona that 
turns 'the absurd into the highest power of thought', and the fact of its appearance in Dostoyevsky's work 
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work in his Cinema books, percepts and affects are (for once! ) lucidly and succinctly 
described. 
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings 
whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. 79 
We will return to look at percepts and affects in a little more detail in the next section, but 
for now we need to consider just what it is that links the percepts and affects of modal jazz 
during the mid-late 1950s to concepts, and George Russell's Lydian Chromatic Concept. 
Percepts and affects, as `blocs' on a plane of composition that are independent of those 
who `created' them and last only as long as the bodies that enter into a relation of 
becoming with them partake of that relation, only to be activated again when the same 
body (which is no longer the same, like Ronald Reagan after his `amputation') or different 
bodies (which are always already different) partake of such becomings. To the extent that 
this is the case it follows that memory is never something invoked when bodies participate 
in affective or perceptive becomings, at least as a `childhood memory' or nostalgia, but 
through `blocs of childhood that are the becoming-child of the present'. 
80 When it comes to 
the becomings-child of non-philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari claim the following: 
Music is full of them. It is not memory that is needed but a complex material that is 
found not in memory but in words and sounds: "Memory, I hate you". We attain to 
the percept and the affect only as to autonomous and sufficient being that no longer 
owe anything to those who experience or have experienced them [... ]81 
testifies to the capablity of non-philosophy (in this case, literature) to mobilize conceptual persona and in 
doing so to be 'philosophical'. 
79 Ibid., p. 164. 
so Ibid., p. 168. 
81 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, they use Messiaen and his conception of rhythmic personae or characters and 
`melodic landscapes' which they first used in `1833: Of the Refrain'. 
Affects are precisely [... ] non human becomings of man, just as percepts [... ] are 
nonhuman landscapes of nature [... ] This is true of all the arts: what strange 
becomings unleash music across its "melodic landscapes" and its "rhythmic 
characters", as Messiaen says, by combining the molecular and the cosmic, stars, 
atoms and birds in the same being of sensation. 82 
If conceptual personae occupy a plane of immanence of thought in relation to the concept, 
then in occupying a plane of composition rhythmic characters or personae come into being 
by becoming with percepts and affects, the former of which involve a `centre of action' in 
a relation to the world conceived of in itself as perception. This is Bergson's understanding 
of perception, or more specifically, of the perception-image. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari describe percepts as landscapes. As regards affects, these always accompany 
percepts in that a given centre of action will always constitute a perception-image or 
percept with the world that constitutes it in that this centre will always be given to undergo 
a change in the relational shifts of the centre of action and `its' perception. This complex 
Bergsonian idea is best described in the Cinema books, and even better in the films that 
Deleuze chooses as his cases. Again, this shall be returned to in the following section. But 
what of `modality'? We are given a clue by Deleuze and Guattari's observations regarding 
non-philosophy, including music: 
In each case style is needed - the writer's syntax, the musician' modes and rhythms, 
the painters lines and colors - to raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived 
affections to the affect. 
83 
82 Ibid., p. 169-70. 
83 Ibid. 
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As was shown earlier in this chapter, modal jazz moves beyond the totalizating conception 
of harmony rendered purely horizontally along with its incumbent resolutions, and thereby 
altering the relation of music to the libidinal investments constituting listening or auditory 
subjectivities. Conceived along the lines of percepts and affects it is possible to further 
qualify this transformation in jazz: the use of modes changes the relation between melody 
and harmony such that the new relation that modality constitutes between them is one that 
changes melody into `fragment' (`Le Petit Tabac', in/on L'Asensceur pour L'echaffaud) or 
into extended improvisation ('Milestones' and Kind of Blue) and which changes harmony 
into a more vertically-oriented construction that allows minimal chords to be used as a 
means to modal ends by allowing the modes to push through the limited chordal structures. 
In doing this, modality moves away from harmonic resolution in ways that force an 
alternative description of its workings, one which has to take account of the new relations 
between melody and harmony, where melody can be said to have become motival or 
tensorial -a character of modality - which creates affects that are specific to the modal 
deployment of melody, ones that submits `forms and motifs to temporal transformations, 
augmentations or diminutions, slowdowns or accelerations, which do not occur solely 
according to laws of organization or even development'. 
84 This description pertains to any 
instance in which music succeeds in deterritorializing a refrain, but to the extent that it 
occurs in modal jazz it applies specifically in relation to the way that harmonic and 
melodic interaction temporalize thus making it irreducible to the pulsed time of metricity, 
84 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 270. 
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which brings to the music an element of `non-pulsed time' that engenders a musical time 
that is not unlike that of Minimalism and its phase-transitions. 85 
Certain modern musicians oppose the transcendent plan(e) of organization, which is 
said to have dominated all Western classical music, to the immanent sound plane, 
which is always given along with that to which it gives rise, brings the imperceptible 
to perception, and carries only differential speeds and slownesses in a kind of 
molecular lapping [... ]86 
Listening to the modal jazz of Miles Davis and George Russell, and even more so to the 
1960s modal experiments of John Coltrane, there is undeniably an element of `molecular 
lapping', an inscription of the plane of composition, where melody arguably does become 
theme, or at least the music becomes irreducible to its melody and harmony and melody 
enter into a modified relation to one another that inscribes the plane of composition in a 
particular way. 
In fact, the most important musical phenomenon that appears as the sonorous 
compounds of sensation become more complex is [sic. ] that their closure or shutting- 
off [... ] is accompanied by a possibility of opening onto an ever more limitless plane 
of composition. According to Bergson, musical beings are like living beings that 
compensate for their individuating closure by an openness created by modulation, 
repetition, transposition, juxtaposition. 87 
The question of whether modal jazz successfully produces compounds of sensation capable 
of `standing up'88 is a question of how one conceives its relation to openness. Certainly, it 
is bound up with a complex relation to modulation, repetition, transposition and 
juxtaposition, and as has been shown it definitively opposes harmonic closure, at least in 
the examples that were examined earlier. To the extent that it succeeds in achieving this, it 
85 Deleuze and Guattari rightly point out that the music of Steve Reich and Philip Glass has an clement of 
non-pulsed time as one of its key characteristics, cf., A Thousand Plateaus, p. 542n. 46. 
86 Ibid., p. 267. 
87 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 190. 
88 Ibid., p. 164. 
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can be said - in terms of the definition of the `theme' given by Deleuze and Guattari - that 
is performs an `unclenching, splitting, opening' of its motifs and in doing so generates new 
`sonorous compounds'. 89 As such, it successfully creates percepts, in terms of the 
`landscape' that the music composes between auditory body qua centre of action - that is - 
a modification of the `field' of perception that alters in some way the relations composing 
it and the `visages' of the characters emerging in this field through the non-pulsing of 
musical time. Accompanying these percepts are affects where the centre of action 
undergoes changes of degree or intensity according to a) a libidinal investment in the 
music and b) permission granted to the music to engender intensive difference in the 
listening body. 
It should be stipulated however that - whilst there is clearly an argument for the attainment 
of a diagonal `thematic' transformation of compositional elements in modal jazz - the 
question of whether this is an example of `popular music' is not a simple one. Miles Davis, 
as much of an entrepreneur as he was a musician, composer and bandleader (an issue that I 
shall go on to discuss shortly), always endeavoured to make his music popular to a wide 
audience. Where the diagonal line of Charlie Parker's bebop innovations `closed more 
clubs than it opened'90, Davis and the cool, modal and fusion experiments would each 
respectively attain a high degree of popularity that makes it possible to argue against 
Brelet's and Deleuze and Guattari's formula distinguishing Classical from Popular music. 
This is certainly the case with Kind of Blue, which as was said earlier has gone on to be the 
most popular jazz album of all time, and one which - if there is one jazz album that a 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ken Bums, Jazz -A Film By Ken Burns, Dd Video, 2001. 
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person is likely to own - it is likely to be this one. However, this popularity may come at a 
price. We will see this briefly as the electric period receives summary consideration as this 
thesis draws to a close, but where it concerns modal Miles Davis, the price may ultimately 
be one of a reterritorialization of the musical innovations on a rigid segment of gender 
binarity that the music does so much to challenge and escape, at least on a formal level, if 
not entirely at the points where it patches into the socius. 
To the extent that the modal Concept succeeds in plotting a transversal line between 
vertical and horizontal it involves `sonorous blocs of variable individuation but that also 
opens them up or splits them in a space-time that determined their density and their course 
over the plane', it creates percepts and affects. But is the word `Concept' here describing a 
compound of sensation, or is it describing something else: a concept, or even a function. 
Once again, perhaps only a provisional answer can be given to this question (remember 
that it is a question of finding a solution worthy of the problem, which often means 
complicating the situation rather than seeking its resolution) and this brings us back to 
Guattari's four functions and the distinction between sensory affect and problematic affect. 
It has been shown how it is that one might legitimately ascribe to modal jazz a stake in the 
production of percepts and affects, but whilst it produces sensory affects which are more or 
less intense as they solicit or extract their affective responses from the invested listening 
body, it needs to be capable of producing problematic affects that permit a survey beyond 
the double-articulation of expression/content relations and produce a diagonal tending 
towards affect's problematization, and thereby towards the abstract machine. If the modal 
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Concept is capable of extracting from the relations of percept and affect their abstract 
machinic constitution then it is possible that the Concept is able to build a bridge91 between 
the plane of composition and the plane of immanence of thought and thereby enable the 
Concept to be rendered as a concept. 
Sensory becoming is the action by which something or someone is ceaselessly 
becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are) [... ] whereas conceptual 
becoming is the action by which the common event itself eludes what is. Conceptual 
becoming is heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form; sensory becoming is 
otherness caught in a matter of expression. 92 
The extent to which Russell's Concept is a concept in the Deleuze-Guattarian sense is the 
extent to which it succeeds in plotting the diagonal or transversal line towards the `absolute 
form' of the abstract machine, not just independently of forms of content/expression, but 
also of the matter of expression. As a result, the problem is the same one that was 
encountered when trying to determine the extent to which modal jazz constituted a war 
machine, except that instead of trying to discern the extent to which it provides access to 
the phylum, or `abstract machine' of matter, it is a question of the extent to which it 
enables a survey of the incorporeal plane of immanence of thought. Again, the answer to 
the question is dependent upon whether the Concept succeeds in plotting its transversal in 
a way that does not fall foul of `gravitas', and - given that a conception of tonal gravity 
underscores the Lydian Concept - to determine whether this engenders a new form of 
harmonic resolution or reterritorialization - it is a question that must remain somewhat 
open until further research into the Concept has been carried out. In addition, if it is to 
successfully create a bridge across the planes then one must not just discover its `rhythmic' 
personnages, but also its conceptual persona(e). 
91 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Despite the inconclusiveness of this consideration of the Concept and the concept, one 
thing remains certain, and of unequivocal importance. Where it concerns the pragmatic 
remit of Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy and its political worth, it needs to be pointed 
out is that the question of the relation between percept, affect and concept - far from 
necessarily or simply being an act of theoretical noodling - is one that Hardt and Negri 
might call a question of the `general intellect', which is to say that some of the political 
force of Deleuze and Guattari's work in this area needs to be refigured along the lines of 
the intellectual work done by non-academic groups. The attainability of the concept, as has 
been shown is bound up with an ethical trajectory in that it involves surveying outwards 
towards the abstract machine of content/expression articulations. If a move beyond the 
micropolitical concerns of the group is to be made towards a re-figuring of wider or more 
molar political struggles, it is imperative that the claims on the concept made by non- 
white, non-middle-class and/or non-male groups - whether consciously philosophers, 
intellectuals, or not - be considered in a way that is sensitive to its singularity and force in 
the thought and action of such groups, and thereby sensitive to the danger of its 
appropriation. The status of the Concept in African-American music is, therefore, bound 
up with the issue of intellectual status of African-American culture. 
What of the Concept's relation to scientific function, then? This is a difficult question, 
primarily because there is a complex relation between the itinerant science of the war 
machine in A Thousand Plateaus and the conception of (state? ) science as it appears in 
What is Philosophy?, that has yet to be explored or articulated sufficiently. In the latter 
92 Ibid., p. 177. 
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work, science is - according to Deleuze and Guattari - bound up with the incarnation of 
`events' in `states of affairs', where the `partial observer' is substituted for the conceptual 
persona of philosophy and the rhythmic persona or character of art. This move towards an 
actualization of the event makes of science a trajectory ostensibly opposed to the one of 
philosophy which seeks rather to extract events and ultimately the Event from states of 
affairs (counter-actualization). This is perhaps what most clearly distinguishes the itinerant 
from the `Royal' scientist in the former work, given that the itinerant scientist - for 
example the smith incarnating the metallurgical phylum in the production of heterogeneous 
assemblages capable of following the flow the phylum along a line of flight - inclines more 
towards the extraction of events from states of affairs in the very attempt to follow the 
phylum, diagramming the abstract machine of matter. The Royal scientist, in the service of 
the state apparatus, is involved with the overcoding of the assemblages of such a war 
machine, whose science could be said to be restricted to a `plane of reference' and the 
extraction of variables for analyses from states of affairs by way of a partial observer. The 
itinerant scientist on the other hand seeks `continual variation' which cannot be restricted 
to the plane of reference, the limitations of which are echoed in Guattari's four functions 
and the restricted role of the referent in the construction of a diagonal, and rather inscribes 
the plane of immanence. 
The distinction between science and philosophy in What is Philosophy? ultimately boils 
down to the different between two types of multiplicity: `[C]oncepts and functions thus 
appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different'. If itinerant 
science inclines more towards the plane of immanence of matter-flow than towards its 
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overcoding or gridding, then it would seem, it is a `transitional multiplicity' which 
challenges arborification in its production of rhizomatic connections. Insofar as music, and 
specifically modal jazz is bound up with multiplicity, it is this kind of multiplicity which it 
engenders, which again is not to say that it is without its arborescent connections. Whilst 
the connection between the itinerant scientist of the war machine and the scientist of What 
is Philosophy? remains somewhat uncertain, not least of all because this book seems more 
conservative in its exploration of science and even a little reluctant to recognize the `crisis' 
that Attali diagnosed, one which brings complexity theory, for example, into much closer 
proximity with philosophy. What is much clearer is the relation of the scientific 'function' 
to the concepts, percepts and affects of the other planes. 
If there is a difference between science and philosophy that is impossible to 
overcome, it is because proper names mark in one case a juxtaposition of reference 
and in the other a superimposition of layers: they are opposed to each other through 
all the characteristics of reference and consistency. But on both sides, philosophy and 
science (like art itself with its third side) include an I do not know that has become 
positive and creative, the condition of creation itself, and that consists in determining 
by what one does not know - as Galois said, "indicating the course of calculations 
and anticipating the results without ever being able to bring them about" 93 
Art and music then, along with science and philosophy, are marked equally by a specific 
enunciation, `I do not know', an enunciation that evaporates from the surface of the event, 
whether it is actualized or counteractualized, and this enunciation is exactly the one we find 
indexed to problematic affect, as opposed to `I feel', or 'I like', or `I believe', etc. In the 
case of modal jazz, to the extent that the enunciation is connected to a specific use of the 
scientific function on the plane of composition and not on the plane of scientific reference, 
it marks a technical problem: how to move away from the tonal laws of European music 
and `towards the immanent laws of jazz'. 
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There are indeed technical problems in art, and science may contribute toward their 
solution, but they are posed only as a function of aesthetic problems of composition 
that concern compounds of sensation and the plane to which they and their materials 
are necessarily linked 94 
The function of the `technical problem' is one therefore of the creation of affects and 
percepts. As such, the function of the proper name `George Russell' is to mark the modal 
harmonic inscription of the plane of (musical) composition that - whilst taking up the uses 
of modality from other Thesiss indexed to other proper names - seeks to create a specific 
universe for modality in jazz, and all that entails regarding the attempt to produce an 
African American culture. As Deleuze and Guattari say of Kafka, we might say that 
`Russell' operates as a tensor marking the transformations of modal jazz on the order of the 
`Russell function' or, as one might say of Doppler, a the `Russell effect', which leads one 
to conclude that - regardless of whether we can use the name to mark a concept. 
Gesturing towards the Event: The Davis Effect and Becoming-Black 
A good way of judging a piece of music with a text is to try out the different attitudes or 
gests with which the performer ought to deliver the individual sections: politely or angrily, 
modestly or contemptuously, approvingly or argumentatively, craftily or without 
calculation. For this the most suitable gests are as common, vulgar and banal as possible. 
Bertolt Brecht95 
Sensorial/inotorial hypothesis 
Gestures can conjoin sounds and sights. Take the infant as it learns to reach for a noise or 
a colour, and then to associate the two qualities of an object, using the gesture as 
confirmation: what is seen and heard can be located with the hands. 
Thomas Lamarre96 
My mother said to me, "Miles, you could at least smile for the audience when they're 
clapping so hard for you, love what you are playing because its beautiful ". 
93 Ibid., p. 128. 
94 Ibid., p. 196. 
95 Bertolt Brecht, 'On Gestic Music', trans. John Willett, from http//: www. 
96 Thomas Lamarre, `Diagram, Inscription, Sensation', in Massumi [ed.!, A Shock to Thought: Expression 
After Deleuze and Guattari, p. 160. 
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I said, "What do you want me to be, an Uncle Tom? " 
Miles Davis97 
The name "Signifying Monkey" shows [the hero] to be a trickster, "signifying" being the 
language of trickery, that set of words or gestures which arrives at "direction through 
indirection ". 
Roger D. Abrahams98 
Another ballad of which Miles Davis was very fond is `Autumn Leaves' from the poem 
`Les feuilles mortes' by Jacques Prdvert, written in 1945 and set to music by Joseph 
Kosma. As the quote used in the epigraph indicates, it is something of a lament, a song for 
estranged lovers. In 1960, Davis performed `Les feuilles mortes', or `Autumn Leaves' as it 
has come to be known in English, at L'Olympia in Paris. This was not by any means the 
first time Davis had performed this song. He is known to have played it as early as 1950 
and famously performed it in Berlin in 1958 with Cannonball Adderley, the `joyful' alto 
saxophonist he recorded with on Kind of Blue. However, what marks out the 1960 
performance - at least in terms of its recording - is that it is a striking and exemplary 
sonorous inscription of a well-known Miles Davis performance trait: turning his back to 
the audience. We hear this very clearly when - at 1 minute and 20 seconds - the sound of 
the trumpet diminishes almost to inaudibility as it is moved away from the stage 
microphone. With the exception of a few slightly more audible notes, the trumpet remains 
distanced from the microphone until 1 minute and 47 seconds. 
As with `My Funny Valentine', both in 1956 and 1964, as well as `Blue in Green', `All 
Blues' and `Flamenco Sketches' - three of the five tracks on the original Columbia release 
of Kind of Blue - Davis again uses the stemless Harmon mute. Once more the effect of the 
97 Davis and Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography, p. 245. 
98 Cited in Gates, The Signifying Monkey, p. 74. 
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amplified mute, coupled with the `lyrical' or even `vocal' style of Davis's playing and his 
minimalist technical approach to the instrument is one that combines `intimacy', and 
arguably seductiveness, with `lament'. In the molar register, this channels affect along the 
lines of `feeling' or `mood' that enable the listener or the analyst to describe Davis's 
`interpretation' as `like melancholy', or as `indigo'. In addition, and as before, the timbre 
of the muted trumpet as played by Davis is one that oscillates between mid-range, sotto- 
voce softness, and shrill, piercing visceral quality it acquires when played in the upper 
register, especially when it is played loud. As the contemporary jazz trumpeter Wynton 
Marsalis describes it, the sound is `soft, but intense. However, whilst we may use this 
observation of Marsalis to jump headlong into a Deleuze-Guattarian rendering of this 
`intensity', this will not primarily be the task here. This is partly because there remains 
considerable ground to cover in an increasingly short word-space, but also because by 
thinking about the combination of softness and `intimacy' with `intense' harshness, the 
argument gestures in another direction, one which has been mentioned at various points in 
this essay as important, but yet to be properly considered. As a result, we are headed in the 
direction of violence, or more specifically the dangers implicit in becoming, and moreover 
in Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of becoming. These dangers are ones that are 
anticipated in advance by Deleuze and Guattari but nevertheless may still have befallen 
their rendering of the of the concept in some measure which leads to a call for extra 
vigilance, or `sobriety' in dealing with its potential and potential limitations. 
Things are about to get even more complicated, because in asking this question of 
becoming we must also consider what the case of Davis's gesture contributes to such a 
99 Burns, Jazz 
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process, with its potential and its dangers/limtations, and what this means for the status of 
the case in Deleuze and Guattari, in this project and in thinking further the relationship 
between the non-philosophy of (Miles Davis's) music and a materialist philosophy of 
immanence. As it turns out, the gesture helps a great deal in this regard, and in bringing the 
to the simultaneous analysis and (re-)construction of the case of Miles Davis under way 
here a lever for thinking more thoroughly the relationship between ethico-aesthetics and 
(micro)politics that aims to remain firmly within the remit of Deleuze's transcendental 
empiricism, and which succeeds in promoting the tasks of stratoanalysis/schizoanalysis. 
With the question of Davis's gesture it is appropriate to commence by providing testimony 
to the ambiguity, and as we shall come on to see, profound ambivalence underlying its 
conceivable motivations. As before, this exercise is one that attempts to strategically 
negotiate the molar and molecular and will soon require a shift of register on the thesis's 
part, a shift towards the questioning of this very strategy through Deleuze, Guattari and 
Davis. However, beginning with a sounding-out of the aforementioned motivations, we 
can list a number of documentary accounts of Davis's in/famous gesture. 
In Chapter 2 we encountered a characteristic example of Davis's `attitude' in Ralph 
Gleason's account of his reticence regarding the value of writing about his music. In the 
same piece on the Blackhawk concert in 1961, just a year after the performance of 
`Autumn Leaves' under consideration here, he writes of Davis's attitude on stage: 
The debate over his onstage attitude has raged wherever he has appeared: Is it 
pretense? Is it real? His refusal to make announcements, his habit of leaving the 
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stage when others are soloing, his occasional turning of his back to the audience, are 
either vigorously defended or attacked, depending on one's point of view. 100 
In another article by Gleason, `Jazzmen Not Vaudevillians', he elaborates by suggesting 
some of the possible motivations for such an ambiguous attitude: 
He eschews the spotlight; never smiles, makes no announcements. Many people are 
annoyed when, at the close of his solo, Davis walks off the stage. The Davis 
syndrome in performance is free individual creation, always a major part of jazz, 
carried to the ultimate... Davis's music is as uncompromising as any in history. 
Sociologically, he has become a symbol of the contemporary Negro as well, winning 
his success solely on his merits with no bending to public taste, no concession to 
entertainment and absolutely no cultivation of `contacts' or anyone likely to do him 
any good. In other words, no `Uncle Tomming'. 101 
Ian Carr locates his citing of Gleason and his own embellishment of the account in his 
chapter entitled `After Coltrane', marking the end of his collaboration with Coltrane in 
1961, and the period where Davis's attitude attained its notoriety. 
It was at this time that people were beginning to notice Miles's apparent 
obliviousness regarding audiences: his unwillingness to make announcements either 
of tunes or of the names of his musicians, and his persistent refusal to acknowledge 
applause. He had been behaving this way for years, of course, but now that so many 
people were aware of him, many having only recently discovered his music, his stage 
demeanour became the subject of comment. 02 
So, it was no new thing at this time, but what was new was the popularity of Davis. Whilst 
he had attained recognition and respect amongst the jazz community and its fans since his 
early outings with Parker and Gillespie, with the success of the modal phase encapsulated 
in the exceptionally popular Kind of Blue, his music was reaching wider audiences 
internationally as well as in the United States, such that relative newcomers to the scene 
were perturbed by his on-stage demeanour and behaviour: 
100 Gleason, 'At the Blackhawk', p. 83. 
101 Ralph J. Gleason, 'Jazzmen Not Vaudevillians', cited in Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, 
p. 164. 
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There were also in-depth articles in French jazz magazines that same year, and one 
of them, in a long piece entitled, "Why So Mean, Miles? ", commented: `The 
behaviour of Miles Davis is not that of an ordinary star. It is that of a strong man 
who has decided to live without hypocrisy. '03 
So, whilst the critics and commentators attempted to find legitimating grounds for such an 
attitude, audiences oftentimes remained perplexed. 104 In terms of the career and ultimately 
the `life' of Davis, the shift towards increased popularity brought with it a shift in status 
and recognition with both ethical and political ramifications. This would happen again in 
1970 with the release of Bitches Brew, and would bring with it even more controversy. 
The `problem' then, at least as far as Gleason is concerned, is accounted for politically in 
that Davis's refusal to engage in any form of banter or repartee with the audience was an 
active and conscious aloofness calculated to distance Davis's demeanour from those of 
some of his forebears: 
As much as I love Dizzy and loved Louis "Satchmo" Armstrong, I always hated the 
way they used to laugh and grin for the audiences. I know why they did it - to make 
money and because they were entertainers as well as trumpet players. They had 
families to feed. 'os 
Davis's dismissal of Parker and Gillespie is perhaps a little too unequivocal given the 
ambiguity of his own attitude. There is an argument that the grinning and laughing was 
tantamount to a Signifyin(g) on white racist appropriations of African-American culture. 
For example, in the case of Louis 'Satchel Mouth' Armstrong his demeanour could have 
102 Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 164. 
103 Ibid. 
1041n actual fact, by the time of 1960-1 it was certain European audiences that were finding this a problem, in 
particular the British audience for Miles concert tour of 1960. French audiences, who were perplexed and 
angered by Davis's antics in 1957 when he toured Paris whilst making the soundtrack to L'Ascenseur pour 
l'echaffaud had by the 1961 concerts, amongst which numbers the L'Olympia concert being discussed here, 
become quite used to it and had ceased to find it a problem. 
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been strategically cultivated as playful Signifyin(g) embodies: the Negro with the big 
white grin as the Monkey or trickster feigning compliance as the means to infiltrate the 
Lion's domain. 106 Davis, for his part, seems far more militant. As a musician of his 
generation there was a greater awareness of stratification and segmentation effected by the 
molar aggregates of white-dominated culture (Davis's relation to the capitalism that 
provides the immobile motor of capture demonstrates less awareness as shall be discussed 
briefly in the conclusion). It is almost as if his own attitude resembles - keeping with `the 
calculating pockets of dark sarcasm and meanness that at times ruled his spirit"07 - 
`playing the Dozens' more than a merely playful form of Signifyin(g). 108 
105 Davis and Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography, p. 73. 
106 Henry Louis Gates Jnr. cites Roger D. Abrahams, the literary critic, linguist and anthropologist as having 
provided an 'extensive' definition of the homonym Signifyin(g) which - for Gates - repeats with a signal difference its more dominant counterpart signifying, cf., Gates, The Signifying Monkey, pp. 74-5: 
1. Signifyin(g) "can mean any number of things. " 
2. It is a black term and a black rhetorical device. 
3. It can mean the "ability to talk with great innuendo". 
4. It can mean "to carp, cajole, needle, and lie". 
5. It can mean "the propensity to talk around a subject, never quite coming to the point". 
6. It can mean "making fun of a person or situation". 
7. It can "also denote speaking with the hands and the eyes". 
8. It is "the language of trickery, that se of words achieving Hamlet's 'direction through indirection'. 
9. The Monkey "is 'signifer', and the Lion, therefore is the signified". 
The complexity of the [roping effects of Signifyin(g) go well beyond the confines of this essay, however, it is 
hoped that its mention might contribute something to a 'volcanic line' that might productively de-stratify the 
main body of this project. For an account of the repetition of difference as against that of identity in the 
Signifyin(g) of jazz, cf. Ibid., p63: "There are so many examples of Signifyin(g) in jazz that one could write a 
formal history of its development on this basis alone. One early example: [... ] Jelly Roll Morton's 1938 
recording entitled "Maple Leaf Rag (A Transformation)" Signifies upon Scott Joplin's signature composition 
"Maple Leaf Rag", recorded in 1916 [... ] Morton "embellishes the piece two-handedly, with a swinging 
introduction [... ] Morton's piano imitates a "trumpet-clarinet right hand and a trombone-rhythm left hand. 
Morton's composition does not "surpass" or "destroy" Joplin's; it complexly extends and tropes figures 
present in the original'. It is worth noting that - despite the homonymic connection between signifying and 
Signifying, the latter tropes the former processually, and therefore could be productively engaged in the 
context of the materialist semiotics presented here. 
107 Cf., Greg Tate, 'Silence, Exile, Cunning' in Gary Charner, The Miles Davis Companion (London, New 
York, Sidney: Omnibus Press, 1996), p. 236. This less 'Cool' side of Davis will be discussed in some more 
detail at the end of the chapter. 
108 Gates describes 'playing the Dozens' as a vernacular strategy by way of H. Rap Brown, distinct from 
Signifyin(g) which could be used disparagingly or affirmatively, can only be used disparagingly, and its 
rhetorical tenor is one of violence and destruction, cf., The Signifying Monkey, pp. 72-3: [T]he dozens were 
an unrelentingly "mean game because what you try to do is totally destroy somebody else with words" [.. ] 
[T]he dozens were structured to make one's subject feel bad'. The 'Cool' of Davis and his 'meanness and 
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However, Gleason's account of the political motivations for Davis's attitude are not by any 
means the only ones. For example Carr's description differs markedly from that of 
Gleason: 
Where the bebop movement failed to get the status of the musicians elevated to that 
of artist rather than entertainer, Miles Davis was succeeding. Gleason's analysis, 
though illuminating and perceptive, nevertheless errs on the side of romanticism. 
Gleason [... ] was fascinated by the trumpeter almost to the point of adulation. Quite 
clearly, Miles knew how to `impose himself', to make his presence felt and to shape 
events as he wanted them, because he was aware of all the salient factors in any 
situation. 109 
Carr, attempting to be more pragmatic than Gleason and to survey more effectively from 
the investment underlying his subjectivity, asserts that Davis cultivated such an attitude in 
order to have control of a situation, to `impose himself' and - implicitly - one that is to 
some extent motivated by entrepreneurial interests. 
What did Davis himself make of his gesture of turning his back on the audience? 
I could communicate with the band just by giving them a certain look. That look told 
them to play something different from what they had been playing, and after a while 
the music really started coming together. I listened to what everybody was playing in 
my band. I listen constantly and if anything is just a little off, I hear it right away and 
try to correct it on the spot while the music is happening. That's what I'm doing 
when I have my back turned to the audience -I can't be concerned with talking and 
bullshitting with the audience while I'm playing because the music is talking to them 
when everything is right. If the audience is hip and alert, they know when the music 
is right and happening. When that's the case, you let things groove and enjoy what's 
going on. 110 
dark sarcasm' are perhaps embodied along the same lines as the relation between Signifyin(g) and playing 
the Dozens, with characteristic undecidability which itself might reflect a strategic use of these games or 
perhaps a more stratified tendency towards a failed becoming whereby the order-word of the gestural or the 
spoken is replaced by a more directly physical form of bodily inscription or cruelty, to be discussed shortly. 
109 Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 165. 
1 10 Davis and Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography, p. 346. 
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Davis therefore claims that he was not in any way seeking to goad or taunt his audience, 
but rather placing his entire focus on the music, and on exactly what the band members 
were doing at any given time. The claim also echoes Davis's objection to the `laugh and 
grin' of Gillespie and Armstrong, in his description of `bullshitting'. Despite the 
consummate professionalism that Davis perceives to be the reason for his attitude, there is 
something of an implicit presupposition to be found in the use of the word `bullshitting' 
that suggests that - whether out of contempt or some other motivation - Davis's take on the 
role of the audience in auditory participation is that it should be of a commitment equal to 
that of the performers and that a failure to meet this demand renders it superficial, and 
perhaps even insulting. " As with so many of Davis's other traits, the endorsement of 
seemingly contradictory viewpoints compounds the futility of any attempt to fix an 
interpretation or intention more generally, and once again prompts an alternative mode of 
analysis which seeks a different path. Before doing this, there remains one other possible 
`interpretation' of Davis's gesture. It is markedly different from the others in that - rather 
than suggest an arrogant or `imposing' desire or motivation - in actuality suggests an 
extreme inwardness, or privation which, attributed generally as a key characteristic of 
Davis's personality by most writers and commentators, is supposedly encapsulated in his 
sound and in particular, in his use of the amplified Harmon mute. Davis, apparently a shy 
as a boy and as a young man, brought up in a very secure middle class professional family 
in the mid-West, and moving to New York in his twenties, developed a combination of 
personal insecurity and `street Negro' aggressiveness. In Marcel Berlins' account of 
Davis's 1958 performance of `Les feuilles mortes' tends very heavily in this direction: 
"1 The on-stage professionalism of Davis and its various 'stages' of development will be looked at briefly in 
the conclusion. 
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It is Miles Davis who delivers the sorrow, especially in his 1958 recording [... ] This 
is Miles searching into his heart, blowing with quiet desperation. Every note 
penetrates the hidden emotions we do not want to surface. The track may be entitled 
"Autumn Leaves", but Miles is playing and feeling "Les Feuilles Mortes". And that 
is how it should be; for Miles Davis first heard it in Paris, sung by the love of his life, 
Juliette Greco. 112 
Whilst it is certainly the case that the minimal sparseness of much of Davis's playing and 
the nuanced subtlety of his timbre - whether with or without the Harmon mute - on many 
occasions throughout most of his career succeeded in using just a few notes to carry across 
the otherwise empty space of his playing, generating distancing effects, perhaps what me 
might call - following Deleuze and Guattari and thereby Alois Reigl - `haptic-acoustics'. In 
the reductive channelling of affect into the sensory-motor circuits of mood, feeling or 
emotion, such minimal sparseness could certainly be described as 'inward' or 
`introspective'. Such a view is compounded by the claim that Berlins makes that Davis 
first heard the song sung by Juliette Greco on his first visit to Paris in 1949, and, with 
Davis having fallen in love both with the liberal, cosmopolitan attitude of the Left Bank 
scene which he frequented and with Greco, an Existentialist compatriot of Sartre, both 
loves were seemingly brought into relief by the racism he experienced in New York on his 
return and all this collectively contributing to his subsequent heroin addiction which lasted 
from 1949 to 1953. 
By implication, it is possible to argue with a degree of conviction and support that the 1960 
performance at L'Olympia, and the dramatic turn-and-fade are somehow an indication of 
the `pain' of lost love that Davis felt, in addition to the undeniable hurt caused him by the 
racism that he experienced, crystallized in the attack outside of Birdland in 1958, just two 
112 Marcel Berlins, 'Autumn Leaves', in DeLisle [ed. ], Lives of the Great Songs, p. 80. 
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years earlier, and the pain that his physical ailments caused him most of the time. 
However, to proceed any further down this path would be to fall foul of the redundancies it 
has attempted to strategically negotiate. This is the point at which it is once again 
necessary to shift register. 
In his first version of the essay `What is Epic Theatre? ', Walter Benjamin provides a 
description of Brecht's conception of Epic theatre: 
Epic theatre is gestural. The extent to which it can also be literary in the traditional 
sense is a separate issue. The gesture is its raw material and its task is the rational 
utilization of this material. The gesture has two advantages over the highly deceptive 
statements and assertions normally made by people and their many-layered and 
opaque actions. First, the gesture is falsifiable only up to a point; in fact, the more 
inconspicuous and habitual it is, the more difficult it is to falsify. Second, unlike 
people's actions and endeavours, it has a definable beginning and a definable end. ' 13 
So far in this section I have reverted as so often before to a register of interpretation, which 
in dealing with musicological factors and biographical details seems at times very difficult 
to avoid. It was said at the outset that this difficulty is one that would have to be negotiated 
as a problem of the relation between the molar statistical aggregates and the molecular 
movements that make up their immanent underside. This is something that I have also 
attempted to do throughout. At this present stage of the case, what is being dealt with is not 
so much the music of Miles Davis qua formations of expression/content, or even a musical 
or sonorous abstract machine. Instead, what is now at stake is more of the order of 
theatricality, a problem for the relation between molar and molecular that itself goes back 
to Anti-Oedipus and the problem of a `theatre of the unconscious' versus the open system 
of a `machinic unconscious'. In conducting this negotiation between molar and molecular 
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with a mind to making this very task the `object' of the case, Miles Davis's on-stage 
attitude and Brecht's concept of the gestus, or gest, provide the means by which it is 
possible to proceed. A clue to how this might work is given in the quote from Benjamin: 
`unlike people's actions and endeavours, it has a definable beginning and a definable end'. 
The gestus in some instances embodies a relation to the social, and in other instances it 
operates at a remove from the social. As Brecht states, 
Not all gests are social gests. The attitude of chasing away a fly is not yet a social 
gest, though the attitude of chasing away a dog may be one, for in-stance if it comes 
to represent a badly dressed man's continual battle against watchdogs. One's efforts 
to keep one's balance on a slippery surface result in a social gest as soon as falling 
down would mean 'losing face; in other words, losing one's market value. The gest 
of working is definitely a social gest, because all human activity directed towards the 
mastery of nature is a social undertaking, an undertaking between men. On the other 
hand a gest of pain, as long as it is kept so abstract and generalized that it does not 
rise above a purely animal category, is not yet a social one. But this is precisely the 
common tendency of art: to remove the social element in any gest. 1 14 
To the extent that the `gesture' of Miles Davis `has a definable beginning and a definable 
end' and - whether interpreted as an expression of sorrow, mourning, pain, or anger - the 
fact that it has attained a status that indexes it to the social via the audience irrespective of 
the motivations that might be attributed to it, means that it is possible to begin considering 
it as an example of gest that is social. Returning to Benjamin's account, one finds that `the 
more frequently we interrupt someone engaged in an action, the more gestures we 
obtain '. 115 
113 Walter Benjamin, `What is Epic Theatre? [First Version], in Understanding Brecht, trans. Anna Bostock, 
with an Introduction by Stanley Mitchell (London: Verso Books, 1984), p. 3. 
114 Brecht, 'On Gestic Music', p. 1. 
115 Benjamin, 'What is Epic Theatre? ', p. 3. 
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Davis's attitude on stage achieves such an effect and it is one effected through the 
movement of his body and its impact on the bodies making up the audience. The standard, 
socially acceptable action at a jazz concert, or even a Classical one, is for the audience to 
show its appreciation through applause. In jazz, this usually takes place - like a Classical 
concert - at the beginning and the end of a performance or a piece, but also involves 
applause during pieces after the completion of a solo. When he came to Britain in 1960, 
Davis was lambasted by the critics for his attitude. The New York Post followed him on 
his tour of Europe and - following his time in Britain - gave the following report: 
Miles Davis packed his trumpet and took off for Paris, Stockholm and home, where 
the citizenry is less likely to be fuddled by his sophisticated approach to jazz ... Londoners were bothered by the fact that he seldom acknowledged applause. ' 16 
Resonant as this report is with the stereotypical characterization of British reserve, its 
importance lies elsewhere. Davis - in his refusal to respond to applause - shorted the 
action-reaction circuits of his audience's sensory-motor-schema. 
Bergson calls this the sensorimotor system"7: 
[L]et us suppose that we have to make a decision. Collecting, organizing the totality 
of its experience in what we call its character, the mind causes it to converge upon 
actions in which we shall afterwards find, together with the past which is their 
matter, the unforeseen form which is stamped upon them by personality; but the 
action is not able to become real unless it succeeds in encasing itself in the actual 
situation, that is to say, in that particular assemblage of circumstances which is due 
to the particular position of the body in time and space. 8 
1 16 Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 170. 
117 Cf., Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 172-3 
18 Ibid. 
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This is a description of the `sensori-motor equilibrium of the body'. Deleuze calls it a 
`situation' in his synthesis of Bergson's materialist thought and Peirce's semiotics and 
pragmatics. 
What begins as perception may be executed as an action (secondness); what cannot 
be converted into action occupies the interval as affection (firstness)' what 
reconstitutes the whole of movement with respect to all aspects of the interval is 
relation (thirdness). 119 
For Deleuze as for Bergson, perception is primary in relation to action and affection, and in 
fact the perception-image as the relational One-all of an open world or `universe' has 
action and affection resulting from its relational modifications. To some extent we have 
implicitly witnessed with the idea with Guattari's fourth function and with Deleuze and 
Guattari's use of the Leibniz-derived `possible world' and the expressions of `I' as 
linguistic index: that which emerges in the perceptual (visual or auditory) field - even if 
only a facial or musical trait - is indexed in some way to affect. In this instance, the 
presence of Peirce's influence forces a more specific definition of the term index which 
has hitherto been used in a more general way. For Peirce and here also for Deleuze, the 
Index is the second is the `object' of his `trichotomies' of the sign, and as such `is 
determined by its dynamic object through the relation it has with it'. ' 20 In Deleuze's 
adaptated use action becomes the index of perception as (quasi-)object, or action-image; 
the other terms of Peirce's schemata are adapted in like fashion: the `felt qualities' of the 
Icon, are affective qualities of the kind we have already encountered: colour, texture, 
timbre, etc. and such constitute the firstness of the affection-image, again extracted from 
1 19 Cf., D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), 
00 
157-8: 
In the interests of brevity I have chosen to derive this description from that given by Andrd Pierre 
Colombat in his excellent essay, 'Deleuze and Signs', which itself is derived from Todorov. Ducrot and 
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perception to the extent that it is the residue not converted into action; finally, the thirdness 
of Symbols are adapted to describe the relationality that constitutes all the images, and 
points most clearly to the difference between Peirce's and Deleuze's use of the schemata: 
for Peirce there remains a conception of consciousness that could be described as 
phenomenological in that it belongs to an `Intepretant', whereas for Deleuze - via Bergson 
- and as was shown in chapter 2, consciousness is never `of something, it just is. This 
leads Deleuze to conceive the images in terms of their relational dynamics (movement- 
image) and their potential for creating `durees' or different temporalities. For Deleuze, the 
case par excellence is cinema, but that does not mean that there are not other cases that can 
make use of this highly pragmatic synthesis, including theatre, or in the present case, a 
theatrical `rigging' of perception, affection, action and thought . 
12' 
As Deleuze actually says as early as Difference and Repetition: 
[A] theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting 
and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire unconscious, 
the final elements of which remain the problems themselves. 122 
Bringing this back to the Brechtian and Benjaminian conception of the gestus or gest it is 
possible to discern the use that the Bergson-Peirce synthesis brings to the case of Miles 
Davis's attitude. If the gestus is about extracting certain traits from the course of action it is 
to the extent it enables the disruption of the normal course of perception, action and 
affection in order to extract percepts and affects from them, which somehow problematize 
such action. The thoughts and ideas of both Brecht and Benjamin must - for the purposes 
Deladelle, cf., Deleuze and Literature, Ian Buchanan and John Marks [eds. ] (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000), p. 24. 
121 One of the virtues of Colombat's essay is that he recognizes this and - by way of Deleuze's astonishing 
non-philosophical re-rendering of Spinoza's Ethics - he attempts to think these images away from their 
cinematic embodiment towards a literary one. 
122 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 192. 
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of the project - be brought into proximity with the Deleuze-Guattarian problem of 
`becoming-minor'. In `Foreword: The Kafka Effect', from Kafka: Towards a Minor 
Literature, Reda BensmaYa compares Deleuze and Guattari's approach to Kafka to that of 
Benjamin: 
According to Deleuze and Guattari [... ] minor literature is [... ] always political, not 
only in the sense in which one speaks of politics, but specifically in the sense in 
which further activity is no longer related to a unified instance, to an autonomous 
subjective substance that would be the origin of the choices we make, of the tastes 
we have, and of the life we lead. In that sense, each and every gesture takes on a 
quasi-cosmic dimension, of the tastes we have, and of the life we lead. Benjamin 
says it well: 
Kafka does not grow tired of representing the gestus in this fashion [... ] 
Experiments have proved that a man does not recognize his own walk on the 
screen or his own voice on the phonograph. The situation of the subject in such 
experiments is Kafka's situation [... ] 3 
The gestus, as the disruption of action then manifests itself in a variety of ways, such that 
its occurrence secondarizes any subject-object relation. Technology is capable of 
intervening in the process of disruption, as with the failure of a man, such as Ronald 
Reagan, to recognize himself on the screen, or with the failure of somebody to recognize 
their voice from a phonograph. Incidentally, both Benjamin and Adorno - at least at a stage 
in his thought - saw the liberatory potential of the phonograph for exposing the 
instrumental mechanisms that conditioned their manufacture, sale and consumption. ' 24 
Deleuze, for his part, recognizes this potential in the creative potential of post-War cinema. 
Furthermore, there is a linguistic and semiotic dimension to the gestus: 
123 Reda Bensmal a, 'The Kafka Effect', in Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, p. xviii. 
124 For an incisive account of both Adorno and Benjamin on this topic, cf., Barbara Engh, 'After "His 
Master's Voice"', in New Formations 38: 1999, pp. 54-63, and in particular p. 54: 'Already in 1926, Adorno 
was writing that the most helpful thing about the phonograph was its failures. It's distortions, scratches and 
skips, its winding down, were an assertion of the inhuman, an interruption of the subject's instrumental 
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Benjamin [... ] may have borrowed the notion from Brecht, but for him it referred 
above all to a space where the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation 
can no longer be separated [... ] It is impossible to separate the tool from the artisan, 
the reader as lexeograph from the scriptor as subscriptor, they are together as 
machine and rhizome, a network, an entangled not of movements and stops, of 
impulsions and immobilizations to experience interminably. 125 
The enunciative character of the gestus is one that - on Deleuze and Guattari's conception 
of enunciation in A Thousand Plateaus - once again upholds the relation between 
enunciation and the material factors involved in its execution: no more a separation 
between the two `subjects' but an assembling of subjectivity in which they mark two 
virtual or incorporeal points which, at the level of corporeality are capable of emanating 
from the assemblage as evaporative surface effects or of inscribing directly the actions of 
bodies: parallelism between `machinic assemblage of bodies' and 'collective assemblage 
of enunciation'. When it comes to the inscription of bodies by these virtual proceedings of 
subjectivation-subjection, it is again a question of the order-word assemblage, and Deleuze 
and Guattari liken it to Kafka's `death sentence': `[E]very order-word, even a father's to 
his son, carries a little death sentence -a Judgment, as Kafka put it': reduced capacity to 
act. 126 In returning to the order-word assemblage, the problem is again one of 
interpellation, in that the re-working of Althusser's concept resides in the intensive 
collapsing of subject of statement into subject of enunciation which - at the level of 
corporeality - engenders privation, to which Deleuze and Guattari ascribe its own 'regime 
of signs', the regime of subjectification whose dispositional line is the 'line of passion' or 
'passional line'. It also has an abstract machine that it shares with the 'regime of 
relation to the object, and an interruption too of the effectivity of the musicial commodity in constituting the 
subject that seizes upon His Master's Voice as his or her own'. 
125 Ibid., p. xii. 
126 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 76. 
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signifiance': black hole and white wall system, or faciality. Again, music provides the 
primary characterization of this regime and its proceedings: the `Maritime Subject 
Authoritarian Face' taken from Wagner's Tristan and Isolde: 
This authoritarian face is in profile and spins towards the black hole. Or else there 
are two faces facing each other, but in profile to the observer, and their union is 
already marked by a limitless separation. Or else the faces turn away from each other 
but in profile to the observer, and their union is already marked by a limitless 
separation. Or else the faces turn away from each other, swept away by betrayal. 
Tristan, Isolde, Isolde, Tristan, in the boat carrying them to the black hole of betrayal 
and death. 127 
The passional line is therefore indexed (in the general sense) to an abstract machine of the 
face that is authoritarian. The black hole of subjectivation is not literally a `black hole', of 
course, but it is real in that it marks the tendency of intensification towards a negative 
absolute deterritorialization: death, or abolition. Deleuze and Guattari consider the 
passional line authoritarian because it creates a doubled Cogito-built-for-two that gets 
carried towards the black hole. 
Benveniste adopts a curious linguistic personology that is very close to the Cogito: 
the You, which can doubtless designate the person one is addressing, but more 
importantly, a point of subjectification on the basis of which each of is constituted as 
a subject. The I as subject of enunciation, designating the person that utters and 
reflects its own use in the statement ("the empty non-referential sign"); this is the I 
appearing in propositions of the type "I believe, I assume, I think... " Finally, the I as 
the subject of enunciation, indicating a state for which a She or a He must always be 
substituted ("I suffer, I walk, I breathe, I feel... "). 
Insofar is this is a question of interpellation they say that: 
Althusser clearly brings out this constitution of social individuals as subjects: he calls 
it interpellation {"Hey you, over there! ) and calls the point of subjectification the 
Absolute Subject [... ) This is not, however, a question of a linguistic operation, for a 
subject is never the condition of possibility of assemblages of enunciation. 
Subjectification is simply one such assemblage and designates a formalization of 
expression or a regime of signs rather than a condition internal to language. Neither 
127 Ibid., p. 184. 
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is it a question of a movement characteristic of ideology, as Althusser says: 
subjectification as a regime of signs or a form of expression is tied to an 
assemblage. 128 
So, to bring a number of the foregoing observations together, technology, or technical 
machines are capable of disrupting the subject-object relation and opening up to the social 
or the socius. In addition, the machinic assemblage of bodies and collective assemblage of 
enunciation bring the two subjects of language together - not as transcendentally structured 
subjects in the strict sense - but as the assemblage of subjective tendencies or proceedings. 
Returning to Bensmaia's observation, Benjamin's conception of Kafka's gestus is one of 
disruption that enables the survey of the material and semiotic constitution of subjectivity. 
It is this that brings the gestus into proximity with the political. However, the question of 
the direction taken on/in the (micro)political fabric of lines, segments and strata may serve 
to compound in extremis the ambiguities and uncertainties crystallized both in the case of 
Davis and those of Deleuze and Guattari. Let us continue with the present case. 
To re-iterate, in attempting to grasp the political dimension of this gestus in the theatrical 
setting of Davis's turn, it is worth bringing together Brecht's, Benjamin's and Deleuze's 
thoughts on the matter, and this brings us back on to the problem of 'alienation', or more 
specifically the Verfremdungseffekt: 
The Verfremdungseffekt or `alienation effect' refers both to the separation of actor 
from character, or any of the Concrete/Abstract binaries, and to the audience's 
resulting disengagement with the locus. Brecht made its purpose explicit: "The aim 
of this effect, know as the alienation-effect, was to make the spectator adopt an 
attitude of inquiry and criticism in his approach to the [play's] incident". 
1Z 
128 Ibid., p. 130. 
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Whilst Davis might be playing at being an `actor', and he did actually `act' later on in his 
career, ' 30 a fact that contributes a key symptom to the fundamental ambiguity of his later 
life and work, not least of all in its relation to the spectacle, on stage at L'Olympia in 1960 
he was a performing musician in a concert hall and not an actor in a theatre, so the question 
should be asked, to what extent does this effect the use being made of Brecht here? As 
should be clear from the earlier quote from `On Gestic Music', Brecht did not perceive the 
gestus to be something restricted to the theatre, but one that could be theatrically rigged to 
bring out its social underpinning. He found a place for it in everyday life, in music and also 
in film. 13' For his part, Benjamin found it in the literary works of Kafka, so it would seem 
that there is indeed a precedent for employing it here, on condition of some further 
investigation. 
When one compares the effect induced by Davis to the purpose Brecht attributes to the 
alienation-effect, or A-effect for short, it seems that the requirements are fulfilled. 
Certainly there is no shortage of criticism or inquiry surrounding the phenomenon, as has 
been shown, and the audience certainly - even more than the critics - could not help but 
take a position on their initial encounter with it, which in numerous instances they 
proceeded to do. Brecht, following the Russian Formalist aesthetician Viktor Schlovsky 
might have called this `strange-making' (priem ostranneniji), or 'the subversion of our 
129 Colin Connell, Signs of Performance: An Introduction to Twentieth Century Theatre (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996), p. 102. 
130 Carr, Miles Davis, p. 519: '[Miles] had an acting role in the film Dingo, and a playing role on its 
soundtrack. The perks of his comeback years, and greater fame, brought him many opportunities to have fun 
doing unaccustomed things an being paid for them. His acting role in the Miami Vice episode, and his visual 
and speaking role in the Japanese commercial for Van Aquavit, were prime examples'. 
"' Cf., Georg H6ellering, Kuhle Wampe, Or To Whom Does the World Belong, the screenplay for which was 
written by Brecht 
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customary ideological view of an event/object, causing us to view it afresh'. 132 Following 
Deleuze and Guattari's take on ideology, this might be rendered as a de-stratification of the 
subjective stratum, a strategic use of the passional line at the point where it plugs into the 
`indigo' and `intimacy' of Davis's music, where his face - having doubled those of the 
audience in accordance with the stratified, territorialized order-word assemblage of 
institutionalized performance and its protocol of decorum - now turns away, betrays 
everyone and ruptures sensori-motor links to engender a problematic affective response: 
shock. Is the gesture of Davis the locus of Signifyin(g) here, or is he rapping, playing the 
Dozens. Can the selection be made? 
However, there is another aspect to gestus to consider (there are actually several, including 
the gestic split, for which - unfortunately - there is insufficient space remaining to merit an 
investigation), and that his the question of how the investment of audience desire can be 
re-distributed - via the gestus - away from the consummation of the spectacle or 
entertainment that supports any ideological or stratified mobilization of desire towards the 
knowledge or identification of this situation. Regardless of what interpretation one might 
choose to give to Davis's account of his own behaviour onstage, there is doubtless a 
political dimension to the gestus as it is executed here and this is what now needs to be 
considered. 
The problem with the `minor' as it plays out in the present case is complicated by the fact 
that it cannot be considered in terms of a `minor literature' as such, and to think of it as an 
example of a becoming-minor of language is problematic. The gestus can and indeed has 
132 Connell, Signs of Performance, p, 103. 
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been read quite extensively in terms of a theatrical semiotics. However, Deleuze and 
Guattari, in their simultaneous mixing and marginalizing of linguistics and semiotics as 
structural determinants means that this not a suitable path to take. However, the problem 
has to some extent already been solved in the very act of mixing/marginalizing on the 
order of a pragmatics, which - no less than it has enabled the consideration of musical and, 
more specifically instrumental musical examples - can be put to work in thinking about the 
becoming-minor engendered through the body of Miles Davis and through gestus of his 
on-stage attitude. Let us return to the glossematics of content/expression by means of a 
demonstration of this. 
In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari dedicate a chapter to the problem of content and expression 
which, for the record is something of a prototype for the work undertaken in A Thousand 
Plateaus, in particular in ' 10,000B. C.: The Geology of Morals'. Dealing with the literary 
work of Kafka, the authors challenge the canonical readings of his work that limit their 
account to negative theological or Oedipal psychoanalytic analyses and - in a characteristic 
move - attempt to promote Kafka as a writer of affirmation. The two approaches to 
Kafka's work are mapped in terms of content/expression relations and seek thereby to 
show that they are both present in the work, with the latter strategically geared towards the 
overcoming of the former. This is done by considering a recurrent motif in Kafka in which 
a particular content/expression relation emerges: the bent head/portrait-photo and 
straightened head/musical sound. The bent head is a form of content for Oedipalized or 
reterritorialized desire whose form of expression is the portrait-photo, and this specific 
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double-articulation of desire is equated in Deleuze and Guattari's reading of Kafka with 
the following characteristics: 
[A] blocked, oppressed or oppressing, neutralized desire, with a minimum of 
connection, childhood memory, territoriality or reterritorialization. '33 
When the form of content is the straightened head, the form of expression is musical 
sound, and this time the double-articulation opens onto a line of deterritorialization: 
[A] desire that straightens up or moves forward, and oP41 ns up to new connections, 
childhood block or animal block, deterritorialization. ' 
Davis's on-stage `aloofness' might be read as embodying similar content/expression 
formations. For example, unlike Dizzy Gillespie who played head-up, trumpet-up with the 
bell itself bent upwards, inflated cheeks for all to see, Davis - notoriously tight-lipped in 
his playing - played with his head often facing down. Now, aloofness is an ambiguous 
term. Read in terms of distance it can be read as a symptom or sign of introspection or 
interiority, a situation of privation where memories become the propria of a sovereign 
subject, for example, the memories of one's `own' childhood. As such, subjectivity follows 
a passional line, or falls into a `black hole' of resonance, subject of statement and subject 
of enunciation collapse into one another and doubly-mark the body thus reducing its 
capacity to act. Aloofness, can also described the kind of distantiation that was 
encountered above, a strategic act of disruption which has the potential to 'open up to new 
connections'. This might indeed take the form of a `sonorous bloc', which - not just 
coming from Davis's trumpet as itself the expression of a content - but from Davis's body 
as a content expressed in the turn from the audience, a deterritorialized refrain, produced 
133 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 5. 
134 Ibid. 
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through a shift from the heimlich of a territorialized, domesticated listener towards the 
unheimlich of an opening out onto to an unpredictable outside. To recall the Leibnizian 
possible world of the previous chapter, there is a correspondence between an auditory field 
and a sonorous field though which can emerge traits of faciality such that `I am afraid' is 
the meaning of `I' as linguistic index, or musicality traits that can engender a similar 
utterance. However, as with Luciano Berio's `Visages', counterpointing faciality and 
musicality lines and simultaneously deterritorializing them produces a generalized 
chromaticism, the production of tensor-signs, taking both face (voice) and music along a 
line of flight in the direction of a molecularized sound-matter. This is in part how Deleuze 
and Guattari account for Kafka's `sonority': 
It is certainly not a systematized music, a musical form, that interests Kafka (in his 
letters and in his diary, one finds nothing more than insignificant anecdotes about a 
few musicians). It isn't a composed and semiotically shaped music that interests 
Kafka, but rather a pure sonorous material. 135 
Whilst Davis played with a bent head, and this could be rendered in terms of a melancholy 
`style' in Deleuze's sense of the word, his turn away from the audience might be 
substituted for the straightened head of Deleuze and Guattari's Kafka as the form of 
content of a deterritorializing expression that takes the proceedings along a line of flight 
akin to Gregor Samsa's becoming-animal in `The Metamorphosis': `[S )ound intervenes at 
first as a faint whining that captures Gregor's voice and blurs the resonance of words 
[ ]'136 Content/expression relations between the sound of the trumpet as it turns from the 
microphone and the body and face of Davis as they turn away from the audience are 
deterritorialized along a line of becoming. Gesture, or rather a gestus, intervenes in the 
13S Ibid. 
136 Ibid., p. 6. 
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form of a face-off, or a the turning-away of a countenance which - rather than produce a 
becoming-animal (although it might do, but this is not the main concern here), produces a 
different becoming-minor, what we might - following Deleuze and Guattari, but also 
Jeffrey T. Nealon - contentiously and problematically describe as a `becoming-black'. 
In a chapter from his book Alterity Politics, entitled `Becoming-Black: Repetition and 
Difference in Baraka's Blues People and Reed's Mumbo Jumbo', Jeffrey Nealon has 
ventured a cursory investigation of the relationship between difference and repetition in 
Deleuze's writing, Deleuze and Guattari's all-too-brief remarks in A Thousand Plateaus on 
`becoming-black' and Amiri Baraka's, a. k. a. Leroi Jones's founding critical text Blues 
People, in which the observations of the latter provide the most pertinent and convincing 
parts of the essay, with the issue of becoming-black itself left somewhat undertheorized. 
Nealon's underlying thesis is that African American cultural traditions repeat difference 
rather than repeat the same. Whilst this is an argument that has also been put forward in 
this project, there is considerable work to be done in negotiating the thesis in its relation to 
the idea of becoming. Taking up Baraka's example-of-choice to illustrate the potential for 
using difference and repetition in relation to African American music, Nealon focuses on 
the `willfully harsh, anti-assimilationist sound of bebop'"7, and in particular, that of 
Charlie Parker. Taking the popular line of pitting constitutive difference against the 
secondarity of representation, Nealon states, 
[W}hen Charlie Parker covers "White Christmas", for example, what you get is not 
so much a representation of Irving Berlin's vacuous classic, but what Deleuze calls 
"a-representation': a presentation that marks and "includes difference" rather than i3s 
effacing it [... ] repetition with a difference [... ] 
137 Amiri Baraka, cited in Jeffrey T. Nealon, Alterity Politics, p. 1 18. 
138 Nealon, Alterity Politics, p. 119. 
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So far so good, if only to the extent that it bears out the claims made in chapter two for the 
repetition of difference in Miles Davis's 1964 version of `My Funny Valentine'. He 
continues, 
[I]n Blues People [... ] Baraka argues that "assimilation" has demanded the 
imposition onto black culture of a narrowing, reterritorialized "parochialism" [... ] 
Benny Goodman is not crowned the King of Swing by mistake; his coronation is 
precisely one of the many complex, site-specific bulwarks against the becoming- 
black of America. 139 
Nealon draws on Baraka's account of the appropriative shift `from verb to noun' 140, and 
draws out more widely the implications of assimilation for `Negro' subjectivity and the 
necessity for resistance or affirmation of the alienating effects in terms of `separation'. 
Again, the example given is that of bebop: 
Baraka sees it as the project of bebop "to make that separation meaningful", to 
"restore jazz, in some sense, to its original separateness". The unique contribution of 
the beboppers was the fact that they "reinforced the social and historical alienation of 
the Negro in America, but in the Negro's terms". 141 
139 Ibid., p. 120. 
140 This highly important shift is marked by a change in the grammatical status of 'Blues' from the word's 
traditional African-American use as a verb to that of a noun, which names, and thereby effectively pegs it as 
something fixed, within definable boundaries. It is not the only term to be subject to enforced nominalization 
and as such supports the idea of a general tendency for the language of a dominant culture to appropriate the 
language of 'minor' culture. The term musicking is perhaps not be found in most standard dictionaries for 
similar reasons, as its vagueness renders it excessive to use- and exchange-value. Alienation as conceived of 
by Baraka is hereby mirrored in the 'linguistic alienation' of Henri Gobard and his 'tetralinguistic 
[meta]model', as used by Deleuze and Guattari in Kafka, p. 23: 'vernacular, maternal, or territorial language, 
used in rural communities or rural in its origins; a vehicular, urban, governmental, even worldwide language, 
a language of business, commercial exchange, bureaucratic transmission, and so on, a language of the first 
sort of deterritorialization; referential language, language of sense and of culture, entailing a cultural 
reterritorialization, mythic language, on the horizon of cultures, caught up in a spiritual or religious 
reterritorialization. The spatio-temporal categories of these languages differ sharply: vernacular language is 
here; vehicular language is everywhere; referential language is over there; mythic language is beyond'. This 
model is ultimately schematic, probably for a number of reasons, but of specific interest here is that 
elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari describe the potential of myth for the creation of a war-machine (sec 
conclusion). Nevertheless, this rectilinear schema might well show that vernacular has n-I dimensions and is 
therefore capable of deterritorializing the other, more majoritarian poles of the referential, vehicular and 
possibly mythic. However, there shall shortly be occasion to speculate on what the potential price of a 
deterritorialized theory of language might be. 
141 Nealon, Alterity Politics, p. 121. 
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Nealon extrapolates from this claim once again in terms of the play of repetition and 
difference: 
[S]uch an "alienation" of "separateness" is, then, a repetition of mainstream 
segregation, but with an important difference: this is a repetition that reinscribes the 
forced segregation of blacks to create a deterritorialization, a line of flight for 
African American culture. '42 
Again, Nealon has taken an approach also to be found in this project, which is to bring 
together the play of difference and repetition with the dispositional and micropolitical 
assertion of the line of flight. However, in failing to provide a more detailed account of 
how this works in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, he has arguably invested more in the 
nomenclature than in how it might be put to more rigorous use, ironically perhaps, a 
repetition of the same. This is where problems emerge with Nealon's account which 
potentially undermine the efficacy of his assertion of becoming-black. 
For Nealon, as for Deleuze and Guattari, it is the rhetoric of black militants in the 1960s 
that provides the justification for stretching becoming across the production of African 
American and other `non-white' subjectivities, whereas Deleuze and Guattari cite a slogan 
of the Black Panthers: 
[O]ne reterritorializes, or allows oneself to be reterritorialized, on a minority as a 
state; but in a becoming, one is deterritorialized. Even blacks, as the Black Panthers 143 must become-black.; 
Nealon, for his part and no less sweepingly, once again cites Baraka: 
142 Ibid. 
143 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 291. 
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[A]s Baraka insists in "The Legacy of Malcolm X", even "the Black Man must 
aspire to Blackness": even prized nouns or identity categories must become-verb: 
whites must become-white, Asians must become-Asian, Latinas become-Latina. 144 
Whilst Nealon is attempting to stay faithful to a becoming-minor of majoritarian uses of 
language that he discerns in the observations of Baraka, in making the jump from such a 
becoming-minor to a becoming-black, etc., he is not only glossing the difficulties and 
dangers of such a jump, but in doing so he manages also to gloss the complexity of 
becoming as it is theorized by Deleuze and Guattari. As they state in `Year Zero: 
Faciality', in A Thousand Plateaus there are `theorems' of deterritorialization which more 
rigorously state how the process works, such that the least deterritorialized territories 
always reterritorialize on the most: 
First theorem: One never deterritorializes alone; there are always at least two terms, 
hand-use object, mouth-breast, face-landscape. And each of the two terms 
reterritorializes on the other [.. ] Second theorem: The fastest of two elements or 
movements of deterritorialization is not necessarily the most intense or most 
deterritorialized. Intensity of deterritorialization must not be confused with speed of 
movement or development [... ] Third theorem: It can even be concluded from this 
that the least deterritorialized reterritorializes on the most deterritorialized. 145 
There have been a good many instances so far given of the deterritorialization of (two or 
more) terms and as has been shown, speeds and slownesses are not to be confused with 
faster or slower. What is important here that has not been explicitly discussed is the third 
theorem, that the line of deterritorialization sweeps along all that is less deterritorialized: 
territories deterritorialize, strata de-stratify, and so on. So when it is a question of 
becoming, therefore, the same is at stake: majoritarian becomes-minor. What Nealon has 
missed here is that the third theorem of deterritorialization precludes `becoming-white', 
144 Nealon, Alterity Politics, p. 121. 
14 S Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 174. 
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because the becoming always tends in the direction of the elements that are most 
deterritorialized, and `whiteness', like `Man', are majoritarian par excellence, because it is 
by avoiding becoming that these molar statistical aggregates remain exactly what they are: 
a repetition of the same. 
Black jazz musicians are [... ] no less the ritual representatives of the community 
than are the bluesmen and gospel singers, and their task is in many ways even more 
important. Conversely, when white musicians play jazz, they are in almost a 
complementary situation in exploring the values of the black culture. How deeply 
they are able to do this will depend on the extent to which they are able to submit to 
the social and musical values they find there; it is in a sense even more difficult for 
them than for their black confreres, since as members of the socially dominant 
culture they have more to unlearn, and more intellectual baggage to dispose of, 
before they can enter fully into the engagement. '46 
So, on the basis of this theorem, coupled with the general theory of micropolitics and 
segmentarity states that - to the extent that segments occur everywhere they inhibit 
becoming, and so long as there are segmental binaries between White-black and also Man- 
woman, not to mention Adult-child, there is, on this theory at least, a strategic necessity for 
black people to become black, that is to say, to subvert the binary that restricts their 
heterogeneity and captures it through molar redundancies. It follows also, and perhaps no 
less controversially, that women must become-women for the same reason. To add to this 
contentiousness, it should be noted that because `Man' is the central point in the 
`arborescent schema of majority', and `male' is the dominant point, that all becomings 
must first pass through a `becoming-woman', or so the theory goes. 
Nealon's `hasty' reading runs the risk perhaps more than some others of indulging in acts 
of theoretical noodling, and this danger is probably nowhere greater than in the affirmation 
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of becoming, as was shown in chapter 2 with regard to the ambiguity of becoming-child, 
but is greater still when the tendency of becoming is towards -woman and -black. Whilst 
not without a degree of support from Baraka, Nealon's, and by proxy Deleuze and 
Guattari's claims for the idea of becoming-black needs further careful investigation. 147 
To compound Nealon's indiscretion he is unable to resist what is admittedly a tempting 
pun on Charlie Parker's musician's handle, `Bird', or what `we might call the "becoming- 
Bird" of [... ] Baraka's discourse'. The idea of a transversal line between the improvisation 
techniques of Parker's bebop and the critical, theatrical and poetical writings of Baraka is 
not in itself necessarily a bad thing, and in actual fact might contribute a good deal to 
promote the philosophical intelligence embodied in the general intellect of jazz or African- 
American culture both ethically and politically at the same time as promoting a better 
understanding of the music's technical and social intricacies amongst non-musicians and 
white people. Yet whilst transversality is to some extent synonymous with becoming, it 
remains very difficult to speak of a becoming-black without running the risk of 
appropriating African-American or black culture in a way that serves to gratify the 
investment of the (white, usually male) theorist or philosopher and at the same time the 
risk of overcoding or axiomatizing its liberatory potential in a way that places in the 
service of dominant culture and capitalism. 
146 Small, Music of the Common Tongue, p. 315. This might also be said of any attempt to make a refrain 
between (White, male-dominated, academic) theory and becoming-black, or becoming-woman. 
147 Nealon quotes Baraka as saying that "`Without dissent, the struggle, the outside of the inside, the aesthetic 
is neither genuinely Black nor Blue', cf., Nealon, Alterity Politics, p. 129. This statement ostensibly reaffirms 
what Deleuze in his reading of Foucault claims for 'thought from the outside' as problematizing self- 
identitical subjectivity and also the claims of Chernoff, Agawu and even Russell, for African and African- 
American subjectivity to connect with an immanent outside that simultaneously challenges the despotic 
overcodings of hegemonic - White-, Male-dominated - culture. 
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Becoming-Black, Becoming-Woman and the Problem of Violence in Deleuze, 
Guattari and Davis 
Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: 
not to be unworthy of what happens to us. To grasp whatever happens as unjust and 
unwarranted (it is always someone else's fault) is, on the contrary, what renders our sores 
repugnant - veritable ressentiment of the event. 
Gilles Deleuze148 
The psychopathology which the poet makes his own is not a sinister little accident of 
personal destiny, or an individual, unfortunate accident. It is not the milkman's truck 
which has run over him and left him disabled. It is the horsemen of the Hundred Blacks 
carrying out their pogroms against their ancestors in the ghettos of Vilna. 
Joe Bousquet149 
Nobody was ever able to show me where David Ruffin admitted to hitting Tammi Terell n 
the head with a hammer, even though on the West Side of Detroit where I grew up we had 
all heard it from somebody who said it like they had the inside line on such things. And 
nobody was able to provide me with a quote from Bill Withers describing how he beat up 
Denise Nicholas when their marriage was grinding to a painfully public close although 
people tell me Jet covered the whole episode in great and gory detail. But Miles... well, I'll 
let the brother speak for himself... 
Pearl Cleage"o 
This problem and the problem of Davis's attitude return us to that of the war machine, the 
passional line of subjectification and one final and Deleuze-Guattarian case: Shakespeare's 
King Richard III: 
Richard III, the deformed, the twisted, whose ideal is to betray everything: he 
confronts Lady Anne in a face-off in which the two countenances turn away [... ] 
[H]is ventures, including those with women, derive more from a war machine than 
from a State apparatus. He is the traitor, springing from the great nomads and their 
secrecy [... ] The only one to guess is Lady Anne, fascinated, terrified, consenting. 
1-51 
Betrayal, absolute betrayal, supposedly places Richard III on a line of flight. The turning- 
away of two countenances, his and that of Lady Anne, theatrically stages this betrayal. The 
148 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 149. 
149 Cited in ibid., p. 153. 
1S0 Pearl Cleage, `Mad at Miles', in Charner, The Miles Davis Companion, pp. 211-2. 
1s1 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 125-6. 
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passional line's abstract machine of faciality: black-hole/white-wall has been strategically 
surveyed, its stratum of subjectification-subjection has in the process become de-stratified 
as `Richard' and the face-off marks a shift into the `strategic zone', and access to the 
outside, or the event-horizon of the line of subjectification. When Miles Davis turns away 
there is also a betrayal, a face-off, between his face and the faces of the audience, a 
severing of the `skewed axes of narrative vision' hitherto conjoining these faces that has to 
some extent served to lock their bodies (the audience members', and as was claimed 
earlier, arguably also that of Davis) within the strata of signifiance and subjectification. It 
is furthermore possible to argue that the gestus of the turn has changed this setup and in 
doing so may be found to have engendered a `pass-word', or an incorporeal transformation 
which has irreversibly changed the bodies of the audience in their relation to their 
immediate circumstances, but also in relation to their habitual associations of 
showmanship and entertainment, dis-positioning their aggregated investments through the 
tensor-sign of the gestus. So is this rigging of subjective proceeds tantamount to the 
creation of a war machine? 
Well, this would probably be once again to overstate the case. An incorporeal 
transformation might have taken place, but `the after-image of its dynamism' for most will 
have likely faded, stratified with the rigidification of the usual segments. It remains quite 
unclear just what the pragmatic efficacy of a war-machine might be beyond its 
theorization, which may be enough to warrant it as an act of philosophical 
deterritorialization with claims on ethical potential, but when it comes to its political 
efficacy, as indeed the political efficacy of a micropolitics of desire or `molecular 
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revolution', the situation is less clear and - in the case of Richard III and arguably also that 
of Davis's attitude - what is symptomatized is not a creative liberation of material forces or 
tensor-signs so much as an appropriative dimension lodged in the cases of the war 
machine, as well as those of becoming. 
A clue is to be found in the case of Richard III, in that surely the betrayal of everything is 
inclined to turn any line of flight into a line of abolition or death, which is the primary 
danger effecting the creative line, and also - as was shown -a danger of betrayal in relation 
to the abstract machine of the subjective authoritarian face. When a line of abolition 
occurs, the creative deterritorializations that may have taken place are themselves taken 
along a line of death or destruction. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari have in some measure 
selected this particular example because of its seismic disruption of subjectification 
proceedings and its challenge to despotic statecraft, what needs to be determined more 
clearly is whether the passional line has patched into a line of flight or a line of abolition, 
or whether it has plugged into a rigidly segment of Fear; perhaps it has become supple, its 
segments loosened but still functioning: Clarity; alternatively, it might bring the last two 
together in the assertion of Power (pouvoir). It is the job of stratoanalysis to work out 
which of the lines and dangers are in evidence, if it is capable, which begs the question: to 
what extent can it achieve this and at the same time determine the status of its own lines 
and segments? 
Now, if the face-off between Richard and Anne, or any such similar betrayal is one in 
which the countenances turn away is to be considered affirmatively, it has to be thought of 
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as a `dismantling of the face' insofar as it is a dismantling of the abstract machine of 
faciality, one which overcomes the limitations of the regimes of signifiance and 
subjectifi cation by indeed connecting with a line of flight. Such a betrayal would be 
affirmative if and only if it is capable of making this connection with the outside, which 
means that the turn away is actually a turn towards, a turn away from the resonances of 
subjectificaton and the redundancies of signification but a turn towards, or survey of their 
outside. If the gesture of Miles Davis affirms itself it has to be along these lines, by 
challenging the interiority of subjectivity and the redundancies rendering the audience 
passive. From a Spinozist perspective, if the conatus is shared between the bodies in a way 
that they somehow come to survey their common notions, then what takes place in such an 
act is indeed ethical, in the sense that the privations of faith and love that reduce passional 
subjectivity's capacity to act are overcome in a betrayal of everything that cuts a body off 
from its power (puissance), including the molarizing tendencies effecting one `person"s 
love for another. 
However, at the risk of reading Deleuze and Guattari (and Davis) against the grain of their 
respective resistances to interpretation one might find another sign, but this time a sign of 
the dangers of articulating this ethical problem in terms of a politics of becoming. Just to 
re-iterate, Lady Anne, in her complicity with Richard is said to be `fascinated, terrified, 
consenting'. These characteristics are more suggestive of a passivity that destines the 
woman (and women more generally) to circumstances of privation, not as essential 
characteristics of their being, but as propria posited of their being, most usually by men. 
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Read this way, it is as if Deleuze and Guattari, delighting in the murderous indiscretions of 
Richard are unable to see the trees for the rhizomes. In clarifying this problem in a way 
that shifts register one final time, it seems apt to turn to the work of Rosi Braidotti, whose 
sensitivity to the dangers and simultaneous affirmation of the potential marks her out in her 
own right as an exemplary user of Deleuze and Guattari. The problem, as she perceives it, 
is one that results from a male desire to appropriate the potential for a feminine subjectivity 
before it has had chance to become constituted in the first place. The danger of positing a 
becoming-woman, and doubtless also a becoming-black is that one risks capturing their 
potential by philosophically conceptualizing becomings as such, and thereby further risks 
placing them in the service of capitalism as well as power (pouvoir): 
[T]hough Deleuze may praise the fragmentation of the subject, the flux of all 
identities based on the Phallus, the truth of the matter is, as I have argued elsewhere: 
one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted; one cannot 
diffuse a sexuality which has historically been defined as dark and mysterious. 152 
Whilst Braidotti wrote this work before much of the more useful work had been done in 
English on Deleuze and Guattari and their relation to feminism (including her own), and it 
does here pit a subjectivist feminism against a deterritorialization of gendered subjectivity, 
the argument remains highly pertinent, not as a necessary outcome of a philosophy of 
becoming, but certainly as a danger. Taking Deleuze's reading of Lewis Carroll's Alice in 
Wonderland in The Logic of Sense she points to such a danger: 
[T]he image of the girl becomes the sign of a subversive force operating within the 
system of meaning which leads her to the loss of personal identity, of the proper 
name. That Alice is a little girl, although she is engendered by a masculine 
imagination, is of no interest to Deleuze, who insists on making little girls' mode of 
reasoning a paradigm of his nomad thought: the sign of a subversion of the signifier, 
escape-lines, becoming-minority, the event, and deterritorialization. For Deleuze the 
152 Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance: A Study of Women in Contemporary Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991), p. 122. 
255 
question: "what is a little girl" becomes the ideal form of sabotage of the econom of 
meaning in discourse. The little girl stands for pre-oedipal, non-genital sexuality. 
'53 
This project practically began with the assertion of a necessary negotiation of molar and 
molecular, and the molecularization of gendered subjectivity still has a long way to go 
before it can be said to have completely done away with its molar dimension. Hasty and 
precipitous deterritorializations, including those of philosophy and theory, must be aware 
of this strategic problem. The implicit claim of men writing on women, as of white men 
writing on black culture, is assuming that they have a legitimate right to speak on their 
behalf. Whilst, as Braidotti herself elsewhere argues, and as Amiri Baraka has also 
claimed, the establishment of fixed, self-identical gendered or racialized subjects is not 
ultimately an end in itself, it is perhaps a strategic means to an end which - if neglected - 
can lead to appropriation on the order of a reassertion of male dominance that is 
tantamount to the infliction of violence: 
[T]o emphasize the masculine incapacity to accept both the incompleteness of all 
thought and the parallel inability to believe that women not only speak but also have 
things to say amounts to denouncing "the death of man" as no more than a funeral 
mask concealing a new form of oppression of women. It is a case of appropriation, 
therefore of violence aimed at devaluing women's expressions of the feminine. 
In terms of the stratoanalytical and micropolitical dimensions of the Miles Davis case, 
where it directly impinges on such a problem, we must return to constitution of auditory 
libidinal investment, with which the chapter began. 
Recall that the music of Monteverdi, as analysed by Susan McClary, posited a shift in the 
libidinal economy of musical subjectivities, resulting from a premeditated contrivance: 
153 Ibid., p. 124. 
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perpetual postponement, aided by the modal system of harmony, such that male desire 
would become unfulfilled whilst `female' emotion would expressed more openly and 
freely. In addition, there was a description of the ways in which the musical `rhetoric' of 
seduction and lament when performed by men became emasculating and therefore - after a 
number of experiments - the task was left to women. 
Miles Davis, with his `tender', `intimate' `like melancholy', sound, made all the more so 
through the amplified Harmon mute, his contribution along with George Russell to the 
move away from European tonality towards an African-American modality, and the gestus 
of the turn might all be said - on the attempt to pragmatically deploy Deleuze and 
Guattari's work undertaken here - to constitute in his name a becoming-woman, and 
through a becoming-woman a becoming-minor, a becoming-black. All of this might also 
be said to contribute to restoring to his music subjectification proceedings that close off the 
lines of flight: childhood memories, interiority, passion. It might also be possible that the 
stakes are higher: power (pouvoir) and abolition. 
Seduction and lament - emasculating they may be - but consider also the possibility that 
seduction in the appropriate circumstances becomes itself a means to appropriate. In 
sleeve shots from two of Davis's albums we find images of woman being beckoned by the 
bell of a trumpet: firstly, an image of Davis and the French actress Jeanne Moreau on the 
reverse of the sleeve for the CD release of the soundtrack to L'Ascenseur pour 1'echaffaud, 
[see fig. 8] a seemingly well-humoured photographic out-take from the recording of the 
soundtrack in which Davis mock-serenades Moreau with the Harmon-mute held towards 
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her ear; secondly, on the sleeve to Big Fun, an album of material recorded in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, a graphical illustration features on the main cover with a naked black 
woman standing as if about to be swallowed by the bell of a mutated (not muted) trumpet. 
The images and the time which separates them is illustrative for at least two reasons: 
firstly, in the early 1960s, Miles Davis made a conscious decision to have no more images 
of white women on his album sleeves, but only black women and, then and on numerous 
occasions after, not just black women but his wives; secondly, and following directly on 
from the first point, the images are both of women seemingly entranced or about-to-be 
seduced by the sound emanating from the horn. These images are possibly signs 
symptomatizing the liberation of forces, of flight and deterritorialization, but they may also 
be signs of a debilitating ressentiment: the placement of women under patriarchal 
command, a combining of the rigid segment on a line of fear with the supple line of black 
holes and microfascisms. If indeed the lyrical sound of Davis's trumpet is akin to that of a 
singing voice, it is conceivable that the `voice' of seduction is in the present instance a 
voice of control: His Master's Voice. ' 54 
154 Cf., Engh, After 'His Master's Voice', p. 59: 'Animals accompany the emergence of the gramophone, and 
the most prominent among them is Nipper the terrier who listens attentively to 'His Master' Voice' as it 
emerges from a gramophone, looking with perplexity into the horn, and who in early versions of the painting, 
is seated on the master's coffin'. Whilst the problem of the gramophone, like that of the phonograph is bound 
up with the production of aggregated (Deleuze and Guattari), reified (Adorno) or alienated (Benjamin) 
subjectivity, which is not primarily at issue at this precise moment, it is relevant in that auditory technologies, 
even the non-reproductive technology of the trumpet, have privileged relation to masculinity and male 
power. Another argument for the 'war machine' of jazz is to recall that many of the instruments-weapons 






Returning to the infamous British tour of 1960, Max Harrison wrote that 
[T]he concerts revealed [... ] the force with which high tones were attacked and 
sustained, and the controlled vehemence of some of the up-tempo phrasing showed 
that Davis's music has expanded its scope to the point where his mode of expression 
can be as violent as it is intense. '55 
Miles Davis, famous for his ambiguity, also became famous for his ambivalence, 
especially towards women and it is this part of the `problem' of Miles Davis that few 
writers are wont to address. Perhaps unsurprisingly it has been left to a woman, Pearl 
Cleage, in highlighting the problem. 
In a disturbing and challenging piece called `Mad at Miles' she explores the difficult and 
sensitive problem of Davis's attitude where it pertained to women, and in particular, the 
highly publicized account he gave of his abuse of Cicely Tyson. One of the very many who 
came into possession of Kind of Blue, the intimate, seductive sound that has been such a 
point of discussion since chapter two takes on a modified inflection. In using a tape of the 
album to generate the `sound walls' of her own territory or domicile, Cleage would use 
Kind of Blue to `call someone in', usually a `gentleman-caller' towards whom the circle 
would open a crack: a launching forth that would patch into a passional line: 
[T]he Bohemian Woman Phase. The single again after a decade of married phase. 
The last time I had a date I was eighteen and oh, god, now I'm thirty phase. The in 
need of a current vision of who and what and why I am phase. The cool me out quick 
cause I'm hanging by a thread phase. For this frantic phase, Miles was perfect. 
Restrained, but hip. Passionate but cool. He became a permanent part of the 
seduction ritual. Chill the wine. Light the candles. Put on a little early Miles. Give 
the gentleman caller an immediate understanding of what kind of woman he was 
dealing with. 156 
155 Cited in Carr, Miles Davis: The Definitive Biography, p. 170. 
156 Pearl Cleage, `Mad at Miles', pp. 213-4. 
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What Cleage did not know at the time - and this is her refrain - was that 
[H]e was guilty of self-confessed violent crimes against women such that we ought to 
break his records, burn his tapes and scratch up his CDs until he acknowledges and 
apologizes and agrees to rethink his position on The Woman Question. 157 
Aside from raising the issue of how best to deal with such flagrant and unrepentant abuse 
of women and in so doing suggesting in full knowledge of what they are, fascist tactics 
(fascism being a big problem to receive all to brief a consideration in the Coda to follow), 
Cleage's refrain draws out a particularly difficult problem that under-rehearsed theories of 
becoming-woman and becoming-black are likely to miss: the relationality of race and 
gender, or otherwise race and sexuality: 
[W]hat if Kenny G was revealed to be kickboxing black men's asses all over the 
country [... ]? 
What if Kenny G wrote a book saying that sometimes he had to slap black men 
around a little just to make them cool out and leave him the fuck alone [... ]? 
What if Kenny G said this black man who saved his life and rescued his work and 
restored his mind pissed him off so bad one day he had to slap the shit out of him? 
Would Kenny G be the music we would play to center and calm ourselves? 158 
The anomalous image of Kenny G, the respectable white purveyor of `jazz-lite' music 
living a duplicitous life in which squeeky-cleanliness divides the honours with racist 
thuggery is Cleage's darkly humorous attempt to locate an analogy appropriate to the 
duplicity of Davis, that between Cool and exceptionally cruel. 159 As has been made clear, 
157 Ibid., p. 214. 
158 Ibid., p. 215. 
1S9 Interestingly, Deleuze distinguishes the 'trickster' of Elizabethan theatre from the 'traitor', with the 
former exemplifying the deceptive 'cruelty' of statecraft, allying the trickster to the segmentations of power, 
whilst as has been shown, the latter is perceived to embody the potential of a war machine, cf., Dcleuze and 
Parnet, Dialogues, p. 41. On this definition the Signifyin(g) trickster is closer to the traitor of Deleuze. 
However, the main point here is that in describing the 'double-theft' of the traitor as being akin to the pick-up 
of the philosophy such that they both constitute war machines may not only be an example of theoretical 
noodling, but one which dangerously romanticizes the Elizabethan 'hero' and the philosopher alike, at the 
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where it concerns the problem of Miles Davis - whether his `music' or his `life' - most 
critics and writers have attempted to avoid dealing with it. The `clams' and `fluffs' of `My 
Funny Valentine' might be `[L]apses, parapraxes, symptoms' that serve as `indicators of 
new universes of reference capable of acquiring enough consistency to turn around the 
situation', but they might also be symptoms of something more sinister that the critics and 
writers have largely neglected, the piercing, visceral upper-register `voice' and tight-lipped 
playing of Davis symptomatizing instead a sadism that extends beyond the confines of his 
music. Speaking of Cicely Tyson, Davis went on record to say the following: 
[O]ne time we argued about one friend [... J, and I just slapped the shit out of her. 
She called the cops and went down into the basement and was hiding there [... ] I 
went down and told Cicely, "I told you to tell your friend not to call over here no 
more. Now if you don't tell him, I'm gonna tell him". She ran to the phone and 
called him up and told him, "Miles don't want me talking to you anymore". Before I 
knew it, I had slapped her again. So she never did pull that kind of shit on me 
again. ' 60 
Perhaps the decodings and deterritorializations in the `seduction' and `intimacy' of the 
music that Cleage played to open her domicile up to a `gentleman caller' has turned out to 
be a sadistic desire for control and authority which, mirroring the castration anxiety of 
Monteverdi's contemporaries, making of any becoming-woman a segmental closure that 
oscillates between Fear and Clarity, between the rigid segment of masculine-feminine and 
the supple segment of microoedipuses and microfascisms that go beyond `domestic 
squabble'. Certainly, the deliberate mistakes and inappropriate gestures that Davis might 
wilfully have inflicted on his listeners could point to how such decodings/ overcodings and 
deterritorializations/reterritorializations have forced a re-consideration of the ethical and 
same time as neglecting how this might be tantamount to appropriation, and therefore closer to the trickster 
as an arbiter of power than to a creative, experimental, and ethical thinker. 
160 Davis and Troupe, Miles: The Autobiography, cited in ibid., p. 212. 
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political potential of jazz, but does the wilful infliction of physical violence turn the idea of 
his becomings-woman/-black onto a line of flight, lines of power or a line of destruction? 
And what of Deleuze and Guattari's theory in all of this? Well, given that Deleuze said in 
The Logic of Sense that `[E]thics, if it means anything, means not to be unworthy of what 
happens to us', and whilst the work of Joe Bousquet might point to the affirmative 
potential that poetry offers to extract the incorporeal event from the tragic and the 
mundane, it is hard to imagine what philosophy or poetry could extract one for the name 
Cicely Tyson, at least in the present instance under consideration. `Pop' philosophy may 
well be up against its limit, and Pop hardly seems the appropriate idiom for addressing the 
situation. Davis might have done a great deal in his music and his attitude to promote the 
potential for extracting an affirmative event, even an ethical and political event. We may 
have not even covered his most concerted or successful efforts (see Coda), but - at the risk 
of moralizing - it seems that theories of Deleuze-Guattarian becoming are presently 
insufficient for addressing these problems in a way that does not either render insidious the 
cases given, or even effect a violent appropriation, and - unless one is prepared to affirm 
the most thoroughgoing Nietzschean genealogical approach to this kind of problem, 
Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy here seems at something of a loss. 
Greg Tate - another of the few writers to have dealt with this part of the problem of Miles 
Davis - has succinctly encapsulated the difficulty to be negotiated. In doing so he quotes 
Amiri Baraka, 
Baraka says black musical tradition implores us to sing and fight. I disagree. I think 
we'd do that anyway, just out of human necessity. What I do think it teaches us is 
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more Joycean in tenor: silence, exile, and cunning. Miles's music makes you think of 
Nat Turner, proud without being loud because it was about plotting insurrection [... ] 
Miles's tight-lipped sound conveyed the gaiety of [Louis] Armstrong's wide vibrato 
while conjuring up the calculating pockets of dark sarcasm and meanness that at 
times ruled his spirit. 
These qualities were nowhere more apparent than in his treatment of women [... ] 16ý 
The experience of Pearl Cleage might have been - above that decisive turn - an incorporeal 
transformation, but if it was, it was definitely not affirmative. Unlike the nomad steppe, it 
is not quite so easy to give it a date. Cicely Tyson, one among several women that, during 
the period of his more pro-active militant tendencies Davis is known to have physically 
attacked may well be a tensor-sign from the perspective of a stratoanalysis, and if so, it has 
to be determined what the mixture of the lines might be, because it remains unclear 
whether the tendency conjoining the milieu components and territory of Tyson and those 
of Davis puts things on a line of abolition, with the passional `Cogito-built-for-two' on its 
maritime voyage towards the Charybdis or `black hole' of abolition; whether the lines of 
two segments have converged and we are dealing with an assertion of power: `drums and 
trumpets' calling bodies to disciplinary attention, or whether something else is happening. 
Whilst it would be ill-advised to suggest a moralizing alternative to Deleuze (and 
Guattari's) `ethical vision of the world', and doubtless there are in theory at least great 
potential for creating concepts, percepts, affects, etc., that might genuinely contribute to 
the overcoming of such hideous privations, but the problem remains perhaps what it 
always has been with Deleuze and Guattari: is it possible to make the selection, or is the 
world as it is too fast for the relative banality of such theorization? If this is the case, the 
theory might have to sober up even more than Deleuze, Guattari and many of their 
followers might have wished, or perhaps a completely different approach is needed, and 
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certainly it would be dangerous to join the rank and file who have tried to `whitewash' 
Davis, or to ignore this kind of tremendously difficult problem more generally. It is a 
demand that should be made of theory that it attempt to say something worthwhile about 
male power and violence, and perhaps this is where an ethics of affirmation needs to risk 
the dangers of capture and appropriation and making a transversal link with an ethics of 
responsibility. Suffice to say that Richard III and Lady Anne might embody an event, but 
to put Miles Davis and Cicely Tyson in a boat to oblivion might just be pouring intellectual 
insult onto physical and psychological injury. Whatever the case, and to quote Meaghan 
Morris, `crazy talk is not enough'. 
16' Tate, 'Silence, Exile, Cunning', p. 236. 
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Conclusion 
Coda: 1968-75A. D. The Geology of Miles, or a Prolegomena to Any Future Deleuze- 
Guattarian Pragmatics 
Between '68 and '75, Macero and Miles [... J turned effects into instruments [... J [EJffects 
are now acoustic prosthetics, audio extensions, sonic destratifiers. 
Kodwo Eshun' 
CBS MEMORANDUM 
FROM. IRVING J. TOWNSEND - TO: TEO MACERO - DATE: OCTOBER 24,1968 
Miles Davis called [... ] to tell me that would he like to purchase from Fender an electric 
piano, a guitar, bass and tom toms ... 
2 
Returning to the account of existential territories and incorporeal universes of reference 
from chapter 3, and at the same time the problem of the war machine, it might be possible 
to produce a diagram of the numerous assemblages and their machinic heterogeneity as 
they constitute `electric Miles' and which - as before - enables the tracking or following of 
the sonic phylum between and across the assemblages, territories and universes that that 
embody it. The diagram for modal jazz was complex and yet - provisional as it was -a 
more thorough mapping of modality would likely be surpassed in its complexity by one 
produced for this later phase of development, which would inevitably take up so many of 
the phylic convergences of the former phase at the same time as introducing a great many 
new ones. For this reason, only the most summary account can be given here, but one that 
should serve very well to illustrate the ambiguities and problems that persist. 
To begin with, if one scrutinizes the art-work produced for Davis's albums during the 
transition to the electric phase, again there is a case for the idea that artefacts of cultural 
production - visual as well as musical ones - potentially embody not only overcodings and 
Eshun, More Brilliant than the Sun, p. 6. Emphasis added. 
2 Printed in the sleevenotes to Miles Davis, The Complete In a Silent Way Sessions (Columbia, 2001). 
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capture, but are intersected by lines of flight or deterritorialization and decoding, and - 
following the period during the 1960s when Davis actively sought to take control of the 
images that would appear on the covers of his albums - the politicization of the art-work 
arguably takes a more radical turn. The issue of politics is one that shall be returned to in a 
moment, but - whatever the political import of these images - they certainly do embody 
something of the shift that can be found in the sonorous and auditory elements of the 
music. The more conventional photographic-based sleeve images from earlier periods are 
now replaced by more `artificial', manipulated materials with the use of more painterly and 
graphic-based illustrations enabling a more flexible and experimental approach to image 
design that monadologically explicates and implicates the auditory dimensions of the 
music and provides an indication of the direction that is being taken. This indeed begins 
with Miles in the Sky and - suspended momentarily in the more conventional portrait image 
of Davis on the original sleeve for In a Silent Way - acquires a certain visual consistency 
with the cover of Bitches Brew (carried over into the cover of Live-Evil in 1971) followed 
by Yokoo's image for Agharta in 1975 [see figs. 9-101. This shift in the visual orientation 
of the art-work accompanying the auditory component also marks the cross-over to other 
styles including rock and soul (see for example the illustration for 197 l's On the Corner, 
arguably Davis's most `straight-ahead' rock and soul-influenced outing of the 1970s). The 
style of the images for Bitches Brew and Live-Evil is largely down to their creator, Abdul 
Mati Klarwein and Agharta's cover owes its style to Tadanoori Yokoo. An important 
milieu component of the existential territories of electric Miles, the sleeve designs for this 







Firstly, it is necessary to elucidate a few more of the milieu components, their territorial 
aggregations and their deterritorializations. Returning to the sonorous and auditory 
elements, a number of components and their machinic interactions have already been 
mentioned: the trumpet-Harmon mute connection which - with its accompanying universe 
of reference of `intimacy', `instrospection' and `seduction' - already deterritorialized in the 
`mistakes' of the 1964 version of `My Funny Valentine' and again in the on-stage gesture 
analysed in chapter 3- become greatly more so through the proliferating extensions and 
warpings of the electric period: Rhodes piano-Echoplex-ring modulator, trumpet-Harmon 
mute-wah pedal-electronic delay, African percussion, sitar, and studio cut-and-splice, re- 
inscribing the material to warp the already-distorted sound of its one-time spatio-temporal 
specificity. The territorial intersections expand greatly during this period, and so do the 
incorporeal universes of reference: Agharta, Pangaea, Panthalassa. 
If the title of this `Coda' seems to tenuously labour the pun on Deleuze and Guattari's 
plateau dates and names, it should be made clear before it is denounced as theoretical 
noodling that the universe of reference accompanying the myriad territories and milieus of 
this period - without recourse to theoretical mediation - explicitly enlists the vocabulary of 
geology. Album titles are very important, as the always were in the output of Miles Davis. 
The constant punning on `Miles' that gave the names to a number of his most famous 
releases: Miles Ahead, `Milestones', Miles in the Sky, served to mark the direction of his 
music, its 'untimeliness '3, and at the same time function as a marketing strategy to shift 
3 To the extent that the electric period can be said to constitute an event, one that results 
from bccomings that 
do not come from history but fall back into history, it might be described as 
'untimely'. In What is 
Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari borrow the term 'Atemal' from Charles Pdguy and implicitly ally it to 
Nietzsche's concept of the 'untimely' . Admittedly the 
description is one that pertains to the philosophical 
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records in numbers. By 1967 (after the somewhat anomalous title and image of Miles 
Smiles in 1966), the titles were also taking a modified line: Nefertiti, Sorcerer, Bitches 
Brew - tensor-signs for the new territorial counterpoints which - as was suggested in 
chapter 2- potentially mark an undecidable transition towards a politicized becoming- 
minor (becoming-black, becoming-woman) and the appropriation of potentially female 
subjectivizing traits in the creation of a global `woman' that is locked into the apparatus of 
capture and/or the segmentarities of power. Whatever the case ultimately, whether the 
selection is possible or not, the names of these albums do mark the direction that the 
universe of reference takes during the early 1970s, with the palindrome of Live-Evil and 
the mythical worlds-views of Agharta, and Pangaea, both albums recorded live at two 
concerts performed on the same day in Japan in 1975, and the last performances and 
recordings to be allied to the name `Miles Davis' until 1980. 
Pangaea the album is - like so many of the work from In a Silent Way onwards - 
comprised of very long tracks that combine motival and thematic materials from many of 
the other works produced over the period. The title of one of the two tracks from this 
album, `Gondwana', takes its name from one of two 'supercontinents'. Gondwana and 
Laurentia that, though their own `stratoanalyses', modern geologists have supposedly 
discerned to have originally composed the landmasses of the Earth, with Gondwana 
event and so the parallel with Miles Davis once again rests on whether the music succeeds in surveying an 
abstract machine whereby the music can be said to have its own concept, cf., Dcleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, pp. 111-2. If it does have a concept, it is something akin to the 'power of the false' that Dclcuze 
derives from Bergson and finds exemplified by the cinema of Orson Welles, cf., Deleuze, Cinema 2: The 
Time-Image, pp. 12647. Here the issue of gravity returns, and according to Dclcuzc the power of the false dc- 
centres and displaces the gravitational pull of the movement-image. If the electric period can 
be said to have 
succeeded where the modal war machine perhaps failed it is that 
it constantly dc-centres all of the musical 
elements, harmony, melody, rhythm, timbre, and the mythologizing of this music through art-work and 
album-titles seems calculated to produce a fabulation. 
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containing what would later become the African continent, after millions of years of 
`continental drift'. The other track on the album emphasizes this African connection, 
`Zimbabwe'. `Pangaea', is a name that has been given to the `primordial continent into 
which all the present ones are ingeniously fitted in jigsaw fashion, its shores washed by the 
waves of `Panthalassa'. To quote David Toop, 
In his [Davis's] mind, this music was inspired by lost civilizations, united land 
masses, utopias of the mythical future and, as Kevin Whitehead suggests, continental 
drift .4 
In terms of its sonority, the album Pangaea, with its two vast, sprawling, constantly 
shifting, monolithic chunks of music both reflects the ideas embodied in the work of 
geologists as explorations of sonorous matter, its capture and its deterritorialization, as part 
of and beyond its double-articulation. This is not to be understood allegorically either, but 
rather as a statigraphic inscription of a number of recording surfaces in reciprocal 
presupposition: bodily surface or skin as surface of affect, the sense organs, but also the 
magnetic tape used in the recording process and its distribution as vinyl or CD, and the 
surface - interior and exterior - of the instruments and electronic devices, surfaces across 
which the breaks-flows of desiring production, technical production and social production 
all take place. However, the universe of reference that accompanies the existential 
territories composed of these milieus components potentially appeals no less to the 
mysticism that did so much to generate these mythological narratives of the Earth's history 
which carried over into the work of more `positivistic' modem geology, and this is where 
one finds one of the greatest ambiguities of all, politically, ethically and aesthetically, 
Toop, Ocean of Sound, p. 100. 
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because these narratives were the ones that were appropriated and mobilized by Nazi 
survivalists to perpetuate the `Aryan' myth of the `master race' .5 
To some extent this echoes the problem that was earlier diagnosed regarding the uses of 
music made by Deleuze and Guattari and the questionable `sobriety' and 'rigour' of their 
own non-philosophical apprenticeship. In appealing for example to the work of 
Stockhausen,, they take his work to be an illustration of the 'Modern' moment. with his 
use of electronic machines to access the phylum of sound-matter. What they neglect. 
however, and what Guattari's work in Chaosmosis implicitly suggests to us, is that the 
sonorous phylum and the territories that embody its machinic hetcrogenesis are always 
accompanied by a universe of reference, and the universe that accompanies the music of 
Stockhausen and arguably all contributions to a 'Cosmic' refrain of this malern moment 
s In a bizarre, disturbing and fascinating book, Jocelyn Godwin traces the history of solar and polar myths 
and the myths of hollow Earth as expounded in esoteric writings of the 19° Century including the work of 
H. P. Blavatsky, Rend Gudnon and Louis Jallicot. This is where the myth of Agartha-Shambala emerges. %ith 
Agartha supposedly being a world of meditation and peace whilst Shamhala was a city of %iolcncc. A qut rc 
from Godwin should illustrate quite clearly the ambivalence underlying this myth . cf. ioccl)n C Win. 
Arktos: Science, Symbolism and Nazi Survival (London: Thames and Hudson. 1993). p. 1t0 '(Tjhe myth 'A 441 
launched, and would be repeated by most of the French authors of the genre, c% cn ones with a pºctcnºwm to 
scholarship. Here is a baroque version from Jean-Claude Fr4e's Nazisme et sociNs iecrltes (1974). Alter 
the cataclysm that made Hyperborea uninhabitable, perhaps 6000 years ago. the inhabitants migrated to the 
region now covered by the Gobi Desert and there founded a new scat: Agartha. People flocked ftam all 
directions to this "center of the world", which enjoyed 2,000 years of brilliant civilization. The atxther 
catastrophe occurred, its cause unknown: the surface of the region was devastated, but Aganha sur%ivrd 
underground. Thither the great initiates traveled - Frtre mentions Pythagoras, Apollonius of Tyana. and 
Jesus - to receive orders from the Masters of the 
World. The Aryan people migrated in two dirc+rtianr: (VK 
went north and west, hoping to return to their Hyperborean homeland and to conquer their 
ktst territories. A 
second group went south, to the Himalayas, and there 
founded another secret center in underground caverns'. 
For Tadanoori Yokoo's illustration for the cover of Agharta. Kodwo Eshun gives a charaeictistically 'pep' 
account of this illustration and the work of Yokoo more generally 
in terms of Afrofutur tm. returning to the 
idea of music (and art's) embodiment of future possibility, cf. Eshun. More Brilliant than the Sun. p, Ip 'In 
Yokoo's Agharta sleeve, the title forms a phonotron that blasts off from a city framed in Iuºh foliage and a 
red liquid flux which arches out of the skyscrapers [... 
] Klarwein. Yokoo and IRobcnl Springest (illustrator 
for the similarly 'cosmic' Herbie Hancock cover sleeve for 
Crossings) exemplify Afro elia. anachnmising 
past and future into what Miles calls Yesternow 
[... J World 4 Art-Sound opens up the I... I collapsar. a 
slippage in time, is a collapsed star in which the times 
between what's to come and %hat hasn't happened Ist 
implode and fold upon each other'. The ambivalence is one therefore of untimely 
becoming through a 
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of which there are many - has as ambivalent relation not only to utopia, but also to 
fascism, to which Stockhausen was sympathetic. To quote Toop quoting Stockhausen. 
With mid-1960s tape pieces such as Mixtur, Hymnen and Telemusick, Stockhausen 
depicted global absorption and transmission: the passage of organic materials into 
the electronic domain; music, the performer and the composer as a satellite dish (... 
In his notes on Telemusik, composted in Tokyo as an electronic transformation of fragments of recorded music from Africa, the Amazon, Hungary, China, Vietnam, 
Bali and Japan, he wrote: "I wanted to come closer to an ever-recurring dream: to go 
a step forward towards writing, not `my' music, but a music of the whole world, of 
all lands and races". 6 
Given that they dedicate sizeable sections of A Thousand Plateaus to a micropolitical and 
stratoanalytical analysis of fascism in both its molecular and molar dimensions, of how the 
line of flight might under given circumstances potentially turn into a line of abolition, 
destruction or `suicide'7, it seems remarkable that in detailing the `Modern' moment they 
seem to miss the connection. Their tripartite division between the three aspects, of course, 
is not to be taken as a punctual linear or teleological account of musical history, and there 
is scope for viewing the potential of the Modern aspect's reterritorialization on the more 
archaic aspects of the `Classical' and `Romantic' refrains: God-Creator and Universe; 
Artist-Hero and Natal. This problem is borne out by the Agharta legend as 'drowning in 
celestial radiances all visible distinctions of race in a single chromatic of light and sound. 
singularly removed from the usual notions of perspective and acoustics'. ' 
strategic re-appropriation of the myth and the reterritorialization on the archaisms associate! % jib racial 
1uri ty. 
Toop, Ocean of Sound, p. 101. 
7 The idea of Telegram 71 and the line of flight of Nazism constituting its own line of ahotitkxt of sukije is 
derived by Deleuze and Guattari from Paul Virilio, cf., Paul Virlio'The Suicidal State'. in James Jet Ukran 
[ed. ], The Virilio Reader (Oxford and Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1998). pp. 4O: 'Telegram 71: if the Nar is 
lost, let the nation perish", in which Hitler decides to associate his efforts with llxrne or his enemies in cwtkt 
to achieve the destruction of his own people by annihilating the last rcsourccs of his habitat (... [' 
e Toop, Ocean of Sound, p. 100. 
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This resonates both fascinatingly and disturbingly with the claims made for transversality. 
the chromaticism of the diagonal line and the potential for becoming-minor. but also the 
potential for the worst kinds of reterritorialization: on the myth of a master race. The 
dangers of such `becomings' then is brought into stark relief, as the ethically and 
politically well-intended gesture, whether a theorization or enactment or both, may have 
this danger as one amongst several on its horizon. 
On a more positive note however, there is a very rich seem of potential to be tapped in 
thinking about the relation between the universe of reference that is allied to the names of 
`Agharta' and `Pangaea' in relation to black politics. Stanley Crouch may have been one of 
the critics to draw attention to the 'sell-out' of Miles Davis and there are a number of 
observations to be made regarding the validity of this claim. However, a number of other 
writers and critics - including Amiri Baraka, Greg Tate and Kodwo Eshun - have pointed 
to the electric period as not actually reflecting the neo-conservatism of 1970s America, but 
as perhaps the most radical of the numerous phases of Davis's output. As was mentioned 
earlier in passing, the discourse of `Afrofuturism' views the work of a number of black 
musicians, artists and writers of this period as embodying the potential for creating new 
forms of black subjectivity, which the contributions of Davis were in many ways geared 
towards producing. The turn towards Africa, not necessarily a case of nostalgia. could be 
viewed a strategic attempt to open up new lines of connection, 
both creative and politically 
charged, which would embrace the possibilities afforded 
by technological development. 
not just to change the music produced but to re-constitute the subjectivitics 
invcstcd in the 
auditory experiences afforded by the music 
itself. From this perspcctivc. the introduction 
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of rock-based idiomatic features was not a sell-out at all, but rather a strategic mobilization 
of its territories and milieu components to challenge its increasingly hegemonic status and 
the active threat that it posed (and continues to pose) to any minoritarian cultural 
production. Returning to Henri Gobard's tetralinguistic schema, this strategy is one that 
uses the `vernacular' pole as a `cutting edge' of deterritorialization with some potential to 
sweep along the vehicular and referential poles in the plotting of a transversal line. Given 
the increasing power of the vehicular, or bureaucratic, corporate, informational and 
communication regulation of language, and all of the subjectivizing tendencies that it 
simultaneously creates and restricts, whatever forms of strategic appropriation might need 
to be taken should not be instantly dismissed as `sell-out'. I have left out one of the poles, 
the mythic, and this is not by accident. 
One of the things that complicates Gobard's schema in its relation to Dclcuzc and 
Guattari's thinking is that in Kafka they dismiss the mythic as rcterritorializing. on 
religious language. In A Thousand Plateaus, right at the outset of ' 1227: Trcaticc on 
Nomadology, The War Machine' they follow a thesis from George Dum&zil that points to 
the role that is played by myth in the creation of a war machine: '(A)xiom I: The war 
machine is exterior to the State apparatus. Proposition I: This extcriority is first attested to 
in mythology, epic, drama, and games'. We have encountered examples dcrivcd from 
games (Go, playing the Dozens, Signifyin(g)), and also - whilst not the kind of epic or 
dramatic productions that the plateau takes for its case - there has also been instances 
'epic' and 'dramatic' qualities or tendencies in the case of this project. «? iat has largely 
been left out of the frame is any example of the mythological potential for sur veying 
276 
exteriority, and it is in this period of the late 1960s and early-to-mid 1970s that this 
potential can be witnessed. It is not just Miles Davis, but also Herbie Hancock's 'World 4' 
Trilogy: Mwandishi, Sextant and Crossings, George Russell's Electronic Sonata for Souls 
Loved By Nature, and - perhaps the most untimely and ambiguous of all the contributors to 
Afrofuturism: Sun Ra and his Solar Myth Arkestra. 9 The universe of reference, and any re- 
singularizing potential that it carries along with it, might contribute to the production of a 
Cosmic Refrain. David Toop's invocation of `utopia' is - as with most of his writing - 
without a rigorous theoretical working through of its ideas. To put such a claim to the test. 
one would do well to consult Deleuze and Guattari at the point in their work , here the 
concept of `utopia' is deployed, in the section of What is Philosophy? called 
`Geophilosophy'. 
Here Deleuze and Guattari take care to distinguish between 'authoritarian utopias. or 
utopias of transcendence and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. 71)c lauer 
conception of Utopia is derived in part from the work of Ernst Bloch and tantalizing 
parallels are drawn briefly with the 'Negative Dialectics' of Adorno. An immanent utopia. 
unlike a transcendent one, functions as part of the 'Modern' moment. relative to its milieus 
and both as part of and against the immanence of capitalist society and the archaisms of 
reterritorialization. What needs to be explored in some detail. in the present case. but also 
9 Sun Ra perhaps embodies these ambivalences and uncertainties more than any other jan musician: pushing 
cross-over way beyond the point of commercial acceptability, Sun Ra combined many different $I) Ics ano 
performed usually with huge big-band line-ups including choir and orchestra as well as a highly ertaste 
range of instruments, acoustic and electronic, to produce the strangest musical affects, and The mythical 
universe that accompanied the music was one of interstellar space travel and the solar myth, 'AN%e histcoty 11 
also explored in the work of Jocelyn Godwin in relation to esoteric thought and Nazi suniralism. cf 
Godwin, Arktos, p. 155: 'Rend Guenon's [... J told of a very early Ilypcrhorcan culture which was fii«sj to 
leave the North and disperse into Asia and Europe, in much the same way as the "Aryan Race" is supposed to 
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in any case of the concept of immanent Utopia is whether it can ultimately work against 
the archaisms and the reterritorializations of capitalism or whether or not, as with the 
example of the war machine, the potential for an affirmation of utopia is always already 
anticipated and caught up in these tendencies. 
For example, if one takes the existential territories of electric Miles and the fusion or 
`fission'10 music of the 1970s and its mythic universe of Agharta, the phylic connections 
do not just cut across the musical assemblages of the past or the prospective ones of the 
future (P-funk, Hiphop, Drum n' Bass, etc. ) but connects with the territories and univcrses 
of black militancy during the 1960s and 1970s, for example the Nation of Islam and - if 
one accepts Attali's proposition regarding the embodiment in music of the potential for 
societal and cultural transformation - then the music of this period can be viewed as a 
diagramming of the connections across these various assemblages and their lines of flight. 
From this perspective, the invocation of Agharta. Pangaea and Gondwana point to the 
potential for a re-singularization of African-American subjectivity %hich. in its 
deployments of technology and of the dominant cultural production or rock and 
mainstream popular music attempts to make itself immanent to the movements of 
capitalism. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is philosophy that does this best of all: 
(Ijt is with utopia that philosophy becomes political and takes the criticism of its own 
time to its highest point. Utopia does not split off from Infinite momcmcnt: 
etymologically it stands for absolute dctertitorialization but always at the critical 
point at which it is connected with the present relative milieu. and especially With the 
forces stifled by this milieu. " 
have done (... J Gu6non writes of the corresponding transition from the i'rimcmlial ttaJiti; +n of Il)rrai 'tvi t< 
the Atlantcan tradition: a change from a fundamentally polar tradition to a solar one'. 
10 The name 'fission' is given to the electric jazz of Miles Davis and 
Tco Macem by KnJMo l: ihun. rf., Al ,e 
Brilliant than the Sun, p. 5. 
11 Dclcuzc and Guattari, What is Philosophy?. pp. 99.100. 
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However, given that it connects more broadly with the wider circuits of materiality and 
culture, experimental music along the lines of `electric' miles might point to its potential 
for activating a mythical fabulation that connects directly to tosound-matter and thereby 
produces a deterritorialized universe for which the 'people are missing'. and on the virtual 
horizon of which might be the potential for counter-actualizing the present in a gesture 
towards the untimely incarnation of abolutely deterritorialized subjectivities. or the people 
yet to come. 12 
Again, one both wonders whether the claim for philosophy is something that could be 
equally made of music such as that being discussed here and that its connective potential In 
some ways surpasses that of philosophy `proper' Either way, the present relative milieu 
here is that of a capitalist socius, itself profoundly capable of deterritorialization but. as 
was indicated towards the beginning of this project, this is only to the extent that it locks 
the movement into an axiomatic, or differential rclationality between labour and 
commodities. This is the other and perhaps more obvious major danger of any attempt to 
produce a diagram, as part of the relative milieu, of the utopian potential for subjective or 
societal transformation, whether this is attempted through philosophy or non-philosophy. 
In a way, as with so many things that have been encountered in this essay. It Is a problem 
that one render as a Spinozist question: is any attempt to survey a common notion always 
already thwarted by the privations of a society that is eminently more efficicnt In putting 
12 Ibid.. p. 108: '(W]c lack resistance to the present (... ) (Ajrt and philo sophy can crgc at this (tºint: the 
constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking in the cordate of creation'. 
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common notions in the service of these privations, consigning such attempts to the first 
kind of knowledge with its inadequate ideas and its minimal capacity to act? 
And what of the other lines that have been encountered, such as those of subjectification. 
or the passional line of abolition? This question returns us to the sleeve images of the 
electric period and the problem of faciality. As was noted before, the shift away from the 
use of photographic portraits, firstly of white women, then of black women and of Miles 
Davis himself, could possibly be regarded as marking a strategic shift away from the 
stratum of subjectification through the face-portrait as a form of expression that leads the 
viewer/listener towards privation, or interiority, serving to mark the 'identity' of the 
celebrity as a global person distinct from, and eminently superior to. the global person N ho 
looks at the image and unconsciously performs the identification. The images from the 
covers of Bitches Brew and Live-Evil are markedly different from their predecessors for the 
reasons mentioned above, but also because they arguably effect a de-facing or a 
deterritorialization of the face. 
It can be seen by observing these sleeve images that - through the expanded potential of 
painting and graphic illustration - the restrictions of the portrait-photo have Ixen 
challenged in a way that the face/landscape of formed content and expression has been 
deterritorialized such that it enters into a zone of indisccrnibility that enables a survey of 
the black-hole/white-wall system of faciality, challenging the redundancies of signification 
and the resonance of subjectification-subjection. The dctcrritorialized face-landscape could 
arguably be described as a visual composition that symptomatizcs a 'clinch' of forces 
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through which the face-landscape lines of the cover connect with a line of flight towards a 
becoming-other or becoming-minor where the order-word of white, male dominance is 
incorporeally transformed such that the assemblage and its interpellation is problematiud. 
and a trajectory is followed whereby the sensory affect of a more territorialized portrait- 
photo gives way to a problematic affect of faciality. 
All of this is arguable perhaps. But it can also be argued that the head that indisccrnibly 
enters into a relation with the sky does not constitute a probe-head'3 or anything of the son. 
but rather constitutes a reterritorialization of face/landscape traits that does little if 
anything to suspend the functioning of its abstract machine, and perhaps only provides the 
most vicarous reprieve from a more standardized 'celebrity' iconography that may do more 
to promote a fascination of a more dubiously fetishistic kind, especially on the part of the 
many non-African American, non jazz fans who bought this record in droves (including, it 
must be said, the owner of the copy used for the illustration in the present case). All this 
demonstrates the undecidability affecting the rclationality of the face, especially uhcn 
Deleuze and Guattari, and few users of their work have considered chat problem` a black 
face might cause both for the abstract machine of black hole/ºº"hite wall. the danger again 
being that there is a reversibility between the poles of the dyad that - rather than make of it 
a strategic dualism - turn it into a means of rendering redundant or o%-crcoding black 
subjectivity altogether so that the black holes and white walls of signifiance and 
subject ification effect a black face in the same way as they do a white one. %khich Is surely 
very problematic. 
13 'Probc-hcads' arc the cutting edges of deterritorialization effecting the abstract nixhinc of the fact. cf . 
Dclcuzc and Guattari. pp. 190-I. 
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It is time to return to that other aspect of Miles Davis's modus operandum during the 
1970s, and that is his altered stage-demeanour. With his growing audiences he started to 
play much bigger venues, often supporting rock outfits, and - with his greatly expanded 
band - he would stay on stage for the duration of his concerts and would often conduct the 
other musicians, using hand-gestures to tell them what to play. This in a way is not new, 
given that Davis - as was shown earlier - had always been verbally demanding of his 
musicians and would often seemingly play the Dozens to strategically avoid repetitions of 
the same or 'cliches'. During this period he would seem to do this in a much more 
theatrical way that doubtless contributed to the 'continental drift' of the enhanced 'live' 
performances such as those to be heard on Pangaea orAgharta arguably rendering 
sonorous the forces of the Cosmos, in a generalized `de-population', a line which would be 
followed without any concern for form, a drift which is sonorously very much in evidence. 
However, there is also the argument that the archaic territoriality of the Artist-hero has 
fallen back on (se rabat sur) the assemblage and overcoded it, with Davis's gestures now 
being less examples of a gestus that provokes or challenges such established territoriality 
so much as simply gestures without the same connection to the social, thereby supporting 
Brecht's contention that art strives as much as it can to avoid socializing the gesture. To 
the extent that it has can be found to have a connection to the social, it is more along the 
lines argued by Eugene Holland in his admittedly highly schematic but nevertheless useful 
distinction between the overcoding of the orchestra and the conductor and the 
'schizophrenia' of improvised jazz. 
The best concrete illustration of the process of schizophrenia I know of is 
improvisational jazz. Whenever references are made here (as in Anti-Oedipus) to 
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schizophrenia as the principle of freedom or the realization of universal history. 
readers should think of jazz, which represents a fulfilment of the process of 
schizophrenia [... ] Jazz musicians [... ] rarely use a score, and continually depart 
from well-known melodies in their improvised solos (... J (SJy-mphony orchcstns can 
only hope their performances rise to the genius of the composer w hose work they we 
performing: the hope their content lives up to the pre-existing phrase. In jazz. by 
contrast, the past enables rather than constrains the present: the improvised 
performance always exceeds the pre-existing musical composition of structure in 
complexity, nuance and originality: the whole point is that content go beyond the 
per 14 
As such, depopulation would be less the order of the day than an assertion of powcr. the 
suppleness of the linear connections barely holding together the drifting music becoming 
segmentalized in a way that reverts to an individual-collective relation that is more akin to 
the `Romantic' refrain of Deleuze and Guattari. rather than the Cosmic refrain of he dici. 
instruments that might otherwise be said to constitute 'electric Miles'. One coulJ do wont 
than recall an observation made by Elias Canctti regarding the orchestra Conductor 
[T]here is no more obvious expression of power than the performance of a 
conductor. Every detail of his public behaviour throws light on the nature of po cr. 
Someone who knew nothing about power could discover all its attributc. s. one after 
the other, by careful observation of a conductor I... Ile has the power of life and 
death over the voices of the instruments; one long silent will speak again at his 
command. Their diversity stands for the diversity of mankind. an orehcttra Is like an 
assemblage of different types of men. The willingness of his membcr: to obey him 
makes it possible for the conductor to transform them into a unit. %%hich he then 
embodies. 13 
There is a clear indication at this time that Davis is becoming more of a public 9, h10wtnxn. 
and that he is playing to the 'crowd', but rather than making a gcsturc a% a meant to 
frustrate or disrupt the investments constituting the audience's subjcctivities there is a ca .c 
for saying that he is now attempting to control them: 
tý Holland. Dcleuze and Cuatmri's Anti-Ocdipus. p. xi. 
Elias Canctti. Crowds and Power. trans. Carol Stcw"art dAmthi t and Southani (cun- Camcbul l'mi. 1962 . 
p. 395-6. 
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The immobility of the audience is as much part of the conductor's design as the 
obedience of the orchestra. They are under a compulsion to keep still [... ] Victory 
and defeat become the framework within which his spiritual economy is ordered. 
Apart from these nothing counts; everything that the lives of other men contain is for 
him transformed into victory or defeat. 16 
Whilst Davis was always concerned about success, it had never been at the cost of making 
the `mistake' as a improvising composer who would insist on launching forth into 
experiment and the demands made of the other musicians were executed most often, 
though not always, to produce unconventional music. The music of the electric period is 
some of the most heavily improvised, `free' music that Davis ever worked on, close in 
some ways to the `free jazz' of Omette Coleman, but one has to wonder whether his stage 
demeanour was any longer the calculated controversial or vulgar gesture, or rather instead 
an oppressed or oppressing embodiment of power, thus patching the lines of flight 
transforming territory and universe into the segmentarity of power. This also has to remain 
open as a problem without resolution, given that the music being produced and 
`conducted' by Davis's hand was about as far removed from that of `dead Masters' as 
music is ever likely to get, and there remains the possibility that this is just another 
example of Signifyin(g) or playing the Dozens. 
The ambiguity of the gesture during this time is maximal in its relation to Capitalism and 
the `spectacle'. The problem of celebrity as part of the restricted milieu of Capitalism begs 
the question of how capable artists might be of resisting capture. By the time of the 1970s 
this had doubtless become more difficult than at any point prior in modern Capitalist 
history as the axiomatic relationality between social machines, technical machines and 
16 Ibid. 
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desiring-machines had become more `cynical', insidious and enslaving than it had at any 
time previously. When one looks back to the modal phase and Kind of Blue, one can see 
how deftly Davis negotiated popularity and success with innovation in a way that - whilst 
the line of flight of modal jazz was perhaps predestined to capture by Capitalism and its 
machinery of archaic reterritorialization, it is eminently more uncertain to what extent he 
achieved this during the electric period. His altered stage demeanour seemed more in 
keeping with the `star' persona than previously, and - it should not be forgotten that rock 
music has by this stage succeeded greatly in turning controversy into a commodity - and 
the challenge was therefore much greater. Christopher Small captures the ambiguity well, 
with specific reference to Davis: 
In each generation there is a handful of artists, such as Miles Davis, David Bowie 
and the pack joker Malcolm McClaren, who manage (or are given permission? ) to 
avoid typing and becoming trapped in an image - if, indeed, their shape-shifting does 
not become, as Bowie's seems sometimes in danger of doing, an image in itself and 
marketed as such. '7 
As Guy Debord suggests, the spectacle tends towards an increasing ubiquity, and the star 
system functions in order to render art and artists impotent as their potential is subsumed 
by the systematic banalization of their social function. To quote Small again, 
The star system, in fact, completely dominates the arts of western industrial societies; 
it functions effectively to distance the majority of people from their own creativity 
by using talented people to act out fantasies of creativity, as well as of 'power and 
vacations'. The star, in fact, as Debord suggest, is chosen to do the living on behalf 
of his or her fans. The image of success is as shallow as the whole business is 
fraudulent; the star's life, simply by reason of his or her stardom, is in its own way as 
narrow, as confined and anxiety-ridden as that of any fan. To turn a musician into a 
star is thus to defuse any challenge his or her musicking may pose to conventional 
values [... ]18 
17 Small, Music of the Common Tongue, p. 415. 
18 Ibid., p. 414. 
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This would then reinforce the claim made using the sleeve images that the music and its 
accompanying sleeve `art' has become banal, evacuated of any potential to generate an 
incorporeal transformation and that it has fallen into the service of a privation whose 
production of surplus value of flux-code serves to reproduce subjectivities that are 
completely cut off from their capacity to act. The achievements of African-American 
musicking, and the rhythms of subjectivation it sets in motion, it would seem, are in no 
way resistant to the banalizing effects of the star system and the spectacle. In 1986. the 
same year as he appeared in an episode of Miami Vice, Miles Davis made a commercial for 
the car manufacturer Honda: 
[T]hat one commercial got me more recognition than anything else I have ever 
done. 19 
As was stated in the last chapter, Deleuze and Guattari themselves became aware of this 
problem and attempted to address it in What is Philosophy?. In fact. this book in many 
ways sets itself up as manifesto for re-appropriating concept creation from advertising 
companies. The extent to which philosophy, for all the potential that they might afford it to 
survey best the immanence that provides the immobile motor of 'Integrated World 
Capitalism' is perhaps the most pressing of all the questions facing its place in the world, 
both inside and outside of academia, and a philosophical pragmatics that implores those 
who encounter it to 'do it', might find that the tensor-sign marking the most effective 
deterritorializations to have resulted from such a slogan arc not the ones that fell from the 
pens of Deleuze and Guattari. 
Davis and Troupe, bfiles: The Autobiography, p. 366. 
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In 1975 Miles Davis's disintegrating body and subjectivity that had made so many break- 
throughs finally broke-down. He returned to music in 1980, with his trumpet and Harmon 
mute. The sensory affects of `intimacy', `indigo' and `seduction' eventually also returned, 
but by this time the problematic affects were being more effectively rendered using another 
disintegrating body: Ronald Reagan's. In 1996 a book was published theorizing business 
practices in the age of `Performance Management'. Its title: Jamming, The Art and 
Discipline of Business Creativity, and its model: `the discursive riffs taken from 
improvisational jazz music'. 
If This Is Your Tune, There May Be Several Ways to Play It 
Deleuze's [... ] death by suicide describes a macabre parallel to the fate he foretells for all 
desiring-machines [... J. If we are to honour this final will and testament, then we must 
resist the desire to fetishize him, and we must set out to investigate the difference produced 
through the repetition of his life and his death. 
Daniel W. Conway" 
In his `Foreword' to A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi draws a stratigraphic parallel 
between the book itself and a record in order to ask the question: `[H]ow should A 
Thousand Plateaus be played? ', and this is a question which is not limited to the book 
itself, as it can opened out to ask more general questions about the philosophy of Deleuze 
and Guattari and the to ask also whether the stratigraphy of non-philosophy needs 
philosophy or theory to stratoanalyze it. Keeping with Massumi's parallel, it would seem 
that - if A Thousand Plateaus is equivalent to a record - there are several ways 
in which to 
play it. As such, in attempting to address the foregoing questions at the same time as 
drawing together the results of this project, it seems appropriate to expand on Massumi's 
20 Daniel W. Conway, 'Tumbling Dice: Gilles Deleuze and the Economy of Repetition', in Anscll Pearson 
[ed. ], Deleuze and Philosophy, pp. 88-9. 
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parallel to try and discern the ways in which it has hitherto been played and the ways in 
which it might be played in the future. 
At the outset of this project, it was shown that Deleuze and Guattari perceive their 
procedure as one of `pick-up', or `cut-up'. To draw another stratigraphic parallel, one 
might say that this procedure is a form of `sampling', in which inscriptions of a material 
surface are manipulated to generate transformation both audibly and incorporeally by 
placing the fragments of strata that have been sampled in a new, more de-stratified relation 
to one another. This method, one of bricolage and rigorous anexactitude, takes its 
fragments from the strata formed as `disciplines' and re-combines them in a way that is 
intra-disciplinary. In What is Philosophy? these various fragments are given names which 
make them specific to their disciplines but make them capable of a deterritorialization: 
functives, prospects, percepts and affects, that enables them to be lifted from their more 
usual planes of inscription: science, logic and art, in order to place them on a plane of 
consistency that puts them to philosophical use. 
Another way that it might be played is like a synthesizer, patching different lines into one 
another in order to maximize connectability and continuous variation, and one that - 
philosophically speaking - seeks to minimize presupposition at the same time as enabling a 
survey of the immanent complexity of material and semiotic processes. This synthesizer 
hereby functions as an `abstract-machine' of thought, a challenge to the epistemologically 
grounded assertion of a transcendental apperceiving subject towards a subjectivity created 
and modulated through a knowledge-practice that is transcendental, with immanent criteria 
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and which deals with the conditions of existence rather than ahistorical possibility. Using 
this thought-synthesizer to survey immanent complexity in this way in principle at least 
makes it a means for producing a diagrammatic map that is `immanent to the territory'. 
The inscriptions by and of a composite human body are not separate from these surfaces of 
inscription or their incorporeal transformations, but both effect and are affected, materially 
and semiotically, by participation in the connections and variations that are taking place. 
The subjectivity that accompanies the body that listens to the record or reads the book is, 
on this account, not something separate, but something that is created in the very process 
of the listening. This process is that of the refrain: where it pertains to music, there can be 
greater or smaller refrains, wide or narrow latitude for affective increase; as it pertains to 
philosophy, it becomes the end of philosophy itself: to produce a hyper-complex refrain 
which makes of thought-synthesis and knowledge-practice an ethics. In plotting a 
transversal line between philosophical thought-synthesis and non-philosophical musicking, 
combining listening, performing, composing and producing, amongst other aspects, 
philosophy is producing a more-or-less complex refrain whose success is indexed to an 
increase in or otherwise of ethical capacity. This task, in the language of Spinoza, is one of 
accessing the `common notion'. Music, for its part, is potentially capable of producing its 
own diagrammatic procedures, its own diagonal line that allows a glimpse of the processes 
constituting it. If music does this, then it enters into a zone of indiscernibility with 
philosophy and may have the potential to create concepts: musicking as knowledge- 
practice. Whether listening, performing, producing or composing, or any of these in 
combination, music may thereby have the capacity to disorient the relation between the 
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faculties of Reason and their privations, by taking them along a line of flight and thereby 
connecting them with a field of exteriority, or an outside (of) thought: the strategy of a war 
machine. This would be to hazard an improvisation, or launch forth into a refrain, capable 
of deterritorializing itself to an increasingly higher power and in doing so enabling the 
double-articulations of strata, formed contents and expressions, to be surveyed in their 
relationality: de-stratification. Musicking bodies might thereby be capable of overcoming 
the order-word of the social dispositif and creating the pass-word of its dis-positioning, 
effecting an incorporeal transformation of their relations and a challenge to the privations 
of their investments as separate from one another: music as transversality. To the extent 
that philosophy hazards an improvisation, one might call this an `uncoordinated leap'. 
None of this is ultimately given. It might have been shown to be possible, but there are 
many things that in principle or in fact that pose an obstacle to realization. To take samples 
from different disciplines, a procedure of bricolage, has a number of its own risks and 
dangers. Firstly, there is the risk that it is used without sufficient rigour and without the 
necessary anexactitude, and that as a result it approximates an exercise in dilettantism 
more than one of philosophical thought and action. Such a making do is in danger of 
getting overly-happy with banality and, rather than enter into a becoming-child of the 
philosopher, substitutes an infantilism, a fetishism of ideas whereby the investmcntis 
constituted by the seduction of nomenclature. 
The same risks go for playing philosophy and non-philosophy like a thought-synthesizer. 
Patching different lines, trajectories and orientations together without sufficient sobriety 
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will `scramble' or `efface all the lines', a danger that Deleuze and Guattari ironically fall 
prey to in their choice of John Cage's prepared piano pieces to illustrate this very danger. 
As such, thought-synthesis gives way to theoretical noodling. Again this is a fetishism, a 
`cult of the machine', as Adorno would call it, and one whose conceptual persona becomes 
the radio-ham, caught within their privated subjectivity and only imagining that they are 
connecting to the social fabric, when really they remain caught within the confines of 
territoriality, or of the domicile, vicarously tweaking their milieu components. One 
wonders whether the Richard Lindner illustration21 at the opening of Anti-Oedipus was a 
wise choice, and it certainly has not done much to dispel the accusations of techno- 
fetishism. 
The relation between philosophy and non-philosophy itself remains both problematic and 
contentious. Badiou's contention that the concept does not need a case has been shown to 
be somewhat limited. His refusal to address the collaborative works of Deleuze and 
Guattari is in part to miss the contribution that Guattari made to taking philosophical 
pragmatics beyond the confines of the academic institution, into psychiatry and politics, 
where analytic, artistic and political machines combine their potential. This goes some way 
to diffusing the accusation of aristocratic asceticism that Badiou levels at Deleuze, at the 
same time as demonstrating, through a conceptual development such as transversality, that 
there are very real effects that cut across the virtual and the actual, and do not just leave 
philosophers trapped within the simulacra of Univocal being. The stoicism of Deleuze in 
the Logic of Sense, is one that very much involves the incorporeal transformation that 
inscribes bodies, generates sense, but also enables events to be extracted from those 
2' Richard Lindner, Boy With Machine, cover insert to Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. 
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bodies. However, this stoicism brings with a danger that does approximate it to an 
asceticism of a kind that challenges its claim on any political potential and also has the 
great danger of rendering its ethical orientation one that is bound up with resignation and 
with the violence of appropriation. This is the primary danger of a philosophy of the event 
or one of becoming. 
This danger is also one that potentially bears out Badiou's claim that there in fact is no 
One-all that connects virtual multiplicities to a single plane of Univocal being. It is one 
that is implicit in the limited success of the cases, both in this project and arguably in a 
project such as A Thousand Plateaus, of embellishing philosophical concepts in a way that 
risks endorsing Badiou's contention that the case thereby serves to proliferate simulacra 
which might connect one concept to another but does not connect philosophy to its cases 
so much as to efface or appropriate them. Such appropriation would place the case in the 
service of the concept distorting the former in a way that makes it subservient to the 
concept. This is a problem starkly borne out by the encounters in this project with 
becoming-woman and becoming-black, where the violence of the case does not 
transversally connect philosophy to non-philosophy so much as to provide an allegory for 
the violence of philosophical appropriation whereby philosophy, as the preserve of a white, 
educated and mostly male elite, seeks inadvertently to consolidate its status by laying 
illegitimate claim to a becoming, whether a becoming-black or -woman of a white, male 
(molar Man), or whether the becoming-black or -woman of black people and women, 
equating molar manhood with any minoritarian subjectivity that refuses to let go of its 
claim to autonomy or independence, even if this itself is strategic. 
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In order to try and overcome this problem, a more thoroughgoing Spinozist ethical physics 
of the body would be of considerable value, and the negotiation of the molar and the 
molecular needs to be carefully undertaken to insure that, strategically, the relationality of 
bodies of different sex- and gender- orientation are respected in their status as global 
persons and that an attempt is made to plot a transversal line between and across different 
conceptions of subjectivity and even identity in a way that does not wink out any process 
lines, but rather attempts to connects them, in the search for a common-notion that 
increases the capacity to act of as many (human) bodies as is possible, an ethical and 
strategic move because it would increase those bodies' capacity - not just to act - but to 
persist in acting without so easily falling prey to privation, to appropriation or violence. 
Additionally it seems that a Spinozist-Deleuzian ontology might itself be part of the 
problem, because in positing the primacy of heterogeneous materiality as the ontological 
non-basis of thought might - immantizing the relation between nature and culture - might 
serve to exacerbate appropriation and violence (consider the political leanings of the 
ethologists), such that, for example, the concept of the war machine which - on the face of 
its is extremely interesting, creative and full of affirmative potential - actually does more to 
level political potential by having it perpetually follow a matter-flow that ends up sending 
constitutive difference, of race and gender in particular, on a proverbial wild-goose chase. 
This concern echoes that of Howard Caygill in relation to Deleuze's attempt to synthesize 
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biology and philosophy which he views as in danger of constituting 'a sentimentalized 
nature and a brutalizated ethics and politics'. 2 
So what of the privation or otherwise of the 'intellectual' who ventures a survey of 
immanence from within the order-word assemblage of academia? What scope is there for a 
dis-positioning of investment here, the generation of pass-words rather than order-words, 
of a problematization of knowledge and thought with prctcntions to an ethical 
apprenticeship? What this project has perhaps shown clearly if nothing else is that there is 
a degree of scope for launching forth towards the world or the outside, or for making an 
uncoordinated leap in thought that has a limited degree of creative latitude. If this is 
comparable to the jazz practices and innovations that have been considered, the territory 
and milieus components of institutional knowledge-production have the scope for 
producing limited variations on a theme. whether in philosophy or in cultural studies, a 
refrain that is perhaps less deterritorialized than more so. The reasons for this, anticipated 
in the introduction to the project are doubtless due to the requirements of academic 
production to maintain a relation to 'good sense'. to call upon the methods of 
interpretation, analysis and exposition that - as with their use by musicologists and music 
writers - inevitably place constraints upon their 'object' and must do so if a coherent 
argument is to be produced. The procedure at work here was an attempt to negotiate the 
relation between these molar constraints and the molecular undercurrents or chromatic 
underside in a way that combines a more conventional analytic approach with one that Is 
more synthetic than analytic in the restricted sense, using the theoretical resources and a 
22 Howard Caygill. Topologies of Selection: The Limits of Dclcuzc's I3io-Philosophy'. In Pcarson (cd. j. 
Dekuze and Philosophv. p. 161. 
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case-study in such a way that 'passage precedes position'. Brian Massumi, who coined this 
expression, has made very effective use of this as we have seen and, following Braidotti's 
observations regarding his approach, there is indeed a degree of scope for a more 
affirmative relation to academic knowledge production that is not so beholden to 'dead 
masters'. A full-blown experimental and pragmatic construction of the case as deployed by 
the Massumi would not have realistically been possible here as it would always have been 
necessary to lay a groundwork that might enable such construction, a groundwork which in 
the end constituted the bulk of the project. To venture straight into such an experiment 
would be to depart too greatly from the requirements of an academic order-word 
assemblage. The problems of Deleuze, Guattari and Miles Davis outlined in this cssay may 
not have found the creative solutions that these names would warrant to the extent that the 
`archaisms' of interpretation and explanation remain factors. something that all three 
would denounce as restrictive and even perhaps despotic, but it has been pursued 
throughout with a mind to promoting irresolution, with a mind to taking these ideas along 
new lines and trajectories in the future. 
lain Hamilton Grant, one of the more 'Nictzschcan' rcader of Dclcuzc and Guattari wcnt 
so far as to denounce Massumi's appeal to 'schizoanalysis' as too analytic, academic and 
safe, a sanitized rendering of proccssuality that indcxcs Dclcuzc and Guattari to the 
policing mechanisms of academic production in a way that reflects what he considers to be 
their own hypocrisy in attempting to negotiate the molar and the molecular. " For Grant, 
there is ultimately just machinism, independent of any life-forms, including the human. a 
2' lain Hamilton Grant, 'At the Mountains of Madness': The Demonology of the New Earth and the Politics 
of Becoming', in ibid.. p. 1 I1 n2. 
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matter-flow that has need of nothing and therefore any attempt to follow it in a way that 
ethically or politically enhances organic life, in particular that of the human. To try and 
have your molecular cake and eat it as part of a statistical aggregate is not an option 
according to Grant. So does this render the work of Massumi and the attempt undertaken 
here to be hypocritical and worthless? 
The cold, geological time of an anarcho-materialist approach to Dclcuze and Guattari may 
rescue them from this danger, but such 'post-human' renderings of their work, taken to the 
letter, would seemingly only add to the privations of thought and action such that one 
perhaps ends up making a quantum leap between the first kind of Spinozist knowledge and 
the third, which Spinoza's work seems to preclude as a possibility. It also seems to go 
hand-in-hand with postmodern apathy about the possibility of ethical or political change. 
Furthermore, whilst the banalization of thought and action that poses such a threat to this 
kind of philosophy risks making its haccceities24, its speeds and slowncsscs2s tortuously 
redundant at the behest of Capitalisms 'dromologicali26 superiority is a possibly the 
greatest one facing the work, it is hard to sec how waiting for the Body of Capital to hit the 
zero degree of its Body without Organs does anything other than promote violence, 
'hastening the desiring-machines towards their end'. A return to 'humanism' through 
Dcleuzc and Guattari, an option suggested implicitly by Guattari in Chaosinos! s and 
explicitly by Hardt and Negri in Empire, is perhaps not the best way to go either. Keith 
2' Ilaccccity' is a term derived by Dclcuzc and Guattari from the philosophy of Duns Scotus. and describes 
the 'this-ncss' of a given mode of individuation. cf. A Thousand Plateaus. p. 261: 'f Tjhcrc is a mode of 
indivuation very different from that of a person. suhjccl. thing or substance. We reserve the name haccccity 
for it. A season, a winter, a summer. an hour. a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing. even though 
this individuality is different from that of a thing or subject'. 
2' On speeds and slowness as distinct from faster and slower, cf., ibid., p. 56. 
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Ansell Pearson in his readings of Nietzsche and Deleuze provides perhaps the most sober 
and pragmatic suggestion: not post-humanism nor humanism, but the transhuman, or a 
perpetual self-overcoming which enhances this life, this world, and those who inhabit it. 
To invoke Spinoza one final time, perhaps it is by seeking a common notion - and not 
necessarily one that is grounded in a materialist ontology of process - that the human can 
increase its capacity to act, making ever-greater connections in a way that does not wink 
out process lines, but that connects them, in a way that strengthens the relationality 
between bodies, thought and action, with a mind to collectively taking this further. Perhaps 
this is beyond the scope of academia after all, or restricts it to one amongst many sites of 
mediation. Guattari's work in particular might in this regard provide so many rich 
possibilities for the future. Certainly, in asking 'why Dcleuze and Guattari? ', cultural 
studies is - in principle at least - in a strong position to take their work forward. Sure, it 
may have to throw in its lot with those who are not willing to sacrifice all to Nictzschcan 
posthumanism, and may have thereby compromised the Intensity of Deleuze-Guattarian 
thought, but perhaps this is the price that has to be paid to rescue their work from 'hasty' 
readers who are unquestioning of the value of their concepts and their procedures. In 
asking 'how? ', one can continue to develop their pragmatics along new lines, responding 
to the objections of more astute criticisms from the likes of ßadiou and to a lesser extent 
I lards and Negri in order to make such a pragmatics more rigorous and less 'angelic' or 
incorporeal. This is maybe a task more for philosophy than cultural studies. I lowever, in 
combining the why and the how of Dclcuze and Guattari, there may be a way of taking 
their work forward that reduces the risk of hasty theoretical noodling and (tcchno)fctishisnt 
26 A term derived from the work of Paul Virilio. a method deployed by Virilio and derived from the Greek 
word 'dromos'. meaning 'a race'. cf.. Dcr Dorian lcd. l. 'Introduction'. The %7rilio Reader. p. 6. 
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at the same time as dispelling the no-less hasty blanket dismissals of so many of their 
detractors, with a mind to opening up transversal lines of connection. Whether the thought 
of Deleuze and Guattari can help us to achieve this, or whether banality destines it to 
inevitable reterritorialization stopping its progress remains an open question. All that 
remains for now is to embrace its irresolution. 
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